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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1. Background to the study 
 
It is rare in law and in other disciplines for a word or a phrase to appear to 
mean what it does not. This is, however, true when it comes to life 
imprisonment or life sentence.1 Unlike sentences like the death penalty, 
there have been instances where even those who are expected to know the 
meaning of the sentence of life imprisonment have misunderstood it.2 This 
misunderstanding is compounded by the fact that even dictionaries that 
have always helped us to understand the meaning of the words are of little 
help when it comes to the definition of life imprisonment. The Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, for example, defines life sentence to mean 
‘the punishment by which [some body] spends the rest of their life in 
prison.’3 It goes ahead to define a ‘lifer’ as ‘a person who has been sent to 
prison for their whole life.’4 
The ambiguity of life imprisonment could partly explain why the campaign 
to abolish the death penalty and substitute it with life imprisonment has 
been successful in many parts of the world. When people are given the 
option to choose between the death penalty and life-imprisonment, many 
                                                            
1 The words ‘life imprisonment’ and ‘life sentence’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
2 It has been argued that the misunderstanding of the meaning of life imprisonment led to 
the jurors in the United States to impose a death penalty in a situation where they would 
have done otherwise. See Marder 2006: 457-458.    
3 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2005: 853. (Emphasis mine). 
4 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2005: 853. (Emphasis mine). 
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would oppose the former and favour the latter for various reasons.5 This is 
because, inter alia, many people think that an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment will be detained for the rest of his natural life. This is of 
course not true in some cases, and, as Lord Mustil held,     
[t]he sentence of life imprisonment is also unique in that the words, which 
the judge is required to pronounce, do not mean what they say. Whilst in a 
very small minority of cases the prisoner is in the event confined for the 
rest of his natural life, this is not the usual or intended effect of a sentence 
of life imprisonment … But although everyone knows what the words do 
not mean, nobody knows what they do mean, since the duration of the 
prisoner’s detention depends on a series of recommendations … and 
executive decisions …6  
 
The two tribunals that were established after the World War III, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, the Tokyo Tribunal, were empowered to impose the death penalty and 
indeed, as will be discussed later in detail, some offenders were sentenced 
to death.7 Although these tribunals were not expressly empowered to 
sentence offenders to life imprisonment, they did sentence some of the 
offenders to life imprisonment. However, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) all 
have jurisdiction to sentence offenders to life imprisonment.8 At the time of 
writing, the ICC had not completed any case and therefore had no 
                                                            
5 McCord 1998: 11-16, outlines the common 21 reasons why various people oppose capital 
punishment.              
6 R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Doody [1994: 549H-550B) as quoted in Van Zyl Smit 
2002: 2-3. 
7 Chapter III, 3.1 and 3.2. 
8 Chapter III, 3.3.1, 3.4.1, and 3.6.  
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jurisprudence on life imprisonment.9 The ICTR has sentenced more 
offenders to life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of their 
lives than the ICTY. This thesis reviews cases on life imprisonment in 
international criminal tribunals in order to examine the theories of 
punishment that these tribunals considered in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment.  There are cases where the ICTR has sentenced offenders to 
imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives. From a human rights 
perspective the thesis argues that imprisonment for the remainder of the 
offender’s natural life is inhuman punishment. The statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC provide for circumstances where an offender sentenced by 
any of those tribunals could be released before the completion of his or her 
sentence. It is on that basis that it is argued that even offenders sentenced to 
imprisonment for the remainder of their lives by the ICTR could be 
released.  
At the national level, the study focuses on three countries of South Africa, 
Mauritius and Uganda. The first reason for comparing the practice and law 
relating to life imprisonment in these three countries is that the author 
would like to investigate whether life imprisonment is approached 
differently in countries where the death penalty was abolished (Mauritius 
and South Africa) and in Uganda where the death penalty is still imposed. 
Secondly, Mauritius and South Africa both of which abolished the death 
penaly were chosen for this study for the author to illustrate that countries 
can take different approaches to the abolition of the death penalty and that 
                                                            
9 For information on the number of accused before the ICC and the indictments issued, see 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (accessed 8 March 2009). 
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those different approaches could also impact on the sentence of life 
imprisonment differently. South Africa abolished the death penalty in 1995 
after the Constitutional Court held that it was unconstitutional for being a 
cruel, inhuman and degrading. The government then enacted a law, the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act,10 to give effect to the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling. Since the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa, 
there have been different changes regarding the sentence of life 
imprisonment. This study highlights those changes and the relevant legal 
developments that accompanied those changes in South Africa.  
The study also discusses the manner in which courts in South Africa dealt 
with the sentence of life imprisonment prior to and after the abolition of the 
death penalty. In Mauritius, the death penalty was abolished in 1995 when 
Parliament passed a law to that effect. Since then, there have been several 
changes in law and practice relating to the sentence of life imprisonment. 
These developments are discussed in detail in this study. In Uganda, the 
death penalty still exists. However, there have been calls that it be 
abolished and be substituted with life imprisonment ‘until death.’ This 
study discusses the legal developments relating to the death penalty and the 
calls for its abolition. The thesis highlights the challenges associated with 
life imprisonment ‘until death.’  
 
2. Statement of the problem 
 
There can be little doubt about the importance of the sentence of life 
imprisonment in the modern penal systems. In most countries that have 
abolished the death penalty it is the most severe sanction at the disposal of 
                                                            
10 Act 105 of 1997. 
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the state. Yet …while there have been major studies on almost every 
aspect of penal policy, there has been very little analysis of the ideas 
underpinning life sentences…in the English speaking world at least, “no 
comprehensive attempt  has …been made to address the penological, 
moral, legal and constitutional issues raised by life imprisonment.”11 
The above observation applies with equal force to the sentence of life 
imprisonment before international criminal tribunals as well as in 
Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Life imprisonment has different 
meanings in Uganda, South Africa and Mauritius. This study discusses the 
different meanings of life imprisonment in the above three jurisdictions. 
Practice from both international criminal tribunals and national 
jurisdictions indicates that life imprisonment has been seen as the 
appropriate substitute for the death penalty in cases where offenders have 
been convicted of heinous offences. Although books have been written on 
sentencing and punishment before international criminal tribunals, none of 
them deals in detail with the question of how the international tribunals 
have applied theories of punishment in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment.12 Therefore, there is a need for a detailed discussion of the 
law and practice relating to life imprisonment so that one understands the 
salient features of the most severe penalty that could be imposed in 
international criminal law. The author is also not aware of any book or 
article that examines in detail the sentence of life imprisonment in South 
Africa,13 Mauritius, and Uganda. In particular, the author is not aware of 
                                                            
11 Sheleff 1987: 17. As quoted in Van Zyl Smit 2002: 1.   
12 See for example, Cassese 2008; Schabas 2006; Kittichaisaree 2008; Bantakes and Nash 
2007; Beigbeder 1999; Morris and Scharf 1995: (Vol.2); Fischer et al 2004; and 
McGoldrick 2004. 
13 Although life imprisonment is dealt with briefly in Terblanche 2007: 232 – 236; Joubert 
(ed) 2007: 290 – 291; and du Toit et al 2007: Chapter 28, 28 – 18D-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
any study addressing the following issues in detail relating to life 
imprisonment: the history of life imprisonment, offences that carry life 
imprisonment, the major legal developments relating to life imprisonment, 
the jurisdiction and discretion of courts in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment, the legal representation for offenders charged with offences 
that carry life imprisonment, the theories of punishment that courts have 
emphasised in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment, and the law and 
procedure governing the release of prisoners sentenced to life 
imprisonment. This research examines all the above aspects. 
 
3. Aims of the study 
 
The study has three major aims: 
1. To give a detailed discussion of the question of punishment and the 
three major theories or objectives of punishment – retribution, 
deterrence and rehabilitation, from a philosophical point of view; 
2. To discuss the law and jurisprudence relating to life imprisonment 
in the international criminal tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo, the 
Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, International Criminal Court and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The emphasis will be on the 
theories of punishment these tribunals have stressed in sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment; 
3. To discuss the history and major legal developments relating to life 
imprisonment in three African countries, viz, Mauritius, South 
Africa and Uganda. The study will also discuss: the offences that 
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carry life imprisonment; the courts with jurisdiction to impose life 
imprisonment; legal representation for accused facing life 
imprisonment on conviction; the theories of punishment that courts 
have emphasised in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment; and 
the law and mechanisms governing the release of offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment in the above three countries. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Two research methodologies were employed to conduct this study: 
informal interviews/discussions and desk research. Informal interviews 
were conducted in Uganda with 14 offenders serving life imprisonment at 
Luzira Maximum Security Prison in January 2008 (when the author visited 
the prison). The aims of the interview were to find out what the offenders 
understood by the sentence of life imprisonment; whether they received 
legal representation during their trial; and whether they had appealed 
against their respective sentences. Face-to-face and telephonic 
interviews/dicussions were also conducted or held with senior Uganda 
Prisons Services officials in order to clarify various issues relating to the 
sentence of life imprisonment. The date and means of the 
interviews/discussions appear in the relevant footnotes of this study. 
Informal discussions were also held with judges and former judges, 
prosecutors and defence lawyers of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court at a seminar on international 
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criminal law in Africa.14 The author was particularly interested in knowing 
the difference the the judges and prosecutors especially those of them from 
the ICTR, attached to the sentence of life imprisonment on the one hand, 
and imprisonment for the remainder of the offenders’ natural life on the 
other hand.  
This research was substantially desk-based. The author analysed the law, 
jurisprudence and literature on life imprisonment in international criminal 
tribunals and the selected three countries.15 Given the fact that this thesis 
attempts to clarify how the tribunals and the courts have approached the 
sentence of life imprisonment, a substantial part of this thesis analyses 
legislation and case law on life imprisonment. 
    
5. Limitation of the study 
 
The study of case law on life imprisonment in South Africa was a big 
challenge in the sense that at the time of writing there were over 8,000 
offenders serving life sentences. It was thus practically impossible for the 
author to review all the cases. For the analysis of the theories of 
punishment that courts emphasise in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment, the author reviewed all the cases reported in the South 
African Criminal Law Reports and South African Law Reports on life 
imprisonment between 1995 (immediately after the abolition of the death 
                                                            
14 The seminar titled ‘Developments in International Criminal Justice in Africa’, was 
organised by the Institute for Security Studies and took place in Cape Town (19 – 20 
March 2008, Villa Via Hotel, Gordon’s Bay). The author attended the seminar.  
15 Some of the sections in this study are based on the author’s published work in the 
African Human Rights Law Journal (2008); South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
(2008 and 2009); and African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law (2007). The 
author is grateful to Juta Publishers for permitting him to reproduce those articles in this 
study. 
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penalty) and January 2009. At the time of writing, there were 43 offenders 
serving a life sentence in Uganda. The author was unable to obtain all the 
43 judgments because most of the offenders had been sentenced by courts 
located hundred of kilometres away from the capital city where the author 
conducted the research. The author was able to get only 23 judgments, most 
of which were in the Court of Appeal Criminal Registry. The majority of 
the cases were also unreported.  The bulk of the cases on life imprisonment 
in Mauritius were available on the Supreme Court of Mauritius online 
library in electronic format. The author was unable to gain access the law 
reports for reported cases. The discussion of Röder’s views on 
rehabilitation is based on secondary sources because the author was unable 
to gain access to the primary sources, which are in German, a language the 
author does not understand.  
 
6. Outline of the study 
 
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I is the introduction and 
covers the following issues: background to the study, statement of the 
problem, aims of the study, methodology, limitations of the study and 
outline of chapters. Chapter II focuses on the discussion of punishment 
from a philosophical perspective. The author relies on European 
philosophers to discuss the question of punishment because it is still 
disputable whether or not one can refer to an African philosophy. The 
definition of punishment is given and the three major objectives of 
punishment – deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution are discussed in 
detail. The merits and demerits of each of these three objectives of 
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punishment are also highlighted. Chapter III deals with life imprisonment 
before the international criminal tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTY, the 
ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leona and the ICC. Two issues are 
focused on: the law relating to life imprisonment and the theories of 
punishment that these tribunals have emphasised in sentencing offenders to 
life imprisonment. 
Chapter IV discusses in detail the major legal developments relating to the 
sentence of life imprisonment in Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. This 
chapter also highlights the relationship between the death penalty and life 
imprisonment. Chapter V deals with: offences that carry life imprisonment; 
courts with jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment; the discretion of 
courts in imposing life imprisonment; legal representation for accused 
facing life imprisonment on conviction; and the theories of punishment that 
courts have emphasised in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment in 
Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Chapter VI examines the law and 
mechanisms that govern the release of offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment in Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Although each 
chapter, where necessary, includes inbuilt recommendations, Chapter VII 
draws the general conclusion and brings together all the major 
recommendations made in the study.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
APPRAISING PUNISHMENT FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
2. Introduction 
 
It is impossible to trace the origin of punishment. It appears to be a well 
developed social institution in the most primitive societies and at the dawn 
of known history. Much speculation has been made as to its origin, but in 
the main rather narrow definitions have tended to justify special concepts.16  
 
This chapter deals with the philosophical arguments that underpin the issue 
of punishment. I illustrate that although some philosophers have indicated 
that there is an African philosophy, there are those who argue that there is 
no African philosophy. It shows that the issue of punishment has not been 
sufficiently dealt with by African philosophers and this is the reason why I 
rely on Western philosophers to discuss the three theories of punishment: 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. I point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of each theory without necessarily taking a position on which 
to be adopted when one is dealing with the question of life imprisonment. 
This chapter forms the background to a detailed discussion of how 
international criminal tribunals and international human rights bodies have 
looked at the theories of punishment in relation to life imprisonment. I also 
deal with the philosophical definitions of punishment. 
 
 
                                                            
16 Stearns 1936: 219. 
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2.1. ‘African philosophy’ and punishment 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the highly contested meaning 
or definition of philosophy,17 but suffice it to say at the outset that western 
philosophy, which forms a substantial part of the discussion of philosophy 
and punishment in this thesis, was born over twenty-five centuries ago in 
the commercial cities of ancient Greece.18 The word ‘philosophy’ in this 
thesis is understood as the ideas that were put forward by thinkers, who 
either regarded themselves as philosophers, or who were regarded by other 
people, whether philosophers or not, as philosophers. The reader might ask, 
and rightly so, why I should put more emphasis on Western philosophy to 
discuss the concept of punishment, when this thesis is substantially 
concerned with life imprisonment as a form of punishment in African 
countries. 
                                                            
17 Philosophers disagree on the definition of philosophy and this has been one of the 
reasons why some have argued that African philosophy is not philosophy. It has been 
observed that ‘…the question “What is philosophy?” is very broad…because of the 
widespread disagreement among philosophers as to its answer. Almost every philosopher 
has a view as to what constitutes philosophy…’ see Wright in Wright 1984: 44.   Devaraja 
1959: 319 - 20 has argued that ‘… philosophy is properly concerned with “concepts,” with 
modes of conceiving, rather than with words or things. Philosophy concerns itself with 
words only insofar as they are instruments of conceiving and with things inasmuch as they 
figure in our conception. Further, philosophy does not concern itself with all concepts or 
all modes of conceiving, but only with those which are regarded as being intrinsically 
interesting and valuable.’ He adds that ‘[a] definition of philosophy is proved or justified 
to the extent to which it enables us to picture, in terms of a definite plan or purpose, the 
general divisions or areas of a man’s cognitive enterprise. The total aim and purpose of 
philosophy…is to achieve a comprehensive and consistent description of all the (general) 
forms of the value-bearing consciousness of man.’ (326). It has been observed with regard 
to the definition of philosophy that ‘…every serious student of philosophy is aware [that], 
various different answers have been offered by philosophers, answers which have been 
described as stipulative definitions or as recommendations that we should conceive the 
nature of philosophy in this or that particular way or that we should lay emphasis on this or 
that particular aspect or function’ Copleston 1992:358. It has been suggested that it is 
doubtable whether experts will ever agree on one definition of philosophy, see Schmidt 
1909: 241. See also Pepper 1946: 29-36 who distinguishes between a nominal and 
descriptive interpretation.                  
18 Walsh 1985: 1.  
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2.1.1. The concept of punishment in ancient Africa  
It is true that punishment existed in all human societies from the time 
human beings started living in organised communities.19 However, it is the 
thinkers from the Western world, especially from the present day Europe, 
who first, as far as my research has been able to establish, wrote and taught 
about the role of the state; and consequently how that state should deal with 
those people who acted against the interests of the state and of the 
community. The discussion of the relationship between the state and the 
individual would result in a debate of how such a state should treat the 
individual who had broken the laws; hence the thinking and writing about, 
and discussion of, the issue of punishment came into focus. This does not 
mean that in the present day Africa there were no thinkers who taught or 
talked about punishment. The problem is that, apart from painstakingly 
gathering their thought and teachings from folk-tales, poems, sayings and 
proverbs, amongst other things, it is extremely difficult to come across any 
source of what one can refer to as an ancient African philosophical 
perspective on punishment.20  
                                                            
19 Some Bantu tribes, such as the Bechuana of Central South Africa (Tswana of Southern 
Africa), believed that punishment began when men who were living in a cave killed a 
chief’s innocent son. The chief was annoyed and punished them by ordering them to leave 
their caves. After leaving the caves, the sun burnt them and some became black, others 
red, and other different races. Much as this discussion looks at the origin of races 
according to the Tswanas, we also see that it deals with the origin of punishment. This is 
because before the cave people murdered the chief’s son, they had lived happily, and it is 
only after they committed murder that they were ordered to go out of the cave as a 
punishment. See Brown 1926: 135-136.    
20 Temples 1959: 91-108 attempts to clarify how the Bantu understood the concept of 
justice in the clan system. According to him, there was compensation in cases of injury or 
damage to property, and the Bantu never found it a problem paying in compensation more 
than the value of what they had damaged or injured (94-97).  He also argues that in case a 
young Muntu disobeyed his or her elders’ or ancestors’ orders, he/she was required to 
undergo a purification exercise (98). The Bantu also believed that natural calamities and 
epidemics were punishments that God inflicted on people for disobeying his orders (98). 
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Those who have read Chinua Achebe’s famous novel Things Fall Apart 
should have realised that punishment, and actually the concepts of justice 
and fair trial, existed in ancient African societies in a manner that is akin to 
the systems that existed in ancient Greek cities.21  We also find in some, if 
not all, African tribes, not only the concept of punishment,22 but also the 
moral justification for punishment. Even before colonialism, Africans knew 
that punishment was evil or unpleasant and its infliction on any individual 
had to be justified. The Fantis of Ghana, for example, combined the 
contemporary three major theories23 of punishment in their understanding 
of punishment. Oguah explains the rationale for punishment as follows: 
Why should a person be punished for wrongdoing? To this question western 
philosophers have given various answers [deterrence and retribution]. Both 
of these theories of punishment appear in the Fanti penal system; but there 
is a third theory which is more dominant in the system. For the Fanti 
                                                                                                                                                     
They also believed that punishment could be in form of a curse, such as a father cursing 
his son when the latter disobeyed him (100-101).      
21 Alumona 2003: 10-11 at <http://www.africanphilosophy.com/issue3/alumona.pdf> 
accessed 7 May 2007. For a discussion of criminal law in ancient Greece see Calhoun 
1977. 
22 For example, the notion of collective responsibility was known in both Togoland and the 
Limpopo region. The ordeal procedure was commonly used to determine guilt or 
innocence. A suspect would, for instance, be asked to put his arm in boiling palm oil or 
water to prove his innocence. If his arm got scalded, which was always the case unless the 
‘judge’ – who was in most cases a witchdoctor, colluded with the suspect and did not 
make the water or oil hot enough, that person would be guilty. See Lowie 1921: 404-411. 
23 Hart argues that the so-called ‘…theories of punishment are not theories in the normal 
sense. They are not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions as to what is or is 
not the case; the atomic theory or the kinetic theory of gases is a theory of this sort. On the 
contrary, those major positions concerning punishment which are called deterrent or 
retributive or reformative “theories” of punishments are moral claims as to what justifies 
the practice of punishment – claims as to why, morally, it should or may be used.’ See Hart 
1968: 72. (Emphasis in the original).  It has been suggested that ‘in order to have a theory 
of punishment, one must develop and defend systematic answers to at least the following 
intimately related five questions: A. What is the nature of crime and punishment? B. What 
is the moral justification of punishment? C. What is the political justification of 
punishment? D. What are the proper principles of criminal liability? E. What are the 
appropriate punishments?’ see Murphy 1987: 87: 510-512. But Armstrong would not agree 
with Murphy, because for Armstrong the theory of punishment is made up of three 
questions that one has to answer: (1) the definition of punishment; (2) the moral 
justification of the practice of punishment; and (3) the question relating to penalty fixing. 
See Armstrong 1961: 473-474. 
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punishment is not only a deterrent or means of exacting restitution but also 
a means of reforming ‘purifying’ the offender. The offender, in committing 
adultery, for example, not only wrongs his neighbor but also brings upon 
himself and his own a curse, mbusu. To punish him he is not only made to 
pay damages to the offended but also he is asked to bring a sheep to be 
slaughtered in the court, which consists of the chief and his councillors, the 
offended party,  a traditional priest and the inquisitive citizen. The priest 
performs certain rituals with the blood of the sheep to remove the curse 
from the offender, thereby purifying him. This ritual practice serves as a 
psychological therapy, freeing the offender of the feeling of guilt. The 
western judge pronounces the offender guilty, but does not have the means 
of ridding the offender of the guilt-feeling, which modern psychiatry shows 
is responsible for many nervous conditions that psychiatrists have to treat. 
The ritual is not only psychologically therapeutic but also its very solemnity 
is often enough to reform the offender.24       
Other African tribes, such as the Akamba in Kenya, also had different 
forms of punishment for various offences. For example, if a person 
committed ‘unnatural offences’, they would be punished by a fine of an ox 
which would be killed, and the offender would be purified by his body 
being smeared with the contents of the animal’s stomach. A coward would 
be punished by not receiving any portion of the loot captured in the fight. In 
case of assault, damages were assessed according to the amount of injury 
inflicted on the victim and the payment capabilities of the offender. The 
nominal damages in some cases were as follows: 
For loss of one finger 1 bull and 1 goat or sometimes even 
a cow 
For loss of two fingers 1 bull and 3 goats 
In case of a hand damaged beyond 
use 
1 cow 
For the loss of an arm 5 cows and 1 bull 
For the loss of both arms 10 cows and 1 bull 
                                                            
24 Oguah in Wright 1984: 221-222. 
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For the loss of one leg 5 cows and 1 bull 
For the loss of both legs 10 cows and 1 bull 
For damage to the head 1 goat 
For accidental death 10 cows and 1 bull 
 
Kidnapping was not considered a punishable offence but the kidnapped 
child had to be returned. Adultery was punished by a fine of a bull and a 
goat, but in some cases only a goat had to be paid as a fine. The goat would 
be: 
[K]illed and the contents of the stomach…smeared on the ground at the 
door of the house occupied by the offending wife, the husband rub[bed] his 
feet in this and formally enter[ed] the house and this ceremony purge[d] the 
offence and normal relations [were] resumed between the couple.25   
   
The abduction of a wife was compensated for ‘by the guilty party paying 
over to the husband the amount of livestock he [had] paid for the woman.’26 
A person found guilty of arson or malicious burning of a house had to build 
a new house ‘and make good any property lost in the fire.’ The Akamba 
tribe never resorted to flogging or imprisonment as forms of punishment 
but in ‘the old days [before 1910 when the book was written] an habitually 
obstinate and disobedient wife was sometimes hanged.’27  In some 
instances, where it was thought that an Akamba man had become a 
‘thoroughly bad character’ and deserved public punishment, he would be 
punished as follows: 
                                                            
25 Hobley 1971: 79.  
26 Hobley 1971: 80. 
27 Hobley 1971: 80. 
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During the night his village [would be] surrounded by a party of men, all of 
his clan, and a guard [would be] placed on the door of his hut while others 
seize[d] one of his oxen and [slew] it. If the offence [was] very serious, 
even a cow or more than one [could] be killed. If there [were] no cattle the 
party would kill a number of sheep or goats. The culprit [would] then be 
dragged forth from his hut and beaten with fists, clubs, and anything handy 
and thrown down and trampled on. His wives [would] also be brought out 
and slapped and scratched; the children [were] not harmed.28 
 
Such forms of punishment clearly had their shortcomings from various 
perspectives, such as human rights violations, but such a discussion is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
 2.1.2 Is there African philosophy?  
It appears that the development of what one may call ‘African philosophy’ 
started in the last days of colonialism. This is because ‘[i]n colonial times, 
African philosophy, at least in the British colonies, was not investigated in 
philosophy departments in Africa – it was left to departments of religion 
and anthropology to study African thought as best as they could’, and this 
explains why ‘the resulting literature was not critical of foreign categories 
of thought that people were required to employ in Africa.’29 Some concepts 
such as ‘punishment’ were also used and employed in Africa by colonialists 
and later western-educated African intellectuals in a manner that did not 
critically examine whether they had the same meaning, not only between 
the Africans and the colonisers, but also between different ethnic groups 
with different cultures in Africa. The task of a contemporary African 
philosopher is therefore to scrutinise Western concepts, such as punishment 
                                                            
28 Hobley 1971: 80. 
29 Wiredu 2003: 91.  
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and justice, that have ‘been used or implied in the characterization of 
African thought’ to establish if their interpretation by western scholars is 
applicable to Africa.30   
It should be mentioned that it is still debatable in the philosophical world 
whether there is anything that one can correctly philosophically call 
‘African philosophy.’31 In answering the question of whether there is 
African philosophy, Maurier argues that ‘[t]he answer must surely be: No! 
Not Yet!’ though there are some groundbreaking writings on various issues 
that are of relevance to a philosophical investigation in various African 
communities.32 According to Maurier, philosophy is a discipline that has at 
least three characteristics: it has to be reflective, rational and systematic; 
and that all of which are lacking in what some people call African 
philosophy. However, some African intellectuals, such as the former 
Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, held that there is African 
philosophy and that it has to be found in the African ways of life.33 Hallen, 
after studying the language and culture of the Yoruba people in Nigeria, 
concluded that there is something that could properly be called African 
philosophy.34 Odera Oruka argues that it is wrong to define African 
                                                            
30 Wiredu 2003: 93-94. 
31 Bondunrin in Wright 1984: 1-24, has argued that African philosophy is still in its 
infancy and that politicians should not try to influence the route it should take, lest they 
confuse philosophy with political ideologies. RA Wright in the same book writes that 
although ‘[t]here have been a number of recent studies’ with the question of whether or not 
there is African philosophy, ‘there seems to be considerable concern as to whether or not 
African philosophy somehow “exists”.’ (Footnotes omitted), 41-56, 41.     
32 Maurier (Translated by McDevitt) in Wright 1984: 25.  
33 See McClendon 2003: 1-39 at <http://www.africanphilosophy.com/issue3/alumona.pdf> 
accessed 7 May 2007.    
34 See Bello 2003: 1-14, at <http://www.africanphilosophy.com/issue3/bello.pdf> accessed 
7 May 2007. 
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philosophy in ‘opposition to philosophy in other continents’, such as 
Western or European philosophy.35 He argues that defining African 
philosophy in a manner that is opposed to philosophy from other continents 
perpetuates the thinking that there is an African thinking which is ‘radically 
unEuropean.’36 He proposes that philosophy as a discipline should be free 
from racial and regional biases and therefore ‘…the talk of a uniquely 
African conceptual framework or way of thinking (African mentality) with 
respect, at least, to the discipline of philosophy is not entertained.’37    
As mentioned earlier, the discussion of the meaning of philosophy, which 
would lead us to either agree or disagree on the issue of whether there is 
African philosophy or not, is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is clear 
is that in Africa, unlike in the present day Europe, it is difficult to find 
philosophers who wrote extensively on the issue of punishment, and in 
particular the justification of punishment. This leaves us with no option but 
to deal with some of the philosophers from the Western world who wrote 
about punishment in a detailed manner. However, one is aware of the fact 
that Egyptian philosophy was instrumental in influencing the growth of 
early Greek philosophy but not of African philosophy in general.38 
                                                            
35 Oruka in Diemer (ed) 1978: 1.    
36 Oruka 1978: 1. 
37 Oruka 1978: 1. 
38 Olela in Wright 1984: 77-92. For a discussion of the history of philosophy in India, see 
Dasgupta 1961: Vol. III. While discussing the philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitã, he 
illustrates that they believed that God was responsible for creation, maintenance and 
destruction and also punishment (51). See also pages 92 and 415. For the influence that 
Indian philosophy could have had on Greek philosophy, see Conger 1952: 127 who argues 
that ‘…[w]hat once may have been plains of transmission were broken long ago in the 
catalysms which befell the ancient world. The fragments which remain are scanty and 
tenuous to encourage doubt that they ever were connected. There is no place for bold 
assertions, but when the fragments are viewed in their setting – geographical, commercial, 
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2.2. The punishment debate 
 
The ‘punishment debate’ has attracted the attention of legal philosophers, 
criminologists, penal reformers, and judges, among others, for generations. 
It has also recently attracted human rights activists. What is obvious is that 
each group approaches this debate from a different perspective since each 
group has different objectives that it aims to achieve from this debate. Put 
differently, each group has its own interests in the debate. What makes the 
debate complicated is that even in one group, such as that of legal 
philosophers or criminologists or human rights activists, there are sub-
groups that approach this issue or debate from different angles. Hart 
observed as early as 1959 that the ‘[g]eneral interest in the topic of 
punishment has never been greater than it is at present and I doubt if the 
public discussion of it has ever been more confused.’39 That statement, 
though made almost half a century ago, is of equal or probably greater 
force today. The debate has been mostly dominated by three schools of 
thought: retribution, utilitarianism (deterrence), and rehabilitation (reform).  
All these schools of thought attempt to answer basically three philosophical 
questions (though there are other related questions) in relation to 
punishment. The first question is ‘What justifies the general practice of 
punishment?’ The second question is ‘To whom may punishment be 
applied?’ And the third question is ‘How severely may we punish?’40 
Attempts to answer these questions have for generations fuelled and 
                                                                                                                                                     
and, we may add, logical, the arguments for at least indirect Indian influence on Greece 
acquires some support.’ (127). For a discussion of the history of philosophy in the United 
States, see Flower and MG Murphey 1977: Vol. 1. 
39 See Hart 1968: 1.   
40 Hart 1968: 3. 
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continue to fuel the debate and confusion surrounding punishment. Bean 
states as follows: 
The great theories of punishment, retribution, deterrence and reform stand 
in open and fragrant contradiction. Each side has arguments that are used to 
demonstrate the consequences of the rival theories. Supporters of retribution 
accuse the utilitarians of opportunism and the reformist of vicious 
paternalism. The utilitarians accuse the retributivists of vindictiveness and 
the reformists of failing to justify punishment by an insistence on treatment. 
The reformists see the retributivists as cruel, and utilitarians as inadequate 
when they attempt to control action. To complicate matters further, each 
theory has splinter groups offering rival or amended arguments. It is no easy 
task to pick one’s way through the variety of positions adopted in this 
debate.41 
 
The purpose of this discussion is not to propose which school of thought is 
more appropriate but rather to examine the arguments and weaknesses of 
each school and determine how they relate to life imprisonment as a 
punishment. It should also be mentioned that these arguments are 
recaptured throughout this thesis especially in the analysis of the 
jurisprudence and practice of life imprisonment at the national and 
international levels.    
2.3 Punishment defined  
 
Throughout this thesis I refer to the sentence of life imprisonment as a 
‘punishment.’ What does punishment mean? Some people may simply 
answer that something is punishment because it is imposed on those who 
break the law. However, it is important to look at the philosophical 
‘definition’ of punishment. I put definition in quotation marks because what 
the philosophers offer is more of a description as opposed to a definition of 
                                                            
41 Bean 1981: 11. 
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punishment. Mabbott rightly observes that ‘[t]he word “punishment” is 
used in a variety of ways and one cannot lay down rules to determine where 
its use becomes appropriate. Thus it is impossible to give a precise 
definition of the word as ordinarily used.’42 Armstrong is of the view that 
[T]he meaning of the word ‘punishment’…is a definitional or logical issue. 
We examine the way the word is used in ordinary language, the things to 
which it is applied, and try to produce some rule which covers these cases 
and only these cases. Applying the same technique to many other words we 
would get a single unequivocal answer on which all users of the language 
would agree – in short, the definition of the term – but in the case of 
‘punishment’ there is no such universally accepted answer …43 
 
Grotius was of the view that punishment is ‘[a]n evil of suffering which is 
inflicted on account of …an evil of doing.’44 In other words, according to 
Grotius, punishment must be inflicted on those who have done what is 
considered to be an ‘ill.’ Bean has suggested that Grotius’s definition 
entails ‘some essential features…although … [it] is not entirely 
adequate.’45 Bean identifies the following as some of the features that form 
Grotius’s definition of punishment: In the first place, Grotius sees 
punishment as an inflicted ill and he thus links punishment to the deed. 
Secondly, Grotius ‘shows that punishment is intentionally inflicted, and not 
a random imposition of pain’ or ill. Thirdly, that ‘Grotius implies, although 
he does not say so, that punishment is given to someone who is supposedly 
answerable for his wrongdoings, that is as opposed to someone not in 
possession of his reason’ and finally that ‘Grotius implies that punishment 
                                                            
42 Mabbott 1955: 256.   
43 Armstrong 1961: 473. 
44 Grotius (Abridged Translation by Whewell) 1853: 222. See also Bean 1981: 4.  
45 Bean 1981: 4. 
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is a social act produced by those claiming the right to punish and imposed 
on those deemed to deserve it.’46  
Hart, while referring to the works of Benn and Flew, defines ‘…the 
standard or central case of “punishment” in terms of five elements: 
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant; 
(ii) It must be for the offence against legal rules; 
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his 
offence; 
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings 
other than the offender; [and] 
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed.47 
 
Hart, in trying to broaden the meaning of punishment, illustrates that there 
are other situations under which a person can be ‘punished’ which do not 
exactly possess all the above five elements. Under those circumstances, 
although the consequences are more or less the same as on the person being 
punished in terms of a situation where all the above five ingredients are 
present, Hart is of the view that such should be relegated ‘to the position of 
sub-standard or secondary cases.’ He outlines some of the examples as:  
(a) Punishments for breaches of   legal rules imposed or administered 
otherwise by officials (decentralised sanctions); (b) Punishments for 
breaches of non-legal rules or orders (punishments in a family school); (c) 
vicarious or collective punishment of some members of a social group for 
actions done by others without the former’s authorisation, encouragement, 
control or permission; (d) punishments of persons (otherwise than under (c)) 
who neither are in fact nor supposed to be offenders.48  
                                                            
46 Bean 1981: 5. 
47 Hart 1968: 4-5. 
48 Hart 1968: 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24
As mentioned earlier, Hart ‘borrows’ his definition of punishment from 
both Flew and Benn. In explaining why we should look at Flew’s definition 
as more attractive than that of Grotius, Bean contrasts the two definitions 
and observes that ‘the value of Flew’s definition over Grotius is that Flew 
compels us to see punishment in terms of a system of rules.’49 Bean, like 
Hart, argues that punishment is not only the prerogative of the judiciary but 
that parents and teachers punish their children and students respectively. 
Mabbott is not ‘so sure’ if expelling people from clubs or unions, 
‘chastisement of children by parents or teachers’ and the penalties in 
games, are to be included as examples of the standard use of 
“punishment”,’ but he does ‘not think anything serious depends on it.’50      
Ross has indicated that Hart’s definition of punishment looks at punishment 
from a juridical point of view, and that defining punishment from a purely 
juridical point of view hardly gives a satisfactory definition. He adds that 
Hart’s definition  
[I]s essentially deficient in not including a requirement to the effect that the 
punitive measure must be an expression of disapproval of the violation of 
the rule, and consequently of censure or reproach directed to the violator. It 
is …simply a logical impossibility to enforce a normative system, that is, 
give effect to its normative requirements, without at the same time giving 
expression to disapproval.51  
 
                                                            
49 Bean 1981: 6. 
50 Mabbott 1955: 258. 
51 Ross 1975: 36-37. (Emphasis in the original).  
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Ross, while referring to the above ingredients of punishment given by Hart, 
suggests that ingredient (iv) is included in (v) and, because of that, (iv) 
‘seems redundant’.52 He adds while attacking ingredient (iii), that  
[T]he requirement that for a legal response to crime to amount to 
punishment, it must be directed upon the person who in fact or allegedly 
committed the crime. Accepting this condition prevents us from talking of 
vicarious responsibility in other words criminal liability for the actions, as 
indeed we do, not only in everyday life but also in juridical contexts.53 
Ross concludes that 
In accordance with [the above] amendments, the concept of punishment 
could be defined in terms of four components. Punishment is that social 
response which: (1) occurs where there is a violation of a legal rule; (2) is 
imposed and carried out by authorised persons on behalf of the legal order 
to which the violated rule belongs; (3) involves suffering or at least other 
consequences normally considered unpleasant; and (4) expresses 
disapproval of the violator.54 
 
Ross’s definition of punishment, and in particular his attack on Hart’s, 
raises some problems, and Ross concedes that he is not convinced that his 
definition is ‘satisfactory.’55 It is argued that Ross’s definition of 
punishment is unsatisfactory in at least three major ways. 
In the first place, Ross’s argument that Ingredient (iv) in Hart’s definition is 
redundant because it is included in Ingredient (v) raises some interpretation 
problems. It has to be recalled that Hart adopts part of Flew’s definition of 
punishment and an interpretation of Flew’s definition of punishment 
applies to the interpretation that should be given to Hart’s. In other words, 
                                                            
52 Ross 1975: 36. 
53 Ross 1975: 39. 
54 Ross 1975: 39. 
55 Ross 1975: 39. 
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Flew’s interpretation is the parent of Hart’s, and the strengths or 
weaknesses Flew’s interpretation affects that of Hart. Bean’s interpretation 
of Flew’s definition of punishment shows that Ross’s claim that ingredient 
(iv) is redundant because it is included in Ingredient (v) is not convincing. 
Bean explains in reference to ingredient (iv) that 
[Punishment] must be the work of personal agencies…Punishment must not 
be the natural consequences of an action, for Flew [and therefore Hart] 
wants to argue that evils occurring to people as the result of misbehaviour 
but not by human actions are not punishments but penalties. Thus unwanted 
children and venereal disease are penalties of, but not punishment for, 
sexual promiscuity.56 
 
In explaining Ingredient (v), Bean puts it that  
 
[E]vil inflicted by anyone, even a public authority acting without preceding 
condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment but as a hostile 
act…Similarly, direct action by an aggrieved person with no pretentions to 
special authority is not properly called punishment. It may be revenge, as in 
vendetta, or it may be…an act of hostility, but it is not punishment.57 
 
The above explanation of Flew’s, and by implication Hart’s, definition of 
punishment shows, as mentioned earlier, that Ross’s argument that 
ingredient (iv) is implied in (v) is not satisfactory. 
In the second place, Ross’s argument that Hart’s definition of punishment 
ignores the fact that people can be held criminally vicariously liable for the 
acts or omissions of others also raises some problems. Much as Ross’s 
argument may hold water if Hart’s essay on the definition of punishment 
titled ‘Prolegomenon on the Principles of Punishment’ in which he defines 
punishment as discussed above is viewed in isolation of Hart’s other works, 
                                                            
56 Bean 1981: 5.  
57 Bean 1981: 6. (Footnotes omitted). 
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a critical reading of Hart’s later writings on punishment that did not dispute 
his earlier definition of punishment, shows that his definition if read 
together with his other works, includes a recognition of vicarious liability 
as a form of punishment. In his essay titled ‘Responsibility and Retribution’ 
which is a postscript to his 1968 book titled, ‘Punishment and 
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law’, Hart recognises vicarious 
liability as a form of punishment when he explains the differences that 
underpin the following classifications of responsibility: (a) role-
responsibility (where an individual is responsible for something for, 
example, parents  responsible for the upbringing of their children); (b) 
causal-responsibility (where, for example, something may be said to have 
caused or led to the existence or otherwise of  a certain thing or event; for 
instance, the drought may be said to have been responsible for the famine); 
(c) legal liability-responsibility (when someone is ‘made to pay’ for 
breaking the legal rules. This could be in the form of imprisonment or 
compensating the victim or any other form of punishment. According to 
Hart, this category of responsibility may be divided into three classes: (i) 
mental or psychological conditions; (ii) causal or other forms of connection 
between act and harm; and (iii) personal relationships rendering one man 
liable to be punished or pay for the acts of another); and (d) capacity-
responsibility (Hart arguing that the capacities in question ‘are those of 
understanding, reasoning, and control of conduct).58 While expounding on 
the circumstances under which a person may be punished for the actions or 
omissions of another, Hart observes that 
                                                            
58 See Hart 1968: 210-237. 
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Normally in criminal law the minimum condition required for liability for 
punishment is that the person to be punished should himself have done what 
the law forbids, at least so far as outlawed conduct is concerned; even if 
liability is ‘strict’ ; it is not enough to render him liable for punishment that 
someone else should have done it. This is often expressed in the 
terminology of responsibility (though …too, “liability” is frequently used 
instead of “responsibility”) by saying that, generally, vicarious 
responsibility is not known to the criminal law. But there are exceptional 
cases; an innkeeper is liable to punishment if his servants, without his 
knowledge and against his orders, sell liquor on his premises after hours. In 
this case, he is vicariously responsible for the sale, and of course, in the 
civil law of tort there are many situations in which a master or employer is 
liable to pay compensation for the torts of his servant or employee and he is 
said to be vicariously responsible 
 
It appears, therefore, there are diverse types of criteria of legal liability-
responsibility: the most prominent consist of certain mental elements, but 
there are also causal or other connections between a person and harm, or the 
presence of some relationship, such as that of master and servant, between 
different persons… [In conclusion] though in certain general contexts legal 
responsibility and liability have the same meaning, to say that a man is 
legally responsible for some act or harm is to state that the connection with 
the act or harm is sufficient according to law for liability. Because 
responsibility and liability are distinguishable in this way, it will make sense 
to say that because a person is legally responsible for some action he is 
liable to be punished for that.59  
 
The above quotations are illustrative of the fact that although Hart did not 
expressly include vicarious liability in his definition as a form of 
punishment, the explanation of his definition of punishment recognises 
vicarious liability, and that should be interpreted to mean that Hart 
recognises vicarious liability as a form of punishment.               
Thirdly, Ross argues that it is essential to link punishment to disapproval in 
the sense that a person can only be punished because they have behaved in 
a manner that is disapproved by members of a community, and that 
                                                            
59 Hart 1968: 221-222. (Emphasis mine). 
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‘punishment is at once suffering and disapproval, and the two are …closely 
bound up with one another. Hart overlooks this connection when he 
explains punishment as suffering but makes no room for disapproval.’60 
Ross’s interpretation of Hart’s definition and explanation of punishment in 
this respect is doubtful in at least two ways. In the first place, when Hart 
says that punishment should, among other things, be understood as imposed 
for an offence against legal rules, and that it must be imposed and 
administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which 
the offence is committed, this, in my view, means that people in a particular 
country or society will find some conduct, such as murder or theft, 
unacceptable and devise legal rules to put in place punishments that would 
be visited on people who behave in a manner that they (the community) 
disapprove of or find unacceptable. Put differently, logically there is no 
society that will impose punishments for conduct that such a society 
approves of or finds acceptable. Hart, by not using the word ‘approve’ or 
‘disapprove’, cannot be said to have meant that the punishment could be 
imposed even for conduct of which people approve. 
In the second place, Ross seems to ignore, in this regard, the relevant 
answers that could be given to the three questions that Hart highlights. As 
mentioned earlier, Hart argues that we should always attempt to answer the 
following questions: What justifies the general practice of punishment? To 
whom may punishment be applied? How severely may we punish?  In 
answering the first of the above three questions (which are more relevant to 
Ross’s disapproval argument), we could say, depending on which school of 
                                                            
60 Ross 1975: 38. 
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thought we subscribe to in the punishment debate, that the general practice 
of punishment is justified by the fact that people in a given society 
disapprove of certain conduct and therefore enact legal rules that stipulate 
the punishments to be imposed on those who behave in that unacceptable or 
disapproved manner. In answering the second question we may argue that 
punishment may be applied to whoever behaves in a manner that is 
unacceptable to, or disapproved of, by members of a given community. 
Answering Hart’s questions in a broad manner clearly puts to rest Ross’s 
worry that Hart overlooked the disapproval aspect of punishment. In the 
same vein, Rabie and Strauss have stated that 
Moral disapproval is not an inherent characteristic of criminal punishment, 
but that it is attached rather to the particular conduct itself, and that the 
conduct should be made criminal only in order to endorse a society’s moral 
disapproval symbolically through the infliction of punishment upon 
offenders.61  
 
Mabbott finds it unacceptable to include the element ‘unpleasantness’, 
which Flew, Hart, and Ross adopt, in the definition of punishment. He 
suggests that ‘… “disliked” would be a better word than …”unpleasant”.’ 
Mabbott is of the view that 
 “unpleasant” has its dangers. Most punishments nowadays are not 
afflictions of suffering, either physical or mental. They are the deprivation 
of the good…Imprisonment and fine are deprivations of liberty and 
property. The death sentence is a deprivation of life and in this extreme case 
every attempt is made to exclude suffering.62  
 
                                                            
61 See Rabie and Strauss 1985: 9. 
62 Mabbott 1955: 257. 
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Mabbott agrees with Flew’s second and third criteria, that ‘punishment 
must be for an offence and of the offender’, but only on condition that ‘… 
“offence” and “offender” mean offence and offender against laws and not 
merely “sin” and “sinner”.’63   Mabbott also agrees with both the fourth and 
fifth elements of Flew’s definition, that punishment should be the work of 
personal agencies and that it must be inflicted by the authority whose rule 
has been broken.64 Bean, after citing Flew’s definition of punishment with 
approval, is of the view that other scholars, that is, Benn and Peters in 
1959, also added one other element to the definition of punishment: ‘that 
the unpleasantness should be an essential part of what is intended and not 
merely coincidental to some other area.’65  
Another definition of punishment is given by Pincoffs who is of the view 
that “[l]egal Punishment”…refer[s] to an institution having the following 
three characteristics: 
 
1. There must be a system of threats, officially promulgated, that should 
given legal rules be violated, given consequences regarded as unpleasant 
will be inflicted upon the violator; 
2. The threatened unpleasant consequences must be inflicted only upon 
persons tried and found guilty of violating the rules in question, and only 
for the violation of those rules and 
3. The trial, finding of guilt, and imposition and administration of the 
unpleasant consequences must be by authorised agents of the system 
promulgating the rules.66  
 
Pincoffs explains that threats may be either categorical or hypothetical. 
They may be directed to particular nameable individuals, or to individuals 
                                                            
63 Mabbott 1955: 258. 
64 Mabbott 1955: 258. 
65 Bean 1981: 6. 
66 See Pincoffs 1966: 56-57. 
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who meet a particular anonymous description. He adds that it is an essential 
element of the definition of punishment that there is a clear understanding 
of what is being threatened. 67 He states that rules, the breach of which 
leads to the infliction of punishment, may be promulgated by a king, 
dictator, tribal leader, governor, council of elders, legislature, among 
others. And that 
Promulgation may be by verbal edict, town cryers, posting on the door of 
the Palace, or publication in official journals; and the rule promulgated may 
or may not already have been in common use. Authority may be derived 
from appointment, descent, designation by a supernatural being, election, or 
any other source. All that is necessary is that the source of authority and the 
derivation process be generally accepted as genuine.68  
What matters, according to Pincoffs, is that the source of authority and the 
derivation process be generally accepted as genuine. It is irrelevant that 
punishment is being imposed by a dictator. The legitimacy or democratic 
nature of the authority in question is not an issue when it comes to the 
punishment of the violator of the legal rules in place. Otherwise the most 
dictatorial and autocratic regimes would not have the moral authority to 
impose punishments. Pincoffs adds that ‘[t]he unpleasant consequences 
threatened must be such that almost everyone wishes to avoid them as 
involving pain, suffering, embarrassment, inconvenience, or loss; even 
though some eccentric may regard them as sources of pleasure, pride, 
salvation, or public recognition.’69  
                                                            
67 Pincoffs 1966: 57. 
68 Pincoffs 1966: 57. 
69 Pincoffs 1966: 58.  
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Armstrong tries to devise ‘a theory of punishment’ by focusing on the three 
major theories of punishment, and their understanding and use of the term 
‘punishment.’ He then formulates three different definitions, each suiting a 
different theory of punishment and suggests that this shows the difficulties 
that arise, especially for retributivism in this area. He says that he should 
not be understood to be ‘urging the acceptance of any one of these three 
definitions in preference to the others.’ He contends that 
[i]rrespective of which problem or problems it sets out to solve, a theory of 
punishment can usually be put under one of three headings: Retributive, 
Deterrent, or Reformatory. When the problem is to define punishment these 
theories provide roughly the following answers: 
1. Retributive: Punishment is the infliction of pain, by an appropriate 
authority, on a person because he is guilty of a crime, i.e. for a crime that he 
committed. 
2. Deterrent: Punishment is the infliction of pain on a person in order to 
deter him from repeating a crime or to deter others from imitating a crime 
which they believe him to have committed…here…deterrence of the person 
punished is not reform. Reform means that the man intends to avoid 
repeating the crime, not from fear of punishment but because he sees that it 
was wrong. 
3. Reformatory: Punishment is the infliction of pain on a person in order to 
reduce his tendency to want to committ crimes or to commit crimes of a 
particular sort.70      
 
Don Locke gives what he calls ‘[a] workable definition of ‘punishment’ in 
a wide sense of that word’, as: ‘Punishment: the infliction of pain/or 
penalties, or the deprivation of privileges, by an authorised person or 
persons on a person or persons believed to be guilty of having broken the 
                                                            
70 Armstrong 1961: 478-479. However, Armstrong argues later that ‘[m]ost of those who 
have examined the difficulty raised by the currency of the phrase “He was punished for 
something he did not do” rightly conclude that the Retributive definition is more or less 
immune, even if their reasons for so concluding are faulty. That able philosophers should 
accept such unsatisfactory solutions to the apparent problem bears witness to the strength 
of their conviction that a Retributive definition is the right one.’ 488.   
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law or, more generally, of having done wrong.’71 He argues that what 
distinguishes this definition from other definitions is that it ‘immediately 
avoids the spurious logical puzzles about the punishment of innocent 
people.’72 Paradoxically Locke, in his attempt to give an explanation of his 
‘workable’ definition which he suggests to be free of the ‘spurious logical 
puzzles about punishment of innocent people’, also finds himself arguing 
that ‘the innocent can, and sometimes do, get declared guilty and so 
punished’ and that ‘it may be wrong or unjust to punish the innocent but it 
can happen (otherwise what would be the point of declaring it wrong or 
unjust?), and if a punished  person is later found to have been innocent this 
does nothing to prove that he has not been punished.’73 Locke’s explanation 
is problematic in at least one major respect: He approaches the issue of 
punishment, not from a moral point of view, but rather from a logical one. 
He argued that ‘[w]hat is logically necessary for punishment is not that the 
person be guilty, but that he be believed to be guilty.’74 Here he attempts to 
justify a moral issue from a logical point of view and falls into the same 
trap as the utilitarians who resort to what Hart calls the ‘definitional stop’ 
as an escape route when pressed by the retributivist to explain why their 
theory should not be objected to for justifying the infliction of pain on 
innocent people (a detailed discussion of this argument is given later). 
Bentham defines punishment as ‘an evil resulting to an individual from the 
                                                            
71 Locke 1963: 568. 
72 Locke 1963: 568. 
73 Locke 1963: 567. 
74 Locke 1963: 569. 
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direct intention of another, on account of an act that appears to have been 
done, or omitted.’75  
What is clear from the above discussion is that there is no universal 
consensus on the definition of punishment. This is partly attributable to the 
fact that each of the three major theories of punishment defines punishment 
in a manner that suits its interests. As Armstrong rightly observes, 
retributivists will always define punishment from a backward-looking 
approach, whereas utilitarianists and reformers will always adopt a 
forward-looking approach, but with different objectives. The utilitarianists 
aim at deterring people from committing crime by severely punishing the 
offender, whereas the reformers aim at treating the offenders so that they 
are cured of the ailments that cause them to commit crimes.  The definition 
of punishment is likely to keep on evolving from time to time to suit the 
interests of a given generation depending on both that generation’s 
understanding of punishment and on the purpose such a generation 
anticipates punishment to serve. In fact, practice has taught us, as it is 
illustrated in Chapters III and V, that judges presiding over international 
criminal tribunals and as well as judges in Uganda, South Africa, and 
Mauritius in some cases consider all the three theories of punishment to be 
objectives of punishment, and impose a sentence to suit the objective they 
think punishment should achieve in a particular case, depending on the 
facts of that case and the law that has to be followed in sentencing. This 
explains why I have not attempted to provide what I consider to be the most 
                                                            
75 Bentham 1830: Book I, Chapter I (para 5) available at 
<http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/rp/index.html> accessed 17 April 
2007.  
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appropriate definition of punishment. Neither have I attempted to suggest 
what major elements a proper or correct definition of punishment should 
entail.   
        2.4 The three major theories in the punishment debate 
 
As mentioned earlier, the three major theories in the punishment debate are 
the: retributive, deterrent and rehabilitation theories. We now examine 
some of the arguments underlying each theory, and look to see how such 
arguments can be used in cases of life imprisonment sentences. In Chapters 
III and V the author demonstrates the extent to which these theories of 
punishment have been invoked in cases where offenders have been 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
2.4.1 Retribution  
‘The theory of retribution has had a long and distinguished history.’76 There 
‘is no single theory of retribution.’77  Walker, for example, mentions the 
following as some of the theories of retribution – repayment theory, desert 
theory, penalty theory, rule theory, and satisfactory theory.78  Traditional 
retributionist arguments are traceable to the writings of Kant (Rechtslehre 
of 1887), Hegel (though some scholars argue that Hegel was not a 
retributivist but rather a reformist),79 Bradley,80 Mabbott and Armstrong. 
                                                            
76 Bean 1981: 12. For a detailed definition of retribution see Perry 2006: 179-183.   
77 Bean 1981: 12. 
78 Walker 1999: 595 – 605. See also Cottingham 1979: 238 – 246. 
79 Pincoffs 1966: 9-12, for example, classifies Hegel as a retributivist. Bean 1981: 46, on 
the other hand, argues that ‘[a]t first sight it appears that Hegel supported retribution, and 
many commentators have agreed. I think this is wrong; Hegel was a reformist offering a 
specific type of reform in which the offender was reformed through the punishment. It was 
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This discussion will be limited to the ideas expounded by Kant, Hegel, 
Mabbott and Armstrong, although those of other philosophers will be 
mentioned where necessary. The reason for the focus on the three 
philosophers is that Kant represents the views of the early retributivists 
whereas Armstrong those of the later ones. 
2.4.1.1 Moral justification of punishment 
Kant has been classified as a retributivist because of the following detailed 
observation that he made: 
 
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for 
promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to 
civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual 
on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never 
to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, 
nor mixed up with the subjects of real right. Against such treatment his 
inborn personality has a right to protect him, even although he may be 
condemned to lose his civil personality. He must first be found guilty and 
punishable before there can be any thought of drawing from his 
punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is 
a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-
windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge 
him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it, 
according to the Pharisaic maxim: “It is better that one man should die 
than the whole people should perish.” For if justice and righteousness 
perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world…. 
   But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice 
takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by 
which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the 
one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved 
evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated 
on himself. Hence it may be said: “If you slander another, you slander 
yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike 
another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.” This is 
the right of RETALIATION (jus talionis); and properly understood, it is 
                                                                                                                                                     
never clear how this was to occur, for pain is a sensation and reform is a moral 
condition…’. For Kant and Hegel’s contribution to retribution, see Brooks 2001: 561-580. 
80 Pincoffs 1966: 2. 
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the only principle which in regulating a public court, as distinguished 
from mere private judgment, can definitely assign both the quality and the 
quantity of a just penalty. All other standards are wavering and uncertain; 
and on account of other considerations involved in them, they contain no 
principle conformable to the sentence of pure and strict justice.81  
 
There are various conclusions one could draw from the above statement. 
Kant is referring to ‘judicial punishment’, that is, punishment that is 
imposed by a judicial officer and, we can also say, a quasi-judicial body. 
According to Kant, such punishment ‘can never’ be inflicted on a person 
unless that person has committed a crime. He makes it clear that 
punishment must not be administered for the purpose of promoting good 
for the society or for the individual.  Before you punish any person, you 
must morally justify the reason for that punishment. That person must have 
committed an offence. This is the moral justification of punishment as a 
practice, and it is this justification which distinguishes punishment from 
other practices that do cause pain or distress. Jacobs has argued that 
retribution is ‘not properly an aim of punishment’ but rather a justification 
of punishment.82 In this regard Armstrong observes that: 
[One of the]…problem[s] that a theory of punishment may be trying to 
solve is ‘What, if anything, is the moral justification of punishment as 
such?’ why should it be felt that this particular practice requires moral 
justification, when in the case of so many other practices – from warning to 
washing-up – we do not feel that the question even arises? Clearly because 
punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain, i.e. distress of some 
sort, normally against the wishes of the recipient, and this is something to 
which there is a prima facie moral objection, the overriding of which 
requires justification. 
                                                            
81 As quoted in Pincoffs 1966: 2-3.  
82 Jacobs 1999:535. (Emphasis in original). 
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It is important to notice that the moral justification of punishment is not the 
same thing as its general point or purpose, except in the eyes of those who 
have travelled the so far down the Utilitarian road that they never question 
the means if the end is desirable.83    
 
Kant and, needless to say, Armstrong are in contrast to the utilitarian who 
maintains, as the discussion below will illustrate, that the punishment 
should be imposed to protect society, or to the reformist who would argue 
that punishment should be imposed for the sole purpose of reforming or 
rehabilitating the offender. The utilitarian points out that if there is no good 
that would accrue to society as a result of punishing an individual or 
individuals, then that is revenge and not punishment. They contend that 
since the retributivist explicitly ignores the consideration of the question 
whether any good consequences may be expected from punishment, and 
yet insists on the right to punish where a crime has been committed, his 
position is morally indistinguishable from that of a man who simply 
insists on revenge for crime.84  
 
2.4.1.2 Guilt and punishment: why punish the innocent 
 
Kant adds that a person must first be found guilty and be punishable before 
punishment is imposed. Here Kant introduces one of the principles of the 
right to a fair trial: that only the guilty should be punished. The ‘punish – 
the – only – guilty’85 stand has been used by the retributivist to discredit the 
utilitarian theory. The former maintains that if the objective of punishment 
is to deter people from committing crimes, the latter would punish an 
                                                            
83 Armstrong 1961: 473-474. 
84 Pincoffs 1966: 43. 
85 For a detailed discussion of the circumstances under which the phrase to ‘punish the 
innocent’ can be used and misused, see Armstrong 1961: 480-481. See also Phillips 1985: 
389 – 391; Smilansky 1994: 50 – 53; and Lyons 1974: 346 – 348. In this thesis it is used in 
the ordinary sense, which is, inflicting pain on a person who has not committed the 
offence, even if the judge might have declared him to be guilty. 
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innocent person in cases where crime is rampant to in order send a clear 
message to other members of the society that whoever breaks the law will 
be severely dealt with.86 It has been observed that: 
 
[t]he utilitarian is committed to doing whatever, in any given situation, is 
likely to promote public happiness; or if it impossible to promote 
happiness, in the circumstances, at least to minimize unhappiness, and 
thus he is committed to the minimization of the mischief, which is merely 
any state of affairs that brings about unhappiness. This means, so far as 
punishment is concerned, that he will punish when, and only when, and in 
such a way, and to the extent that, there is likely to be less mischief than if 
he did not punish, or punished in some other way. But sometimes the best 
way to minimize mischief would be to punish the innocent.87   
 
Armstrong would add that 
 
of course a deterrent will deter as long as the person on whom the pain is 
inflicted is believed to be guilty by those we wish to deter. It really wouldn’t 
matter, if deterrence is our aim in fixing penalties, whether he was in fact 
guilty or not; as long as we kept his innocence a secret we could make a 
very effective example of him. This conclusion has been acted on by more 
than one government in our own times.88   
 
The utilitarians deny that their theory calls for the punishment of the 
innocent. They argue that, when we look at the definition of punishment, it 
does not include punishing the innocent, but rather punishing the offender. 
Hart disagrees with this reasoning on the ground that resorting to the 
definition of punishment to justify punishing an individual is not a 
satisfying reason to explain why one has to punish that person. Hart calls 
this ‘the definitional stop’, which means that whenever utilitarians are hard-
pressed to explain why their theory would not lead to punishing innocent 
                                                            
86 Pincoffs 1966: 33-42. 
87 Pincoffs 1966: 33. 
88 Armstrong 1961: 484. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41
people, where it has not been possible for the authorities to arrest the 
criminal, if that will be sufficient to send a deterrent massage to the public 
that such an offence should not be committed again, and that those found 
guilty of committing it will be dealt with severely, they would say: ‘but the 
definition of punishment does not include punishing an innocent person.’89 
Armstrong argues that for the utilitarians to invoke the retributivists’ 
definition of punishment as their evidence (the utilitarians) that their theory 
of punishment does not contemplate punishing the innocent ‘is to give an 
answer which is technically correct (for those who subscribe to a 
Retributive definition of punishment) but which misses the point behind the 
question.’90 
The ‘punishing the innocent’ argument has been part of the punishment 
debate for generations, and philosophers from both the retribution and 
deterrence theories of punishment, have expressed their views in support of 
or against the possibility that the deterrence theory of punishment justifies 
punishment of the innocent. This debate cannot be resolved here. What is 
clear is that utilitarianists cannot resort to the ‘definitional stop’ to explain 
satisfactorily why their theory should not be labelled as supporting 
punishing the innocent if that will deter potential criminals. 
2.4.1.3 Punishing the punishable   
An important aspect of Kant’s statement is that punishment must be 
imposed on a person who is punishable. This word, like many others, can 
be subjected to several interpretations. It is argued that a people are 
                                                            
89 Hart 1968: 5-6. 
90 Armstrong 1961: 485. 
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punishable if it can be established that they can be held responsible for the 
offences which they are alleged to have committed. ‘Responsibility’ can 
also be interpreted in various ways.91 A person may be said to be 
‘responsible’ for the death of another. A person may be said to be 
‘responsible’ for his/her children. A person may be said to be ‘responsible’ 
because he/she is taken to be earnest.92 There are various forms of 
responsibilities, and therefore various contexts in which this term can be 
used. However, here we are concerned with criminal responsibility. Not 
responsibility the way Flew understood it ‘as a prevalent psychiatric-
psychological security-risk – that crime being a sort of disease the criminal 
should be absolved of his responsibility.’93   
Criminal responsibility in the sense that although some people might be 
said to have broken the law, they cannot be held criminally liable because 
of factors such as age and cognitive capacity (e.g. insanity). In the latter 
case I should not be seen to be looking at criminals the way a reformist 
would, that is, by assuming that all criminals have mental disorders which 
are attributable to society and the environment in which they were brought 
up, but rather from the literal understanding of insanity. Children who have 
not reached the age of criminal responsibility and the insane have no 
                                                            
91 We were warned that ‘general theories of responsibility based on philosophical 
speculation alone can get us nowhere for the practical purposes of criminal law; that in 
studying the causative factors of the criminal act of the individual offender…we are not 
only finding the causes of the trouble in the individual case and the means to be employed 
to remove them, but, from the point of view of pure ethics alone, we are actually getting 
nearer to estimating the measure of the offense in terms of moral responsibility than has 
ever been achieved by pure speculation, unrelated to scientifically acquired data as of 
hereditary, developmental and environmental influences and unrelated to any problem of 
the individual case.’ Glueck 1923: 245. 
92 Hart 1968: 186-237.  
93 Flew as quoted in Stott 1954: 366. 
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‘freedom of will’, as opposed to ‘determinism’,94 which is the basis of 
criminal responsibility. Therefore they are not punishable.   
2.4.1.4 Freedom of will versus determinism  
The principle of ‘freedom of will’ is underpinned by the argument ‘that 
confronted by two or more alternative courses of action, the criminal is he 
who has deliberately chosen the illegal course, and who, by the same token, 
could deliberately have chosen the path of virtue.’95 Bradley would ask:  
How in the world is it possible to say what relieves a mad man of 
responsibility unless you know what makes a sane man responsible? Unless 
a man is agreed with us as to our main beliefs as to a sane man’s 
responsibility, how can we receive his evidence as to anyone’s non-
responsibility?96 
The answer to Bradley’s question is provided by Glueck, when he writes 
that ‘[t]he truth is that the law, following common sense and common 
morality, assumes a certain degree of freedom of conscious, purposive 
                                                            
94 The distinction between ‘freedom of will’ and ‘determinism’ is described by Hones as 
follows “[c]an a man do differently from what he does do? Could any different thing ever 
have been done by anybody than that which they did do? Is the future of each individual 
already written in the nature of things, or ‘in his forehead’ as the Mohammedans say? Is 
some such force as fate, or predestination, or necessity, or hereditary, or environment, or 
any or all of these an adequate explanation of the events of an individual’s life without 
reference to any ability of his own to do otherwise than he does do?...To all these 
questions the determinists answer [is that] man and society are determined by efficient 
causes working out but one inevitable; the free-willists answer man and society co-operate 
with the efficient causes in shaping themselves partly at least toward their own ends… To 
the free-willist the possible is one of several things that may be made to happen, and the 
actual is the one thing that did happen or was made to happen. To the determinist the 
future is as fixed as the past, to the free-willist the future is not fixed, but is in process of 
being fixed by the choices men make in the present. To the determinist the sense of th [sic] 
evitable is delusory, to the free- willist the sense of the inevitable is delusory … Both 
cannot be right. Either all events are determined or some events are not determined, there 
is no middle ground…Determinism holds the former position; libertarianism the latter. The 
issue could not be more sharply drawn”. Hones 1912:  64-66, as quoted in Glueck 1923: 
212-213. 
95 Glueck 1923: 208. See pages 209-210 for criticism of ‘freedom of will’ or ‘determinism’ 
or ‘scientific determinism.’ 
96 As quoted in Glueck 1923: 210. 
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activity possessed by the “normal” mind.’97 Glueck adds that ‘[f]or the 
commission of crime there must be an illegal act with “criminal intent”.’98 
This means two things: one, ‘the existence in the offender of a state of mind 
which is declared by law to be consistent with criminality’ and, two, ‘[t]he 
voluntary commission of an act declared by law to be criminal, as a result 
of, or contemporaneous with, that state of mind.’99 Glueck holds that: ‘[i]f 
there is such a thing as criminal responsibility, based on moral 
responsibility, it must take account of the instinctive nature of man and his 
capacity to modify the impulsive, primitive power of instinct by the 
ejection of some degree of intelligence.’100 He concludes that the 
‘requirement of a union of act and intention which is necessary to constitute 
a criminal act is a recognition of the fact of conscious, purposive activity in 
man and of the fact that this capacity may be weakened or destroyed by 
mental disease.’101 For a retributivist, a person should only be punished for 
violating the law and for no other reason, such as, to protect society or to 
reform him or her and if the person is punishable. 
2.4.2 Retribution and distribution of punishment: how much should we 
punish? 
 
The question that we have to answer is: how much punishment should be 
inflicted on the offender? In other words, how much can we punish? Kant 
                                                            
97 Glueck 1923: 210. 
98 Glueck 1923: 223. 
99 Glueck 1923: 223. 
100 Glueck 1923: 233. 
101 Glueck 1923: 234. 
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posed the same question in different words and at the same time gave an 
answer: 
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice 
takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by 
which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the 
one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved 
evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated 
on himself. Hence it may be said: “If you slander another, you slander 
yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike 
another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.” This is 
the right of RETALIATION (jus talionis); and properly understood, it is 
the only principle which in regulating a public court, as distinguished 
from mere private judgment, can definitely assign both the quality and the 
quantity of a just penalty. All other standards are wavering and uncertain; 
and on account of other considerations involved in them, they contain no 
principle conformable to the sentence of pure and strict justice.102 
Kant is of the view that the principle of equality should form the basis for 
the imposition of punishment. By that principle he means that ‘the pointer 
of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the 
other.’ He adds that ‘…the undeserved evil which any one commits on 
another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself.’ By adopting this view, 
Kant justified the principle of ‘an eye for an eye.’ This principle has been 
criticised widely on the ground that it is barbaric because it encourages and 
institutionalises revenge.  
2.4.2.1. Is retribution the same as revenge? 
Some scholars have argued that retribution is the same is revenge.103 
Oldenquist, for example, is of the view that ‘there is no doubt that 
                                                            
102 See 2.4.1.1 above. 
103 Revenge has been defined as ‘any deliberate injurious act against another person which 
is motivated by resentment of an injurious act or acts perfomed by that other person 
against the revenger, or against some other person or persons whose injury the revenger 
represents.’ See Rosebury 2009: 4.   
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retribution is revenge, both historically and conceptually.’104 According to 
Nygaard, ‘[r]etribution is revenge plain and simple. We punish offenders 
who violate the law because we are angry and want to get even. Retribution 
is about power. It is about force. It is about repression.’105 
Kant insists that there has to be equality in punishment, in the sense the 
people who kill should also be killed, and that those who slander should 
also be ready to be slandered. Pincoffs argues that ‘[t]he suspicion is 
confirmed that retributivism is revenge-taking in disguise when we note 
how naturally revenge-taking assumes the form of the “principle of 
equality”: ambush the ambusher, blackball the blackballer.’106 Like 
Pincoffs, Nygaard and Oldenquist, Archbishop Desmond Tutu also equated 
retribution with revenge.107 However, Nozick, like Armstrong in 1961,108 
disputes that retribution is revenge. His reasons are that 
(a) retribution ends cycles of violence, whereas revenge fosters them; (b) 
retribution limits punishment to that which is in proportion to the 
wrongdoing, whereas revenge is limitless in principle; (c) retribution is 
impartially administered by the state, whereas revenge is often personal; (d) 
retributivists seek the equal application of the criminal law, whereas no 
                                                            
104 Oldenquist 2004: 339. 
105 Nygaard 1998: 363. 
106 Pincoffs 1966: 45. 
107 The South Africa Archbishop Tutu is quoted to have said that ‘… (i) [p]unishment is 
retribution; (b) retribution is vengeance; and (c) vengeance is morally wrong.’ See Crocker 
2002: 512. For the criticism of Tutu’s observations, see 513-524. For a detailed analysis of 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and arguments against retribution, 
see Markel 1999: 389-445.       
108 Armstrong argued that ‘[r]etributive punishment is not revenge…Revenge is private 
and personal, it requires no authority of one person or institution over another; 
[p]unishment requires a whole system of authorities given a right to secure justice. As 
members of the State, we surrender the right to secure justice ourselves to the authorities 
that the State appoints (though retaining, for example, our right to punish our own 
children). It is these State-appointed authorities, not ourselves, who must both punish 
malefactors and recover for us, by force where necessary, what a reluctant debtor owes 
us.’ Armstrong 1961: 487.   
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generality attaches to the avenger’s interest; and (e) retribution is cool and 
unemotional, whereas revenge has a particular emotional tone of taking 
pleasure in the suffering of another.109 
It is clear that Pincoffs errs, in my opinion, when he suggests that ‘the 
retributivist has not yet met the gravamen of the revenge argument. It is 
that the very theorizing about justice, freedom, and human dignity is what 
lies on the surface: that these are but glosses over the demand for revenge.’ 
and that ‘[t]he retributivist has been challenged to produce a criterion by 
means of which we can say that A is punishing from motives of justice, but 
that B is punishing from motives of revenge.’110 Without unnecessarily 
repeating what Nozick says, he proposes a clear criterion upon which a 
distinction can be drawn between revenge and punishment. It is revenge, 
according to Nozick, when it has no institutional backing, and it is 
punishment when it has institutional backing. A person carries out revenge 
to satisfy his/her personal desires and such a person will not be required to 
think about issues of proportionality before he or she takes any action. But 
punishment is imposed because justice has to be done and has to be seen to 
be done, and proportionality is an integral element of punishment. Whether 
proportionality takes the retaliatory approach, or another approach, is a 
different matter. What is vital is a distinction between revenge and 
punishment can, in my opinion, be drawn from Nozick’s arguments. 
                                                            
109 Nozick 1981: 366-68 as quoted in Markel 2005: 438. However, Rosebury has argued 
that ‘Nozick, in an otherwise convincing account of differences between retribution and 
revenge, is surely wrong to claim that, as a matter of definition, “revenge involves a 
particular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffering of another”. While this emotional 
character may sometimes be present, counter examples can be imagined, and they provide 
some of the most interesting cases. A revenger – for example, a person whose child has 
been murdered – may aim simply to end her victim’s intolerably continuing existence, and 
may feel no pleasure in the act of doing so; and if suffering is inflicted in the process, she 
may derive no pleasure whatever from contemplating it.’ see Rosebury 2009: 3. 
110 Pincoffs 1966: 47. 
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In the same vein, Locke tries to illustrate that revenge and retribution are 
distinct theories of punishment but that they are ‘closely connected.’111 His 
argument is that the revenge theory takes that approach that ‘punishment 
should make the guilty person suffer the same evil as he has created, 
whereas the retributive theory is that punishment should make the guilty 
person atone for or compensate for the evil he has done. The two are 
connected but different’ and that  ‘on the Retributivist theory, if a man 
steals £500 then he must pay it back, whereas the Revenge theory holds 
that £500 should be extracted from him.’112      
It is argued that very few people, if any, would argue that there is a theory 
of punishment called revenge. Although Locke maintains that his 
explanation draws a clear distinction between retribution and revenge, my 
interpretation is that he has bisected retribution and is thus looking at it 
from two levels: the one part is what Kant calls for, the ‘an eye for an eye’ 
theory of retribution; the other is what Armstrong calls for; the ‘liberalised’ 
theory of retribution at the penalty -fixing level. Consequently Locke calls 
Kant’s theory ‘Revenge’ and Armstrong’s ‘Retribution.’ In Kant’s own 
understanding of retribution, he who kills another person kills himself. This 
is the argument that even Armstrong refers to as the source of all the 
accusations that retribution is barbaric, and this is what Locke calls 
revenge. In Armstrong’s understating of retribution, there is not any harm 
done to retribution if the ideals underpinning the deterrence and 
reformatory theories are integrated into retribution at the penalty-fixing 
                                                            
111 Locke 1963: 568. 
112 Locke 1963: 570. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49
stage, provided that the limit of the punishment that is to be imposed is set 
on retributive grounds.113  
Armstrong succinctly summarises for us the attacks that have been directed 
against retribution in the light of the arguments that are given in support of 
other theories of punishment. He says that the attack unfolds as follows: 
Retributive punishment is only a polite name for revenge; it is vindictive, 
inhumane, barbarous, and immoral. Such an infliction of pain-for-pain’s- 
sake harms the person who suffers the pain, the person who inflicts it, and 
the society which permits it; every body loses, which brings out its 
essential pointlessness. The only humane motive, the only possible moral 
justification for punishment is to reform the criminal and/or to deter others 
from committing similar crimes. By making the punishment of 
wrongdoers a moral duty, the Retributive theory removes the possibility of 
mercy. The only people who today defend the Retributive theory are those 
who, whether they know it or not, get pleasure and a feeling of virtue from 
seeing others suffer, or those who have a hidden theological axe to grind. 
In any case, the theory is not only morally indefensible but completely 
inadequate in practice to determine what penalty the criminal should 
suffer in each case. Finally, the theory can be shown to be wrong by such 
simple facts of language usage as, for instance, that it makes sense to say 
‘He was punished for something he did not do,’ because, inter alia, the 
theory demands that to say a man was punished for a crime logically 
necessitates that he committed it. Historically, morally, and logically the 
theory is discredited.114    
In addition to Nozick’s correct distinction between revenge-taking and 
retribution, Armstrong’s response to the above criticisms of retributivism is 
that ‘…they are all mistaken – either because they are based on confusions 
about what the theory is or else because they spring from erroneous moral 
judgments.’115  He does not deal with the attack that the proponents of 
retribution are sadists or have a hidden religious interest, but nevertheless 
                                                            
113 Wilson also argued that a retributive punishment could also serve deterrent and 
rehabilitative objectives. Wilson 1983: 525. 
114 Armstrong 1961: 471-472.  
115 Armstrong 1961: 472. 
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mentions that ‘it could be true.’ However, he cautions that ‘philosophers, of 
all people, should surely be above using the ploy of analysing a man’s 
motive instead of meeting his arguments.’116 To the objection, that ‘the 
theory is out of date i.e, unfashionable’, Armstrong replies with a non-
satisfying statement that that objection ‘…seems so ridiculous 
philosophically that [he] would not have mentioned it at all if it were not 
for the unfortunate fact that it is the most common objection of all’ and that 
he certainly does not bother ‘…with it any further, giving the reader credit 
for being free from what Belloc called “[t]he degrading slavery of being a 
child of one’s time”.’117  This reply is unconvincing, because it would have 
been an opportunity for Armstrong to give his reason or reasons why the 
theory could still be defended in modern times in the light of other theories 
which claim to be the best in the circumstances. This being the ‘most 
common objection of all’, it should have been one of the central issues of 
his paper to point out the weakness of that objection, and thereby prove the 
strength of his theory. 
2.4.2.2 Is retribution inhumane? 
 
On the charge that retribution is inhumane, Armstrong argues that this 
charge, if correct, cannot be directed against the definition of punishment 
by the retributivist nor against their moral justification of punishment, but 
can only be against the penalty-fixing aspect of retribution. Put differently, 
Armstrong contends that the definitional and moral justification aspects of 
retribution are free from the charge of being inhumane, but that the penalty-
                                                            
116 Armstrong, 1961: 472. 
117 Armstrong 1961: 472. 
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fixing aspect is one that could be attacked as being inhumane. Armstrong, 
understandably so, reacts to this criticism not by directly showing the 
humane nature of the penalty-fixing aspect of retribution, but by indicating 
that, in the light of the penalty-fixing aspects of Deterrence and 
Reformation, retribution is more humane. He argues that if the aim of 
deterrence is to punish the offender severely so as to deter others from 
committing crime, ‘[l]et [somebody] be whipped to death, publicly of 
course, for a parking offence; that would certainly deter me from packing 
on the spot reserved for the Vice-Chancellor’ and that with rehabilitation, 
an offender could be detained ‘until he is sufficiently changed for the 
experts to certify him as reformed. On this theory, every sentence ought to 
be indeterminate ... “You stole a loaf of bread? Well, we’ll have to reform 
you, even if it takes the rest of your life”.’118        
Surely if utilitarianists were to whip people to death for minor offences, it 
would be both inhumane and would ignore the aspect of proportionality. 
The same applies to rehabilitationists if they were to detain a person for the 
rest of his/her life for stealing a loaf of bread. What Armstrong provides are 
hypothetical examples, though they clearly illustrate the weaknesses of 
both deterrence and rehabilitation. 
2.4.2.3 Can retribution be freed of the ‘eye for an eye’ approach? 
Unlike Kant, Armstrong is of the view that the ‘an eye for an eye’ approach 
to punishment is not justifiable, and therefore inapplicable, in some 
circumstances. He holds that there is no reason why retributivists should 
                                                            
118 Armstrong 1961: 484. 
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not look at other theories of punishment, in particular deterrence and 
reformatory, and use them at the penalty -fixing level of punishment, after 
the ‘permissible limit’ of how much punishment should be imposed in a 
given case has been determined by retributive principles. In this case, 
Armstrong concedes that although retribution adopts a non-compromising 
stand on the definitional and moral justification components of 
punishment,119 the three theories can merge at the penalty-fixing level, and 
that at that stage retribution borrows from deterrence and rehabilitation. He 
argues that there are circumstances where reliance on retribution does not 
help, for example, ‘[w]hat would lex talionis prescribe for a blind man who 
blinded someone else?’120 
As the discussion of punishment under international criminal tribunals and 
national courts illustrates in chapters III and V respectively, international 
criminal tribunals and courts in countries such as South Africa, Uganda (in 
some cases) and Mauritius do not sentence people to death because of the 
                                                            
119 Armstrong 1961: 487. 
120 Armstrong 1961: 486. See also 487, where Armstrong argues that justice does not mean 
that a man should be punished to the limit of the punishment, but that, depending on other 
considerations, such as reformatory considerations, a man can be punished less than justice 
requires but should not be punished more than justice requires. He therefore opines that 
‘The Retributive theory is not, therefore, incompatible with mercy. Quite the reverse is the 
case – it is only the Retributive idea that makes mercy possible, because to be merciful is 
to let someone off all or part of a penalty which he is recognized as having deserved.’ 
Armstrong concludes on this point  that ‘When the problem is to find the best system of 
penalty-fixing there is no doubt that a purely Retributive theory would have serious 
weaknesses, both practically, because it may be very difficult to decide which of the two 
crimes is the more serious and thus deserving the severer punishment, and morally, 
because if Deterrent and Reformatory considerations are all together ignored when the list 
of penalties is drawn up a great social good might be sacrificed in order to achieve a small 
improvement in the accuracy of the punishment from a Retributive standpoint. But, on the 
other hand…the charge that Retributive theories of penalty-fixing are barbarous is based 
on the mistaken assumption that the only such theory is the lex talionis, and that a 
modified Retributive theory is perfectly possible, one which only uses Retributive 
considerations to fix some sort of upper limit to penalties and then looks to other factors to 
decide how much and what sort of pain shall be inflicted. Purely Reformatory or Deterrent 
theories of penalty-fixing, which lack that limit, run the risking of becoming far more 
inhumane than even a purely Retributive theory.’ 489.     
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murder they committed, although retribution as an objective of punishment 
is still observed by these judicial bodies. 
Mabbott, like Kant, would disagree with Armstrong’s views stated above. 
He maintains that ‘[t]he truth is that while punishing a man and punishing 
him justly, it is possible to deter others, and also to attempt to reform him, 
and if these additional goods are achieved the total state of affairs is better 
than it would be with just punishment alone. But reform and deterrence are 
not modifications of the punishment and, still less reasons for it.’121 
Mabbott emphasises that ‘the punishment itself seldom reforms the criminal 
and never deters others. It is only “extra” arrangements which have any 
chance of achieving either result.’122 
Another argument that has been advanced to link retribution and 
punishment generally to revenge is that retribution originates from the ‘an 
eye for an eye’ argument and thus, by implication, there is no way in which 
it can be free of revengeful elements. Pincoffs suggests that the fact that 
punishment has its origin in revenge does not make it revenge itself.123 
Punishment evolves, and during this evolution the revenge elements that 
formed part of it during its ‘infancy’ disappear as punishment approaches 
‘maturity’. Weber elaborates this point as follows 
The argument that punishment is bad because it is brutal and medieval in 
its origin only illustrates a fallacy which besets the human mind in every 
                                                            
121 Mabbott 1939: 153. 
122 Mabbott 1939: 154. (Emphasis in original). He argues later that ‘I completely agree that 
while punishing a man we ought to make every effort to use this opportunity [for instance 
when he is in prison] in order to try in addition to reform him and to deter others.’ See 
Mabbott 1955: 262. (Emphasis in original). 
123 Pincoffs 1966: 46. 
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sphere of thought. The root of this fallacy is the notion that a thing can be 
defined in terms of its origin. Thus, the revolt against Darwinism is moved 
in part by the notion that if man originated from apes, he is essentially an 
ape…In short, things which evolve are what they are, not what they were. 
So with punishment.124   
 
2.4.2.4 The principle of equality as viewed by Mabbott 
 
Mabbott, like Kant, agrees that the principle of equality should govern the 
imposition of any punishment, but he takes this principle to another level 
by suggesting that those who commit the same crimes should be visited 
with the same punishment. Mabbott is against laws that allow judges 
discretion to determine which sentence is to be imposed on a particular 
criminal. Laws that give the judge a wide discretion in deciding which 
punishment to inflict on the offender are common in many jurisdictions. 
For example, in the case of robbery a judge may have a discretion to 
impose a sentence depending on the circumstances under which the robbery 
was committed. Such a law may read ‘a person found guilty of aggravated 
robbery shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less 10 years or 
to life imprisonment depending on the circumstances under which such 
robbery was committed.’ Another law may provide that ‘a person found 
guilty of murder is liable to be sentenced to life imprisonment.’ According 
to Mabbott such laws permit judges to take into consideration other factors, 
such as deterrence, in sentencing, and that this brings about inequality and 
defeats the purpose of punishment, and the theory of retribution in 
particular. He calls for laws that provide for ‘fixed penalties.’ In Glueck’s 
words this is ‘the cut-to-the-same-pattern view of all criminals committing 
                                                            
124 Weber 1928: 184-185. (Emphasis in original). 
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the same offense.’125 Such laws should provide, for example, that a person 
found guilty of murder ‘shall be imprisoned for 25 years.’ This would mean 
that all those who commit murder get the same sentence. He puts it clearly 
that: 
If the laws do include their own penalties then the judge has no 
option…The danger of allowing complete freedom to the judicature in 
fixing penalties is not merely that it lays too heavy a tax on human nature 
but that it would lead to the judge expressing in his penalty the degree of his 
own moral aversion to the crime. Or he might tend on deterrent grounds to 
punish more heavily a crime which was spreading and for which temptation 
and opportunity were frequent...The death penalty for sheep-stealing might 
have been defended on such deterrent grounds. But we should dislike 
equating sheep-stealing with murder. Fixed penalties enable us to draw 
these distinctions between crimes. It is not that we can say how much 
imprisonment is right for a sheep-stealer. But we can grade crimes in a 
rough scale and penalties in a rough scale and keep our heaviest penalties 
for what are socially the most serious wrongs regardless of whether these 
penalties will reform the criminal or whether they are exactly what 
deterrence would require.126 
 
A critical reading of Mabbott’s views above in the light of Armstrong’s 
position mentioned earlier, which is to the effect that at the penalty-fixing 
level retribution can borrow a leaf from deterrence and rehabilitation where 
appropriate, shows that although both Armstrong and Mabbott agree that 
issues of equality and proportionality are indispensable if punishment is to 
be imposed on retributive grounds, they disagree on how to approach these 
issues at a penalty fixing-level. Whereas Armstrong would disagree with a 
law which provides that ‘any person who is found guilty of blinding 
another person shall also be blinded’, on the ground that practically nothing 
would happen to a blind person who blinded another person, Mabbott 
                                                            
125 Glueck 1923: 235. 
126 Mabbott 1939: 162. 
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seems to have no problem with such a law, provided that offenders who 
commit similar offences are punished uniformly. Although Mabbot’s 
argument looks meritorious theoretically, it is argued that there are two 
reasons why it is difficult to defend in practice when evaluated in the light 
of Armstrong’s theory. The first is that it would lead to some offenders 
escaping punishment because the law is inflexible in accommodating their 
special circumstances for punishment purposes. To use Armstrong’s 
example, it would mean that blind people who blind others, in cases where 
the punishment for blinding another person is the blinding of the 
perpetrator, escape punishment. But if the law allowed the judge, for 
example, to impose another sentence in cases where the stipulated sentence 
would be inappropriate, such offenders may either be imprisoned or fined. 
The second problem with fixed penalties is that they fly in the face of the 
principle of separation of powers. In effect it is the legislature which passes 
the law and also determines the sentence, irrespective of the circumstances 
under which the offence was committed. The judge’s discretion is not just 
limited, but rather eliminated. 
2.4.2.5 Does retribution justify torture? 
Ruben has suggested that ‘[u]nlike utilitarian notions of incapacitation, 
which at least suggest incarceration, or rehabilitation, which virtually 
requires it, retribution could be achieved by virtually any means of 
inflicting pain or suffering on the offender, and most obviously, by physical 
torture’ and that ‘…the first thing that retribution brings to mind is that the 
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offender should be tortured while in prison.’127  He, however, adds quickly 
that ‘[m]odern retributivists, of course reject torture as a mode of 
punishment…’128Ruben does not define ‘torture.’ I will take it that he 
understood torture as it is defined under Article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).129 In my opinion Ruben errs when he says that 
retribution supports torture. As early as 1955, Mabbott, a convinced 
retributivist, argued that ‘[w]hen a man is sentenced to imprisonment he is 
not also sentenced to partial starvation, to physical brutality, to pneumonia 
from damp cells and so on.’130 This should be interpreted to mean that 
Mabbott supports the view that prisoners should be detained in humane 
conditions, and surely torture cannot be part of that. From a human rights 
perspective, the right to freedom from torture is recognised in international 
human rights law and international law as a peremptory norm, a jus 
cogens.131 This means that every country has, amongst other things, an 
obligation to eradicate torture in all places of detention and severely punish 
                                                            
127 Ruben 2003: 69.  
128 Ruben 2003: 70. 
129 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987. Under 
Article 1 of CAT torture is defined as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
form him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’    
130 Mabbott 1939: 166. 
131 For a detailed discussion of torture as a norm of jus cojens, see Ranganathan 2008: 381. 
For a detailed discussion of the concept of jus cogens in international law see Fry 2009: 
118; von Bogdandy and Dellavalle 2009: 27. 
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officials who have been found guilty of torturing prisoners.132 Therefore, 
any theory of punishment that would support a violation of international 
law and international human rights law should be classified as something 
other than a theory of punishment. It is true that prison warders torture 
prisoners and that some government officials inflict torture on inmates, but 
this does not mean that this is done because retribution as an objective of 
punishment approves of torture. The argument applies with equal force to 
rehabilitation and deterrence. Any attempt to argue that they support torture 
should not be supported.    
2.4.2.6 The right to be punished 
There are some circumstances where, even if a person has committed a 
heinous offence, they should be pardoned. A pardon can only be granted by 
the executive arm of government, and in most cases by the head of state or 
government. Different countries have different laws that govern the 
circumstances under which a person can be pardoned. A person can be 
pardoned either before conviction or after. Kant does not seem to support 
the idea of pardon, especially after conviction. He states that  
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its 
members – as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an 
island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole 
world - the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the 
resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one 
may realise the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltness may not 
remain upon the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as 
participants in the murder as a public violation of justice.133 
 
                                                            
132 Mujuzi 2006: 425-427.  
133 As quoted in Pincoffs 1966: 4. 
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Kant was of the view that a person found guilty of a crime must be 
punished. His argument presents one of the strongest points of retribution: 
deserts. Retribution is partly based on the fact that a person is punished 
because he/she deserves to be punished for his/her conduct.134 According to 
Fisher and Rosen-Zvi the principle of just desert is founded on the fact that 
‘punishment cannot be inflicted for further social ends, but rather solely 
because the punished individual deserves it.’135 In fact Hegel, like Kant,136 
has argued that a man is punished because he has a right to be punished.137 
In his words: 
The injury (the penalty) which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly 
just – as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, 
his right; on the contrary, it is also a right established in the criminal 
himself, i.e. in his objectively embodied will, in his action. The reason for 
this is that his action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it 
is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law 
which he has explicitly recognized in his action and under which in 
consequence he should be brought under his right.138 
                                                            
134 Lee 2009: 621; and Kolber 2009: 199. 
135 Fisher and Rosen-Zvi 2008: 910. 
136 It has been suggested that ‘‘Kant is right in declaring that criminals have a right to be 
punished.’ See Weber 1928: 195.   
137 It has been suggested that the doctrine that ‘a man has a right to be punished ‘originated 
from difficulties that faced states during the Enlightenment period. During this period 
Enlightenment reformers’ trust in the common man’s equal rationality was not quite as 
solid as they claimed’ and therefore it was clear that the state had to ensure that errant 
members of the society obeyed the law. But states were imposing harsh sentences such as 
‘whipping, hanging, burning and mutilating offenders in market places. This meant that 
the condemned man on whom such punishments were to be inflicted could not see the 
state as an instrument of his self-realization.’ On the one hand some people were harming 
others and therefore needed to be punished but the state that was punishing such members 
used harsh measures. ‘This dilemma was resolved by simultaneously assaulting existing 
punishment practices and calling for their radical reconception and reform on the grounds 
of autonomy. The offender, it was said, had in fact consented to his punishment. This 
consent was found either in his signature to the social contract (which, as it turned out, 
contained a punishment clause) or in his very act (which, after all, was universalizable as 
the act of a rational being). The more daring among punishment apologists of the time 
went so far as to argue that the offender not only had consented to his punishment, but that 
he had a right to be punished.’ Dubber 1998: 115.             
138 Hegel as quoted in Pincoffs 1966: 12.   
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It is important to mention that some modern scholars who have written 
about the right to be punished erroneously assume that Hegel was the 
‘father’ of this right. Diegh, for example, says that though this right was 
‘[b]orn of Hegelian social philosophy, it still finds adherents and 
sympathizers long after the death of its progenitor.’139 Some writers, such 
as Pincoffs,140 also only look at the right to be punished from a retributive 
perspective, as if it is exclusive to retribution. Dubber argues that the 
concept of the right to be punished was coined by the early 19th – century 
scholar, Fichte, a year ‘before Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals appeared’ and 
that ‘Hegel ... merely put a sharp dialectical point on a Kantian idea.’141 
Hegel assumes that the criminal exercises his freedom of will as a rational 
human being and decides to commit a crime. In other words, a criminal, as 
a rational human being chooses to follow the ‘criminal route’ and ignores 
the ‘non-criminal route’, and thereby invites punishment himself. It thus 
becomes his/her right to be punished because he has chosen his/her conduct 
well aware of, and ‘intends the natural consequences of his act’ as criminal 
lawyers would put it. Here Hegel, though he does not explicitly say so, 
rejects the determinism argument and adopts the free-will argument. It has 
been argued that 
[T]he moral right to be punished derives from a more fundamental natural 
right, inalienable and absolute: the right to be treated as a person. Persons 
are entitled to have their choices respected; therefore, when one chooses 
responsibly to engage in morally reprehensible conduct prohibited by a 
                                                            
139 Deigh 1984: 191. 
140 Pincoffs 1966: 12. 
141 Dubber 1998: 116. 
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just system of criminal law, one chooses also the consequences of his 
offense: punishment. That choice is to be respected.142 
 
Parry has argued that in ‘the Kantian world...the citizen claims punishment 
as an equal moral right. But the right to be punished itself depends upon 
being normal. Deviants are not entitled to punishment precisely because 
they are not equal.’143 Whether a person has a right to be punished is a 
controversial issue. Deigh is of the view that the doctrine that a criminal 
has a right to be punished has outlived the system of philosophy that gave 
birth to it, and that the ‘reason for its independent life…’ is that ‘the 
doctrine captures for many the uplifting thought that human society owes 
even its most inimical members respect as responsible, moral agents’ and 
that ‘punishment is part of institution of social control that treats persons as 
responsible, moral agents, and thus punishment becomes a sign of 
respect.’144 Deigh asks: ‘what manner of right is this? A right to suffer the 
deprivation of some good or to be visited with some evil? What could ever 
possess a person to want to assert such a right?’145  He adds that ‘[l]ooked 
at it one way, the doctrine is appealing; looked at it in another, it is a 
morass of confusion.’146 He maintains that one of the standard objections to 
this doctrine is that ‘…a right to be punished is otiose; no one would ever 
have good reason to assert it. Punishment, because it is an evil, is not 
                                                            
142 Gardner 2008: 480. 
143 Parry 2007: 219-220. 
144 Deigh 1984: 191. 
145 Deigh 1984: 191. 
146 Deigh 1984: 192. 
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something a person of sound mind would want to claim as his due.’147 
Binder argues that ‘despite paradoxical claims of Kant and Hegel that 
offenders had a “right to be punished,” the offender is hoping neither for 
punishment nor for frustration.’148  
What if those who support the concept of the right to be punished put it that 
this is a unique right, in the sense that people do not have to claim it. It is a 
right that society thinks that you deserve to enjoy because you broke the 
law. And, therefore, being a right of this kind, it should be distinguished 
from other rights that ordinarily people claim. They could also strengthen 
their argument further by suggesting that even with regard to those rights 
that Deigh thinks that people of sound mind are entitled to claim, there are 
different principles that govern these different rights. For example, they 
may argue, that civil and political rights require immediate implementation, 
whereas socio-economic rights require progressive realisation depending 
on, amongst other things, the availability of resources. But the mere fact 
that there are different principles at the implementation level of civil and 
political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other, 
does not make either less than rights. Therefore, they may add, the mere 
fact that the right to be punished involves some pain and deprivation and is 
forced upon you by the state, does not make it less of a right.  
One of the arguments that have been put forward to support the right to be 
punished goes like this: 
                                                            
147 Deigh 1984: 192. 
148 Binder 2008: 734.  
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a criminal concerned to maintain his dignity as a human being would have 
reason to demand that he be punished in circumstances in which relieving 
him of that punishment would constitute an affront to his dignity, would 
insultingly convey to him that he was regarded as less than a person.149 
In support of the above contention, defenders of the right to be punished 
argue that in a system where a person commits an offence and the 
authorities think that he deserves to be treated and not punished, on the 
ground that he is suffering from a curable illness which made him/her 
commit that offence, such system treats that person with indignity. Such 
system assumes that that person is sick and that he is not responsible for his 
actions or omissions. This is an affront to human dignity and therefore 
should be resisted. Many convicted criminals, if asked to choose between 
being treated as sick and subjected to therapy, and being punished to show 
that they were responsible for their acts, would choose the latter, hence 
claiming their right to be punished because such a right would come with 
dignity.150  It is also contended that pardoning a criminal violates his 
dignity; this is so because by committing the offence he wanted to enjoy his 
right to be punished.151  
But this contention is rejected on the ground that a criminal does not choose 
to be punished; it is the authorities which arrest, try and convict the 
criminal. Therefore he cannot say that, by committing an offence, he 
chooses to be punished.152 It may also be added that many people who 
                                                            
149 Deigh 1984: 192. 
150 Deigh 1984: 194-196. 
151 Deigh 1984: 198-199. 
152 Deigh 1984: 197. 
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commit offences do not get arrested.153 Such people hardly, if ever, unless 
there are compelling indications that they will be arrested hand themselves 
over to the authorities so that they will be able ‘to enjoy’ their right to be 
punished. Another objection to the assertion that when a criminal is 
pardoned this amounts to a violation of human dignity, is that, in such 
cases, no substantive wrong is done to the right, and therefore there can be 
no claim that the right has been violated.154 However, the difficulty with 
this objection is that it is subjective, depending on the angle from which it 
is being approached. The criminal would say that by ‘pardoning me the 
authorities have treated me like a kid or a person incapable of serving my 
sentence.’ Surely to him this would be a substantive wrong, because he has 
been treated in a derogatory manner. 
Another view that supports the doctrine that a criminal has a right to be 
punished, is grounded in the reformatory theory of punishment. This view 
holds that: 
punishment renders a criminal benefits in that it provides him with the 
means necessary for his moral regeneration. The criminal’s guilt implies 
diminished stature, and by submitting to punishment he expiates that guilt 
and so regains the stature he lost…the harm that a criminal would suffer if 
he remained in his diminished condition, if, in particular, he were denied the 
means necessary for expiation, suffices to establish his right to be punished 
much as the harm a diseased person would suffer if he were denied 
medicine that would cure him suffices to establish his right to medical 
treatment.155     
                                                            
153 In State v Makwanyane and another 1995 (3) SA 391 para 120 the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa heard that only between 30 and 40 percent of people who commit violent 
crimes get arrested. 
154 Deigh 1984: 199-200. 
155 Deigh 1984: 202. 
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The first objection in principle to this theory, by a retributivist adhering to 
Kant’s position, is that it is based on reformatory theory. Kant would argue 
that ‘[t]he penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps 
through the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage 
that may discharge him from the justice of punishment.’ But Armstrong 
would concede that if there is something good that retribution could learn 
from rehabilitation at the penalty-fixing level, it should be emulated. 
However it has to be shown that ‘a criminal can regain a well-integrated 
moral personality only by submitting to punishment.’156 Deigh holds that, 
in cases of serious offences, for a criminal to regain a well-integrated moral 
personality, he has to be punished, but that for less serious crimes this may 
not be the case. He also maintains that punishing a criminal does not in 
itself change people’s perceptions towards him.157  
One of the questions that arise with regard to the right to be punished is 
whether someone would argue that this right is applicable in capital 
punishment cases. Could it be argued that an individual has a right to be 
killed by the state? Beccaria argued, almost two and a half centuries ago, 
that when we talk about the right to be punished as a contractual obligation 
between an individual and the state (arising out of the social contract – in 
the sense that an individual to that contract consents to be punished if he 
breaches that agreement), there is no way that capital punishment can be 
justified. This is because no one could consent ‘to his own extinction, be it 
through state punishment or suicide, no matter how great a consideration he 
                                                            
156 Deigh 1984: 207. 
157 Deigh 1984: 207-209. 
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might receive in return…’158 He, like many modern reformers, considered 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release as no better than the 
death penalty.159 He therefore viewed consenting to ‘lifelong 
incarceration…as a state of perpetual slavery, a fate worse than death.’160   
The above discussion shows that for a retributivist, punishment must be 
linked to the crime. He looks at the conduct of the criminal in the past. He 
takes a ‘backward –looking’ approach and not a ‘forward –looking’ one.161 
In other words, the retributivist will argue that when, punishing a criminal, 
the punisher should not concern himself or herself with issues such as the 
likely benefit to society from the punishment inflicted on the individual, 
and the likely benefit to the individual from the punishment inflicted on 
him. The former underpin the utilitarian theories and the latter the 
rehabilitation theories, while retribution opposes such theories and 
questions their legitimacy. The retributivist is not concerned with the 
psychological and social functions of punishment.  However, Rabie and 
Strauss have argued that courts, in deciding whether to adopt a retributive, 
reformative or deterrent approach to punishment will rely on the offence 
committed. If the offence is heinous and the law provides that it should be 
punished severely, then courts will adopt a retributive approach.  They add 
that in such cases the court will not separate retribution from deterrence, 
but will impose a sentence to reflect both. In other words: 
                                                            
158 Beccaria 1764 as paraphrased by Dubber 1998: 120. 
159 See Appleton and Grover 2007: 605-606. 
160 Dubber 1998: 120. 
161 Harding and Ireland 1989: 117. 
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Where the court has to do with a crime which threatens the public well- 
being, such as dealing in drugs, and which is expressly branded by the law 
giver as a major evil, personal circumstances and rehabilitation make way 
for retribution and deterrence as the stronger elements in sentencing.162 
 
The retributivist will disagree with the above observation. First of all, he 
will argue that what matters when the court imposes a sentence is not that 
the offence ‘threatens the public well-being’, for this would be punishing 
an individual for the benefit of the public at large, but that the individual 
has committed the offence. In fact this is what Mabbott warns against when 
he argues that the reason why it is necessary for the law to provide the same 
punishment for the same type of crime, is to avoid the possibility of judicial 
officers sentencing people who have committed similar crimes to different 
sentences. The second reason why a retributivist will disagree with the 
above observation, is that, for him to be convinced that because the offence 
is heinous and that therefore rehabilitation and the circumstances of the 
criminal should ‘make way for retribution and deterrence’, is like telling 
him that both schools of thought approach the issue of punishment from the 
same angle. The utilitarian would also disagree because both theories of 
punishment aim at achieving different ends. Reformers will also disagree 
with the above observation, on the ground that the more heinous the 
offence, the more rehabilitative the programmes should be to which the 
offender is subjected,  and that punishing such an offender in a manner that 
aims at achieving deterrence and retribution objects will not reform them, 
but rather harden them and hence lead to recidivism.   
                                                            
162 Rabie and Strauss 1985: 273.  
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2.4.3 Utilitarianism/deterrence 
The deterrence theory of punishment has been part of the punishment 
debate for centuries, although the ‘formal emergence of this theory is often 
identified with Cesare Beccaria.’163 In the eighteenth century, Beccaria 
‘espoused the general proposition that human behaviour can be influenced 
by variations in punishment.’164 He argued for ‘the general prevention of 
crime through intimidation or deterrence…’165 Beccaria opined that ‘[t]o be 
just, a punishment must not exceed that degree of intensity which will deter 
other men from crime’.166 His ideas influenced legislation in different 
countries such as England, France, Russia, Germany, and Denmark,167 and 
many scholars, politicians and philosophers including Bentham.168 After 
Bentham’s death, Mill ‘was recognised as the leader, or at least the 
exponent, of the philosophical radicals.’169  The three early great 
philosophers of the deterrence theory of punishment are Beccaria, Bentham 
and Mill. Their arguments would form the backbone of the deterrence 
theory.  
Deterrence can be categorised into two: specific deterrence and general 
deterrence. According to Christopher, specific deterrence aims at ‘deterring 
the offender from committing future crimes’, whereas general deterrence 
                                                            
163 Archer et al 1983: 992. 
164 Archer et al 1983: 992-993. 
165 Cantor 1935: 217.  
166 Manzoni 1964: 47. 
167 Farrer 1880: 29-68. 
168 Coughlin 1975: 248.   
169 Mill 1957: vii.  
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aims at ‘deterring others in society from committing’ crime in the future.170 
In this discussion I use the words ‘deterrence’ and ‘utilitarianism’ 
interchangeably because they are often used interchangeably in the 
punishment dabate. 
2.4.3.1 Utilitarianism and justification of punishment  
As alluded to earlier, protecting society from crime is what the 
utilitarianists consider to be the moral justification of punishment. Their 
justification of punishment was succinctly171 put by Hospers when he 
observed as follows: 
[T]hat an act or rule of punishing, like every other act or rule, is justified 
only if the act or the adoption of the rule produces good. Punishment 
involves an intrinsic evil, for it is the deliberate infliction of pain, 
discomfort, frustration, and other forms of unhappiness upon the person 
punished. Punishment is justified however, by the effects it has; where its 
effects are not good, there is no excuse for indulging in it. Punishment 
should always be future-looking, not past-looking; always in order that, 
never simply because of it. If some one has committed a crime, that is 
unfortunate, but punishment should be strictly in order to produce good 
consequences (which, again, includes the prevention of bad ones) in the 
future.172   
The above quotation entails important elements and features of punishment. 
One is, that punishment is evil or unpleasant. Retributivists agree with this 
in principle. The second element is that punishment is only justified when it 
                                                            
170 Christopher 2002: 856. For the same distinction see Bene 1991: 935-937. 
171 This does not mean that he was the first person to talk about this justification. His work 
is quoted because I believe that it clearly summarises the justification.  
172 Hospers 1961: 454, quoted in Strong 1969: 188-189.  It has been observed that 
‘[b]riefly stated, deterrence theory holds that there is an effective relationship between 
specific qualities of punishment (for example, its certainty, celerity, or severity) and the 
likelihood that a punishable offence will be committed. A corollary of deterrence theory is 
that increasing the penalty for an offence will decrease its frequency while decreasing the 
penalty will cause infractions to multiply. Deterrence theory therefore envisions potential 
offenders as rational actors who weigh the qualities of potential punishment before acting.’ 
See Archer et al 1983: 991.    
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is aimed and bringing good or happiness to society. The retributivists do 
not agree with this argument. Finally, that punishment should always be 
future-looking in order to prevent crime. The retributivist will disagree and 
state that it should backward –looking and that the offender should only be 
punished because he/she broke the law. 
2.4.3.2 Ethical arguments underpinning utilitarianism: the principle of 
utility 
A brief look at the ethical argument for utilitarianism will help us to 
understand the arguments underpinning this theory of punishment. Every 
action or omission that utilitarianism advocates is for the purpose of 
promoting the principle of utility. According to Bentham, this principle 
‘approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question.’173 Mill is of the view that utility 
consists of both the pursuit of happiness and the mitigation of 
unhappiness.174 He would add that ‘[t]he whole force …of …punishment, 
whether physical or moral …is to enforce the utilitarian morality…’175 To a 
utilitarian, if there are two choices, one yielding five benefits to a majority 
of the population, and the other yielding six, the latter should be preferred 
because the choice that yields the greatest benefit to the most people is the 
one that is ethically correct. 
 
                                                            
173 Bentham 1982: 12. 
174 Mill 1957: 11-12. 
175 Mill 1957: 26. 
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2.4.3.2.1 Act and rule utilitarianism  
There are generally two types of utilitarianism: act utilitarianism and rule 
utilitarianism.176 It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into a detailed 
philosophical and ethical discussion of what should be the criterion to 
determine what amounts to act-utilitarianism or rule-utilitarianism.177 
However, a simple illustration of what should guide us to have an 
elementary understanding of the features differentiating between these two 
types of utilitarianism is warranted. If a person who subscribes to rule-
utilitarianism was asked for the criterion applied to distinguish between 
what is right and what is wrong, he would answer that ‘[a]n act is right if 
and only if it is permitted or recommended by the moral code whose 
acceptance in the agent’s society would maximise utility.’178 Put 
differently, ‘…an action is right if and only if  its performance is required 
by a set of rules the satisfaction of which would have at least as good 
consequences as the satisfaction of any other set of rules.’179  On the other 
hand, if the same question were posed to those who subscribe to act-
utilitarianism, their answer would be that ‘…an action is right if and only if 
                                                            
176 Though Regan argues that there is another type of utilitarianism known as ‘co-operative 
utilitarianism.’ For the discussion and criticism of co-operative utilitarianism see Conee 
1983: 415-424. There are also other types of utilitarianism such as ‘…extended act 
utilitarianism, extended rule- utilitarianism, hedonistic utilitarianism, ideal utilitarianism, 
pluralistic and monistic utilitarianism, utilitarianism Kantian in form and …deotological 
utilitarianism.’ Kerner 1971: 37.   
177 For some of the advanced philosophical arguments on the classification of some 
thinkers’ works as either act-utilitarianism or rule- utilitarianism see, Brown 1974: 67-68.  
178 See Trianosky 1978: 416. 
179 Haynes 1983: 252. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72
its performance by an agent would lead to consequences at least as good as 
those of any other action available to the agent.’180  
Both act –utilitarianism and rule- utilitarianism have different features and 
both have been criticised widely in that neither can solve society’s 
problems.181 However, those criticisms, if explored, would lead us into a 
detailed discussion of each of these theories of utilitarianism, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. That notwithstanding, both theories agree 
on some principles: any act should be done for the good of society, and the 
ultimate good of society is to achieve happiness or pleasure and avoid pain; 
that if there are two competing actions or desires, the one that brings more 
pleasure or happiness should be followed. Common to both theories is that 
all desires, like virtue, are a means to an end and not ends in themselves, 
and that they all facilitate humankind to reach his only and ultimate desire: 
Utility or the Greatest Happiness. As Benatar observes that utilitarianism is 
‘…a goal- based theory that seeks to maximise utility.’182 Mill opines that 
‘Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and 
the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain, and the privation of pleasure.’183 
It is with this approach in mind that the question of punishment is looked 
                                                            
180 Haynes 1983: 251. 
181 For some of the criticisms and defences of act utilitarianism, see Bales 1972: 203-205, 
who argues that ‘probably utilitarians have been more persistent than non-utilitarians in 
their attempts to provide an account of moral obligatoriness in terms of the right 
alternative (or alternatives) open to an agent in given circumstances. They may take 
comfort, however, in the observation that utilitarianism fares no worse than does a 
deontological theory which proposes such an account of obligatoriness’. See 205.  
182 Benatar 1992: 66. 
183 Mill 1957: 6. 
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at. Punishment is looked at as a means to bring happiness to society by 
either deterring potential criminals or by punishing those who commit 
crime. This is because crime is thought to reduce or diminish happiness. 
Crime is regarded at as a source of pain and it has to be prevented at any 
cost. 
2.4.3.3 Forward-looking approach 
Those who subscribe to the deterrence theory of punishment maintain that 
punishment can only be justified by a forward-looking approach: deterring 
people from committing crime, which consequently reduces delinquency. 
This means that the authorities must do whatever is possible to bring it to 
the attention of members of society that punishment has been imposed for 
breaking the law, because ‘to achieve general deterrence, the appearance or 
publicity of punishment is crucial. Actual punishment, without society’s 
awareness generates no general deterrent effect.’184 They argue, in 
comparison to retribution, that the: 
deterrence theory does not rest on anything metaphysical like justice. 
Retributionism does. Deterrence theory suggests that punishments are 
justified by reducing the crime rate and should be determined by the amount 
of deterrence people are willing to pay for in money (for police, judiciary, 
prisons, etc.) and in the cost (“moral and financial) paid by the persons 
punished.185 
 
Van Den Haag suggests that rehabilitation does not reduce the crime 
rate.186 Like Armstrong, who objectively realises that sometimes both 
retribution and deterrence could be reconciled especially at the penalty-
                                                            
184 Christopher 2002: 856. 
185 Van Den Haag 1982: 795. 
186 Van Den Haag 1982: 794. 
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fixing stage, van Den Haag suggests that ‘the punishments by deterrence 
and by retributionist theories coincide more often than is realized. But 
neither theory is a proxy for the other and the punishments may differ 
since…punishments required by retributionism are arbitrary’187 The issue 
of whether the retribution theory of punishment is arbitrary or not has been 
discussed above. The deterrence theory is based on the assumption that the 
punisher imposes and administers punishment for the wellbeing of the 
community, and by implication knows what the community wants. In most 
cases it would be argued that the community wants happiness, which is, 
utility, and that by preventing and punishing crime, the community 
achieves utility. As Mill would put it,  
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness, holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of 
pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.188    
 
One of the criticisms levelled against Mill’s explanation of utility is that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for one to measure happiness, and be able to 
ascertain that a given community is happy because of the actions taken 
against an offender. This issue is dealt with later in this chapter. Bentham, 
like Beccaria, held the view that punishment should be administered for the 
purpose of deterring people from committing crime.189 Bentham argued 
further that punishment is evil and that ‘it ought only to be admitted in as 
                                                            
187 Van Den Haag 1982: 794. 
188 Mill 1957: 6.  
189 Bentham 1982: 70-71. 
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far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.’190 He explains four cases 
where punishment ought not to be inflicted: 
(1)Where it is groundless; where there is no mischief for it to prevent; the 
act not being mischievous upon the whole; (2) where it must be 
inefficacious: where it cannot act so as to prevent the mischief; (3) where 
it is unprofitable, or too expensive; where the mischief it would produce 
would be greater than what it prevented (4) where it is needless: where the 
mischief may be prevented, or cease of itself, without it: that is, at a 
cheaper rate.191 
 
2.4.3.3.1 Where punishment is groundless 
Bentham is of the view that punishment would be groundless if a person 
freely and fairly consented to the mischievous act, which ordinarily would 
have attracted punishment, to be performed on him or her. This is because 
‘no man can be so good a judge as the man himself, what it is that gives 
him pleasure or displeasure.’192 An example would be of a person who 
consents to be injected with medicine. The injection itself would cause him 
or her pain but he would have consented to it. Another instance where the 
infliction of punishment would be groundless, according to Bentham, is 
where the mischief was outweighed by the benefit. In other words, 
‘although a mischief was produced by that act, yet the same act was 
necessary to the production of a benefit which was of a greater value than 
the mischief.’193 This would be the case where some mischievous measures 
are taken to avert an instant calamity, for example, in the case of necessity. 
                                                            
190 Bentham 1982: 158. 
191 Bentham 1982: 159. 
192 Bentham 1982: 159. 
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Bentham also argues that punishment is groundless ‘where there is a 
certainty of an adequate compensation.’ He adds that for punishment to be 
groundless on this ground, two factors must exist: one is that ‘the offence is 
such as admits of an adequate compensation’ and that ‘such compensation 
is sure to be forthcoming.’194 One example is where A negligently damages 
B’s car and gives him all the money he needs to have his car repaired.195 In 
this case it would be groundless to punish A. However, should A 
negligently damage B’s car but refuse to give B the amount of money 
needed for the repairs, then A should be punished, and such punishment 
cannot be classified as groundless. The second example is where A, in his 
capacity as a police officer, tortures B with the intention of extracting a 
confession from him, and B suffers severe bodily injuries as a result of the 
torture. In such a case A must be ordered to pay B’s medical bills and 
income lost as a result of arrest, detention and hospitalisation. However, 
torture being crime (in some countries), A should also be punished by 
imprisonment and dismissal from the police force so that he serves as an 
example to other police officers to refrain from engaging in torture. 
2.4.3.3.2 Where punishment is inefficacious  
Bentham is of the view that punishment should not be inflicted when it is 
inefficacious. The first instance in which punishment would be 
inefficacious is ‘where the penal provision is not established until after the 
act is done.’ Two examples are given to illustrate this point: first, where the 
                                                            
194 Bentham 1982: 160. 
195 The assumption is that it is not a case where the damage results from a criminal conduct 
which is punishable, for example, drunken driving. 
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law under which the accused is being charged was not enacted until the 
accused committed the alleged offence; and secondly ‘where the judge, of 
his own authority, appoints a punishment which the legislator had not 
appointed.’196 In my opinion, if the objective of punishment is to deter 
people from committing crime, it would indeed be impossible to achieve 
that objective if there was no law specifying the prohibited act and no 
punishment is stipulated for the prohibited act. This explains why in cases 
where a judge has a discretion to impose the sentence, the law would 
normally provide either the minimum or the maximum punishment that 
should be imposed on the offender.197 
Related to the above, Bentham suggests that punishment would be 
inefficacious ‘where the penal provision, though established, is not 
conveyed to the notice of the person on whom it seems intended that it 
should operate.’198 In this case, Bentham implies, for example, that in 
countries such as South Africa where a person convicted of murder has to 
be sentenced to life imprisonment unless there are compelling and 
substantial circumstances, the government should make sure that such a 
fact is known to all potential murderers, so that they do not commit 
murders lest they be sentenced to life imprisonment. The effectiveness of 
this measure seems to be doubtful because of the fact that many criminals 
                                                            
196 Bentham 1982: 160. 
197 However, there are situations where the law does not provide for a minimum or 
maximum punishment that the judge could impose. Legislation may provide that a person 
found guilty of defilement, for example, is ‘liable’ to suffer death. The judge has discretion 
to impose any sentence which could include caution, imprisonment or death.  
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commit offences in the expectation that they will not be caught.199 Thus, 
the fact that the law is widely disseminated is not a guarantee that crimes 
would not be committed. Bentham adds that punishment would be 
inefficacious even if the penal provision were brought to the potential 
criminal’s notice but such notification ‘could produce no effect on him, 
with respect to the preventing him from engaging in any act of the sort in 
question.’ People who fall in this category, according to Bentham, include 
infants, the insane and those who are intoxicated.200 
According to Bentham, punishment would also be inefficacious if the 
person, to whom the legal provision prohibiting any act has been conveyed, 
erroneously believes that such provision does not prohibit the act that that 
person is about to engage upon, although indeed such act is prohibited by 
the legal provision. One important element of this argument is the 
assumption that the person who has broken the law would have refrained 
from taking the forbidden action had they understood that the law, of whose 
existence they are aware, prohibited such action. Bentham argues that this 
scenario may arise in three circumstances: where a person engages in the 
prohibited act unintentionally; where a person engages in the prohibited act 
unconsciously; and ‘in the case of mis-supposal.’201 The first two 
circumstances are self-explanatory but a detailed account of what Bentham 
calls ‘mis-supposal’ it worth reproducing verbatim. ‘Mis-supposal’ arises in 
cases  
                                                            
199 As already illustrated, the Constitutional Court of South Africa observed that only 
between 30 and 40 percent of violent criminals are arrested. See S v Makwanyane 1995. 
200 Bentham 1982: 161. 
201 Bentham 1982: 161-162. 
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where, although he may know of the tendency the act has to produce that 
degree of mischief, he supposes it, though mistakenly, to be attended with 
some circumstance…which, if it had been attended with, it would either not 
have been productive of that mischief, or have been productive of such a 
greater degree of good, as has determined the legislator in such a case not to 
make it penal.202 
In addition, punishment would be inefficacious if a person is in the 
predicament of having to choose between committing an act forbidden by 
the law, which imposes a less severe sentence, and executing an order 
whose disobedience would result into a severer punishment. This, 
according to Bentham, may happen in the case of physical danger and in 
the case of threatened mischief.203 This could be illustrated as follows: the 
Traffic law in Country W provides that ‘any person who drives on any 
pavement in the city will be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 2 weeks. 
A, a physician, who is aware of the law, is driving his car on street B in the 
city. He realises that a child has been knocked down by a car, which now 
blocks the road, and that unless he drives on the pavement, he will not be 
able to save the child’s life, by first administering first-aid and then driving 
him to his clinic for treatment. The Medical Code in that country provides 
that ‘any physician who fails to help any person involved in a road accident 
in circumstances that were not beyond the control of the said physician 
shall have his/her practising certificate withdrawn for a period of not less 
than 10 years.’ The possibility that A will be imprisoned for a period not 
exceeding two weeks, which could even be a mere caution depending on 
the circumstances of the case, will not deter A from driving on the 
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pavement to save the child’s life, because failure to do so could lead to A’s 
certificate being cancelled for a period of not less than 10 years.   
Related to the foregoing is the situation where a person, though fully aware 
that the action he is about to engage in is against the law, will go ahead and 
break the law, because of the ‘physical compulsion or restraint, by 
whatever means brought about.’ This is the case, for instance, ‘where a 
man’s hand…is pushed against some object which his will disposes him not 
to touch; or tied down from touching some object which his will disposes 
him to touch.’204 
2.4.3.3.3 Where punishment is unprofitable 
 
Bentham argues that punishment should not be imposed where it is 
unprofitable. This includes cases where punishment would produce more 
evil than the offence for which the offender is being punished. Examples in 
this category include: ‘the extraordinary value of the services of some one 
delinquent; in the case where the effect of punishment would be to deprive 
the community of the benefit of those services;’ or, where the community 
conceives that ‘…the offence or the offender ought not to be punished at 
all, or at least ought not to be punished in the way in question.’205 There are 
at least two problems with Bentham’s argument in this regard. The first, is 
that it appears to perpetuate unequal treatment of people before the law. He 
appears to suggest that people who are of ‘more value’ to the community 
than others should not be punished when they break some law, because of 
                                                            
204 Bentham 1982: 162. 
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the likely consequences that the community will suffer as a result of their 
being punished. This would, for example, mean, that in a community where 
parking on pavements is an offence punishable by two days imprisonment 
on conviction, and where there is one cardiologist who attends to all 
patients with heart problems, such cardiologist, even if found guilty of 
parking on the pavement, should not be detained for the stipulated two days 
because, according to Bentham, his service is of extraordinary value, and 
the effect of such detention would deprive the community of the benefit of 
his services. 
Another problem arises in that Bentham suggests that punishment would be 
unprofitable where the community conceives that the ‘offence or the 
offender ought not to be punished at all, or at least ought not to be punished 
in the way in question.’ This would only apply in cases, for instance, where 
the judge has discretion to determine how great a sentence is to be imposed 
on the convicted criminal. In cases where the judge does not have that 
discretion, for example, where the law provides for a mandatory sentence, 
even if the community feels that the person should not be punished as the 
law stipulates, the judge has no alternative but to impose the stipulated 
sentence. This also brings into the equation the issue of public opinion and 
its likely influence or impact on the independence of the judiciary. 
Bentham’s argument seems to support the view that public opinion should 
be one of the factors that courts should take into account when sentencing 
offenders. This is highly debatable. 
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2.4.3.3.4 Where punishment is needless 
Bentham points out that punishment is needless ‘where the purpose of 
putting an end to the practice may be attained as effectually at a cheaper 
rate.’ This, according to Bentham, may be achieved: ‘by instruction…as 
well as by terror: by informing the understanding, as well as by exercising 
an immediate influence on the will.’206 In this regard Bentham is 
emphasising the need for the authorities not to resort to expensive and time 
consuming measures to prevent crime, when cheaper avenues could be 
invoked. He also implies that it is not only the sovereign that has the 
responsibility to prevent crime. Members of the community also have such 
a duty. He states that ‘if it be the interest of one individual to inculcate 
principles that are pernicious, it will as surely be the interest of other 
individuals to expose them. But if the sovereign must needs take part in the 
controversy, the pen is the proper weapon to combat error with, not the 
sword.’207        
2.4.3.4 Challenges to measuring happiness    
As mentioned earlier, utilitarianists argue that punishing offenders is meant 
to bring happiness to the community, by deterring potential criminals from 
committing crime. One problem that the utilitarianists have had to grapple 
with, is to justify the criterion they use to determine what the community or 
society wants. Den Haag concedes that ‘there are problems in finding out 
what the community wants and whether the best way to gratify its demand 
is to increase apprehension rates, or conviction rates, or severity of 
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punishment.’208 These are legitimate concerns. If we are talking about 
happiness as that which the community wants, how do we measure desire 
or want when it comes to punishment? Would the community be happy if 
the police apprehended more criminals? Would it be happy if the police 
apprehended more criminals, but the prosecution secured fewer 
convictions? Would it be happy if the police apprehended less criminals, 
but the prosecution secured a higher rate of convictions? Would the 
community be happy if the police apprehended many criminals, but courts 
imposed lenient punishments? Or would the community be happy if less 
criminals were apprehended, but severe punishments imposed on those 
convicted?  
Various answers could be given to the above questions. Bentham concedes 
that it is not always easy to determine the community’s interests. To 
determine this, Bentham argues one has to combine the interests of 
‘several’ individuals in that community.209 Bentham realises that each 
individual in a community has different interests, and that it is impossible 
to take into consideration each and every individual’s interests in the search 
for happiness for the community. That could be the reason why he carefully 
uses the word ‘several’ instead of ‘all.’ This means that some members of 
the community will be happy with the action taken by the government to 
deal with crime, but others will not.  
However, Van Den Haag suggests that ‘…these empirical problems [which 
question the criterion used to determine what makes a community happy] 
                                                            
208Van Den Haag 1982: 795. 
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arise only after one accepts deterrence as a criterion for punishment and 
seem solvable…’210 In my opinion, the problem with Van Dan Haag’s 
answer is that it ignores the fact that many people would need to have those 
questions answered to their satisfaction before they would accept 
‘deterrence as a criterion for punishment.’ Put differently, the reason why 
one would reject deterrence as a theory of punishment is that the above-
stated problems have not been answered convincingly enough to disregard 
the retributive and rehabilitative theories of punishment. Utilitarianists have 
to devise a more convincing answer than that provided by van Den Haag. 
2.4.3.5 Does deterrence reduce crime? 
In addition to the ‘punishment of the innocent’ criticism directed against 
deterrence, and the failure to a provide a convincing criterion for 
determining what the community wants, in 1928 Weber criticised 
deterrence by arguing that ‘whether or not the infliction of punishment will 
deter from crime is answerable in only two ways - psychologically and 
statistically.’211 He continued to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 
deterrence by arguing that there was no statistical evidence that deterrence 
reduced crime and added that most crimes were concealed and that ‘mostly 
the stupid offenders are caught.’212 68 years later, Weber’s view was also 
upheld in the South African Constitutional Court decision of State v 
                                                            
210 Van Den Haag 1982: 795. 
211 Weber 1928: 184. 
212 Weber 1928: 188. Mocan and Gittings are of the view that ‘[a]n inherent difficulty in 
uncovering the impact of deterrence on crime is to find appropriate data sets to overcome 
the issue of simultaneity between criminal activity and deterrence measures.’ See Mocan 
and Gittings 2003: 455.   
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Makwanyane,213 in which the state, amongst other things, argued that the 
death penalty was a greater deterrent than life imprisonment. The Court 
held that:  
The statistics presented in the police amicus brief show that most violent 
crime is not solved, and the Attorney-General confirmed that the risk of a 
criminal being apprehended and convicted for such offences is somewhere 
between 30 and 40 per cent.214 [The Court has] referred …to the figures 
provided by the Attorney-General which show that between…1990, and 
January 1995, 243 death sentences were imposed, of which 143 were 
confirmed by the Appellate Division. Yet, according to the statistics placed 
before us by the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney-General, there 
were on average approximately 20 000 murders committed and 9 000 
murder cases brought to trial, each year during this period. Would the 
carrying out of the death sentences on these 143 persons have deterred the 
other murderers or saved any lives?215     
Research carried out over a period of 25 years in the United States of 
America concluded that ‘sentence severity has no effect on the level of 
crime in society.’216 Tonry has also argued that there is no evidence that 
severe punishments reduce crime.217 Garfield argued that ‘[a]lthough 
uncommon, contracts to conceal  a crime do exist. These contracts 
occasionally arise when the victim of a crime  receives compensation from 
either the crime’s  perpetrator or the perpetrator's relative in exchange for a 
promise not to report the crime.’218 In the light of the above discussion, it is 
clear that apologists for the deterrence theory of punishment have yet to 
convince retributivists and reformers that deterrence, with its severe 
punitive approach aimed at making the offender serve as an example to 
                                                            
213 State v Makwanyane 1995: 391. 
214 State v Makwanyane 1995: para 120. 
215 State v Makwanyane 1995: para 126.   
216 Doob and Webster 2003: 143. 
217Tonry 2008: 279. 
218 Garfield 1998: 306.  
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potential criminals, really works. The deterrence theory would be more 
compelling if its apologists abandoned the status quo and focused on 
promoting the idea that the greater the likelihood of the offender being 
arrested has a more deterring effect than imposing severe punishments on 
the few individuals who have been unlucky enough to be arrested. As the 
South African Constitutional Court put it, ‘[t]he greatest deterrent to crime 
is the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and 
punished. [I]t is at this level and through addressing the causes of crime 
that the State must seek to combat lawlessness.’219 
2.4.3.6 Attempts to resolve the antinomy between retribution and 
deterrence 
Quinton has suggested that ‘the traditional antinomy [between retribution 
and deterrence] can be resolved’ because ‘the two theories answer different 
questions: retribution, the question [being], when logically can we punish? 
Utilitarianism, the question [being], when morally may we or ought we to 
punish?’220 Quinton’s suggestion was criticised by both retribution and 
deterrence scholars,221 but the discussion here is limited to Armstrong’s 
criticism. Armstrong argued that Quinton misunderstood retributivism in at 
least two ways: ‘first he says that it is a logical and not a moral doctrine.’ 
According to Armstrong, all the three theories of punishment look at the 
definition of punishment from a logical point of view, and that therefore 
Quinton’s argument that it is exclusive to retribution does not hold water. 
                                                            
219 State v Makwanyane 1995: para 122. 
220 Quinton 1954: 134, as cited in Bean 1981: 41-42.   
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But when retribution, deterrence and reformation deal with the moral 
question of justification of the practice of punishment and fixing of 
penalties, they all become moral doctrines. He adds that the reason why 
Quinton could have missed this point is that many retributivists concern 
themselves with the definition of punishment.222  
Armstrong adds that  
Secondly, Quinton misunderstands retributivism when he says that it 
regards punishment as trying to bring about “A state of affairs in which it is 
as if the wrongful act had never happened”... He criticizes this doctrine as 
only applicable to a restricted class of cases: “Theft and fraud can be 
compensated but not murder”. Here he is confusing retribution with 
restitution. If we recover stolen property, or if a confidence man repays the 
money he got by fraud, then although restitution has been made the 
retributivists would say that punishment was still due, i.e. the loss has been 
annulled but the crime has not. Only physically are things as they were 
before the crime. In the case of murder, restitution is clearly impossible – 
we cannot get back the life that was taken – but Retributive punishment is 
still possible. Further, the lex talionis is not an extension of retributivism, as 
Quinton claims…, but a particular Retributive theory dealing 
with…(penalty – fixing), and in my view a poor Retributive theory…’223  
With the above illustration from Armstrong, it is submitted that Quinton’s 
attempt to reconcile retribution with deterrence by arguing that retribution 
approaches punishment from a logical point of view, and deterrence from a 
moral point of view must fail.   
 
2.4.4 Rehabilitation  
 
Simply defined, rehabilitation is ‘any planned intervention that reduces an 
offender’s further criminal activity’ and ‘the focus of rehabilitation remains 
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on the psychological causes of crime-excluding deterrence strategies.’224 
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when 
imprisonment emerged as the dominant form of punishment, ‘the problem 
of punishment became the problem of imprisonment.’225 During this period 
retributivists spent most of their time justifying the existence of 
punishment, but not how punishment should be administered. 
Rehabilitationists were the first to address in detail the issue of how 
punishment should be administered.226 By introducing the system of trial by 
jury, the Enlightenment had moved the practice of imposition of 
punishment into the public domain. At the same time, the Enlightenment 
moved the system of the infliction of punishment from marketplaces and 
other public areas, to prisons, which were always established in rural and 
remote areas.227  
It therefore became almost impossible for members of the public to access 
prisons and scrutinise the way punishment was being inflicted on prisoners 
by the state, because such prisons were made ‘impenetrable to the general 
public.’228 Thus the public lost control over the state’s treatment of 
offenders during the infliction of punishment. The practical consequence 
was that the state, without public scrutiny, could do anything to the 
prisoners in the name of punishment. As Dubber puts it: ‘Its privacy and 
duration dramatically distinguished imprisonment from all previous 
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methods of punishment infliction and therefore posed new and difficult 
questions of legitimacy. Most immediate, the seclusion of imprisonment 
meant that it carried an enormous potential of abuse.’229 Unlike other 
punishments, such as corporal punishment, that would last for a few 
minutes depending on the justification for their infliction, ‘[p]rolonged 
imprisonment could be seen as the continuous daily reinfliction of 
punishment, each reinfliction requiring rejustification.’230  
Rehabilitation challenged the Enlightenment view that punishment was 
based on the autonomy of the offender. It also challenged the view that 
punishment was painful. For the rehabilitationist punishment was for the 
benefit of the offender, and therefore the state, in imposing punishment, 
had to ensure that it suited the rehabilitative interests of a particular 
offender. As the discussion below illustrates, it is not easy to determine the 
interests of each offender. These two challenges, Dubber observes, ‘help 
account for the disappearance of any serious effort to continuously assess 
the legitimacy of [the] system of state punishment after the middle of the 
nineteenth century and the resulting degeneration of that system into the 
heteronomous imposition of punishment onto others.’231  
Rehabilitation supported painful methods of punishment, such as solitary 
confinement. But the support for this type of punishment was based on the 
assumption that, if pain resulted from any form of punishment, such pain 
was incidental because punishment was not painful. This was a very 
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difficult position to defend, and ‘in the end, when the rehabilitationists 
recognized that it was impossible to drain punishment of its painful 
connotations, no matter how incidental, they discarded the concept of 
punishment all together and insisted that incarceration was treatment not 
punishment.’232 However, Dubber illustrates that reformers such as 
Bentham and the early prisoner reformers in the United States stressed the 
fact that punishment was painful and evil, and argued that ‘rehabilitative 
imprisonment meant a cosy life of leisure.’233  
One of the early writers and founders of the rehabilitation theory of 
punishment was the early nineteenth century German philosopher Karl 
David August Röder. According to Dubber, Röder ‘developed what comes 
closest to a principled defense of rehabilitative treatment.’234 Dubber is of 
the view that: 
Röder’s account of adult punishment follows directly from his account of 
juvenile punishment. Certain youths required “supplementary education” 
in reform houses, to which they could be committed not only upon the 
commission of a crime, but also upon parental request or judicial 
determination. Adult criminal offenders, however, were very much like 
disobedient children. Criminal punishment was “rational supplementary 
education” of those persons who “by illegal word or deed” had proven 
themselves so morally diseased as to be incapable of rational self-
determination. It now fell upon the state literally to serve as their guardian 
and to provide them with pedagogic treatment to nurse them back to moral 
health. Punitive treatment as supplementary education must focus on the 
“inner man,” so that it may generate and foster those good thoughts, 
feelings, and resolutions that determine behaviour. Punishment, as Röder 
put it, was “effective but bitter medicine.”235  
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The quotation above entails one of the ideas that has been criticised widely: 
offenders are sick and should be treated until they are free of the ailment 
that made them commit offences.  
According to Dubber, Röder attempted to distinguish pain that is inflicted 
on the offender for rehabilitation purposes from that inflicted on him for 
retributive or deterrent purposes. He argued that the retributive theory of 
punishment inflicted punishment for the purpose of causing pain, but that 
‘any pain resulting from reformative punishment was purely incidental to 
its educative function.’236 Dubber suggests that when one looks at 
punishment the way Röder understood it, what mattered was not the pain 
that was inflicted on the offender, but the intention of the punisher. In his 
words, ‘the punisher’s intent therefore could distinguish two punishment 
practices that had the same pain impact on the offender and were generally 
indistinguishable to the offender and any nonexpert outside observer.’237 
This meant that a panel of experts had to establish what the punisher had 
said or written to know that the punishment inflicted on the offender 
represented either retributive or rehabilitative purposes. But the purpose of 
the punishment inflicted could not be identified solely by relying on the 
pain that punishment would cause or caused the offender.  
In my opinion, this must have been very difficult for the offender and the so 
called non-experts to understand. For instance, how would one tell offender 
A., who had committed a robbery, that he was being sentenced to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, and that the only reason for the sentence was that he had 
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violated the law (retributive theory, and its retrospective or backward-
looking approach as the moral justification of punishment). At the same 
time one tells offender B, who has also committed a robbery and is being 
sent to the same prison for the same period of time as A, that he is serving 
the 10 years because the state thinks that he is sick, and that therefore the 
punishment is aimed at rehabilitating him (rehabilitative theory, and its 
prospective or forward-looking approach as the moral justification of 
punishment). Dubber argued that 
This disregard for the offender’s experience is troubling in its own right, 
but is particularly disturbing given that rehabilitationists…placed great 
emphasis on the actual effect of punishment on the offender’s mind and 
often chided their opponents for failing to do so.238   
 
2.4.4.1 Offender has a right to be punished 
Röder also argued that punishment accorded the offender rights, and that 
‘the offender was entitled to have the state facilitate the pursuit of his 
rational life plans, so that punishment turned out to be in the offender’s 
ultimate interest, even if he might not realise it immediately.’239 As 
discussed above, Kant and Hegel also regarded punishment as being the 
right of the offender.  Although Röder also examined punishment in that 
context, he criticised Kant and Hegel, stating that they had “uttered the 
assertion, or rather the delusion…that one honors the offender by treating 
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him entirely according to the principle that he himself had postulated and 
that he had followed in his offense.”240  
Unlike the retributivists who argued that the state had an obligation to 
justify the practice of punishment, Röder’s view was that the state was 
required to justify its failure to punish those who had broken the law. This 
was because failure on the part of the state to punish lawlessness 
disregarded ‘its duty to educate its constituents by whatever means 
necessary.’241  
2.4.4.2 Indeterminate incarceration  
By regarding punishment not as pain but as treatment, rehabilitation has 
supported indeterminate incarceration.242 In other words, the offender 
should be incarcerated as long as it takes for him or her to be cured of the 
disease that made him or her break the law.243 However, one needs to ask 
the question: what watertight measures are in place for the rehabilitationists 
to conclude that a prisoner has been rehabilitated and is therefore ready for 
release? Put differently, is it not possible for a prisoner to pretend that he 
has been rehabilitated so as to secure an early release? The rehabilitationsts 
would argue that professionals, such as social workers, psychologists and 
physiatrists stationed at prisons, would be able to assess, with a certain 
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243 Vitiello argued in relation to the United States that ‘…by the 1960s, a growing faith in 
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degree of accuracy, that a prisoner has been rehabilitated and is therefore 
ready for release. This would mean that the prison authorities have to 
employ as many such professionals as possible in order to assess whether 
prisoners have been sufficiently rehabilitated. This has to be seen in the 
light of the fact that many African countries lack a sufficient number of 
such professionals.  
As illustrated in chapter VI, prison authorities in Africa have insufficient 
numbers of professional such as social workers. They therefore may find it 
difficult to attract such professionals as a result of low salaries paid by 
prison authorities. Where they do attract them, many resign from prison 
jobs for better employment opportunities elsewhere. The result is that, with 
overcrowding being the norm in most prisons in Africa, coupled with the 
unavailability of enough professionals to assess the extent to which 
prisoners have been rehabilitated, rehabilitation remains a very challenging 
objective to achieve. It is not a guarantee that, where rehabilitation 
programmes are being implemented in prisons, prisoners do not easily 
exploit the loopholes in the system and secure early releases. As one 
prisoner reportedly put it: “If they ask if this yellow wall is blue, I’ll say, of 
course it’s blue. I’ll say anything they want me to say if they’re getting 
ready to let me go”.244 This could be one of the reasons that explains 
recidivism and parole violations in many African countries, irrespective of 
                                                            
244 Hampton 1984: 233.   
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the implementation of various rehabilitation programmes in almost all 
prisons.245  
Related to the above is the issue of the financial and human resources 
required to rehabilitate prisoners. Prisoners have different problems which 
require different solutions. Some people commit offences because they lack 
the necessary skills to acquire jobs. Should prisons then be turned into 
colleges to train such people in different job skills in order to make them 
employable upon release and therefore less likely to re-offend? Another 
problem is that many employers are reluctant to employ ex-offenders.  
2.4.4.3 Punishment incompatible with rehabilitation 
 
Rehabilitationists believe that punishment is incompatible with 
rehabilitation. One of their major arguments is that if indeed punishment, 
for example imprisonment, was capable of reducing crime, we would not 
have high recidivism rates.246 Toby argues that ‘the compatibility of 
punishment and rehabilitation could be clarified…if it were considered 
from the point of view of the meaning of punishment to the offender.’ He 
opines that there are offenders who think that they deserve to be punished 
for breaking the law, and offenders who believe that punishment is a 
‘misfortune bearing no relationship to morality.’ He suggests that 
punishment should be distinguished from bowing before the superior order. 
When a child is physically punished for misbehaving is a state of affairs 
different from that of a person imprisoned for car theft. According to Toby, 
                                                            
245 This issue is dealt with below in Chapter VI in the examination of rehabilitation 
programmes in prisons. 
246 Toby 1964: 336. 
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whereas the child example is a demonstration of bowing before the superior 
order and not of punishment, the thief’s incarceration is punishment which 
therefore would have rehabilitative effect on the robber. He therefore 
recommends, that if rehabilitation is to be achieved, it is essential for the 
correctional officials to convince ‘the prisoner that his punishment is just 
before they motivate him to change.’247 However, for prisoners to be 
convinced that punishment is for their rehabilitation, they must also be 
convinced that their punishment is just. Where the prisoner believes that 
there was no fair trial he/she would question the rehabilitative value of 
incarceration.248   
Toby’s attempt to distinguish punishment from rehabilitation needs critical 
examination. One should ask whether it is possible for a judge at the time 
of sentencing to look at punishment as a form of rehabilitation and 
rehabilitation as a form of punishment. In most cases judges think that 
punishment is meant to send a message to the criminal that what they did 
was wrong, which is why they are being punished.249  On the other hand, 
judges who think that a person should not be punished but rehabilitated, 
would in most cases express in their judgments which measures they think 
are appropriate for the proper rehabilitation of the offender. This is because 
rehabilitation ordinarily involves education and training.   In other words, a 
                                                            
247 Toby 1964: 336. 
248 Toby 1964: 336-337. 
249 A study was carried out in England about the attitude of magistrates towards sentencing 
and the researchers established that ‘magistrates in England are likely to become less 
oriented to the goals of reform and do regard the possibility of rehabilitation of offenders 
with great skepticism as a consequence of their experience on the bench. Under such 
circumstances, it seems inevitable that their sentencing philosophies will reflect the need 
to deter, to protect society, and to punish, and that they should take a less sympathetic 
view of defendants.’ See Bond and Lemon 1981: 135-136.     
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judge in most cases will have to choose either a rehabilitative approach or a 
‘punishment’ approach, and that will be reflected in the language of the 
judgment. As Jeffery and Woolpert rightly observed, ‘…judges often find it 
impossible to impose punishment and to prescribe rehabilitory measures at 
the same time. They must choose one at the expense of the other or strike a 
compromise which serves neither goal satisfactory.’250 This could explain 
the reason why alcohol and drug abusers are not sent to prisons but to 
rehabilitation centres, and those who commit crimes, even petty ones, are 
sent to prisons and not rehabilitation centres.  
However, this argument does not seek to undermine the fact that many 
prisons and correctional institutions in Africa are now leaning towards 
combining punishment and rehabilitation. Countries such South Africa, 
Uganda, and Mauritius have enacted pieces of legislation and adopted 
policy documents which expressly indicate that the major objective of 
prisons or corrections in these countries is to rehabilitate offenders.251 Is 
this achievement attributable to rehabilitationists? This would have been 
the case if one stopped at reading these beautifully written pieces of 
legislation and policy. However, if one looks at how they are implemented, 
one realises that the rehabilitation of offenders is more a myth than a 
reality. This is underscored by human rights reports and media accounts 
depicting that prisoners are detained in inhumane prison conditions which 
are far below the internationally required standards. Inhumane prison 
conditions, needless to say, are not favourable for rehabilitation. Prisons are 
                                                            
250 Jeffrey and Woolpert 1974: 405.     
251 For a brief discussion of rehabilitation in Uganda, Mauritius and South Africa see 
Chapter VI. 
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overcrowded, and prison authorities in many African countries lack 
sufficient resources to introduce, or implement, rehabilitation programmes 
for all inmates.  
If one examines the training that many prison warders receive, it is evident 
that it is more militaristic. Prison warders perceive prisoners not as people 
who need to be rehabilitated, but rather as people who are in prison to be 
punished. In other words, they think that people are in prison to be 
punished, rather than being in prison as a punishment. This explains why 
prison officials torture prisoners in cases where they commit prison 
offences; the existence of rampant corruption in prisons; and why some 
prison have failed to put strict measures in place to eradicate prison gangs. 
Rehabilitation is impossible to achieve if two state institutions that deal 
with offenders communicate mixed messages to offenders. Courts often 
communicate with offenders in retributive or deterrent language, and prison 
officials communicate to the same offenders in a rehabilitative language. 
This sends a mixed and confusing message to the offender. He is not sure 
whether his being in prison is meant to deter him from committing further 
crimes, for example, or to rehabilitate him/her. 
2.4.5 Towards reconciling retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation  
It has already been noted that Armstrong agrees that it is possible for the 
three theories of punishment to be reconciled at the penalty-fixing level. 
Taylor, after identifying the weaknesses of retribution, rehabilitation and 
detterence,252 suggests that we should adopt a Christian approach to 
                                                            
252 Taylor 1981: 52-65. 
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punishment so that we can be able to solve the dilemma between 
punishment and treatment. He argues that: 
…I believe that the Christian view alone solve the secular humanist 
dilemma of punishment versus treatment. If neither the punitive nor the 
therapeutic ideologies or models of crime control can provide us with a 
valid basis for public policy on the handling of criminals, it seems that we 
are either left with the “Rethinking Method”253 or the biblical-reformational 
approach. The ‘Rethinking’ advocates of crime control fail to address the 
crucial question: How can both requirements be combined so that both the 
individual criminal and his society each make proper expiation and 
restitution for the crime committed? The Christian answer is to arrange for 
society also to help expiate the wrong done in the method of punishing the 
criminal, and to admit its own share of responsibility. The idea of both 
expiation and responsibility must be cultivated afresh so that every member 
of society recovers a sense of his or her own personal responsibility for the 
original sinfulness of society, the sinfulness of the criminal, and his or her 
own need to make expiation for the wrong doing. This must be done in such 
a way that it does not foster a spirit of self-righteousness, nor a sadistic 
enjoyment of cruel punishment, but in such away that the sacrifice of time 
and money which the punishment imposes upon the society as well as upon 
the criminal, society will be reminded of its own guilt. This means that in 
practice the Christian will agree with those modern penologists who press 
for individualising and humanising of the administration of criminal justice 
and the penal law, while in theory he or she will support the adherents of the 
theory of expiation and just retribution for wrong doing. The guilty person 
must expiate his crime: this means that all who are guilty must offer 
expiation – society as a whole by means of the taxes imposed to support the 
costs of maintaining prisons and rehabilitation centres, police, prisons 
guards, lawyers and judges.254   
 
He adds that this would be achieved by adopting various strategies, such as, 
tempering justice with mercy; restoring a proper hierarchy of penalties, in 
the sense that the more serious the offence, the more serious should the 
                                                            
253 The ‘rethinking model’ was suggested by Fersch and according to him it is based on 
three assumptions “the first assumption of the rethinking method is that man’s behavior is 
the product of his free will, that he is generally free to act in conformity with laws or defy 
them…The second assumption is that some men are evil, or bad, or wicked, or not to be 
trusted, or destructive, or whatever; and that those men need to be sequestered or removed 
from the company of those on whom they would prey”. Fersch 1980: 41-42 as quoted in 
Taylor 1981: 76.  
254 Taylor 1981: 79. (Emphasis in the original).    
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penalty be; much greater use of fines rather than probation or 
imprisonment; much greater use of probation, and reserving of prisons for 
the most hardened criminals and recidivists; and creative restitution where 
society should ensure that the victim of crime is compensated in monetary 
value, and, in cases of murder, the deceased’s relatives should be 
compensated.255 
One could say that, from a Christian point of view, Taylor’s arguments and 
recommendations appear impressive for a couple of reasons, the major one 
being that they are based on the Bible. That notwithstanding, his arguments 
and recommendations have inherent problems that make their 
implementation difficult. In short, they are more theoretical than practical 
in the modern world. In the first place, his argument that we should look to 
the Bible and Christian teaching for principles that should guide our 
criminal justice system has two inherent shortcomings: one, that it will be 
an attempt to justify the interference or re-interference by the Church in the 
way the state should administer its criminal justice system; and secondly, 
that Taylor assumes that all people should be subjected to laws and 
principles originating from the Bible. This would be problematic, because 
people in Muslim countries and atheists will find it difficult to follow such 
an approach, in the same way that non-Muslim countries have found it 
barbaric that some countries impose punishments based on Sharia law 
which originates from the Quran and Prophet Mohammed’s teachings. 
Related to the above, one of the reasons why retribution has been criticised 
widely is because its ‘eye for an eye’ policy originates from biblical 
                                                            
255 Taylor 1981: 79 -82. 
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teachings.256 There is no assurance that a combination of retribution, 
rehabilitation and deterrence, based on Christian values, will not resurrect 
the ‘eye for an eye’ approach to punishment. He observes that: 
By turning our backs on God’s Word and Law revealed in creation and in 
the Holy Scriptures, we shall discover that all defense against the exercise 
of arbitrary power has vanished at the same time. If we refuse to accept 
the God of the Bible as the source of all legal norms and principles of 
justice and law, we shall finish up having tyrants as our masters; since 
experience has proved that only the God and Father of the Lord Jesus 
Christ can subject the power of rulers, judges, of police as well as the 
ordinary citizen to conscience.257 
Another problem with Taylor’s view relates to his recommendation for the 
greater use of fines instead of imprisonment. This recommendation fails to 
take into consideration the fact that many criminals in Africa are low 
income earners, and would not ordinarily be able to afford to pay fines on 
conviction. Many awaiting-trial prisoners even fail to post bail fees and 
stay in prisons until such a time that they stand trial. Implementing Taylor’s 
recommendation would mean that many criminals would either have to be 
imprisoned for failure to pay fines on conviction, or will have to be 
pardoned for failure to pay such fines, and hence effectively would not be 
punished. This would result in a public outcry as the government will be 
seen as being soft on crime. 
                                                            
256 Greene has pointed out that ‘… “An eye for an eye,”…and “a tooth for a tooth,” 
embody the notion of retribution. The concept of retribution as a punishment tool has 
existed for a long time, “run[ning] deep in English criminal law from at least the year 
1200.” Its origins go back even further. From the Old Testament’s eye for and eye, to the 
nineteenth –century …[conceptual idea] that it is right to hate and hurt criminals, to the 
modern idea of “lock ‘em up and throw way the keys,” the desire for retribution has run 
strong and deep in both religion and criminal justice.’ See Greene 1998: 180. It has been 
observed that ‘the retributive theory…has its roots in savagery and primitive religion’. See 
Weber 1928: 181.           
257 Taylor 1981: 75. 
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Taylor’s recommendation that prisons should be reserved for hardened 
criminals and recidivists is also not without its own problems. First, he does 
not give us a threshold above which a person should be considered a 
hardened criminal. This means that every government will have discretion 
to determine who is to be regarded as a hardened criminal. If a government 
adopts a wide definition, then any criminal, including those who would 
pass as petty offenders in some jurisdictions, could be categorised as 
hardened and sentenced to prison. This will not reduce, but rather increase, 
the use of imprisonment. Another problem with Taylor’s recommendation 
relates to the imprisonment of recidivists. Some offenders may commit 
minor offences over a period of time, for example, a pupil might steal 
sweets from different school canteens every month and get caught on each 
occasion. Does that mean that such pupil should be imprisoned or sent to a 
probation officer? Or should the canteen staff be encouraged to improve 
their security, so that pupils are unable to reach the sweets, and thereby 
discouraged from stealing? 
The recommendation that society should create a system to ensure that 
victims of crime are compensated in monetary value, and that the relatives 
of a murdered victim should also be compensated in monetary terms, raises 
some problems. The first problem is how to deal with people who 
negligently expose their belongings in a manner that ordinarily would 
attract thieves? For example, a person leaves his very expensive new state 
of the art cellphone on the driver’s seat in an unlocked vehicle in a 
nightclub’s parking yard and it gets stolen. Should the community also be 
made to pay for such a person’s negligence? Secondly, does not the 
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community have other pressing needs, such as welfare and medical 
demands that should be catered for instead of compensating victims of 
crime?  On the issue of compensating relatives of a murdered person, 
should the authorities enact law to the effect that ‘each and every relative of 
any murdered person irrespective of whether that murdered person was 
making any monetary contribution to his or her family shall be 
compensated US$400. Funding for such payments shall be approved by 
Parliament.’ Whether this is practical is highly doubtful. 
2.5 Conclusion: going beyond Taylor 
Bradley states that although retribution is the ‘central aim of punishment’, 
one cannot underestimate the ‘relation between and among retribution and 
legitimate secondary purposes of punishment such as deterrence and 
rehabilitation.’258 Thorn proposes an interesting view that ‘…retribution 
justification is insufficient unless it relies on deterrence justification; the 
two theories are not mutually exclusive…retribution justification requires a 
specific empirical finding from deterrence research, and thus, retribution 
does not focus solely on the past criminal act.’259  Schopp has suggested 
that ‘[t]he Supreme Court [of the United States] has identified deterrence 
and retribution as the two primary social purposes of capital 
punishment.’260 Bradley is of the view that ‘if the goal of retribution is to 
reestablish the balance of political society…it is at least as forward looking 
as deterrence, in that both theories attempt to positively affect society after 
                                                            
258 Bradley 1999: 105. 
259 Thorn 1983: 202. 
260 Schopp 1991: 1005. 
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the incidence of criminal activity.’261 The above scholars attest to the fact 
that it is not impossible for the three theories on punishment to be brought 
together. Notwithstanding the shortcomings in Taylor’s recommendations, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that courts of law including 
international criminal tribunals, have in some instances combined the three 
theories of punishment and considered them to be the objectives of 
punishment. This has been so both in cases in which life sentences have 
been imposed, as well as and where they have not been imposed. In the 
next chapter, I deal with life imprisonment in international law, and how 
international criminal tribunals have interpreted and applied the three 
theories on punishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
261 Bradley 2003: 29-30. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT 
 
3. Introduction 
Chapter II has dealt with the purposes/objectives of punishment from a 
philosophical perspective. In this Chapter the author examines the 
following issues relating to life imprisonment before international criminal 
tribunals: the use of life imprisonment, laws governing the sentence of life 
imprisonment and the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals 
to establish the importance that the tribunals have attached to the 
purposes/objectives of punishment in cases where offenders have been 
sentenced to life imprisonment. The discussion interrogates in detail the 
relevant judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals which were 
established immediately after World War II; the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and 
that of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Attention is 
also paid to the founding documents or cases of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to establish how 
they have dealt, or likely to deal, with the three theories of punishment 
when imposing or likely to impose sentence. Much emphasis is placed on 
the jurisprudence of the ICTR because the manner in which it has dealt 
with the question of life imprisonment raises many interesting and 
challenging issues. The author does not deal with other factors, such as the 
seriousness of the offence, aggravating and mitigating factors that these 
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tribunals have emphasised in imposing life imprisonment because of the 
fact that almost every text book on the tribunals’ jurisprudence deals with 
these factors.   
3.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal: Establishment and punishment 
The detailed history of, and circumstances under which, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Nuremberg Tribunal (the Tribunal), 
was established have been a subject of academic discussion for many years 
and thus fall beyond the scope of this study. The London Agreement of 8 
August 1945, to which the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
the Nuremberg Charter (the Charter), was annexed, made it clear in its 
Preamble that the ‘United Nations have from time to time made 
declarations of their intention that war criminals shall be brought to 
justice.’262 The Charter provided that the Nuremberg Tribunal ‘shall have 
the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the 
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
organisations committed...’ crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.263 The Charter added that the official position of 
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 
government, was not to be considered as freeing them from responsibility 
or mitigating punishment.264 The Charter further stated that the fact that the 
defendant had acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior 
                                                            
262 See Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis. 
263 Article 6. 
264 Article 7. 
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could not free him from responsibility, but could be considered in 
mitigation of punishment, if the Tribunal determined that justice so 
required.265 
The Charter and the Rules of Procedure266 required the Tribunal to hear and 
determine cases expeditiously267 but at the same time to protect the 
defendants’ rights, such as the rights to counsel,268 to have documents 
translated in a language that the defendant understood,269 to cross-examine 
witnesses,270 and to have access to all the documents upon which he was 
being charged.271 Article 27 empowered the Tribunal ‘to impose upon a 
defendant on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be 
determined by it to be just.’ In addition to any punishment it could impose, 
Article 26 empowered the Tribunal to ‘deprive the convicted person of any 
stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for 
Germany.’272 What should perhaps be noted here is that the Tribunal was 
                                                            
265 Article 8. 
266 Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal, adopted 29 October 1945. 
267 Article 18. Because of the fact that thousands of witnesses wanted to testify before the 
Tribunal on both sides, the Tribunal said that it was ‘necessary to limit the number of 
witnesses to be called, in order to have an expeditious hearing, in accordance with Article 
18(c) of the Charter.’ See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and 
Sentences 1947: 173. 
268 Articles 16 (d) and (e). The Tribunal observed that ‘[i]n accordance with Articles 16 
and 23 of the Charter, Counsel were either chosen by the defendants in custody 
themselves, or at their request were appointed by the Tribunal. In his absence, the Tribunal 
appointed Counsel for the Defendant Bormann…’ International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 172-333.  
269 Article 16 (c). The Tribunal noted that ‘[c]opies of all the documents put in evidence by 
the Prosecution …[ were] supplied to the Defense in the German language’ International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 174.  
270 Article 16 (e). 
271 Article 16(a). 
272 Article 28. 
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expressly authorised to impose the death penalty.273 The Nuremberg Trial 
was conducted in four languages – English, Russian, French and German. It 
began on 20 November 1945 and the hearing of evidence and speeches by 
counsel on both sides ended on 31 August 1946. Judgment was delivered 
on 1 October 1946.274 Indeed the Tribunal imposed death penalties on 12 
defendants and 10 of them were executed by hanging. Two could not be 
hanged because one committed suicide just minutes before his execution275 
and another has never been apprehended.276  
Article 27 also authorised the Tribunal to impose ‘such other punishment as 
shall be determined by it to be just.’ It is upon this that the Tribunal 
sentenced three defendants to life imprisonment: Rudolf Hess (Deputy to 
Hitler in the Nazi Party until May 1941); Walter Funk (Reich Minister of 
Economics and President of the Reichsbank); and Erich Raeder 
(Commander-in-Chief of the Germany Navy).277 It is also on the basis of 
Article 27 that the Tribunal sentenced two defendants to twenty years 
imprisonment; one defendant to ten years imprisonment; and one defendant 
to fifteen years imprisonment.278 Thus the heaviest punishment the Tribunal 
imposed was death by hanging; the second heaviest was life imprisonment; 
followed by 20 years’ imprisonment, 15 years’ imprisonment and 10 years’ 
                                                            
273 It has been rightly observed that ‘…the Nuremberg Tribunal imposed death sentences 
for the most culpable instigators of the Holocaust…[w]hen the Allies announced their 
decision to apply the death penalty at Nuremberg, few objected or suggested that 
executions would violate international human rights law.’ See Ohlin 2005: 747. Footnotes 
omitted.   
274 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 173.  
275 Sprecher 1999: 1383-1435. 
276 Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002: 1761 
277 Sprecher 1999: 1415. 
278 Sprecher 1999: 1415. 
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imprisonment. It is common knowledge that some of the accused before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal were convicted under circumstances which many 
academics agree were against the principles of a fair trial, and justice done 
by that the Tribunal came to be popularly know as ‘victors’ 
justice.’279Apart from the fact the three defendants who were sentenced to 
life imprisonment were found guilty of heinous crimes, as were all the 
convicted accused, one needs to establish which of the three 
purposes/objectives of punishment (retribution; deterrence; and 
rehabilitation) the Tribunal took into consideration in sentencing the 
defendants to life imprisonment. 
3.1.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal and the purposes/objectives of 
punishment in cases of life imprisonment 
Before the London Agreement was signed, the ‘Allies in the anti-Hitler 
coalition were fully agreed that inevitable retribution must be visited upon 
the guilty parties.’280 However, different opinions were expressed ‘on the 
subject of how the decision on this responsibility should be reached, what 
                                                            
279 It has been observed that ‘[t]he crimes with which the Nuremberg defendants were 
charged – including murder, torture, and enslavement, carried out on an enormous scale – 
were so clearly criminal under every domestic legal system in the world that it could 
hardly be said that the prospect of criminal liability was unpredictable…the criticism of 
the Nuremberg judgments for violating the legality principle was directed primarily to 
crimes against peace, and…to crimes against humanity.’ See Meron 2005: 830. Buchanan 
is of the view that ‘…a strong case has been made by a number of respected commentators 
that the “Victor’s Justice” at Nuremburg was illegal under existing international law. In 
particular, it has been argued that there was no customary norm or treaty prohibiting what 
the Tribunal called “crimes against humanity” at the time World War II occurred…it can 
be argued that at least some of the punishments meted out at Nuremburg were illegal.’ 
Buchanan 2001: 681. Charney is of the view that ‘…despite the charge that the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals reflected victors’ vengeance over the vanquished, they promoted the 
development of international criminal law.’ See Charney 1999: 464. Abbott also suggests 
that ‘[t]he Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have been criticized as victors’ justice, 
condemning Axis leaders for atrocities Allied forces also committed.’ See Abbott 1999: 
371.       
280 Larin in Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev (eds) 1990: 76. 
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complexion it should assume, different opinions were expressed.’281 The 
quotation below is illustrative of what those behind the establishment of the 
Tribunal thought was to be achieved by punishing the defendants: 
[T]he Prime Minister of Great Britain, W. Churchill, and Lord Chancellor, 
D. Simon, the U.S. Secretary of State, C. Hull, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, H. Morgenthau, advocated a “political” or “administrative” 
solution which attracted by its speed and low cost. In their opinion, the 
leaders of the Allied Powers should draw up a list of fifty to one hundred 
or more major war criminals who, in the event of their capture, would be 
executed without trial or investigation. However, there was also another 
point of view. Having set out not only to punish war criminals, but 
likewise to expose the anti-human essence of fascism, establish the causes 
and conditions from which it sprang, the Soviet leadership invariably 
considered a public trial the most suitable means for achieving this goal. 
[This view was also supported by various leaders in the United States 
including President Truman].282 
From the above quotation one realises that those who were behind the 
establishment of the Tribunal clearly placed retribution and deterrence as 
priorities above any other objective of punishment. Churchill, for example, 
and some of those who followed his line of reasoning, advocated a political 
or administrative approach to punishing war criminals. If that had 
happened, our history of dealing with post-war situations would have been 
different. It would have set a precedent that people suspected of committing 
war crimes and crimes against humanity do not enjoy the protection of the 
law, and the criminal justice system in particular. Although one should be 
thankful for the foresightedness of the Soviet leadership that even war 
criminals should stand trial for their atrocities, sight should not be lost of 
the reason the Soviet leadership had in mind for the trial of these war 
criminals. The Soviet Union wanted such a public trial ‘to expose the anti-
                                                            
281 Larin in Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev (eds) 1990: 76. 
282 Larin in Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev (eds) 1990: 76. 
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human essence of fascism’ and ‘establish the causes and conditions from 
which it sprang.’ In essence, it wanted the offenders convicted by the 
Tribunal to be punished in such a manner that would send a clear message 
to the international community that committing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity had serious consequences. 
As mentioned earlier, retribution is premised on the backward-looking 
approach, that is, offenders should only be punished because they broke the 
law. Thus the offence for which the offender is being punished must have 
been provided for under the law before the offender broke the law. The 
defence at Nuremberg argued in relation to the crime of aggression that: 
a fundamental principle of all law – international and domestic – is that 
there can be no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law. "Nullum 
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege." It was submitted that ex post 
facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations, that no 
sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time that the 
alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined 
aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission, and no 
court had been created to try and punish offenders.283 
By suggesting that their clients had been charged with an offence that was 
created after they had behaved in a particular manner, the defence lawyers 
were indirectly invoking the argument that their clients were innocent, but 
that they were being charged and punished to serve as examples to other 
people who might be tempted to engage in such activities. In other words, 
the drafters of the Charter had given deterrence priority over justice. 
However, the Tribunal did no agree and held that 
[i]n the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine 
lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of 
                                                            
283 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 217. 
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justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of 
treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning 
is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that 
he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would 
be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the 
positions they did in the Government of Germany, the defendants or at 
least some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, 
outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes, they 
must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international law 
when in complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion 
and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it would appear that the 
maxim has no application to the present facts.284 
The Tribunal’s ruling above could be interpreted to mean that violators of 
international law are punished, and should be punished, because 
international law must be protected against violations. In other words, those 
who violate international law principles should be punished not only 
because they deserve to be punished, but also to send a message to other 
members of the international community that violating international law 
principles has serious consequences. Thus the Tribunal held that ‘[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.’285 
In its 163 page document, which combined both the judgment and the 
sentence, the Tribunal did not mention which theory or theories of 
punishment it had relied on to impose the various sentences on all the 19 
defendants, including the three who were sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Put differently, the Tribunal did not mention the purposes/objectives that 
the punishments imposed were meant to achieve. However, when one looks 
                                                            
284 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 217. 
285 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 221. 
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at the language of the judgment in other respects, one is able to realise that 
the Tribunal considered the sentences to serve retribution and deterrence 
objectives. We should recall that Article 9 of the Charter provided that ‘[a]t 
the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the 
Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual 
may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual 
was a member was a criminal organization.’ Relying on this provision, the 
Tribunal declared various Nazi groups criminal groups and ordered that 
some groups of people who had been members of these organisations 
should also be tried for the offences that they had committed during their 
membership.286 
It is noteworthy that the Prosecution asked the Tribunal to use its powers 
under Article 9 of the Charter to declare the ‘General Staff and High 
Command of the German Armed Forces’ a criminal organisation. The 
Tribunal rejected the Prosecution’s demand287 in this regard but held: 
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier’s oath of 
obedience to military orders. When it suits their defense they say they had 
to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to 
have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The 
truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and 
acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and 
more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. This 
must be said. Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to 
                                                            
286 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 252-
272. 
287 For the reasons why the Tribunal refused to so declare the General Staff and High 
Command of the German Armed see International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 
Judgment and Sentences 1947: 270-271.  
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trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not 
escape punishment.288 
The above is representative of the manner in which the Tribunal understood 
the objective of punishment. Those who committed heinous offences or 
who turned a blind eye when such offences were being committed when it 
was within their power to prevent the commission of such offences ‘should 
not escape punishment.’ They deserved to be punished for what they did. 
By punishing them the world would know that the international community 
was not to entertain the commission of such atrocities any more. In short, 
punishment should serve both the retributive and deterrent objectives. This 
could also be deduced from the time those who were sentenced to life 
imprisonment were supposed to spend in prison. The impression one gets is 
that those sentenced to life imprisonment were supposed to be in prison for 
the ‘whole of their lives.’ Two of the prisoners, Funk and Raeder, were 
released after serving a considerable number of years, not because they 
were considered to have been reformed or rehabilitated, but because their 
health had deteriorated.289 However, even though Hess’ health also 
deteriorated and there was support from other Allied members290 that he 
should have been released as well, the Soviet Union disagreed all the time, 
until Hess committed suicide in prison at the age of 92.291  
 
                                                            
288 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences 1947: 271-
272. 
289 Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002: 1762. 
290 Spandau Prison in Berlin, Germany where the prisoners were serving their sentences 
‘was administered and guarded jointly by the four allied powers: the Soviet Union, France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.’ See Kamchibekova 2007: 124. 
291 Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002: 1762. 
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3.2 The Tokyo Tribunal: Establishment and punishment 
The Tokyo Tribunal (the Tribunal) was established by the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, the Tokyo Tribunal Charter (the 
Charter), for the purpose of ‘just and prompt trial and punishment of the 
major war criminals in the Far East’, with its permanent seat in Tokyo.292 
Members to the Tribunal were to be appointed by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers and they had to number not less than six and not 
more than eleven.293 All the decisions of the Tribunal had to be by majority 
vote.294 The Tribunal had ‘the power to try and punish Far Eastern war 
criminals who as individuals or as members of organisations’ were charged 
with offences which included crimes against peace, conventional war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.295 The Charter, like the Nuremberg 
Charter, provided for fair trial guarantees. The indictments upon which the 
charges against the accused were based had to ‘consist of a plain, concise, 
and adequate statement of each offence charged.’296 A copy of the 
indictment, in a language understood by the accused, had to be made 
available to the accused.297 The trial and related proceedings had to be 
conducted in English and in the language understood by the accused. All 
documents in a language that the accused did not understand had to be 
                                                            
292 Article 1 of the Tokyo Charter. See also article 12 of the Tokyo Charter. See Rule 9 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, of 25 April 
1946 (the Tokyo Tribunal Rules of Procedure). 
293 Article 2. 
294 Article 4(b). 
295 Article 5. 
296 Article 9(a). 
297 Article 9(a). See Rule 1 of the Tokyo Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 
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translated and made available to him.298 The accused also had a right to be 
represented by counsel of their choice subject to some exceptions such as, 
the right of the Tribunal to disapprove of any of such counsel at any time 
during the proceedings.299 The accused, either personally or through their 
counsel, had the right to conduct their defence, including the right to 
examine any witness, subject to such reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal 
might determine.300 The accused also had the right to apply to the Tribunal 
to allow them to produce any witnesses or documents.301  
Under Article 16 of the Charter, the Tribunal was empowered ‘to impose 
upon an accused, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be 
determined by it to be just.’ Article 17 required that judgment was to be 
announced in open court and the reasons upon which such judgment was 
based had to be given. Under Article 17, a sentence imposed by the 
Tribunal was to ‘be carried out in accordance with the order of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, who may at any time reduce or 
otherwise alter the sentence except to increased its severity.’  
Wanhong identifies two major challenges that confront whomever attempts 
to study the jurisprudence of the Tokyo Tribunal: ‘the Nuremberg Trials 
dwarfed the Tokyo Trial. The scant availability of the Trial’s records along 
with the apathy of scholars have resulted in the public’s appalling 
                                                            
298 Article 9(b). See Rules 2 and 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 
299 Article 9(c). 
300 Article 9(d). See Rule 4 of the Tokyo Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 
301 Article 9(e). See Rule 5 of the Tokyo Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 
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ignorance of the Tokyo Trial.’302 The 28 Class “A” defendants at the Tokyo 
Trial included the majority of government and military officers who had 
occupied some of the highest offices in Japan during World War II. The 
trial lasted almost two years – 3 May 1946 to April 16 1948. The judgment 
was delivered on 4 November 1948. Apart from one defendant who was 
found to be unfit to stand trial due to psychological problems and the two 
others who died during the trial, the Tribunal found all the defendants 
guilty and imposed various sentences: seven defendants were sentenced to 
death by hanging; sixteen defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment; 
one was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment; and one to seven years 
imprisonment.303 Those who were sentenced to death were executed on 23 
December 1948.304 The sixteen defendants who were sentenced to life 
imprisonment were: Araki, Hashimoto, Hata, Hiranuma, Hoshino, Kaya, 
Kido, Koiso, Minami, Oka, Oshima, Sato, Shimada, Shiratori, Suzuki, and 
Umezu.305  
3.2.1 The Tokyo Tribunal and justification of punishment in cases of 
life imprisonment   
Like the Nuremberg Tribunal, in its majority judgment and sentence, the 
Tribunal does not expressly mention the theory of punishment it relied on 
to punish the defendants.306 This could be attributed to the fact that, as 
Judge Röling put it in an interview in 1982, ‘[i]n Tokyo it took an 
                                                            
302 Wanhong 2006: 1674.   
303 Wanhong 2006: 1675. 
304 Futamula 2006: 473. 
305 Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002: 1762. 
306 Röling and Rüter 1977: Vol. 1, 439-464. 
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unexpected short time to determine the penalties.’307 Put differently, judges 
did not have time to discuss which theory of punishment should be relied 
on to impose a particular sentence. However, in his separate opinion, the 
President of the Tribunal, Sir William Webb, clearly states the objective 
that the punishment the Tribunal imposed was meant to achieve 
as to the punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity: it is 
universally acknowledged that the main purpose of punishment for an 
offence is that it should act as a deterrent to others. It may well be that the 
punishment of imprisonment for life under sustained conditions of 
hardship in an isolated place or places outside Japan – the usual conditions 
in such cases – would be a greater deterrent to men like the accused than 
the speedy termination of existence on the scaffold or before the firing 
squad. Another consideration is the very advanced age of some of the 
accused. It may prove revolting to hang or shoot such old men.308    
It is clear that Sir William Webb thought that the punishments imposed on 
the defendants should serve both as general and specific deterrents: general 
deterrence in the sense that ‘the main purpose of punishment for an offence 
is that it should act as a deterrent to others’; and specific deterrence in the 
sense that life imprisonment under ‘sustained conditions of hardship in an 
isolated place or isolated places outside Japan...would be a greater deterrent 
to men like the accused.’ Webb opposed the death penalty which he 
considered to be “purely vindictive.”309 He ‘argued that the highest 
sentence that should be imposed on an accused was life in prison and that 
the maximum penalty should be the same.’310 
                                                            
307 Brackman 1989: 427. 
308 Röling and Rüter 1977: Vol. 1, 478. 
309 Brackman 1989:  410. 
310 Brackman 1989: 410. 
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Bassiouni and Hanna argue that, whereas the German people accepted the 
legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Japanese never accepted the 
Tokyo Tribunal, and considered its proceedings as another way to humiliate 
them after they had just been defeated in World War II.311 This would later 
affect the manner in which the punishments imposed on the defendants 
would be served. Thus,  
when the Tokyo trials prematurely ended in 1949, the government of 
Japan insisted that all persons sentenced to imprisonment by the IMTFE 
as well as other allied forces be transferred to a central prison in Tokyo. 
This was accomplished in 1953 before the signature of the armistice 
between the United States and Japan. Within months, every convicted 
person was released, and the following year, two of the major defendants 
at the Tokyo trials had become members of the Japanese cabinet in the 
capacity of Prime Minister and Minister.312  
With regard to those sentenced to life imprisonment, it has been observed 
that ‘[n]ot a single Tokyo defendant imprisoned at Sugamo actually served 
his life sentence “unless he died of natural causes within a very few years. 
They were all paroled and pardoned by 1958”.’313 It is vital to note that 
unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal prisoners who could be detained for the 
whole of their lives, prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment by the Tokyo 
Tribunal could not be detained for the whole of their lives even if they had 
not been released with the other prisoners in 1958. This was because ‘[t]he 
Supreme Commander, General MacArthur, did lay down criteria for early 
release: ...offenders sentenced to life imprisonment were to be considered 
                                                            
311 Bassiouni and Hanna 2006-2007: 93. See also Bassiouni 2000: 225-226 who explains 
the circumstances under which the Japanese defendants at the Tokyo trial were released. 
312 Bassiouni and Hanna 2006-2007: 93-94. Footnotes omitted. 
313 Penrose 2000: 564-565. Footnotes omitted. 
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for parole after they had served 15 years.’314 It is not clear whether the 
Tokyo Tribunal could have imposed more death sentences or lengthy 
prison terms had it been aware that those it had sentenced to life sentences 
could be paroled after 15 years. But the Tribunal was aware that under 
Article 17 of the Tokyo Charter the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers might at ‘any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentence except to 
increase its severity.’ 
3.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY): Establishment and punishment  
The ICTY was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 
827 on 25 May 1993 with the ‘power to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.’315 Unlike the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charters, the ICTY Statute (the Statute) specifically prohibits 
the imposition of the death penalty. Article 24(1) of the Statute provides 
that ‘[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Tribunal shall 
have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
Courts of the Former Yugoslavia.’ This is clearly a very big departure from 
the provisions of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters in at least two 
respects. First, as mentioned earlier, the Tribunal is prohibited from 
imposing the death penalty. The penalty imposed shall be limited to 
                                                            
314 Van Zyl Smit 2005: 359. 
315 Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (as last amended on 28 February 2006 by Resolution 1660). See also O’Brien 
1993: 639. See also Schabas 2006: 13-24. 
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imprisonment. Secondly, the Tribunal is empowered to refer to the general 
practice regarding prison sentences in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. However, as the Trial Chamber mentioned in the Prosecutor v 
Milomir Statić, ‘[i]t is settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal that the Trial 
Chamber...is obliged to take into account the sentencing practice of the 
former SFRY316 as guidance in sentencing. This practice will accordingly 
be considered, although in itself it is not binding.’317 The Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals were not required to refer to the general practice on 
sentencing that prevailed in Germany or Japan, respectively, at the time the 
Tribunals imposed their sentences. The Tribunals’ only sources of 
reference were their Charters and Rules of Procedure, the latter of which 
were very unhelpful as far as sentencing was concerned because they did 
not guide the Tribunals in that regard. 
Another important difference between the ICTY Statute and the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charters relates to the manner in which the sentences imposed 
were to be served. Article 27 of the Statute provides: ‘Imprisonment shall 
be served in a State designated by the ...Tribunal from a list of States which 
have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted 
persons. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable laws 
of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the ...Tribunal.’ The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and Rules were silent as to the manner in 
which those sentenced to imprisonment would serve their sentences. This 
left it to the enforcing bodies, in the case of the Nuremberg Tribunal the 
                                                            
316 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
317 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, (Judgment of 31 July 2003): para 
887 (Trial Chamber). Footnote omitted. 
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Control Council, and in the case of the Tokyo Tribunal the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers to determine where people sentenced to 
imprisonment would serve their sentences. The result was, as already 
discussed above, that those who were convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
served their sentences in Germany and those convicted by the Tokyo 
Tribunal ‘served’ their sentences in Japan. I have put ‘served’ with respect 
to the Tokyo Tribunal in quotation marks because, as we have already seen, 
the majority of those prisoners were released before they could even serve a 
substantial part of their sentences. 
Another provision that relates to punishment is Article 24(2) of the Statute 
which provides that ‘[i]n imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers 
should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.’ This means that before 
the Trial Chamber imposes any sentence, it has to look at the kind of crime 
of which the accused has been found guilty in the light of the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person. That test, it is submitted, guides the 
Trial Chamber in determining which objective of punishment should be 
achieved by imposing a given sentence depending on the individual 
circumstances of the accused. If the accused, for example, committed 
heinous crimes, refused to cooperate with the prosecution318, and did not 
show remorse for his actions,319 then it is more likely that the Tribunal will 
                                                            
318 Under Rule 101(B)(ii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, 
IT/32/Rev.40 (last amended 12 July 2007), in determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber 
shall take into consideration factors such as ‘any mitigating circumstances including the 
substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before and after 
conviction.’   
319 However, the Trial Chamber, in the case in which it sentenced the accused to life 
imprisonment, held that it ‘…does not accept that the absence of a potential mitigating 
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impose a deterrent or retributive punishment or both. However, on the other 
hand, if the accused committed less heinous offences, co-operated with the 
prosecution, and showed remorse for his acts or omissions,320 the Tribunal 
is more likely to impose a sentence based on the rehabilitative objective of 
punishment. This issue is dealt with later when the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal on life imprisonment is assessed.  
Article 24(3) provides that ‘[i]n addition to imprisonment, the Trial 
Chambers may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by 
criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.’ 
This means that, for instance, when a person has been sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and that person acquired property and proceeds by criminal 
conduct, for example, through theft, robbery or extortion, the Tribunal, in 
addition to the life sentence imposed, may order that person to return such 
property or proceeds to their rightful owner. Thus, the rightful owner of 
such property is restored, in proprietary terms, to the position he was in 
before his property was unlawfully taken away. 
3.3.1 The ICTY and life imprisonment  
Article 24(1) of the Statute is buttressed by Rule 101(A) which provides 
that, ‘[a] convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up 
to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life.’ This 
provision unambiguously empowers the Trial Chamber to impose a life 
                                                                                                                                                     
factor such as remorse can ever serve as an aggravating factor.’ See Prosecutor v Milomir 
Stakić 2003: para 918. Footnotes omitted. 
320 The Trial Chamber observed that, ‘[m]itigating circumstances may include those not 
directly related to the offence such as co-operation with the Prosecution or true 
expressions of remorse.’ See Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 920. 
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sentence. This is again a major departure from the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters and Rules of Procedure. They did not expressly state that the 
Military Tribunals could impose life sentences. These Tribunals interpreted 
their discretion broadly under the relevant Charters and Rules of Procedure 
to justify the imposition of life sentences. We need to look at the language 
used in Rule 101(A) in the light of the language used by the ICTY Tribunal 
where it has dealt with the question of life imprisonment.  
Rule 101(A) stipulates that the Tribunal may imprison the convicted person 
‘for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s 
life.’ The Trial Chamber, on the other hand, in the only case in which it 
imposed a life sentence, the Stakić case,321 does not use the ‘remainder of 
the life’ language. Instead, after citing Rule 101(A), it states that, ‘[t]he 
maximum sentence that may be imposed by the Tribunal is life 
imprisonment.’322 This means that the Trial Chamber in Stakić considered 
the sentence in Rule 101(A) of imprisoning the convicted person ‘for the 
remainder of his life’ to be synonymous with the sentence of ‘life 
imprisonment.’ 
The question that needs to be answered is: to what extent has the ICTY 
utilised its powers under Rule 101(A) by sentencing the convicted person 
or persons to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives? Unlike its 
counterpart the ICTR, the ICTY has been parsimonious with imposing life 
                                                            
321 It has been noted that ‘[i]n Jelisić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that “it falls 
within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to impose life imprisonment”. Perhaps this was a 
message to the Trial Chambers, as none of them had previously seen fit to pronounce such 
a sentence.’ See Schabas 2006: 550.    
322 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 890. 
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sentences. At the time of writing, July 2008, only two offenders, Milomir 
Statić and Stanislav Galić323 had been sentenced to life imprisonment by 
the Trial Chamber; and on appeal Statić’s  sentence was changed to 40 
years imprisonment by the Appeals Chamber. Unlike in the Statić case, in 
the Galić case although the ICTY mentions that the sentence it imposed 
would serve both deterrent and retributive objectives,324 it does not enter 
into a detailed discussion of those objectives of punishment. it is upon that 
basis that a conscious decision has been made to exclude the discussion of 
the Galić  decision. 
3.3.2 The ICTY and the objectives of punishment in case of life 
imprisonment 
In Statić the Prosecution recommended ‘a sentence of life imprisonment “in 
order to give due consideration to the victims of [Stakić’s] crimes and to 
make clear the determination of the international community to deter ethnic 
cleansing.’325 The Defence on the other hand submitted that Stakić should 
be acquitted ‘because this will serve the goal of deterrence both generally 
and specifically...because when ...Stakić returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
he will be a productive law-abiding citizen and a loving and responsible 
parent like before the war.’326 Thus the Defence deemed ‘deterrence and 
                                                            
323 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić Case No. IT-98-96-A (Appeals Chamber Judgment of 30 
November 2006). 
324 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić 2006: para 441. 
325 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 895. 
326 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 896. 
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retribution to be the primary principles underlying sentencing.’327 In 
responding to the above submissions the Tribunal observed that 
it is universally accepted and reflected in judgments of this Tribunal and 
the Rwanda Tribunal that deterrence and retribution are general factors to 
be taken into account when imposing sentence. Individual and general 
deterrence has a paramount function and serves as an important goal of 
sentencing. An equally important goal is retribution, not to fulfil a desire 
for revenge but to express the outrage of the international community at 
heinous crimes like those before this Tribunal.328 
The Tribunal is impliedly telling us that rehabilitation is not universally 
accepted and reflected in its judgments and those of the ICTR as a general 
factor to be taken into account when imposing sentence. It is deterrence and 
retribution which have to be emphasised. The Tribunal is aware that there 
are people who hold the view that retribution is the same as revenge, and 
thus observes that retribution is not meant ‘to fulfil a desire for revenge but 
to express the outrage of the international community at heinous crimes like 
those’ committed by the accused. Much as the Tribunal at first, as seen 
above, considered retribution and deterrence to be equally important, it 
appeared to lean more towards deterrence when it observed that 
[t]he Tribunal is mandated to determine the appropriate penalty, often in 
respect of persons who would never have expected to stand trial. While 
one goal of sentencing is the implementation of the principle of equality 
before the law, another is to prevent persons who find themselves in 
similar situations in the future from committing crimes. Therefore, general 
deterrence is substantially relevant to the case before this Chamber.329 
It is worth noting how the Tribunal at this stage narrows the scope of the 
purpose/objective that the punishment it was about to impose was meant to 
                                                            
327 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 897. 
328 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 900. Footnotes omitted. 
329 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 901. See also para 909. 
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achieve. From emphasising that deterrence and retribution were equally 
important in the case before it, and thereby excluding rehabilitation, the 
Tribunal zeros down to deterrence. We have to recall that it is the Defence 
which submitted that acquitting the accused would serve the objectives of 
both general and specific deterrence.330 The Prosecution, on the other hand, 
wanted the sentence to achieve the objective of general deterrence. As the 
above quotation indicates, the Tribunal disregarded specific deterrence and 
favoured general deterrence because it was ‘substantially relevant to the 
case’ under consideration. The Tribunal went on to explain what it meant 
by general deterrence and why it preferred it over specific deterrence. 
In the context of combating international crimes, deterrence refers to the 
attempt to integrate or to reintegrate those persons who believe themselves 
to be beyond the reach of international criminal law. Such persons must be 
warned that they have to respect the fundamental global norms of 
substantive criminal law or face not only prosecution but also sanctions 
imposed by international tribunals. In modern criminal law this approach 
to general deterrence is more accurately described as deterrence aiming at 
reintegrating potential perpetrators into the global society.331 
The Trial Chamber emphasised that, in as much as life imprisonment was 
the maximum sanction it could impose, its imposition was ‘not restricted to 
the most serious imaginable criminal conduct.’332 It thus found Stakić 
guilty of extermination, murder (both a violation of the laws and customs of 
war and as a crime against humanity) and deportation, and sentenced him to 
‘life imprisonment.’ The Trial Chamber also issued various orders that 
                                                            
330 In the alternative it argued that, should the Tribunal convict the accused, it should 
impose shorter sentences ranging between five and nine years, and that sentences in that 
range would fulfil both the deterrence and retribution objectives of punishment. See para 
933. 
331 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 902. Footnotes omitted 
332 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2003: para 931. 
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accompanied the sentence, the most relevant to this discussion being that 
Stakić was to serve 20 years before he could be considered for early 
release.333 However, because in its judgment the Trial Chamber indicated 
that its order did not affect the relevant provisions of the Statute and Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence relating to early release, this meant that in 
practice Stakić could be released before serving all the 20 years imposed, 
depending on the laws in the Host state.334 However, the Appeals Chamber 
held that the ‘... “20 year review obligation” on the Host State”...’ was 
‘inconsistent with the regime set forth in the Statute and Rules’ because it, 
amongst other things, imposed on the ‘Host State ...the date of 
review...thereby supplanting applicable municipal laws.’335  It found that 
                                                            
333 After sentencing Stakić to life imprisonment, the Trial Chamber imposed the following 
conditions: “The then competent court (Rule 104 of the Rules) shall review this sentence 
and if appropriate suspend the execution of the remainder of the punishment of 
imprisonment for life and grant early release, if necessary on probation, if: 
(1) 20 years have been served calculated in accordance with Rule 101(C) from the 
date of Dr.Stakić’s deprivation of liberty for the purposes of these proceedings, 
this being the “date of review”. 
(2)  In reaching a decision to suspend the sentence, the following considerations, 
inter alia, shall be taken into account: 
• The importance of the legal interest threatened in case of recidivism; 
• The conduct of the convicted person while serving his sentence; 
• The personality of the convicted person, his previous history and the 
circumstances of his acts; 
• The living conditions of the convicted person and the effects which can 
be expected as a result of the suspension.” (Emphasis in original). 
334 The Trial Chamber wished to ‘emphasize that Rules 123-125 of the Rules, and the 
Practice of Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release’ remained 
unaffected by the disposition it made. See para 937. See also para 391 of the Appeals 
Chamber decision.  
335 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić (Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 22 March 2006), para 
392. 
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‘...the Trial Chamber acted ultra vires in imposing a review obligation on 
the Host State and therefore committed a discernable error.’336  
The ruling of the Appeals Chamber clarifies that, whereas the Tribunal can 
impose a life sentence on the accused, it should not ‘dictate’ to the Host 
State the minimum period the prisoner should serve before being 
considered for early release or parole. His early release should be governed 
by the laws of the Host State and the agreement of internment between the 
Host State and the Tribunal. Imposing a minimum sentence also meant that 
the courts of the Host State had the power to determine whether the 
prisoner should be released after serving the minimum period of 20 years, 
and hence fettered the powers of the President of the Tribunal. As the 
Appeals Chamber observed, ‘...by vesting the courts of the Host State with 
the power to suspend the sentence, the Trial Chamber effectively removes 
the power from the President of the Tribunal to make the final 
determination regarding the sentence.’337  
The Stakić judgment should be contrasted with the position of those 
sentenced to life imprisonment by the Nuremberg Tribunal, who were 
meant to serve their ‘whole life’, and those by the Tokyo Tribunal, who 
could serve 15 years imprisonment. This distinction is important in the 
sense that it reminds us that since the Tokyo Tribunal, and actually in two 
of the three cases of Nuremberg prisoners who were sentenced to life 
imprisonment; life imprisonment has never meant ‘whole life’ in 
international criminal law. On the issue of the objectives of punishment, the 
                                                            
336 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 393. 
337 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 393. 
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conclusion that one draws from the Stakić case is that the Tribunal 
emphasised general deterrence as the purpose/objective that was to be 
achieved by the punishment it imposed. 
Stakić appealed both his conviction and sentence. For the purposes of this 
discussion the author examines only the arguments relating to the sentence, 
and then establishes the position of the Appeals Chamber on the issue of 
life imprisonment. On appeal Stakić’s lawyer argued that the maximum 
sentence ‘of life in prison should be reserved for situations where an 
individual is found to have personally committed the most serious crime 
possible, namely genocide.’ The justification for his argument was that 
‘imposing the maximum sanction for lesser offences than genocide may 
undermine deterrence, leading to the commission of graver crimes because 
the sanctions would be the same.’338  The Appeals Chamber did not agree 
with the appellant. It held that ‘the sentence of life imprisonment can be 
imposed in cases other than genocide’339 and that the Trial Chamber had 
not ‘committed a discernible error in the imposition of a life sentence.’340  
It is true that Article 24(1) and Rule 101(A) do not prohibit the imposition 
of a sentence of life imprisonment on convicted persons who have 
committed offences less serious than genocide. It is within the discretion of 
the Tribunal, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, to 
determine whether the convicted person should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment or not. However, this being the first case in which the 
                                                            
338 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 373. 
339 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 375. 
340 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 376. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131
Tribunal had imposed a life sentence, the appellant was justified in his 
belief that such a sentence, being the maximum sentence, should surely 
have been reserved for those who had committed the most heinous of the 
offences.  
The appellant argued further that the Trial Chamber should have given 
greater weight to ‘other important sentencing factors, including 
rehabilitation, reintegration into society, proportionality and consistency...’, 
instead of relying so much on deterrence and retribution.341  After 
mentioning that the Trial Chamber when sentencing the appellant had 
considered some of the factors pointed out by the appellant, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that ‘the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the ICTR 
consistently points out that the two main purposes of sentencing are 
deterrence and retribution. Other factors, such as rehabilitation, should be 
considered but should not be given undue weight.’342 Interpreting the 
Tribunal’s approach of giving ‘undue weight’ to retribution and deterrence 
means that, if the Appeals Chamber were to impose a life sentence, being 
the maximum sentence that could be imposed, it would be more inclined 
towards deterrence and/or retribution. The Appeals Chamber imposed ‘a 
global sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment, subject to credit being given 
under Rule 101(C) of the Rules for the period the Appellant has already 
spent in detention.’343    
                                                            
341 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 400. Footnotes omitted. 
342 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: para 402. 
343 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006: Disposition.  
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3.4 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): 
Establishment and punishment 
The ICTR was established to ‘prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in 
the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.’344 Like the Statute of the ICTY, the Staute of the ICTR 
provides that the ‘penalty imposed by the [ICTR] shall be limited to 
imprisonment.’345  Rule 101(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the ICTR is to the effect that ‘a person convicted by the Tribunal may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed term or the remainder of his life.’346 
Rule 101(A) which ‘operationalises’ Article 23 of the Statute of the ICTR 
does not mention ‘life imprisonment’ but ‘imprisonment ...for the 
remainder of [the convicted person’s] life.’ From the outset it is vital to 
note this distinction because the Tribunal has sentenced offenders to both 
life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of their lives. In 
comparison with the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICTY, the ICTR is on 
record for having sentenced the largest number of offenders to life 
imprisonment and/or imprisonment for the whole of their natural lives.347 
An analysis follows of the objectives of punishment that the Tribunal relies 
                                                            
344 Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as amended 
by Resolution 1534 of 26 March 2004). For a detailed history of the ICTR Schabas 2006: 
24-34. For all the relevant documents relating to the establishment of the ICTY, see Morris 
and Scharf 1995: Vol, 2.  
345 Article 23(1). 
346 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(Adopted on 29 June 1995; as amended on 15 June 2007).  
347 At the time of writing, July 2008, the ICTR had sentenced 14 offenders to life 
imprisonment or to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives. The Tokyo Tribunal 
sentenced 16 offenders to life imprisonment. 
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on to sentence offenders either to life imprisonment or to imprisonment for 
the remainder of their life. 
3.4.1 The ICTR and life imprisonment 
As will be illustrated shortly, the Tribunal has drawn a distinction between 
life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life 
– although whether it is entitled to draw this distinction remains a matter of 
controversy. There are cases where it is difficult to establish exactly which 
theory of punishment the Tribunal relied on when it sentenced the offender 
to life imprisonment. These are cases where the Tribunal mentioned two or 
more objectives of punishment without homing in on any of them when 
imposing sentence. Rather, the Tribunal will spend most of its time 
emphasising other factors that influenced it to sentence the accused to life 
imprisonment, such as, the nature of the offence and the circumstances 
under which it was committed, the personal characteristics of the offender, 
and whether there were any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. In 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, for example, the Trial Chamber, before 
sentencing the offender to life imprisonment, referred to Security Council 
Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 which stipulates that the Tribunal was 
established with the aim of prosecuting and punishing those people who 
participated in the genocide, and thereby to promote national reconciliation 
and restoration of peace through putting an end to impunity.348 The 
Tribunal added that the  
                                                            
348 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 October 
1998) Sentence.  
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penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must 
be directed on the one hand attri - - attribution (sic) of said accused who 
must see their crime punished and on the other hand as deterrence, namely 
dissuading for good those who will be tempted in future to perpetrate such 
atrocities by showing them that the International community was no 
longer ready to tolerate serious violations of International humanitarian 
law and human rights.349 
Obviously in the above statement the Trial Chamber invokes both 
retribution and deterrence as the philosophical justifications for sentencing 
the offender to life imprisonment. After observing that the sentence it was 
about to impose had to be proportionate to the offences committed for it to 
be just, the Trial Chamber commented that ‘[j]ust sentences contribute to 
the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society.’350 It is argued that the above statement also indirectly shows that 
the Tribunal emphasises retribution and deterrence in its explanation of the 
aim or purpose of a just sentence. In the first place, there has to be a law in 
place, and people can only be said to be punished justly if they are being 
punished for breaking that law – retribution and the backward approach to 
punishment. In the second place, just punishment should be able to 
‘contribute to the respect for the rule of law and the maintenance of a just, 
peaceful and safe society.’ In other words, just punishment of offenders 
sends a clear message to potential criminals that should they behave the 
way the offender who has just been punished behaved, they would also be 
punished. The result is that they avoid behaving in a manner that would 
                                                            
349 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998: Sentence. In its earlier judgment in Prosecutor v 
Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S (Trial Chamber, judgment of 4 September 1998) the Trial 
Chamber also followed the same reasoning as in the Akayesu decision. It emphasised both 
retribution and rehabilitation when sentencing the offender to life imprisonment. See paras 
28 and 58. Also in Prosecutor v Georges Rutaganda, ICTR-97-32 (Trial Chamber 
judgment of 6 December 1999) the Trial Chamber relied on both retribution and 
deterrence to sentence the offender to life imprisonment. See para 456. 
350 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998: Sentence. 
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attract punishment, for this lowers the crime rate and consequently, ensures 
that peace and safety are maintained in society – deterrence and its forward 
looking approach to punishment.  
On Appeal in the Akayesu case the Appeals Chamber, in dismissing the 
appeal against the sentence, did not clarify which theory of punishment it 
approved of in upholding the sentence that was imposed by the Trial 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber just ‘corrected’ the Trial Chamber by 
holding that it should not have held that the appellant had been sentenced to 
‘life imprisonment’, but rather to ‘imprisonment for the remainder of his 
life’ as provided for in Rule 101(A) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.351 The failure by the Appeals Chamber to discuss whether the 
punishment was properly grounded on retribution and deterrent objectives 
could be attributed to the fact that the appellant did not raise as one of his 
grounds of appeal that the Trial Chamber should have taken into 
consideration other objectives of punishment, such as the possibility of 
rehabilitation, before sentencing him to such a lengthy prison term. 
However, one has to recall that, at both the pre-sentencing stage before the 
Trial Chamber and during the appeal, the appellant, who was not a lawyer, 
waived his right to legal representation352 despite the fact that he told the 
Trial Chamber that he was not ‘well conversant with the law.’353 One could 
argue that perhaps if Mr. Akayesu had had legal representation, he would 
                                                            
351 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T (Appeals Chamber, judgment of 1 June 
2001) Sentence, para 422. 
352 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu 2001: Sentence, para 397.  
353 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu 2001: Sentence, para 395. 
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have raised issues relating to the objectives of punishment and the Tribunal 
would have expressed its opinion on them.  
However, it should also be recalled that even in Jean Kambanda v The 
Prosecutor, where the Trial Chamber invoked retribution and deterrence to 
sentence the appellant to life imprisonment, the appellant’s counsel on 
Appeal did not ask the Appeals Chamber to rule on the issue of whether the 
appellant, who had pleaded guilty to, amongst others, the crimes of 
genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide, should have been sentenced 
on the basis of an objective of punishment other than retribution and 
deterrence.354 In dismissing the appeal the Appeals Chamber indirectly 
referred to retribution by holding that a ‘sentence imposed should reflect 
the inherent gravity of the criminal conduct.’355 Thus, it appears that the 
Appeals Chamber would only take the discussion of the objectives of 
punishment ‘seriously’ if the appellant or his counsel invoked such issues 
either as one of the grounds of appeal or as one of the reasons to support 
any of the grounds of appeal especially in relation to sentencing. In Stakić, 
for example, the appellant’s counsel argued before the Appeals Chamber 
that the Trial Chamber should have taken into consideration other 
objectives of punishment apart from retribution and deterrence. It is upon 
this basis that the Appeals Chamber dealt with the objectives of punishment 
and gave satisfactory reasons why it emphasised retribution and deterrence 
                                                            
354 Jean Kambanda v The Prosecutor, ICTR 97-23- A (Appeals Chamber, judgment of 19 
October 2000). See also Georges Rutaganda v The Prosecutor, ICTR-96-3-A (Appeals 
Chamber, judgment of 26 May 2003) where the appellant’s appeal against his life sentence 
was dismissed but the Appeals Chamber did not refer to any objective of punishment. The 
defence lawyers also did not appeal against the Trial Chamber’s reliance on retribution and 
deterrence to sentence the accused to life imprisonment.  
355 Jean Kambanda v The Prosecutor 2000: para 125. 
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as the major objectives that punishments imposed by international criminal 
tribunals seek to achieve. 
3.4.2 The ICTR and imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s 
life  
As mentioned earlier, Rule 101(A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence expressly authorises the Tribunal to sentence the convicted 
person ‘to imprisonment for a fixed term or the remainder of his life.’ In the 
judgments discussed above, the Tribunal uses the phrase ‘life 
imprisonment’ and not imprisonment ‘for the remainder of the convicted 
person’s life.’ However, in its judgments (as will be illustrated shortly) the 
Tribunal has sentenced more people to imprisonment for ‘the remainder’ of 
their lives than it has to life imprisonment. Curiously, in most of its 
judgments the Tribunal does not expressly state the practical or theoretical 
differences between life imprisonment on the one hand, and imprisonment 
for the remainder of the offender’s natural life, on the other.  
For those who are not well acquainted with the jurisprudence of life 
imprisonment, the impression would be that there is no practical difference 
between life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of the 
offender’s life. This is because, they might argue, and perhaps justifiably, 
in both cases the prisoner will remain in prison for the whole of his life. As 
will be discussed in chapter IV, life imprisonment in some African 
countries does not really mean that the prisoner will be in prison for the rest 
of his life. However, there are countries where life imprisonment means 
that the prisoner will be in prison for life unless pardoned by the head of 
state. The questions that should be answered is: which of the two 
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aforementioned scenarios does the Tribunal have at the back of its mind in 
deciding to sentence an offender to life imprisonment or to imprisonment 
for the remainder of his life? 
It should be stressed that a survey of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence is of less 
relevance in finding answers to that question. This is because, as mentioned 
earlier, such jurisprudence does not expressly give reasons as to why, for 
practical purposes, life imprisonment should be considered as different 
from imprisonment for the remainder of the prisoner’s life. However, in 
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze v The 
Prosecutor356 the Tribunal appears to hold the view that offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment may be released after completing the 
number of years that that country regards as equal to life imprisonment and 
that the period spent in detention awaiting trial should be taken into 
consideration at the time of the prisoner’s release. The Appeals Chamber 
held that 
The Appeals Chamber notes that, pursuant to Rule 101(D) of the Rules, 
the Chambers are obliged to give credit for any period during which a 
convicted person was held in provisional detention. Even though the 
sentence imposed here was life imprisonment, the Trial Chamber should 
have made it clear that the Appellant... would be credited with the time 
spent in detention between his arrest and conviction, as this could have an 
effect on the application of any provisions for early release.357  
                                                            
356 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor, Case 
No. ICTR-99-52-A (Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 28 November 2007) 
357 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1112. One has to note that in fact the Trial Chamber had not sentenced the appellant 
to ‘life imprisonment’ but rather to ‘imprisonment for the remainder of his life.’ 
Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber’s holding is vital in the sense that it clarifies that the 
Tribunal is of the view that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment has the prospect of 
being released in line with the laws and policies of the detaining country provided the 
Tribunal is notified thereof and consents thereto. 
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The reasoning behind the above ruling, that offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment have the prospect of being released, was also confirmed by 
the informal interviews the author conducted among some judges, 
prosecutors and defence counsel of the ICTR. When asked to clarify their 
understanding of the difference between the two sentences, all opined that 
life imprisonment meant, and was understood to mean, that the offender 
could be released on parole or could be entitled to remissions depending on 
the laws and policies relating to the release of prisoners serving life 
sentences in the detaining country provided the Tribunal was notified in 
advance and consented to such release.358 In other words, judges, 
prosecutors and defence counsel of the ICTR understand life imprisonment 
to mean life imprisonment as stipulated in the law of the detaining state. 
Which means, for example, that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment 
and who serves his sentence in Mali would have been sentenced to a 
different prison term compared to the one sentenced to life imprisonment 
but serves his sentence in Swaziland, as life imprisonment could mean 
something different in case of those countries.359  
                                                            
358 Personal informal conversations with some judges, prosecutors and defence counsel of 
ICTR (who preferred to remain anonymous) 19 -20 April 2008 Villa Via Hotel, 
Summerset West, Gordon’s Bay, Cape Town, South Africa (at a workshop on 
‘Developments in International Criminal Justice in Africa’ organised by the Institute for 
Security Studies).    
359 As of 5 May 2008, statistics from the website of the ICTR indicated that some the 
prisoners had been transferred to Mali from the ICTR detention facility to serve their 
sentences there. The author could not acquire the relevant laws relating to life 
imprisonment in Mali and in other countries with agreements of enforcement with the 
ICTR to establish what life imprisonment means in those countries. However, it is worth 
noting that the ICTR signed agreements of enforcement with countries like: Rwanda (see 
Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-557-EN, 5 March 2008); Swaziland, Mali, and Benin. See 
Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002:1774.    
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On the other hand, judges, prosecutors and defence counsel of the ICTR 
understand imprisonment ‘for the remainder’ of the offender’s life, which is 
the ‘maximum sentence’360 that the Tribunal could impose, to mean that 
such an offender shall never be released from prison. Put differently, an 
offender sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life is meant to 
be in prison forever. This view is supported by the Appeals Chamber’s 
holding in Jean de Dieu v Kamuhanda to the effect that: 
Domestic courts in some countries have held that an accused should be 
given the possibility of release, even if he is sentenced to imprisonment 
for the remainder of his life. As the German Federal Constitutional Court 
stated the argument: “One of the preconditions of a humane penal system 
is that, in principle, those convicted to life sentences stand a chance of 
being freed again.” The Appeals Chamber considers that, whatever its 
merits in the context of domestic legal systems, where it may apply “in 
principle”, this view is inapplicable in a case such as this one which 
involves extraordinary egregious crimes [genocide and crimes against 
humanity].361 
In Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana the Trial 
Chamber found the first accused guilty of four counts of genocide and 
sentenced him to ‘four remainder-of-life sentences concurrently.’362 The 
Prosecution had asked that the accused be sentenced to ‘concurrent 
sentences of “life imprisonment” for each of the [four] counts’363 but 
because of the gravity of the offences that he had committed, which the 
Tribunal considered to have constituted ‘offences beyond human 
                                                            
360 See The Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A (Appeals 
Chamber Judgment of 12 March 2008): para 227. 
361 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A (Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment of 19 September 2005) para 357. 
362 Prosecutor v Clement Keyishima and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T (Trial Chamber, 
Judgment of 21 May 1999).  
363 Prosecutor v Clement Keyishima and Obed Ruzindana 1999: Sentence, para 24. 
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comprehension and of most extreme gravity’,364 the accused was sentenced 
to ‘four remainder-of-life sentences concurrently.’ The Trial Chamber drew 
the distinction between life imprisonment on the one hand and 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life on the other in the 
following terms: 
Rule 101(A) authorises the Trial Chamber to sentence a convicted person 
“to imprisonment for a fixed term or the remainder of his life.”  This 
Chamber, in imposing four concurrent remainder-of-his-life sentences for 
Kayishema, finds that the “remainder of his life” sentence is distinct from 
a “life sentence” under the laws of most national jurisdictions.  This 
Chamber gives the phrase “remainder of his life” under Rule 101(A) its 
plain meaning.365  
Whereas the Tribunal appears to reason that a person sentenced to 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life should be detained until his 
death, it is argued that, in the light of the right to human dignity issues 
surrounding imprisonment in contemporary debates, one wonders whether 
in practice it would be possible for the offender to remain in prison for the 
rest of his biological life. The Tribunal does not have its own prison and, 
therefore, its sentences have to be enforced in domestic prisons. There is 
room for arguing that if enforcing countries, both in Africa and other parts 
of the world, as well as international and regional human rights bodies, are 
of the view that imprisonment without the possibility of release is 
inhumane, the Tribunal would find it difficult to maintain its position of 
supporting such imprisonment. One cannot expect the Tribunal to develop 
                                                            
364 Prosecutor v Clement Keyishima and Obed Ruzindana 1999: Setence, para 9. 
365 Prosecutor v Clement Keyishima and Obed Ruzindana 1999: Sentence, para 31. The 
Trial Chamber recalled that ‘[r]elying on the gravity of the crimes committed, the 
Prosecution request[ed] the Chamber to impose the most severe sentence upon the 
Accused, that is, imprisonment for the remainder of his life.’ See The Prosecutor v Eliézer 
Niyitegeka 2003: para 489.  
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sentencing jurisprudence that is not in accord with international human 
rights law, even if the offenders committed some of the worst offences 
known to humankind.  
It thus appears that the Tribunal’s reasoning that an offender could be 
detained in perpetuity is unlikely to stand the test of time. This is because 
there is emerging jurisprudence from African countries, such as South 
Africa and Namibia, to the effect that imprisonment without the possibility 
of release is inhuman.366 The European Court of Human Rights has also 
held that life imprisonment without the possibility of release is inhuman.367 
As will be discussed later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, which gives the Court jurisdiction over crimes, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity, does not anticipate that a person could be 
detained for the rest of his life.  
In The Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka in reaction to the Prosecution’s 
submission that the Tribunal should sentence the offender to imprisonment 
for the remainder of his life,368 the Defence submitted that an ‘excessively 
long sentence can amount to cruel and inhumane punishment.’369  
Unfortunately the Trial Chamber did not find it relevant to rule on the 
                                                            
366 See Bull and another v The State Case No. 221/2000 (decided on 21and 23 August 
2001), where the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa held that it is the possibility of 
release which saves the punishment of life imprisonment from being inhuman and cruel. In 
S v Tcoeib 1996 (1) SACR 390, the Supreme Court of Namibia held that life imprisonment 
without the possibility of release is unconstitutional because it amounts to the violation of 
the prisoner’s right to human dignity. 
367 See for example, The Republic of Cyprus v. Andreas Costa Aristodemou Case No. 
31175/87 cited in Case of Kafkaris v Cyprus (Application No. 21906/04) European Court 
of Human Rights, Judgment of 12 February 2008. 
368 The Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka 2003: para 489. 
369 The Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka 2003: para 491. 
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Defence’s argument that excessive long sentences amounted to cruel and 
inhumane treatment. It went ahead and sentenced the offender to 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life. One would have expected the 
Tribunal to justify why imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s 
life, though expressly recognised by the Statute read together with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, did not amount to cruel and inhumane 
punishment. It is also regrettable that the Defence did not continue to 
pursue this argument on appeal; probably the Appeals Chamber would have 
adopted the same opinion as that of the Trial Chamber on that point.370  It 
should be stressed that as much as the judges of the ICTR are of the view 
that a person sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life shall 
remain in prison forever, it is very unlikely, at least in some countries, that 
that will in fact happen. Some of the prisoners might be released on 
medical grounds or old age or for humanitarian reasons. This is what 
happened in the two cases at Nuremberg.371  
However, in the light of the fact that Rwanda signed an agreement with the 
Tribunal to enforce some of the sentences, the issue of prisoners sentenced 
to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives and also to life 
imprisonment becomes critical.372 This is because the likely influence of 
the politics of the day, as was the case with the Tokyo Tribunal prisoners, 
should not be underestimated. Article 3(1) of the sentences enforcement 
                                                            
370 Eliézer Niyitegeka v The Prosecutor Case No. ICTR-96-14-A (Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment of 9 July 2004) paras 263 - 269. 
371 See Chapter III, 3.1.1. 
372 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the United 
Nations on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 4 March 2008 (on file with the author). 
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agreement373 provides that ‘in enforcing the sentences pronounced by the 
Tribunal ... the Government of Rwanda shall be bound by the duration of 
the sentence so pronounced...’ However, Article 8 of the same agreement 
contemplates that a prisoner may be paroled or pardoned.374  One has to 
recall that detainees at the ICTR facility reportedly protested against being 
transferred to Rwanda.375 This could be interpreted to mean that they 
suspected that the politics of the day could influence not only the manner in 
which they were likely to serve their sentences but could also impact on the 
possibility of their release. This could be attributed to the fact that all the 
offenders belonged to the ousted government, and the new government was 
perceived as less likely to protect their rights and, most importantly, less 
likely to favour their early release. 
In 2007 Rwanda abolished the death penalty. The Organic Law Relating to 
the Abolition of the Death Penalty provides that a person convicted of 
‘crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity’ shall be sentenced to 
‘life imprisonment with special provisions.’376 Article 4 defines ‘life 
imprisonment with special provisions’ to mean: 
                                                            
373 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the United Nations 
on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4 
March 2008 (on file with the author). 
374 Article 8 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
United Nations on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 4 March 2008 (on file with the author). 
375 See ‘Most of the ICTR Prisoners on Hunger Strike to Denounce Transfers to Country 
[Rwanda]’ Hirondelle News Agency 8 October 2007, at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200710090398.html (accessed 23 May 2008).  
376 See Article 5 of Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 Relating to the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145
1. A convicted person is not entitled to any kind of mercy, conditional 
release or rehabilitation, unless he/she has served at least twenty 
(20) years of imprisonment; 
2. A convicted person is kept in isolation. 
It is more likely that an offender sentenced to imprisonment for the rest of 
his life by the ICTR and who serves his sentence in Rwanda may not be 
released even after serving 20 years of imprisonment, for the reason that he 
was not sentenced to life imprisonment but to imprisonment for the 
remainder of his life. There were concerns at the ICTR that offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment who happen to serve their sentences in 
Rwanda could to be treated as prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment 
with special provisions. The result was that the ICTR declined to order the 
transfer of cases to Rwanda on, amongst other grounds, that offenders 
could be sentenced to life imprisonment with special provisions. As a result 
in November 2008 Rwanda amended the Organic Law on the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty to make it clear that offenders sentenced by the ICTR 
and transferred to serve their sentences in Rwanda or those transferred from 
the ICTR to stand trial in Rwanda were not to be sentenced to life 
imprisonment with special provisions.377 
In the light of the above difference between life imprisonment and 
imprisonment for the remainder of the prisoner’s life, the question that one 
needs to answer is: what theory of punishment does the Tribunal take into 
consideration to sentence a person to imprisonment for the rest of his life 
instead of life imprisonment? We now turn to the Tribunal’s case law to 
answer that question. In Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi Sylvester, the Trial 
                                                            
377 Mujuzi 2009(a). 
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Chamber found the accused guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and rape.378 He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment because the 
Tribunal ‘deeme[d] it appropriate to impose an exemplary sentence.’379 It 
appears that the Tribunal expressly recognised general deterrence as the 
major objective that the sentence it imposed was to achieve. The accused 
appealed against the Trial Chamber’s decision arguing, inter alia, that the 
sentenced imposed on him was too severe and should be reduced to 15 
years ‘in light of his advanced age and the normal life expectancy in 
Africa.’380 
On the other hand, the Prosecution argued that the sentence was too lenient 
and that had the Trial Chamber paid sufficient attention to ‘the gravity of 
the crimes and the degree of the Appellant’s criminal responsibility’, it 
would have sentenced the appellant to ‘life imprisonment’ which was the 
‘maximum sentence.’381 While agreeing with the Prosecution, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that the appellant had committed various crimes such as 
genocide, murder and rape and that he deserved to be sentenced to a 
punishment that was ‘commensurate with the gravity of the offences.’382 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that it ‘consider[ed] that the maximum 
sentence [was] warranted in the Appellant’s case and that there [were] no 
                                                            
378 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi Sylvester ICTR -2001- 64. (Trial Chamber) 
379 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi Sylvester 2001: para 355. He was born in 1943. 
380 Sylvester Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor ICTR-2001-64-A (Appeals Chamber), para 109. 
381 Sylvester Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor 2001: para 188. The Trial Chamber has 
considered life imprisonment to be ‘the highest sanction’ see The Prosecutor v Théoneste 
Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva Case No. ICTR-
98-41-T (Trial Chamber, Judgment of 18 December 2008): para 2267. Mr. Kibiligi was 
acquited and the rest were sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against 
humanity.  
382 Sylvester Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor 2001: para 204. 
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significant mitigating circumstances that would justify imposing a lesser 
sentence than imprisonment for the remainder of his life.’383 Consequently 
it quashed the sentence of 30 years and ‘entere[d] a sentence of 
imprisonment for the remainder of the Appellant’s life, subject to credit 
being given under Rule 101(D) ... for the period already spent in 
detention...’384 
The Gacumbitsi decision on appeal raises three interesting points in relation 
to punishment. In the first place, the deterrence argument on which the 
Trial Chamber based its 30 year sentence was not raised on appeal by either 
the prosecution or the appellant. We have to recall that, in sentencing the 
accused to 30 years imprisonment, the Trial Chamber noted that the 
sentence was supposed to be exemplary. The failure by both parties to 
emphasise the purpose/objective which the punishment that was to be 
imposed by the Appeals Chamber was to achieve should be seen as 
regrettable. This is because, while they both argued against the sentence 
imposed by the Trial Chamber, they did not justify, from a philosophical 
point of view, why the Appeals Chamber should impose a new sentence. 
One would have expected the prosecution to argue that life imprisonment 
would have been a more deterrent sentence than 30 years’ imprisonment. 
On the other hand, one would have expected the appellant, because of his 
advanced age and also because of the fact that his family members were 
living in Rwanda, to try to convince the Appeals Chamber to emphasise 
                                                            
383 Sylvester Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor 2001: para 206. 
384 Sylvester Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor 2001: para 207 (Disposition). 
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reconciliation or any other objective of punishment apart from deterrence 
and retribution, and thus impose a 15 year sentence.  
The second aspect to note is that the prosecution never asked the court to 
sentence the accused to imprisonment for the reminder of his life. They 
instead asked the Tribunal to sentence him to life imprisonment which they 
argued was the maximum sentence. The Tribunal reacted by sentencing the 
appellant, not to life imprisonment as asked by the prosecution, but to 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life. This shows that, whereas the 
Tribunal in Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana held 
that life imprisonment meant something different from imprisonment for 
the rest of the offender’s life, with the latter being more severe than the 
former, in Gacumbitsi the prosecution and the Tribunal seemed to have 
thought that life imprisonment was the same as imprisonment for the 
remainder of the appellant’s life. This is so because the Tribunal did not 
justify why it did not sentence the accused to life imprisonment, as 
requested by the prosecution, but decided to sentence him to imprisonment 
for the remainder of his life. 
The aforementioned point is further buttressed by the third interesting 
aspect of the case: the Tribunal held that the appellant would be entitled to 
credit for the time he had spent in prison awaiting trial and the finalisation 
of his appeal. If the Tribunal indeed thought that imprisonment for the 
remainder of the appellant’s life had to be given its natural meaning, that is, 
that the appellant was to be detained for the remainder of his biological 
existence, one could argue that the order that he was entitled to credit for 
the time he had spent in prison awaiting trial and the finalisation of his 
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appeal would be of no practical relevance. It thus appeared that, whereas 
the Tribunal sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for the remainder of 
his life, it meant life imprisonment, in the sense that, if the appellant were 
to be detained in a country where prisoners serving life imprisonment could 
be released on parole, the period spent in prison awaiting trial and 
finalisation of the appeal would be considered in assessing his period of 
detention before his release on parole. One appellant argued recently that a 
sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of his life ‘deprived him of any 
credit based on the period already spent in detention.’385 
The Trial Chamber judgment in Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda386, 
in which the accused was found guilty of genocide and extermination as a 
crime against humanity and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of 
his life, also illustrates the difficulty one encounters in an attempt to 
establish the purpose/objective of punishment that the Tribunal emphasises 
in sentencing offenders to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives. In 
the first place, the prosecution, although it called on the Tribunal to 
consider several aggravating factors, such as the offender’s leadership role 
during the genocide, ‘in its deliberations on sentencing’387, preferred to 
remain silent on the sentence it thought should be imposed on the offender. 
                                                            
385 In Franois Karera v The Prosecutor Case No. ICTR-01-74-A (Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment of 2 February 2009): para 397, the Appeals Chamber dismissed ‘the Appellant’s 
claim that the sentence [of imprisonment for the remainder of his life] deprived him of the 
benefit of any credit based on the period already spent in detention. Rule 101(C) of the 
Rules states that …This provision does not affect the ability of a Chamber to impose the 
maximum sentence, as provided by Rule 101(A) of the Rules.’ The appellant was 
convicted of instigating and commiting genocide and aiding and abetting murder as a 
crime against humanity. 
386 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T (Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment of 22 January 2004). 
387 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 762. 
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One would have expected the prosecution, after leading evidence that led to 
the conviction of the accused, to have asked the Tribunal to sentence the 
offender, let us say, to life imprisonment because he had played a leading 
role in the genocide. The prosecution thus left it to the Tribunal to 
determine which sentence, in the circumstances, was appropriate for the 
offender. This meant that the Tribunal could sentence the offender to a 
determinate term of imprisonment, life imprisonment or imprisonment for 
the remainder of his life. 
Another curious aspect of the judgment was that the defence refused to 
address the Tribunal on sentencing, on the ground that it was convinced 
that their client was to be acquitted. However, ‘when pressed on the matter, 
the Defence submitted that in the event Kamuhanda is found guilty, his 
sentence should be limited to the time period he ha[d] already spent in 
custody at the behest of the Tribunal.’388 Had both parties taken the 
sentencing issue seriously, the Tribunal would probably have paid 
sufficient attention to it. The result was that, in sentencing the offender to 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life, the Tribunal, as was later argued 
on appeal, pretentiously referred to Security Council Resolution 955 
(1994)389 whose preamble stressed the following as the ‘themes’ to guide 
the Tribunal in imposing punishment: ‘deterrence, justice, reconciliation, 
                                                            
388 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 756. In The Prosecutor v Franois 
Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T (Trial Chamber, judgment of 7 December 2007) the 
offender was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life for genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Although the prosecution submitted that in the light of the 
gravity of the offences the offender had been convicted of ‘life sentence’ was the 
‘adequate penalty’, the ‘Defence did not make submissions on sentenecing. See para 573. 
389 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 753 
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and the restoration and maintenance of peace.’390 In the light of that, it 
disturbingly concluded: 
In considering the appropriate sentence to be passed upon Kamuhanda, the 
Chamber weighs heavily the factors which will contribute towards the 
realisation of these objectives [deterrence, justice, reconciliation and the 
restoration and maintenance of peace]. In view of the grave nature of the 
crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994, it is essential that the international 
community condemn them in a manner that carries a substantial deterrent 
factor against their reoccurrence anywhere, whether in Rwanda or 
elsewhere. Reconciliation amongst Rwandans, towards which the 
processes of the Tribunal should contribute, must also weigh heavily in 
the Chamber’s mind when passing sentence.391 
The above quotation clearly illustrates that the Tribunal considered both 
general deterrence and reconciliation as factors that were essential in 
sentencing the accused to imprisonment for the remainder of his life.392 
There is room for arguing that it is difficult to understand how 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life could simultaneously 
further the process of reconciliation of the offender with the victims of his 
atrocities. For reconciliation to take place the offender, after serving his 
sentence, should be able to meet face to face with his victims and apologise 
for his deeds. This is almost impossible in cases where the offender is 
sentenced to prison for the remainder of his life.393 The inevitable 
                                                            
390 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 753. 
391 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 754. 
392 In The Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka 2003, the Trial Chamber, before sentencing the 
offender to imprisonment for the remainder of his life, held that it placed ‘specific 
emphasis’ on ‘general deterrence’ but ‘also considered the likelihood of the Accused’s 
rehabilitation.’ See para 487. The offender appealed against the sentence on, amongst 
others, the ground that imprisonment for the remainder of his life was contrary to the spirit 
of rehabilitation. However, his appeal on this ground was dismissed. See Eliézer 
Niyitegeka v The Prosecutor 2004: para 267. One wonders how rehabilitation could be 
achieved when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life. 
Such a person has no hope of being released and consequently has no incentive to 
participate in rehabilitation programmes. 
393 In The Prosecutor v Eliézer Niyitegeka 2003, when the Prosecution asked the Tribunal 
to sentence the offender to imprisonment for the remainder of his life, the Defence 
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conclusion is that, although the Tribunal did not expressly state it, this was 
a clear case where it based its sentencing on general deterrence. If it had 
indeed given sufficient weight to reconciliation as it claimed, it would not 
have sentenced the offender to the severest sentence at its disposal. It would 
have imposed a sentence that would have enabled him to get out of prison 
and reconcile with his victims, and also rebuild his country. As Judge 
Maqutu succinctly put it in his dissenting judgment on sentence: 
Despite the Accused’s lack of physical and moral courage at a crucial 
time, the heinousness of the Accused’s act, the hundreds or thousands that 
died, that the Accused should not be given the highest sentence of life 
imprisonment. The Accused must in my view be given a chance to reflect, 
and if possible learn from his mistakes and teach others – if he becomes so 
minded. Many people have done a lot of good in prison by writing for 
[sic] those outside prison. Rwandans are his people, perhaps he will be 
able to add his voice to the many voices that say Rwandans should 
recognise their common humanity, nationality and destiny.394 
The language of the Tribunal also testifies to the fact that, in circumstances 
where the offender is sentenced to imprisonment for the rest of his life, it is 
more likely that he will be in prison until he dies. For example, after 
announcing that Kamuhanda had been sentenced to imprisonment for the 
remainder of his life ‘[t]he Chamber [found] that Kamuhanda [was] entitled 
to credit for time served of four years and fifty eight days, if applicable.’395 
                                                                                                                                                     
submitted that ‘[t]he heavier the sentence imposed [on the offender] the more difficult his 
reintegration into society will be, especially considering that there is little or no prospect 
that the Accused will be able to return to his home and country of birth.’ See para 491. 
Footnotes omitted. However, the Tribunal sentenced the offender to imprisonment for the 
rest of his life.   
394 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: (Judge Maqutu’s dissenting opinion on 
sentence) para 14. Judge Maqutu imposed 25 years. 
395 Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 2004: para 769. Emphasis added. In Prosecutor 
v Clement Keyishima and Obed Ruzindana 1999: Sentence paras 30 – 31, where the Trial 
Chamber sentenced the first offender to four concurrent sentences for the remainder of his 
life and the second offender to 25 years imprisonment, it was held that the second offender 
was entitled to credit for the time he had spent in detention whereas in the case of the first 
offender the Tribunal was silent. This could be attributed to the fact that the Tribunal knew 
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One could argue that by qualifying its order, the Tribunal was aware that 
this was one of the cases in which credit for the period spent in prison 
awaiting trial could not be earned. The prisoner was to be in prison for the 
rest of his life.396 The Tribunal just wanted, as a formality, to refer to Rule 
101(4) which provides, in mandatory terms, that ‘credit shall be given to 
the convicted person for the period, if any, during which the convicted 
person was detained in custody pending his surrender to the Tribunal or 
pending trial or appeal.’ It is argued that if Rule 101(D) had not required 
the Tribunal, regardless of the sentence imposed, to mention that the 
convicted person shall be entitled to credit for the years spent in detention 
awaiting trial or the finalisation of his appeal, cases where the convicted 
person was sentenced to imprisonment for the rest of his life would have 
been cases where the Rule is clearly inapplicable. It is thus recommended 
that Rule 101(D) should be amended to require the Tribunal to only order 
that the convicted person shall be entitled to credit for the time spent in 
                                                                                                                                                     
that, practically, a person sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life could not 
benefit from credits earned while in detention awaiting trial. In The Prosecutor v Mikaeli 
Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T (Judgment of 28 April 2005) paras 618-621, the 
offender was convicted of one count of genocide and two counts of rape and murder as 
crimes against humanity and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life on all 
the three counts. The Trial Chamber was silent on whether he was entitled to credit for the 
period he had spent in detention awaiting trial. This could be attributed to the fact that the 
Trial Chamber knew that had it made such an order it would be of no practical importance 
and opted not to make it. In Prosecutor v Ferdinard Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
and Hassan Ngeze 2003: paras 1105 -1109, the Trial Chamber sentenced the two 
offenders, Nahimana and Ngeze, to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives and did 
not even mention that they were entitled to credit for time spent in detention awaiting trial.  
396 In The Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba 2008, where the offender was convicted of 
genocide and crimes against humanity, the Appeals Chamber imposed a ‘sentence of 
imprisonment for the remainder of Athanase Seromba’s life, subject to credit being given 
under Rule 101(D) of the Rules for the period already spent in detention from 6 February 
2002.’ See para 240 (Disposition). However, Judge Liu, while recognising that the 
offences of which the accused was convicted were callous, and also ‘in principle’ 
supported an increase of the sentence, dissented from the sentence imposed by the majority 
and held that the sentence imposed on the offender should have been ‘short of a term of 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life.’ See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu, para 17.  
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detention awaiting trial or awaiting the finalisation of his appeal in cases 
where a determinate sentence or life imprisonment has been imposed. 
The Appeals Chamber’s judgment in Kamuhanda indicates how the 
Tribunal’s approach to questions regarding sentencing makes it very 
difficult for one to be convinced that the Tribunal thinks that a particular 
objective of punishment should be stressed in cases where a person is 
sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of their life. One of the 
appellant’s grounds of appeal was that although the Trial Chamber referred 
to reconciliation as one of the purposes/objectives that the punishment it 
imposed was to achieve, it ‘nevertheless sentenced him to life 
imprisonment’ which indicated, in the appellant’s view, that the Trial 
Chamber ‘ostentatiously...purported to have’ been mindful of the 
reconciliatory role that the punishment was to play, but that it ‘“gave no 
explanation whatsoever...as to what extent...the sentence it imposed would 
help restore...national reconciliation”.’397 The Appeals Chamber in 
dismissing the appellant’s argument reasoned that: 
The Appeals Chamber first notes that while national reconciliation and the 
restoration and maintenance of peace are important goals of sentencing, 
they are not the only goals. Indeed, the Trial Chamber correctly referred to 
“deterrence, justice, reconciliation, and the restoration and maintenance of 
peace” as being among the goals consistent with Security Council 
Resolution 955 of ...1994 which set up the Tribunal. These goals cannot 
be separated but are intertwined, and, in any case, nothing in Resolution 
955 indicates that the Security Council intended that one should prevail 
over another…The Trial Chamber was free to conclude that any 
advantage in terms of national reconciliation gained by the Appellant’s 
                                                            
397 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v The Prosecutor 2005: para 350. In Prosecutor v Ferdinard 
Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze 2003: para 1095, the Trial 
Chamber, in sentencing all the offenders to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives, 
also just outlined the objectives of punishment (retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
protection of society) without even attempting to explain what each of them meant, let 
alone how one or more of them was applicable to the case in question.  
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eventual release was either minimal or was outweighed by the harms to 
both general deterrence and national reconciliation that would be created 
by a lenient sentence that was not perceived to reflect the gravity of the 
crimes committed... The Appellant has neither demonstrated that the Trial 
Chamber committed any error in its assessment of the goals behind the 
creation of the Tribunal, nor that the Trial Chamber improperly exercised 
its discretion in determining the appropriate sentence .398 
There are at least three problems with the Appeals Chamber’s observation. 
First, it is not true that the Trial Chamber assessed the goals behind the 
creation of the Tribunal. What the Trial Chamber did, as already 
mentioned, was to merely mention Security Council Resolution 955 and 
thereafter outlined what it called the ‘themes’ that guided the sentencing 
discretion of the Tribunal. This explains why on appeal the appellant 
argued that the Trial Chamber ‘“ostentatiously...outlined the rules it 
purported to have applied. However, it did not apply those rules”.’399 
Secondly, the Appeals Chamber erroneously concluded that the Trial 
Chamber had emphasised all the ‘themes’ of punishment mentioned in 
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) when it sentenced the appellant to 
imprisonment for the remainder of his life. The true position is that though 
the Trial Chamber referred to Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), it 
singled out general deterrence and reconciliation as the bases on which it 
sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for the rest of his life. It is partly 
because of that, that Judge Maqutu wrote a dissenting opinion to the effect 
that, if the Tribunal really took the reconciliation aspect seriously, it should 
not have sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for the remainder of his 
life but rather to 25 years imprisonment. It could be argued further that by 
                                                            
398 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v The Prosecutor 2005: para 351. 
399 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v The Prosecutor 2005: para 350. 
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singling out general deterrence and reconciliation, the Tribunal was itself 
making some goals prevail over the other.  
The third problem with the Appeals Chamber’s judgment is that most of the 
time it erroneously referred to the fact that the appellant had been sentenced 
to ‘life imprisonment’ by the Trial Chamber and not that he had been 
sentenced to ‘imprisonment for the remainder of his life’, as if both 
sentences meant the same thing. Much as the equating of imprisonment for 
the remainder of the appellant’s life with life imprisonment did not 
prejudice the appellant’s appeal, one would have expected the Appeals 
Chamber to refer to the correct sentence to which the appellant had been 
sentenced, against which he was appealing, and which it confirmed later.400 
However, most importantly for sentencing and the theories of punishment, 
the Appeals Chamber clearly demonstrated that the purposes/objectives of 
                                                            
400 The equating of life imprisonment with imprisonment of the remainder of the 
offender’s life could also be found in Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze 2003, in which the Trial Chamber, after convicting the 
accused of genocide and other serious war crimes, held that ‘Rule 101 of the Rules states 
that upon conviction, an Accused may be sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed term or 
the remainder of his life. The Chamber considers that life imprisonment, being the highest 
penalty permissible at the Tribunal, should be reserved for the most serious offenders…’ 
para 1097. Emphasis in original. The manner in which the Tribunal equated life 
imprisonment with imprisonment for the remainder of the accused’s life is clear with 
regard to the sentence imposed on Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. The Tribunal held that 
‘[h]aving considered all the relevant factors, the Chamber considers that the appropriate 
sentence for Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in respect of all the counts on which he has been 
convicted is imprisonment for the remainder of his life.’ However, in its decision dated 31 
March 2000, the Appeals Chamber decided: ‘[T]hat for the violation of his rights the 
Appellant is entitled to a remedy, to be fixed at the time of judgment at first instance, as 
follows: 
a) If the appellant is not found guilty, he shall receive financial compensation; 
b) If the Appellant is found guilty, his sentence shall be reduced to take account of 
the violation of his rights. 
The Chamber considers that a term of years, being by its nature a reduced sentence from 
that of life imprisonment, is the only way in which it can implement the Appeals Chamber 
decision…’ see paras 1106 – 1107. (Emphasis added). Even on Appeal, the Tribunal 
mistakenly observed that ‘…the Trial Chamber imposed on each Appellant a single 
sentence of life imprisonment.’ See Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean- Bosco Barayagwiza, 
Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: para 1039. Footnotes omitted.    
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punishment mentioned in Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) are 
equally important, intertwined, and that none prevails over another. 
However, one could argue that, as much as that is the position, it is not of 
general application and that some ‘themes’ should be expected to override 
others depending on the objective that is sought to be achieved by the 
sentence imposed. If the Tribunal intends to emphasise reconciliation, one 
would expect it not to sentence the offender to imprisonment for the rest of 
his life. However, if it intended to stress deterrence, one would expect it to 
impose a severe sentence which could be life imprisonment or 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life. 
In some cases an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment for the 
remainder of the appellant’s life does not attempt to convince the Appeals 
Chamber to revise the sentence on the ground that it was based on a wrong 
purpose/objective of punishment; but rather focuses on whether the Trial 
Chamber addressed the issues of aggravating or mitigating factors properly. 
In Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana,401 for example, 
where the Trial Chamber sentenced the first appellant to imprisonment for 
the remainder of his life on each of the four counts of genocide, on appeal 
the appellant argued that the Trial Chamber erred in law and fact when, at 
sentencing, it emphasised the seriousness of the offence committed, his 
individual circumstances and the aggravating factors but ignored the 
mitigating factors.402 In upholding the sentence imposed by the Trial 
Chamber the Appeals Chamber held that the sentence of imprisonment for 
                                                            
401 Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 2001. 
402 Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 2001: para 363. 
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the remainder of the appellant’s life on each of the counts of genocide was 
‘appropriate’ as the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors.403 The Appeals Chamber also held that the sentence imposed on the 
first appellant was appropriate because ‘[t]he crimes for which he was 
convicted were of the most serious nature, and a sentence imposed must 
reflect the inherent gravity of the criminal conduct.’404  
The Appeals Chamber clearly ignored any discussion of the objectives or 
purposes of punishment as justification for upholding the sentence imposed 
by the Trial Chamber. It rather emphasised the nature of the offence 
committed and the individual circumstances of the appellant. In my opinion 
this is attributable to two factors: one, that both the Prosecution and the 
Defence did not mention what purpose/objective the revised punishment 
should serve; and two, the Trial Chamber did not base its sentence on 
purposes/objectives of punishment but rather on the seriousness of the 
offences, the individual characteristics of the offender, and that the 
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Consequently both 
the Prosecution and the Defence did not find it relevant to base their 
arguments on appeal on issues that were not emphasised by the Trial 
Chamber, which meant that the Appeals Chamber could also not rule on 
issues not raised in the arguments on Appeal. This was regrettable because 
one would have expected both the Trial Chamber405 and the Appeals 
                                                            
403 Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 2001: para 363. 
404 Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 2001: para 370. 
405 The Trial Chamber mentioned in passing that it was mindful that in sentencing the 
accused for crimes such as genocide, such a sentence was to serve the objectives of 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and the protection of society. See Prosecutor v 
Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 1999: (Sentence) paras 1 – 2. 
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Chamber to seriously discuss the objective or objectives to be achieved by 
such a serious sentence as the one that was imposed. 
It could be argued that there are cases in which the Tribunal has sentenced 
offenders to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives by unconsciously 
relying on retribution. In The Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana, for 
example, the accused was convicted of genocide and rape and murder as 
crimes against humanity and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder 
of his life on each of the three counts, which sentences were to run 
concurrently. In imposing the sentences the Trial Chamber underscored that 
the ‘Preamble to the Security Council Resolution 955 establishing the 
Tribunal ... emphasized the need to further the goals of deterrence, justice, 
reconciliation, and restoration and maintenance of peace.’406 The Trial 
Chamber added that, for it to impose ‘a just sentence’, such sentence had to 
reflect the above five goals of punishment.407 In justifying the imposition of 
heavy sentences on the offender, the Tribunal held that ‘[g]enocide and 
murder and rape as crimes against humanity rank amongst the gravest of 
crimes. The Chamber has no doubt that the perpetrators of such crimes 
deserve a heavy sentence.’408  
As discussed in Chapter II, retribution is based on the just desert principle 
with the underlying argument being that an offender is punished because he 
deserves to be punished for breaking the law. It could also be argued that in 
this case the Tribunal understood ‘deserve’ to have its dictionary or 
                                                            
406 The Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana 2005: para 588. 
407 The Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana 2005: para 588. 
408 The Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana 2005: para 603. (Emphasis mine). 
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ordinary meaning and did not intend it to be construed in the way 
punishment specialists would. What the intention of the Tribunal was in 
choosing to use the word ‘deserve’ in this context could be debatable. But, 
in my opinion, the Tribunal should be understood to have intended 
‘deserve’ to mean what it means in the punishment debate, that is, that the 
offender is punished severely because of the offences he committed and for 
which he deserves to be punished. This is because ‘deserve’ was used at the 
sentence stage of the judgment where any court or tribunal would invoke it 
if it were to rely on retribution. This interpretation is also supported by the 
Tribunal’s later observation which stated as follows: 
The Chamber recalls the incident where the Accused used a machete to 
cut the pregnant woman Pascasie Mukaremera from her breasts down to 
her genitals and remove her baby, who cried for some time before dying. 
After disembowelling the woman, the assailants accompanying [the 
Accused] then cut off her arms and stuck sharpened sticks into them. This 
savage attack upon a pregnant woman deserves condemnation in the 
strongest possible terms and constitutes a highly aggravating factor.409 
The Appeals Chamber judgment in Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor410, in which the 
appellants successfully appealed against their sentences of imprisonment 
for the remainder of their lives, demonstrates how the vague ruling by the 
Trial Chamber on the purposes/objectives of punishment could lead to the 
appellants raising different grounds of appeal against the same sentence. As 
mentioned earlier, although the Trial Chamber, had outlined the four goals 
of punishment as being retribution, deterrence,  rehabilitation and the 
protection of society, it did not point out which of the four goals it 
                                                            
409 The Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana 2005: para 612. (Emphasis added). 
410 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007.  
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emphasised in sentencing all the accused to imprisonment for the remainder 
of their lives.411 In his appeal against sentence Nahimana contended, inter 
alia, ‘that the Trial Chamber imposed a clearly excessive sentence having 
regard to international jurisprudence’, and to other mitigating factors.412 
Barayagizwa argued that the ‘sentence [was] excessive and 
disproportionate in view of’ the various mitigating circumstances.413 
Barayagizwa added that ‘in determining his sentence, the Trial Chamber 
placed too much emphasis on the objectives of retribution and deterrence, 
and not enough on those of national reconciliation and rehabilitation.’414 
Ngeze argued that ‘the sentence imposed on him by the Trial Chamber 
[was] too harsh.’415 
It is indisputable that, indeed, imprisonment for the remainder of the 
offender’s life is an excessive sentence by all standards. This explains why 
there was unanimity among all the three appellants on that ground of appeal 
and the Appeals Chamber agreed with them and reduced the sentences.416 
However, it is only Barayagwiza who, in addition to arguing that the 
sentence was excessive, also argued that the Trial Chamber erred in 
                                                            
411 See Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze 
Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (Trial Chamber, Judgment of 3 December 2003): para 1095.  
412 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1044. 
413 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1053. 
414 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1056. Footnotes omitted. 
415 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1098. 
416 Ngeze was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment (see para 1115); Barayagwiza to 32 
years’ imprisonment (see para 1097); and Nahimana to 30 years’ imprisonment (see para 
1052). Judge Theodor Meron dissented from Nahimana’s sentence on the ground that it 
was ‘too harsh’. See Partly Dissenting Judgment of Judge Theodor Meron (XXII): para 22. 
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emphasising retribution and deterrence instead of rehabilitation and 
reconciliation. In dismissing his appeal on this ground the Appeals 
Chamber was of ‘the opinion that in view of the gravity of the crimes in 
respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, the two main purposes of 
sentencing are retribution and deterrence; the purpose of rehabilitation 
should not be given undue weight.’417 The Appeals Chamber concluded 
that it could not ‘find that the Trial Chamber committed an error by giving 
undue weight to the purposes of retribution and deterrence.’418   
It is submitted that both the Appeals Chamber and the appellant were 
wrong when they held the view that the Trial Chamber emphasised 
retribution and deterrence. What the Trial Chamber did was to mention the 
four goals of punishment, thereafter consider the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, and then sentenced all three offenders to 
imprisonment for the remainder of their lives. However, despite that 
oversight the Appeals Chamber should be credited for emphasising that 
retribution and deterrence were the major goals of punishment for cases 
within its jurisdiction. It should naturally follow from that holding that it is 
those two objectives of punishment that are emphasised even in cases of 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life.  
 
 
                                                            
417 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1057. 
418 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 2007: 
para 1057. 
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3.5 Life imprisonment under the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) 
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR the SCLS is a hybrid court that was 
established by an agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 
1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000.419 Proceedings of the SCSL are governed 
by the Court’s Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.420 The 
Statute empowers the SCSL to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility421 for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996.422 The Statute specifically empowers the SCSL to 
prosecute persons responsible for certain crimes against humanity, certain 
violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of 
1977 Additional Protocol II, other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, and some crimes under Sierra Leonean law.423 
                                                            
419 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu Case No. SCSL-04-16-T (Judgment of 20 June 2007): para 2. In 
Cambodia, in 2004 the government and the United Nations established the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of the Crimes Committed during 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. The Extraordinary Chambers is allowed to impose 
life imprisonment. See Articles 3 and 39 of the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 
2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). For the background to the establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers see Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 53/135 (18 February 1999). 
420 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu 2007: para 2. 
421 For a detailed discussion of the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the notion of ‘greatest 
responsibility’ see The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu 2007: paras 640-458. 
422 Article 1 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
423 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu 2007: para 3. 
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Article 19(1) of the Statute of the SCSL provides that ‘the Chamber shall 
impose upon a convicted person...imprisonment for a specified number of 
years.’ This should be contrasted with Articles 24(1) and 23(1) of the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes, respectively, which provide that ‘the penalty imposed 
by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment.’ It is argued that 
‘imprisonment’ is wide enough and could mean anything from one year or 
less to imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life. This explains 
why the judges of both the ICTY and the ICTR interpreted the relevant 
Articles as empowering them to impose life imprisonment and 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life, respectively, and 
included such punishments in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
However, the position is different with the Statute of the SCSL. Whereas 
the Statutes of both the ICTY and the ICTR allow the Tribunals to impose 
‘imprisonment’, that of the SCSL allows it to impose ‘imprisonment for a 
specified number of years.’ This means that the SCSL cannot impose a life 
sentence or imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life because 
the years to be served by offenders sentenced to either of the two sentences 
cannot be ‘specified.’  
The SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that ‘a person 
convicted by the Special Court...may be sentenced to imprisonment for a 
specific number of years.’424 One could argue that, unlike the Statute which 
makes it obligatory for the SCSL to sentence the offender to specified 
number of years, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence gives the SCSL 
                                                            
424 Rule 101(1) of SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence (As Amended on 27 May 
2008). (Emphasis added). 
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wider discretion. By providing that the offender ‘may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a specified number of years’ the Rules of Procedure 
could be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal may in some circumstances 
also sentence the offender to a non-specific number of years. However, 
such an interpretation of the Rules of Procedure would be in conflict with 
the Statute which uses mandatory language that the SCSL ‘shall’ impose 
imprisonment for a specified number of years. In practice the SCSL has not 
sentenced any offender to life imprisonment although it has in one case 
sentenced the offenders to lengthy terms of imprisonment ranging from 45 
– 50 years.425 On 20 March 2009, the SCSL signed an emforecment 
agreement with the Republic of Rwanda, according to which, ‘former 
Sierra Leonean rebel and militia leaders convicted by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone could serve their sentences in Rwanda.’426 The SCSL has held 
that because of the nature of the offences committed by the individuals 
falling under its jurisdiction, the punishment imposed should serve the 
purposes/objectives of retribution and deterrence.427 These two goals seem 
to be the dominant considerations of international criminal tribunals. One 
wonders why, given the growth of the human rights ethic in the 
international sphere, the goals of rehabilitation and reconciliation are not 
taken into account in view of the emergence of transitional justice 
considerations such as Truths Commissions. 
                                                            
425 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu Case No. SCSL-04-16-T (Sentence of 19 July 2007). 
426 See Special Court Concludes Enforcement Agreement with Rwanda, at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=3VejdLwAIPk%3d&tabid=214 (accessed 25 March 
2009). As at the time of writing, the author was unable to access a copy of the agreement. 
427 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu 2007: Sentence. 
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3.6 Life Imprisonment under the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The ICC has had a very long history. As far back as August 1951 the 
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, which was appointed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, met in Geneva and wrote a 
report and a Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court.428 This report 
and the Draft Statute were submitted to Member States for comments 
before June 1952.429 Wright, who wrote within a year after the Committee 
on International Jurisdiction adopted its report and the Draft Statute of the 
ICC in 1951, clearly demonstrated the early challenges faced in the process 
of establishing the ICC. He stated as follows: 
The report and draft raise[d] questions concerning (1) the purpose of an 
international criminal court, (2) the appropriate procedures for 
establishing it, (3) the proper scope of its jurisdiction, and (4) the law 
which it will apply. Indecision on these points was exhibited by the 
closely divided votes and numerous abstentions on many articles of the 
draft and by the fact that its detailed provisions tend to nullify its apparent 
purpose. Indecision on these points ... [was] also ... manifested in the 
discussions of more than a dozen official and unofficial proposals and 
drafts of the subject of the international criminal court during the past 
thirty years.430 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to deal with all the important 
historical developments that preceded the adoption of the Statute of the 
ICC. There is an avalanche of literature on that subject.431 However, it 
should be mentioned that in 1994 the International Law Commission 
adopted the Statute for an International Criminal Court (the ICC Statute).432 
                                                            
428 Wright 1952: 60. 
429 Wright 1952: 60. 
430 Wright 1952: 60. 
431 See for example Schabas 2004; and Lee (ed) 1999. 
432 Crawford 1995: 404-416. 
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The drafters of the ICC Statute ‘benefited from important previous 
experiments – the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.’433 Following 
lengthy, and at times heated, negotiations, deliberations, lobbying, and 
compromise, the ICC Statute was adopted and entered into force on 1 July 
2002.434 The ICC has jurisdiction over serious crimes, such as genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.435 At the time of writing, June 
2008, the ICC had not finalised even a single case although some African 
war criminals had been indicted, but were still at large, and others were in 
detention awaiting trial.436 
In relation to punishment, Article 77 of the Statute empowers the ICC to 
impose ‘imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not 
exceed a maximum of 30 years.’437 The ICC is also empowered to sentence 
the offender to ‘a term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.’438 However, Article 110(3) provides that ‘when a person has 
served ... 25 years in the case of life imprisonment, the Court shall review 
                                                            
433 Arsanjani and Reisman 2005: 385. 
434 Text of the Rome Statute circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and 
corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 
May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 
2002. For the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC see 
generally Lee (ed) 1999. For the history of the International Criminal Court, see Ellis and 
Goldstone (eds) 2008: 7 – 26. 
435 Articles 6-8. 
436 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (accessed 2 July 2008). 
437 Article 77(1)(a) of the ICC Statute. 
438 Article 77(1)(b) of the ICC Statute. See also Article 78(3). Rule 145(3) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provides that ‘[l]ife imprisonment may be imposed when justified 
by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person, as evidenced by the existence of one or more of the aggravating circumstances.’  
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the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced.’ If after review the 
ICC decides that the prisoner does not qualify for the reduction of the 
sentence, the prisoner’s sentence shall be reviewed (by the ICC) at later 
intervals as provided for under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.439 
Several observations can be made in relation to the ICC Statute’s 
provisions on punishment in the light of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. In the first place, as in the 
case of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, but in contrast to the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICC is not allowed to impose the 
death penalty. This shows that the international community is committed to 
moving away from the death penalty even in the most serious of offences. 
Secondly, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the ICC Statute 
specifically provides for life imprisonment. One has to recall that both the 
ICTY and the ICTR Statutes only allow the relevant Tribunals to impose 
imprisonment and that it is the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which 
empower those Tribunals to impose a sentence of imprisonment for the 
remainder of the convicted person’s life. It is argued that the ICC does not 
have jurisdiction to sentence a convicted person to imprisonment for the 
remainder of his life. Another observation to be made is that the minimum 
number of years to be served by a person sentenced to life imprisonment 
has been defined by the ICC Statute. Such a person should have the 
possibility of release evaluated after serving a minimum of 25 years. This is 
not the case with offenders sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTR. 
The minimum number of years they are to serve will depend on two 
                                                            
439 Article 110(5). 
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factors: the law relating to life imprisonment in the country in which the 
prisoner is serving his sentence, and the willingness of the ICTR to accept 
that such a prisoner should be pardoned or paroled under the relevant laws. 
By setting the minimum number of years a person sentenced to life 
imprisonment should serve before his sentence is revised, the ICC Statute 
not only creates uniformity with regard to the meaning of life imprisonment 
in relation to its prisoners, but also ensures that life imprisonment cannot 
amount to a cruel and inhumane punishment, because the prisoner at least 
has the prospect of being released.  
Another observation about the penalty regime provided under the ICC 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is that, unlike the SCSL 
Statute which empowers the SCSL to impose imprisonment for a specified 
number of years thus leaving it to the judges to determine for how many 
years depending on the circumstances of the case, the offender should be 
sentenced, the ICC Statute limits the number of years that could be imposed 
to 30 years imprisonment. Worth noting is that a person sentenced to, say 
30 years, is required to serve two-thirds of the sentence and could qualify to 
have his sentence reduced. This ensures that judges do not hide behind the 
veil of retribution and deterrence to impose sentences that would be far 
beyond the life expectancy of offenders. The last observation is that, under 
the ICC Statute, life imprisonment is reserved for the most heinous of 
offences. As discussed already, this is not the case with the ICTR and 
ICTY. Both the ICTY and the ICTR can impose life imprisonment on a 
person convicted of any offence under the Statute. However, practice has 
shown that life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of the 
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offender’s life have only been imposed in cases where the offender has 
committed heinous offences. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The above discussion has illustrated not only the meaning of life 
imprisonment before the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, the 
ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the ICC, but also the purposes/objectives of 
the punishment which each international tribunal, where applicable, thinks 
the sentence of life imprisonment should achieve. The following 
conclusions should be drawn from the discussion of the jurisprudence or 
the relevant documents of the international tribunals with regard to life 
imprisonment: retribution and deterrence are emphasised more than any 
purpose of punishment; the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did not state 
the purpose the punishments they imposed were to serve; the Tribunals 
generally pay scant attention to the discussion of the objectives of 
punishment; the ICTR in some cases erroneously equates life imprisonment 
with imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life; and the ICC 
Statute approaches punishment in a manner that is more  human rights 
friendly than the statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. It is 
recommended that international tribunals should always engage in a robust 
discussion of the objectives/purposes of punishment at the sentencing stage 
so that the offenders and their counsel know whether the sentence imposed 
reflects the objectives that the Tribunal intends to achieve.      
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CHAPTER IV 
LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, MAURITIUS AND 
UGANDA: HISTORY AND MAJOR LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
4. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the history and major legal issues or developments 
relating to life imprisonment in South Africa, Mauritius and Uganda and 
where applicable, the jurisprudence and legislation of other African 
countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. In Uganda, where the death 
penalty is still lawful and where there have not been major developments in 
case law regarding life imprisonment, the historical analysis of life 
imprisonment will emphasise how the respective laws and constitutions 
have dealt with the right to life. The chapter will examine how these 
various enactments have led to the retention of the death penalty instead of 
substituting it with life imprisonment, as some have suggested. Before 
discussing the history and legal developments relating to life imprisonment 
in South Africa, Mauritius and Uganda, the different approaches that 
countries have adopted with regard to the sentence of life imprisonment 
will be described. 
4.1 The different approaches to the sentence of life imprisonment in 
domestic jurisdictions 
The sentence of life imprisonment is probably the most confusing sentence 
in some countries. Many people, including some lawyers, hold the view 
that a person sentenced to life imprisonment will spend the rest of his or her 
life in prison or, as the Nicozia Assize Court of Cyprus in the case of The 
Republic of Cyprus v. Andreas Costa Aristodemou put it, ‘the sentence 
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“imprisonment for life” means exactly what is stated by the simple Greek 
words, that is, imprisonment for the remainder of the biological existence 
of the convicted person.’440 It is true that in some countries a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment spends the rest of his life in prison. But in 
other countries this is not the case. One can generally say that there are five 
major approaches that countries have adopted in regard to life 
imprisonment. The first approach is that adopted by countries such as Costa 
Rica, Columbia, El Salvador,441 Brazil and Portugal, where the 
Constitutions prohibit the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment on 
any person.442 The second approach is to be found in countries such as 
Croatia, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, which ‘make no legislative 
provision for life imprisonment at all.’443 The third category is to be found 
in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Tanzania444 where 
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment cannot be considered for parole or 
their sentences cannot be remitted.445 The fourth category is to be found in 
                                                            
440 The Republic of Cyprus v. Andreas Costa Aristodemou 1987 cited in Case of Kafkaris v 
Cyprus 2008: para 47.  
441 Van Zyl Smit 2006: 410. 
442 The Constitution of Brazil (of 5 October 1988) prohibits the imposition of life 
imprisonment on any person. Article XLVII (b) provides that ‘there may be no sentence of 
life imprisonment.’  In Extradition 855, Decision of 26 August 2004, the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal of Brazil ruled that it could not order the extradition on a Chilean citizen to Chile 
unless Chile commuted the defendant’s sentence to 30 years imprisonment because 
‘Brazilian law establishes that 30 years is the maximum of actual serving time.’ See 
http://www.stf.gov.br/jurisprudencia/abstratos/documento.asp?seq=70&lng=ingles 
accessed 16 August 2007. It has been observed that ‘[i]t is noteworthy that life 
imprisonment is not considered everywhere as an essential form of social control. In 
countries such as Brazil and Portugal it is constitutionally outlawed…’ See van Zyl Smit 
and Dünkel (eds): (2001) 814. See also van Zyl Smit 2002: 189. 
443 Appleton and Grφver 2007: 601. 
444 Mujuzi 2008(a): 174. 
445 For a detailed discussion of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole in the United States of America and England and Wales, see generally see van Zyl 
Smit 2002: 20-131. 
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countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana,446 Liberia,447 
Swaziland,448 Namibia,449 Sudan450 and Ethiopia451 where the law allows 
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment to be considered for parole or to 
have their sentence remitted after serving a specified number of years. The 
last category is to be found in countries such as Mexico and Peru, where the 
respective Constitutional Courts have ‘declared life imprisonment to be 
unconstitutional.’452 With respect to the fourth category, courts in South 
Africa have held that life imprisonment is only constitutional if the 
offenders have a prospect of being released. Within this category of 
countries, the Constitutional Court of Uganda held that if life imprisonment 
is to substitute the death penalty, it should mean that the offender sentenced 
to life imprisonment should spend the rest of his life in prison. 
                                                            
446 Mujuzi 2008(a) 174. 
447 Section 15:34(3) Act to Amend Chapters 14 and 15 Sub-Chapter (C), Title 26 of the 
Liberian Code of Laws Revised, Known As the New Penal Law of 1976, by Adding 
Thereto Four New Sections Thereby Making the Crimes of Armed Robbery, Terrorism 
and Hijacking , Respectively, Capital Offenses, and Providing Punishment Thereof, 
Approved 22 July 2008 and Published by Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs Monrovia, 
Liberia, 30 July 2008 (where a person sentenced to life imprisonment for those offences is 
eligible for parole at the age of 90 years old). For a detailed discussion of the Liberia’s law 
on life imprisonment, see Mujuzi 2009(c). 
448 Section 43(2) of the Prisons Act, 1964. 
449 In Namibia the release policy provides that ‘prisoners sentenced for life (for which the 
minimum period of detention is regarded as twenty (20) years for administrative purposes) 
may be considered for parole … after having served at least half of the minimum period of 
detention of twenty (20) years, irrespective of whether it was his first offence or not.’ See 
Release of Prisoners on Parole (Department of Justice, Directorate of Prisons, File No. 
10/8/B, of 4 August 1986) para 4.3.1(h)(i). On file with the author. 
450 Section 66 of the Penal Code of Sudan (2003) provides that ‘[i]n calculating fractions 
of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to 
imprisonment for twenty years.’  
451 Section 202(1) of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Proclamation No.414/2004, provides that ‘[w]here a prisoner has served two-thirds of a 
sentence of imprisonment or twenty years in case of life imprisonment, the Court may, on 
the recommendation of the management of the institution or on the petition of the criminal, 
order conditional release.’ In Ethiopia, a prisoner serving a life sentence and granted 
conditional release is required to be on probation for a period of not less five years and not 
more than seven years. See section 204 of the Criminal Code. 
452 Van Zyl Smit 2006: 410. 
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4.2 History of life imprisonment in South Africa, Mauritius, and 
Uganda 
 
South Africa, Mauritius and Uganda have had interesting but different 
developments in relation to the sentence of life imprisonment. In South 
Africa, life imprisonment became the severest sentence when the 
Constitutional Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional. 
Since then, the sentence of life imprisonment has gone through different 
stages, and the time that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment has to 
spend in prison has increased in comparison to that required when the death 
penalty was still lawful.453 The analysis focuses on those cases when the 
death penalty was discretionary and when courts could impose the death 
penalty instead. It also deals with cases where courts would have imposed a 
lesser sentence but opted for a life sentence.  The discussion focuses, too, 
on life as a minimum sentence for some offences. In Mauritius, the 
government abolished the death penalty by enacting a law to that effect. 
The discussion will deal with the major legal developments relating to life 
imprisonment after the abolition of the death penalty. In the case of Uganda 
life imprisonment in relation to the death penalty is discussed. This is 
because the death penalty is still lawful in Uganda.  The excursus on 
Uganda will address the measures taken to include the capital punishment 
provision in the Constitution. The discourse here will look, too, at the major 
constitutional and legal developments that have taken place in an effort to 
replace the death penalty with life imprisonment.     
 
                                                            
453 The release of prisoners serving life sentences is dealt with under Chapter VI. 
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4.2.1 South Africa 
Life imprisonment in South Africa has never meant that the offender would 
spend the rest of his life in prison.454 Whereas life imprisonment has never 
meant life imprisonment in the literal sense in South Africa, its meaning 
has changed substantially in the past decades. This section investigates the 
meaning and use of life imprisonment in South Africa in four major legal 
historical eras: (i)  at the time when the death penalty was still lawful in 
South Africa (including life imprisonment as early as 1906); (ii)  
immediately after the abolition of the death penalty (1994-1998); (iii) 
following the introduction of the minimum sentences legislation (1998-
2007); and (iv) after December 2007, when the sentencing jurisdiction of 
the regional courts was extended to include life imprisonment. In assessing 
the meaning and use of life imprisonment during these four historical 
periods, the focus falls on the law in place at the time and how courts 
interpreted it to justify the imposition of life imprisonment. The relevant 
statistics are brought into play to illustrate the incidence of cases in which 
life imprisonment was imposed. The section shows that despite its 
evidently simple meaning life imprisonment in South Africa has evolved in 
meaning over time, particularly in the last 20 years. These changes, 
                                                            
454 Diemont JA held in S v Qeqe and another 1990 (2) SACR 654 (CkA) at 659 that 
‘[d]oes a “life sentence” mean that the appellants must remain incarcerated in prisons until 
they die? The answer is no. It has been widely accepted for many years [in the former 
Ciskei] that a life sentence will not exceed 25 years and that even 25 years is an 
exceptionally long sentence… [section] 18(1)(b) of the Police and Prisons Act 36 of 1983 
(Ck) provided that any person sentenced under the provisions of any law to imprisonment 
for life, shall be detained in a prison for a period not less than 10 years and not more than 
25 years.’  In S v Siluale en ander 1999 (2) SACR 102 (SCA) at 103 the Court stated that 
‘[i]f the circumstances of a case require that an offender should receive a sentence which 
for all practical purposes removes him permanently from society, life imprisonment is the 
only appropriate sentence. It is intended to be the most severe sentence that can be 
imposed, although there are acknowledged procedures which make parole possible in 
appropriate circumstances, eg where the offender (contrary to all expectations) genuinely 
reforms.’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
176
especially since the early 1990s, were the result of two macro political 
forces. On the one hand was the democratisation of South Africa with the 
enactment of a new constitution, a progressive Bill of Rights with its 
provisions protecting the right to life and the right not to be subjected to 
inhumane and degrading punishment or treatment. Pulling in the other 
direction was the government’s reaction to spiralling incidence of crime, 
characterised by its over-emphasis on punishment and retribution. By 31 
December 2008, South Africa’s prisons were home to 8,764 prisoners 
serving life sentences.455 In the last 10 years South African courts 
sentenced more people to life imprisonment than they had done in the 
previous century.456 The meaning of life imprisonment has also changed 
significantly during this period. The increase in the number of prisoners 
serving life sentences and the consequent changes in the meaning of life 
imprisonment are traceable to issues that this section will interrogate. 
 
4.2.1.1 Life imprisonment during the imposition of the death penalty 
(1906 – 1994) 
 
Life imprisonment has been part of the South African legal system for 
many decades. South African case law indicates that as early as the 
beginning of the 20th century, courts started granting divorce decrees where 
one spouse could prove that the other was serving a life sentence. In Nefler 
v Nefler457 the High Court of the Orange Free State was petitioned by Mrs 
Nefler for a divorce decree on the ground that her husband had been found 
                                                            
455 See http://www.dcs.gov.za/WebStatistics/ (accessed 19 February 2009).  
456 In 1995 there were 443 prisoners serving life sentences in South Africa. See Giffard 
and Muntingh 2006: 10. 
457 Nefler v Nefler (1906) ORC 7.  
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guilty of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and ‘sentenced 
to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for the term of his natural life.’458 
The Court held that ‘[e]quity will demand that ... in this case where the man 
is imprisoned for life’ it necessitated the granting of ‘a divorce on the 
ground of imprisonment for life.’459 The reasoning in Nefler would later be 
followed in the cases of Jooste v Jooste (1907),460 Van Broemsen v Van 
Broemsen (1933)461 and Smith v Smith (1943).462 From these cases it is also 
clear that in the early 20th century courts rarely imposed life imprisonment. 
In all the cases cited above, except in Nefler the defendants had been 
sentenced to death and their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Life 
imprisonment in South Africa in the late 19th century and the early 20th 
century was not as long as the terms would later become by the first decade 
of the 21st century. In the early 20th Century a prison officer reported that 
the longest period he had known a person to have served life imprisonment 
was 20 years, and that in one case, a prisoner who had been sentenced to 
life imprisonment had served only one year and two months.463 In R v 
Mzwakala the Court observed that there were ‘two Government Notices...in 
terms of which a sentence of imprisonment for life [was] deemed for the 
                                                            
458 Nefler v Nefler 1906: 7. 
459 Nefler v Nefler 1906: 12. 
460 Jooste v Jooste (1907) 24 SA 329 (Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope). 
461 Van Broemsen v Van Broemsen (1933) SR 58 (High Court of Southern Rhodesia, 
Bulawayo). 
462 Smith v Smith (1943) CPD 50 (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division). 
463 Jooste v Jooste 1907: 330. 
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purposes of remission to be a sentence of imprisonment for twenty 
years.’464 However, a Court observed in 1968 that 
 
[T]he provisions of those Government Notices were, however, 
subsequently repealed. No such provision [was] to be found in the 
consolidated regulations issued under sec. 94 of the Prisons Act of 31st 
December 1965 (published under Government Notice R 2080 in 
Regulation Gazette 604 of that date) which repealed all prior regulations 
governing remission of sentences or release of prisoners on parole or on 
probation.465 
 
It appears that even before 1965, when the above mentioned government 
notices were repealed, the meaning and length of life imprisonment was 
determined by the Executive. For example, a person sentenced to life 
imprisonment (or whose death sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment) or another term of imprisonment under section 41(2) of the 
Prisons and Reformatories Act,466 was required to serve both the life 
sentence, which was always fixed, and the additional sentence of 
imprisonment imposed for another offence unless the court ordered 
otherwise. For example, in Attwood v Minister of Justice and Another, the 
applicant was sentenced to death in addition to 10 years imprisonment in 
November 1945. The Governor-General-in-Council commuted his death 
sentence to life imprisonment in terms of which, according to the Prisons 
Board, ‘the Executive Council had decided that the life imprisonment 
                                                            
464 R v Mzwakala 1957 (4) SA 273(A): 278. The Government notices referred to by the 
Court were G.N. 1551 of 8th September 1991, and G.N. 286 of 28th February 1986. 
465 S v Masala 1968 (3) SA 212 (A): 216-217. 
466 Act 13 of 1911. Section 41(2) provided that ‘when a person receives more than one 
sentence of imprisonment or additional sentences while serving a term of imprisonment, 
each such sentence shall be served the one after the expiration, setting aside, or remission 
of the other in such order as the Director may determine, unless the court specifically 
direct otherwise, or unless the court direct that such sentences shall run concurrently.’ As 
reproduced in Viljoen v Minister of Justice and Another 1948(3) SA 994(T): 997. 
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sentence should be determined as imprisonment for a period of 30 years.’467 
After serving 14 years and 2 months of the 30-year sentence, the prison 
authorities did not release him as they opined that he was supposed to serve 
40 years, as the 10- year sentence had to run consecutive to the life 
sentence (30 years). He applied to the court and argued that he was entitled 
to be released as the 10-year sentence ran concurrently with the life 
sentence. The Court dismissed his application, holding that this was not the 
legal position.  
 
The Attwood case shows, amongst other things, that in practice it was up to 
the Governor to determine what life imprisonment meant and that the 
prison authorities had to await the decision of the Executive Council on the 
meaning of life imprisonment; that life imprisonment was a fixed sentence; 
and a person sentenced to life imprisonment was entitled, through earning 
credits as a result of good industry, to the remission of his sentence like any 
other prisoner serving a fixed sentence (which meant that he could serve 
less than half of the equivalent prison term). Further, a person sentenced to 
life imprisonment could be sentenced to another imprisonment term or 
terms and the sentences would run consecutively.  
 
However, the 1959 Correctional Services Act,468 under section 32(2) read 
together with section 97(2), provided that any determinate sentence 
imposed had to run concurrently with a life sentence. Nevertheless, the Act 
still did not stipulate what a life sentence meant in practical terms. This led 
                                                            
467 Attwood v Minister of Justice and Another 1960(4) SA 911(T): 912. 
468 Act 8 of 1959. 
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courts to conclude that the 1955 Criminal Procedure Act,469 which provided 
for the sentence of life imprisonment ‘containe[d] no indication that the 
duration of such a sentence [was] to be anything other than that conveyed 
by the plain meaning of the words “imprisonment for life”.’470 Thus, by 
1968, persons sentenced to life imprisonment were released in line with 
section 64(1) of the Prisons Act471 in terms of which the Prison Board 
submitted a report to the Commissioner of Prisons recommending the 
release of the prisoner. The Commissioner would submit such a report to 
the Minister of Prisons who had the discretion to authorise the release of 
the prisoner on parole. The practice at the time was that such a report was 
submitted after a prisoner had served ten years.472 Effectively this meant 
that a person sentenced to life imprisonment could be released after 10 
years.  
 
The 1960s saw South African courts becoming increasingly punitive due, 
presumably, to political instability. This punitive attitude was evident in the 
manner in which courts approached sentencing. Dugard, a celebrated South 
African legal scholar, observed that ‘since the early 1960’s [sentences in 
general] have been more severe than those imposed in other periods of 
South African history.’473 He adds that during this period, ‘the number of 
sentences of life imprisonment imposed has been great.’474 After giving a 
                                                            
469 Act 56 of 1955. 
470 S v Masala 1968: 216. 
471 Act 8 of 1959. 
472 S v Masala 1968: 216-218. 
473 Dugard 1978: 239. 
474 Dugard 1978: 239-240. 
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summary of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment in South Africa, 
Dugard cites one case which shows that some South African judges did not 
want prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment to be released. 
 
In S. v. Tuhadeleni and others475 the trial judge, Ludorf J., sought to 
emphasize that such sentences were really “for life” when he sentenced the 
prisoners to “imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives,” but on appeal 
it was held that such a formulation could only mean imprisonment for life 
and could not exclude the power of the authorities, acting on 
recommendation from a prison board, to release a person serving a sentence 
of life imprisonment.476 
 
The punitive nature of the South African courts in the 1960s is also 
evidenced in the statistics on people sentenced to both death and life 
imprisonment before and after that, as shown in Chart 1.  
 
Chart 1477: The annual incidence of (i) the imposition of death 
sentences (represented by the black line) and (ii) the imposition of 
sentences of life imprisonment (represented by the grey line) between 
1949 and 1996 
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475  S v Tuhadeleni and others 1969 (1) S.A. 153 (A.D.). 
476 Dugard 1978: 240. 
477  The data presented in Chart 1 are based on numerous government reports dating back 
to 1949. For detailed statistics, see Appendix 1. 
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Chart 1 shows that between 1947 and 1970 courts consistently imposed 
more death penalties than life sentences. From 1949 until 1994 there was in 
no one year more than 50 offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. It also 
appears that the number of offenders sentenced to death and the number 
sentenced to life imprisonment seem to mirror each other in broad terms, 
often with a few years delay. This could be a result of death penalty 
sentences being commuted to life imprisonment. Both sentences saw a 
spike in the early 1960s but then declined until the early 1970s. Different to 
the previous spike, death penalties imposed climbed sharply from the early 
1970s but the number of life sentences imposed remained stable and low 
for the next 20 years. It was only from 1990 onwards that the number of 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment started to increase and in 1994/5 
shot through the historical ceiling of 50 cases per year as a result of the 
abolition of the death penalty in 1995/6. It is also interesting to note that 
despite the democratisation of South Africa since 1990 that there was an 
initial drop in the number of death sentences imposed, but that it quickly 
climbed back to the historical average of 150 cases per year until it was 
finally abolished.  
 
Before section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act478 was amended by the 
1990 Criminal Law Amendment Act479, ‘where an accused had been 
convicted of murder and the court found no extenuating circumstances, it 
                                                            
478 Act 51 of 1977. 
479 Amendment to section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act by section 4 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, Act 107 of 1990. 
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was obliged to impose the death penalty.’480  Put differently, before the 
aforementioned amendment, the death penalty, as an ultimate sentence, was 
obligatory for murder.481 Terblanche argues that the ‘final major overhaul’ 
of the death penalty before it was abolished in 1995 ‘was effected through 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990.’482 Du Toit el al illustrate that 
although the death penalty could still be imposed after the 1990 amendment 
to the Criminal Procedure Act, in cases of murder courts were now not 
required to establish whether there were no ‘extenuating circumstances’ but 
rather whether there were ‘mitigating or aggravating factors.’483 This was a 
positive development in ensuring that many offenders who would otherwise 
have been sentenced to death in the absence of extenuating circumstances 
could now be sentenced to lesser sentences such as life imprisonment 
because ‘the term “mitigating factor” ha[d] a wider connotation than an 
extenuating circumstance and [could] include factors unrelated to the 
crime, such as the accused’s behaviour after the crime he ha[d] committed 
or the fact that he ha[d] a clean record.’484 In other words, after the 1990 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, the death penalty for murder 
became discretionary and could only be imposed when it was ‘the only 
proper sentence.’485   
 
                                                            
480 Du Toit et al 1993: 277. The death penalty could, and was indeed, also imposed and 
offenders executed for other serious offences such as rape. See Dugard 1978: 124-130.  
481 Du Toit et al 1993: 277 (28-11). 
482 Terblanche 2007: 434. 
483 Du Toit et al 1993: 277. 
484 Du Toit et al 1993: 277. Footnotes omitted. 
485 Du Toit et al 1993: 277 (28 -14 A). Footnotes omitted. 
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Much as the government was tough on crime and courts were very punitive 
before the 1990s, Terblanche argues that ‘life imprisonment was expressly 
inserted into section 276 of the [Criminal Procedure] Act by the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, 1990’ but that even before then, the ‘supreme courts’ 
had ‘always been empowered to impose it.’486  Du Toit et al are of the view 
that the reason why ‘[s]ection 276(1)(b) was amended to read 
imprisonment, including imprisonment for life,’ was to ensure that ‘where 
the court imposed the sentence of life imprisonment, it would be the 
manifest intention that the offender should be removed from society for the 
rest of his life...’ unless released by the Minister of Correctional 
Services.487  However, it should be recalled that as early as 1955, life 
imprisonment was expressly recognised in the Criminal Procedure Act.488 
Much as the Divisions of the Supreme Courts had the discretion to impose 
life sentences during the time of the death penalty, and indeed some 
offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment, Terblanche reminds us that: 
[u]ntil the early 1990s more than 25 years’ imprisonment was rarely 
imposed in South Africa, and it was a basic principle that such longer 
sentences should be imposed only in cases of exceptional severity. At that 
stage the death penalty was still regularly imposed for the most serious 
crimes and life imprisonment almost non-existent.489 
                                                            
486 Terblanche 2007: 232. Footnotes omitted. It has also been argued that ‘life 
imprisonment was expressly inserted into section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act by 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, although it was available to the High 
Courts before that as well.’ See Joubert (ed) 2007: 290. 
487 Du Toit et al 1993: 277 (28 -14A). Footnotes omitted. (Emphasis in original). 
488 Act 56 of 1955. Section 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955 provided that ‘[a] 
person liable to a sentence of imprisonment for life or for any other period, may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for any shorter period…’ as reproduced in Lansdown et al 
1957: Vol. 1, 877; see also Lansdown 1960: 284. In S v Masala 1968: 216, the Court 
observed that ‘[a] sentence of imprisonment for life [was] referred to in sec.334 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955.’  
489 Terblanche 2007: 222. However, as early as 1960, when the Court was confronted with 
the question of the meaning of life imprisonment, it was observed that ‘[t]he Chairman of 
the Transvaal Prison Board informed the Court that, generally speaking, his board would 
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Joubert et al argue that during the period when the death penalty was still 
lawful in South Africa, ‘life imprisonment was considered to be a valuable 
alternative to the death sentence and was imposed in cases of extreme 
seriousness ... but where the death penalty was not considered to be the 
only proper sentence.’490  
 
The following survey of case law in which life imprisonment was imposed 
during this period demonstrates some of the factors that courts took into 
consideration in ‘cases of extreme seriousness’ to impose life imprisonment 
instead of the death penalty: where the court thought that the accused was 
‘to be imprisoned for the rest of her life’ in the sense that like the death 
penalty, life imprisonment would permanently remove him from society;491 
where the appellant was young, had no previous criminal record, and 
committed murder while intoxicated;492 and where there was a ‘reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                     
only make a recommendation for release on a parole [of a prisoner serving a life sentence] 
after the prisoner had completed at least ten years of his sentence, while a recommendation 
for release on probation might only be given after he had completed 12 years of his 
sentence. Certain statistics covering the last five years, furnished to the Court by the 
Commissioner [of Prisons], indicate[d] that, while releases during that period [had] – in 
contrast with former years – some times occurred before the prisoner [had] served ten 
years, the majority [had] been required to serve at least ten years before being released on 
parole or probation and, in a number of cases, considerably longer.’ See S v Masala 1968: 
218. One has to recall that as at 31st December 1947, there were 204 prisoners serving life 
sentences in South Africa. See Statistics of Criminal and other Offences and of Penal 
Institutions for the Year ended 31st December, 1947, Special Report No. 178, (Government 
Printer, Pretoria) Table 34(c) – Race and Sex of Sentenced Offenders in Penal Institutions 
According to the Nature of Sentence, as at 31st December 1947. 
490 Joubert (ed) 2007: 290-291. In S v Shabalala and others 1991 (2) SACR 478 (A) the 
accused murdered an elderly recluse and mutilated and partially burnt his body and 
occupied his house. The court in sentencing them to death held that even life imprisonment 
was not an appropriate sentence in the circumstances.  
491 S v Phillips and another 1985 (2) SA 727(N): 747. 
492 S v Masala 1968: 215. 
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prospect’ of the appellant’s rehabilitation.493 Courts also imposed life 
imprisonment because the appellant was unlikely to commit murder again 
as the circumstances that led him to commit such murder were unlikely to 
happen again;494 because the appellant was immature;495  the offender had 
no previous record for ‘serious’ convictions and none of the victims of his 
rapes suffered severe or prolonged psychological effects.496 Courts also 
considered the fact that the interests of justice demanded the imposition of 
a life sentence instead of a death penalty for example, where the prisoner’s 
detention would enable the prison authorities to treat him for his mental 
condition;497 and because the murder had not been accompanied by cruel 
and humiliating acts.498  
 
In cases of murder, the circumstances under which it was committed and 
the accused’s level of participation were important factors to determine 
                                                            
493 S v Sampson 1987 (2) SA 620 (A). 
494 See S v Cele 1991(1) SACR 627(A) in which the appellant, a 40 year old man, had paid 
two young men to murder his former employee who had caused trouble for his business 
which led him to lose his customers. 
495 S v Cotton 1992(1) SACR 531(A). 
496 S v D 1991(2) SACR 543(A). Where the accused was found guilty of various crimes, 
including six counts of rape (in which some of his victims contracted sexually transmitted 
diseases), one count of attempted rape and one count of indecent assault. See also S v P 
1991 (1) SA 517 (A) where the court set aside the death penalty that had been imposed on 
the appellant and substituted it with life imprisonment on, amongst other grounds, that the 
women the appellant had raped were not virgins, they had not experienced serious 
psychological problems as a result of rapes, and that the appellant could be rehabilitated 
during his long term of imprisonment.  In S v W 1993 (2) SACR 74 (A) the Court 
substituted the appellant’s death sentence into life imprisonment on amongst other grounds 
that the victim of his rape had suffered no serious physical injuries. 
497 S v Lawrence 1991(2) SACR 57(A) where the appellant, a psychopath with previous 
convictions, murdered a 19-year-old girl, the court in sentencing him to life imprisonment 
held that there was ‘no doubt that if the Court sentences a person suffering from severe 
psychopathy to life imprisonment the prison authorities would take active and adequate 
steps to ensure that he was appropriately detained and treated. In any event the failure to 
do so, for whatever cause, does not commend itself…as a reason, in itself, for imposing 
the [death] penalty.’ At 59.   
498 S v Mdau 1991 (1) SA 169(A). 
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whether he should be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. Where the 
circumstances were not cruel and the accused had not directly participated 
in the murder, he was sentenced to life imprisonment;499 where the accused, 
though found guilty of murder with no extenuating circumstances, was 
close to 80- years old the court held that society did not expect such an old 
man to be sentenced to death and sentenced him to life imprisonment even 
though his two co-accused who were younger than he, were sentenced to 
death.500 The fact that a dangerous accused may be released on parole if 
sentenced to life imprisonment did not justify the imposition of a death 
penalty on him.501 However, it should be stressed that in most cases where 
the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death, the 
youthfulness of the accused was highlighted. For example, in S v Bosman, 
although the court observed that the ‘nature and circumstances of the 
murder ... [were] so heinous’ and that retributive and deterrent elements 
were decisive and the death penalty was the only appropriate sentence, the 
accused was sentenced to life imprisonment.502   
 
The above cases show that one factor alone, for example, the youthfulness 
of the offender was normally not sufficient for the court to depart from 
imposing the death penalty. Courts had to consider other factors such as the 
prospect of rehabilitation, whether the accused had previous criminal 
records, and the nature of the crime. A closer examination of the cases 
                                                            
499 S v Mthembu 1991 (2) SACR 144 (A). 
500 S v Munyai and others 1993 (1) SACR 252 (A). 
501 S v Oosthuizen 1991 (2) SACR 298 (A). 
502 S v Bosman 1992 (1) SACR 115 (A) at 116. 
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above in which the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment instead of 
death, also shows that most of these were decided in the early 1990s. As 
mentioned earlier, the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act in 1990 
gave courts the discretion to impose life sentence in some cases that would 
otherwise have attracted the death penalty. In all the cases from the 1990s 
cited above, courts, before sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, 
referred to section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 503 
For example, the court observed: 
[The] provisions [of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990] 
brought about a radical change in the law relating to death sentences. The 
effect thereof has been considered in a number of judgments... Broadly 
speaking the following principles have emerged from these judgments. 
The imposition of the death sentence is no longer, as in the past, 
mandatory in certain circumstances, but rests entirely in the discretion of 
the trial Judge. This discretion is exercised with due regard to the presence 
or absence of any mitigating or aggravating factors (as found by the trial 
Court). The death sentence is only authorised where the trial Judge is 
satisfied that it is 'the proper sentence', which has been interpreted to mean 
'the only proper sentence'. Its imposition is therefore to be confined to 
exceptionally serious cases - cases where the death sentence 'is 
imperatively called for'.504 
 
What should also be noted about the above cases is that the accused had 
either committed murder combined with robbery with aggravating 
circumstances or rape. After 1990, even in cases where the accused was 
found guilty of murder with no extenuating circumstances, courts held that 
they could not sentence the offender to death because the death penalty was 
not the only appropriate sentence. This was mostly after courts had 
considered factors such as the manner in which, and the purpose for which, 
the murder was committed, the age of the accused, whether he was capable 
                                                            
503 Act 107 of 1990. 
504 S v Mthembu 1991: 145. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189
of rehabilitation and whether the objectives of punishment would be 
achieved and the interests of society protected by imposing a life sentence 
instead of the death penalty. In cases of rape, on the other hand, an accused 
was more likely to be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death when 
in the opinion of the court the victim did not sustain serious physical or 
psychological injuries as a result of the rape!505 A conscious decision has 
been made to exclude the discussion of the circumstances under which 
prisoners serving life sentence were being released before 1995. This is 
because Van Zyl Smit has dealt with this question exhaustively.506 
 
4.2.1.2 Life imprisonment in the aftermath of the abolition of the death 
penalty (1995 -1997) 
 
For a clear discussion on life imprisonment in the aftermath of the 
Makwanyane decision, in which the Constitutional Court declared the death 
penalty to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the discussion is divided 
into two parts. The first part deals with what is called the ‘Constitutional 
Court supervised life sentences’ and the second part with the ordinary life 
sentences. The first part deals with the death sentences imposed prior to 
1994 but not executed and consequently commuted to various prison 
sentences, including life imprisonment. The second part analyses cases in 
which courts imposed life imprisonment as it was the severest sentence 
available following the abolition of the death penalty in 1995. 
 
                                                            
505 Statements and sentiments of this nature would in due course, rightly, attract the ire of 
gender rights activists. 
506  D Van Zyl Smit 1992: 378 – 380; and also 135 – 139. See also S v Bull and another; S 
v Chavulla and others 2002 (1) SA 535 (SCA): para 23. 
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4.2.1.2.1 The Constitutional Court supervised sentences 
 
On 6 June 1995, in the famous Makwanyane case,507 the Constitutional 
Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional on the grounds that 
it violated the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.508 The Court ordered, 
amongst other things, that all death sentences be ‘set aside in accordance 
with the law, and substituted by appropriate and lawful punishments.’509 In 
dismissing the Attorney-General’s argument that the death penalty was the 
most deterrent sentence, the Court emphasised that life imprisonment was 
an equal deterrent to the death penalty.510 However, it took Parliament 
another two years to pass the Criminal Law Amendment Act511 whose 
objectives included ‘to make provision for the setting aside of all sentences 
of death in accordance with the law and their substitution by lawful 
punishments.’  
 
Under section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,512 the Minister of 
Justice was obliged to ‘as soon as possible after the commencement of the 
Act, refer the case of every person who [had] been sentenced to death and 
[had] in respect of that sentence exhausted all the recognised legal 
procedures pertaining to appeal or review, or no longer [had] such 
                                                            
507 S v Makwanyane 1995. 
508 S v Makwanyane 1995: 344. 
509 S v Makwanyane 1995: 150. 
510 S v Makwanyane 1995: para 128. 
511 Act 105 of 1997. 
512 Act 105 of 1997. 
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procedures at his or her disposal, to the court in which the sentence of death 
was imposed.’ The court had to consist of the judge who had imposed the 
death sentence upon the prisoner and if that was not possible the Judge 
President of the court in question was required to designate any other judge 
of that court to deal with the matter.513 The court was required to consider 
arguments and evidence from, or on behalf of, the prisoner before 
converting the sentence and based upon that evidence and arguments 
‘advise the President, with full reasons ... of the need to set aside the 
sentence of death, of the appropriate sentence to be substituted in its place 
and if, applicable, of the date to which the sentence shall be antedated.’514  
 
The President was required to set aside the sentence of death and substitute 
it with the punishment advised by the court.515 All appeals pending before 
the Supreme Court against the sentence of death were to be heard by the 
full bench of the division which would have heard the appeal had the 
Supreme Court directed such a division to hear the appeal.516 The full 
bench was empowered to set aside the sentence of death and to substitute it 
with the appropriate sentence.517 On the other hand, all appeals that had 
been partly heard or were pending before the Supreme Court of Appeal 
were to be disposed of by that court in terms of section 322(2) of the 
                                                            
513 Section 2. 
514 Section 1(3). 
515 Section 1(4). 
516 Section 1(7). 
517 Section 1(9). 
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Criminal Procedure Act518 with the powers to substitute death sentences for 
appropriate sentences.519 Courts were required to antedate the sentence of 
imprisonment substituted with the one of death to a specified date which 
was not to be earlier than the date on which the sentence of death was 
imposed.520  
 
Despite the existence of the legal framework for substituting death 
sentences with lawful sentences, the process of dealing with these cases 
made slow progress and eventually gave rise to another constitutional 
challenge in the case of Sibiya and others v The Director of Public 
Prosecutions and others.521 The Constitutional Court lamented the fact that 
for the preceding 10 years, since the Makwanyane decision, all the death 
sentences had not yet been converted to other sentences. It thus ordered the 
Department of Justice, which was one of the respondents, to update it, 
within a stipulated time, on the measures it had taken to convert all the 
death sentences and in cases where such sentences had not been converted, 
to provide reasons thereto.522 Table 1 below shows the number death 
sentences converted to life sentences in the light of the Makwanyane 
decision enabled by the above outlined provisions of the Criminal Law 
                                                            
518 Act 51 of 1977. Section 322(2) provides that ‘upon appeal…against any sentence, the 
court of appeal may confirm the sentence or may delete or amend the sentence and impose 
such punishment as ought to have been imposed at the trial.’ 
519 Section 1(10). 
520 Section 1(11). 
521 Sibiya and others v the Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2006 (1) SACR 220 
(CC). 
522 Sibiya and others v Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2006: para 64. 
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Amendment Act.523 The new sentences are also categorised according to 
the six different mechanisms for conversion. 
Table 1: Death sentences converted to other sentences by different 
courts 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates that the majority of prisoners who had been sentenced to 
death had their sentences converted to life imprisonment (including those 
who were sentenced to more than one life sentence) and those who were 
not sentenced to life imprisonment were sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from 15 to 50 years.  However, a prisoner whose sentence was reviewed by 
                                                            
523 As at 5 June 2005, 465 prisoners were on death row in South Africa. As of October 
2005, 378 sentences had been converted to other sentences, seven prisoners had died and 
80 prisoners were waiting for their sentences to be converted.  The author relies on the 
statistics available as of October 2005 because attempts to get the statistics from the 
Constitutional Court on what sentences were imposed on the 80 prisoners who were 
waiting the conversion of the sentences were not successful. The statistics are based on the 
submissions of the Department of Justice to the Constitutional Court for the October 2005 
judgment.     
Category Same 
judge 
Different 
judge 
SCA 
to 
Court 
a quo 
SCA Full 
bench 
SCA 
s 322 
Nr. of 
prisoners on 
death row 123 108 49 68 64 6 
Converted to 
life 
imprisonment 74 90 26 63 60 6 
Converted to 
other terms of 
imprisonment 49 18 23 5 4 0 
 % % % % % % 
Converted to 
life 
imprisonment 60.2 83.3 53.1 92.6 93.8 100.0 
Converted to 
other terms of 
imprisonment 39.8 16.7 46.9 7.4 6.3 0.0 
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the same judge who had sentenced him to death or by the lower court at the 
order of the Supreme Court of Appeal, stood a better chance of being 
sentenced to another sentence other than life imprisonment compared to a 
prisoner whose sentence was reviewed by the other four mechanisms. 
 
This raises a question that needs to be examined: what reasons did the 
courts consider to be relevant in converting most of the death sentences to 
life imprisonment? The author was unable to access the High Court 
decisions in this respect as they were not reported. However, those of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal were accessible and these were used to establish 
the factors the courts considered when they converted death sentences to 
life imprisonment. The following trends were noted in the cases reviewed: 
In all cases the Court reviewed the facts of the case, that is, the nature of 
the offence committed by the accused, the personal circumstances of the 
accused, for example whether he was capable of rehabilitation or not, the 
aggravating and the mitigating factors. When the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, which was generally the case, the death 
penalty was converted to life imprisonment.524 In the few cases where the 
                                                            
524 In Khaba v S [1999] JOL 5758(A) the Supreme Court of Appeal, before converting the 
appellant’s death sentence to life imprisonment, held that ‘[i]t had been noted …that the 
aggravating circumstances were such that only the maximum sentence [of life 
imprisonment] was appropriate.’ See page 1 of 5758; in Kruger and another v S [1999] 
JOL 5341(A), the Court observed that ‘[i]n prior proceedings, mitigating and aggravating 
factors had been considered and Court had concluded that death penalty was the only 
appropriate sentence. For these reasons the Court considered that life imprisonment was an 
appropriate sentence.’ See page 1 of 5341; see also Mafumo and another v S [1999] JOL 
5342(A); Mashego v S [1999] JOL 5525(A); Motshwedi v S [1999] JOL 5511(A); 
Ndgungweni and another v S [2001] JOL 7324(A); Ngcobo v S [1999] JOL 5731(A); 
Nkala en ‘n ander v S [1999] JOL 5515(A); Nortje v S [1999] JOL 5756(A); Pekeer v S 
[1999] JOL 5528(A); Rasmeni v S [1999] JOL 5510(A); Shabalala and another v S [2000] 
JOL 7270(A); Smith v S [1999] JOL 5730(A); Stotenkamp v S [1999] JOL 5753(A); 
Swartbooi v S [1999] JOL 5509(A); Van Der Merwe v S [1999] JOL 5524 (A);Walus and 
another v S [2001]JOL 7629(A); in Mhlongo v S [2000] JOL 5891(A) the Court held that 
‘the facts and circumstances of the case warranted the imposition of the most extreme 
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death penalty was converted to a short prison term, like 16 years, the court 
held that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. For 
example, in Musingadi and others v S, the Court held that the first 
appellant’s death sentence had to be converted to 16-years imprisonment 
because the following mitigating factors existed: the appellant was 
relatively young (31 years old), he was a first offender, he had a wife and a 
child whom he supported, his level of education was low (Standard 5), and 
he had not played a leading role in the murder and robbery.525  
 
In some cases the Court gave particular attention to the character of the 
accused. For example, in Boy and another v S, the sentence of death was 
converted to life imprisonment because the Court was of the view that the 
appellants ‘were irretrievably beyond any possibility of rehabilitation.’526 In 
December v S, the Court justified the imposition of life sentence on the 
ground that ‘the appellant’s removal from society should be permanent and 
                                                                                                                                                     
sentence available to the courts. The substitute sentence now had to be likewise. The Court 
imposed life imprisonment. See page 1 of 5891; in Naidoo v S [1999] JOL 5340(A) the 
Court held that ‘the offence was so heinous that this was a case in which the destruction of 
the appellant was imperatively called for. In view of this it follows that his removal from 
society should be permanent and accordingly the possibility of rehabilitation is not a 
relevant factor…[T]he  proper sentence in this case would be one of life imprisonment.’ 
Page 4 of 5340; in Phaleng en andere v S [1999] JOL 4629(A) the Court in, converting the 
appellant’s sentence from death to life imprisonment held that its decision had been 
influenced by ‘constitutional developments regarding the death penalty’ see page 1 of 
4629. 
525 Musingadi and others v S [2004] 4 SA 274(SCA): para 52. However, in Nogqala v S 
[1999] JOL 5527(A), the Court held that even though the accused was young (30 years 
old), was a first offender, came from an impoverished background, and had the prospect of 
rehabilitation, his death sentence had to be converted to life imprisonment because of the 
callous nature of the murder he had committed. The Court held that in such a case of 
heinous murder (the murder of an elderly man in the most brutal of circumstances) the 
retribution and deterrence objectives of punishment outweighed the prospect of 
rehabilitation.  See also Plaatjies and another v S [1999] JOL 4626(A) where the 
appellant’s death sentence was converted to 30 years’ imprisonment.     
526 Boy and another v S [1999] JOL 5392(A): 1 of 5392. 
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that life imprisonment [was] the only fitting sentence.’527 In Mokoena v S, 
the court converted the death penalty into life imprisonment because, in 
addition to the offence of which the appellant was found guilty, a 
particularly violent murder, the Court also ‘took into account the fact that 
the accused also had previous convictions.’528 
 
One could argue that in cases where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appellants’ appeal against the sentence and ordered the lower 
courts to impose a ‘competent’ or ‘appropriate’ sentence, such courts had to 
ensure that the offenders were sentenced to the penalty that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal would have imposed had it not referred the matter to the 
lower court. This could explain why in such cases, as illustrated in Table 1 
above, the majority of the death penalties were converted to life 
imprisonment and in cases where they were not converted to life 
imprisonment, lengthy prison terms were imposed. In Malefane and others 
v S, for example, the Supreme Court of Appeal after dismissing the 
appellants’ appeal against their conviction for murder, in substituting their 
death sentence to life imprisonment on the ground that the trial judge who 
would have been ordered to resentence them had died during the pending of 
the appeal, held that it imposed life imprisonment because that was the 
‘sentence that the court a quo would have imposed’ for the purpose of 
rendering the accused ‘incapable of endangering law and order in the 
community ever again.’529  
                                                            
527 December v S [1999] JOL 5508(A): 3 of 5508. 
528 Mokoena v S [1999] JOL 5396(A): 1 of 5396. 
529 Malefane and others v S [1998] JOL 2431(A): 1 and 26 of 2431. 
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One also realises that, like the Supreme Court of Appeal, the full bench of 
the High Court also weighed the mitigating factors against the aggravating 
factors in determining the appropriate sentence that should be substituted 
with the death penalty. In Lukhele v S, the full bench of the Transvaal, 
before converting the appellant’s sentence from death to life imprisonment, 
took into consideration the ‘overwhelming’ aggravating circumstances and 
said that it had ‘little sympathy with the appellant’ and sentenced him to 
life imprisonment which it understood to mean that the prisoner was to be 
‘detained in prison for as long as [the authorities] considered reasonable.’530 
   
4.2.1.2.2 Life sentences not directly supervised by the Constitutional 
Court in the aftermath of the abolition of the death penalty 
but prior to the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1998 
 
After the abolition of the death penalty, courts that imposed life sentences 
considered different factors ranging from the nature of the offences and the 
character of the accused for the purpose of life imprisonment as a sentence. 
This was because the Criminal Procedure Act531 gave courts wider 
discretion with regard to the imposition of life sentences. Section 283(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act provides that ‘a person liable to a sentence of 
imprisonment for life or for any other period, may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for any shorter period...’ However, section 283(2) puts a 
proviso to section 283(1) to the effect that ‘the provision of subsection (1) 
shall not apply with reference to any offence for which a minimum penalty 
is prescribed in the law creating the offence or prescribing a penalty 
                                                            
530 Lukhele v S [2001] JOL 8647(T): 5 of 8647. 
531 Act 51 of 1977. 
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therefore.’ Before 1998 courts had wide discretion in deciding who was to 
be sentenced to life imprisonment. This explains why, when the minimum 
sentences legislation was introduced in 1998 directing courts to sentence 
persons convicted of specified scheduled offences to life imprisonment 
unless there were substantial and compelling circumstances for not doing 
so, some courts felt that their discretion to determine who was to be 
sentenced to life imprisonment, or not, had been eliminated.532  
 
How did the courts exercise their discretion before 1998? In the first place, 
courts considered the offence that the accused had committed. If it was a 
serious offence, such as multiple murders, courts were more likely to 
sentence the accused to life imprisonment.533 In Martin v S, where the 
appellant was convicted of four counts of murder and two counts of 
attempted murder, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that life 
imprisonment ‘must be accountable to the reality that as equal increments 
are added to duration of sentence, there comes a point where the marginal 
value of a further increment tends to be less than that of every previous 
increment. A law of diminishing returns operates.’534 The Court cautioned 
that ‘the court must hesitantly exceed the optimum point for the sake of 
striving for more or for guaranteed effectiveness. So it is that in this case 
                                                            
532 See for example  S v Dodo 2001 (3) BCLR 279 (E): 292, where the judge was of the 
view that under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, ‘an accused convicted 
of a serious charge before the High Court, unless the Court is satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence, faces a 
life sentence which was decided upon before the commencement of the trial, not by the 
Court itself, but by the Legislature…In my view, this is not a trial before an ordinary court. 
It is a trial before a court in which, at the imposition of the prescribed sentence, the robes 
are the robes of the judge, but the voice is the voice of the Legislature.’  
533 See Martin v S [1998] JOL 268 (SCA). 
534 Martin v S 1998: 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199
long imprisonment, but for less than a lifetime, may not be left out of 
consideration.’535 The Court was also alive to the fact that one-size-fits - all 
life sentences may cause discrepancies between offenders and that before a 
life sentence was imposed, factors such as the age of the offender and his 
likely future contribution to society could not be ignored. The court held 
that: 
 
An approach that life imprisonment is what is appropriate for a bad man 
committing a bad crime disregards that such a norm tends to create 
disparity. Life sentence imposed upon a lively man of 30 imposes a much 
longer and harsher sentence than the nominally identical sentence when 
imposed on a man of 65 who has lost interest in everything around him. 
Little else but the established need to use detention as a means of 
preventing repetition of crime by the accused can justify ignoring such 
discrepancies. But there is also an aspect of cruelness to a life sentence 
…the man who is incarcerated for life does not have a curtain drawn on 
awareness. There is no dividing date which ends his subjective suffering 
and renders him unaware of the past, or of the futility of the future. What 
he is subjected to is an unending punishment, day after day. It is life 
without future hope, coupled with a permanence of suffering. It is 
extremely unpleasant while it lasts – which is interminable.536 
 
From the above comment one observes that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
considered life imprisonment to be a sentence so severe that before its 
imposition the court had to weigh various factors. These factors, as 
mentioned earlier, included the heinous nature of the offence committed, 
the age of the accused,537 and most importantly all these factors must be 
balanced against the cruel nature of the sentence of life imprisonment – a  
                                                            
535 Martin v S 1998: 14. 
536 Martin v S 1998: 14. (Emphasis in original). 
537 In S v M 1994 (2) SACR 24 (A) the appellant had been sentenced to death for the rape 
of an 8- month old baby leading to her death. On appeal, the court substituted his death 
sentence to life imprisonment on the grounds that though the offence was callous, the 
accused was of young age (20 years old) and committed the offence under the influence of 
alcohol. 
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sentence by which the offender was being punished in ‘an unending’ 
manner ‘day after day’ which was also ‘coupled with a permanence of 
suffering.’ This meant that courts had wider discretion to determine 
whether, irrespective of the heinous nature of the offence committed, the 
circumstances, not only of the accused, but also of justice, required the 
imposition of such a severe sentence. Thus in S v Matolo en ‘n ander the 
High Court, before sentencing the accused to life imprisonment for the 
offence of murder, made it clear that ‘it had a very wide discretion with 
regard to the passing of sentence’ but that discretion had ‘to be exercised in 
a legal or judicial manner at all times.’538 The Court considered life 
imprisonment to be the ‘appropriate sentence’, and it gave ‘particular 
attention’ to the following factors: ‘(i) the seriousness of the crime; (ii) the 
personal circumstances of the accused; and (iii) the interests of the 
community at large.’539  
 
One could conclude that courts considered the following variables or a 
combination thereof in deciding whether to impose life imprisonment or 
not: the seriousness or otherwise of the offence; the need to protect the 
community from the accused;540 the fact that life imprisonment would 
achieve the objectives of punishment such as retribution, deterrence and 
                                                            
538 S v Matolo en ‘n ander [1997] 4 All SA 225 (0): 225-226. 
539 S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1997: 226. In S v Stonga 1997 (2) SACR 497 (O) where the 
appellant was found guilty for the rape and murder of an 8-year old girl in a gruesome 
manner, that is, he choked her until she was lifeless, raped her and dumped her, head first, 
in a toilet. The court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held that although the 
appellant was young (aged 25 years old), cooperated with the prosecution and had shown 
remorse after his conviction, his personal characteristics had to be ‘subordinated to the 
interests of society’ and the latter required that he had to be effectively and permanently 
removed from society and that to achieve that life imprisonment was the only available 
sentence. At 498.    
540 S v Ngcongo and another 1996 (1) SACR 557 (N). 
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protection of the society;541 the extent to which the crime the accused 
committed was prevalent in society in that, where the offence was serious 
and prevalent the accused was more likely to be sentenced to life 
imprisonment;542 the conduct of the accused in committing the offence and 
‘whether the conduct of an accused in, during and preceding the 
commission of the offence was of so grave and repulsive a nature, that the 
community has to be protected against the onslaughts of such an 
unscrupulous aggressor by his removal from society for the rest of his 
life.’543    
   
In some cases, even if the accused committed offences such as murder and 
robberies and was vengeful, courts avoided sentencing them to life 
imprisonment or ‘extremely long sentences’ such as 60 years imprisonment 
because of the ‘law of diminishing returns.’544 In S v De Kock the court 
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment because, amongst other 
grounds, he was not susceptible to rehabilitation.545 Life imprisonment was 
also imposed in cases that were so serious that demanded the imposition of 
the ‘heaviest sentence permissible’ and these were cases where, for 
example, the accused played a leading role in the commission of a heinous 
offence, and there were no mitigating factors for the court to impose a 
                                                            
541 S v Ngcongo and another 1996. 
542 S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O) 208. 
543 S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1998. 
544 S v Naryan [1998] JOL 4132 (W) : 47. Where the accused was sentenced to 27 years 
for various offences which included murder, car robberies and unlawful possession of a 
firearm and ammunition. 
545 S v De Kock 1997 (2) SACR 171 (T). 
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lesser sentence.546 In the same vein, life imprisonment was avoided if the 
imposition of a lesser sentence would accord with the ‘notions of fairness 
and equity.’547  
 
Another important factor that influenced sentencing in the aftermath of the 
abolition of the death penalty was the manner in which some courts 
imposed excessively long prison terms on the offenders to prevent them 
from being considered for parole on the basis that, because of the callous 
nature of the offences they had committed, they would have been sentenced 
to death had it not been declared unconstitutional. Put differently, courts 
were aware that if they sentenced offenders to life imprisonment, they 
would be considered for parole after serving a certain number of years in 
prison. In an effort to prevent their release, courts imposed sentences that 
were longer than actual life sentences.548 In reacting to this sentencing 
trend, the High Court observed in S v Smith, where the accused was found 
guilty of murdering his employer, his employer’s wife and daughter, that it 
was ‘inappropriate, when considering a proper sentence, to take into 
account that the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence if it had 
                                                            
546 S v Magoro and others 1996 (2) SACR 359 (A) at 365. Where the accused were found 
guilty of burning to death an old woman whom they suspected to be a witch, one was 
sentenced to life imprisonment because he had played a leading role in the murder. In S v 
Van Wyk 1997 (1) SACR 345 (T) where the accused, aged 21-years old, was found guilty 
of committing various murders and sentenced to life imprisonment, the court in justifying 
the imposition of the sentence, placed emphasis on the heinous nature of the offences 
committed and the fact that ‘the appellant had not shown any real remorse, particularly in 
respect of the murders.’ See page 347.    
547 S v Magoro and others 1996: 365. 
548 For example, in Mhlakaza and others v S [1997] 2 All SA 185(A) the accused were 
convicted of a number of offences including the murder of a police officer. The first 
accused was sentenced to an ‘effective’ sentence of 47 years’ imprisonment and the 
second to 38 years’ imprisonment. The reason the court gave for the sentences was that 
they would serve as deterrent to potential criminals.    
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been available as a sentencing option’ and the court added that it was 
‘similarly inappropriate for the court to impose lengthy, non-concurrent 
periods of imprisonment in an attempt to eliminate any possibilities of 
parole.’549 
 
4.2.1.3 Life imprisonment in the minimum sentences legislation era 
(imposed by High Courts) 1998-2007 
 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act,550 or the minimum sentences 
legislation (MSL), as it became popularly known, has been a subject of 
various studies and reports.551 it requires courts to sentence an offender 
convicted of the offence of murder or rape under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to 
life imprisonment unless there are substantial and compelling 
circumstances.552 Its drafting history and impact on the prison population in 
general are beyond the scope of this discussion. It was meant to be short-
lived as a ‘response to a situation which was hoped would not persist 
indefinitely’ but that the ‘situation does and remains notorious.’553 The 
situation was and still is the ‘alarming burgeoning in the commission of the 
crimes of the kind specified [in the MSL] resulting in the government, the 
                                                            
549 S v Smith 1996 (1) SACR 250: 251. 
550 Act 105 of 1997. 
551 See for example O’Donovan and Redpath 2006. Giffard and Muntingh 2006. 
552 For the offences under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, see 
Appendix 1. 
553 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA): para 7. Under section 53(1) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, the Act was to cease to be law after two years but the President has the 
powers to extend its operation. Since its coming into force on 19 December 1997, the 
applicability of the Act has been annually renewed and in December 2007 the Act was 
amended to amongst other things give jurisdiction to regional courts to impose life 
sentences (this aspect is discussed in detail below). Also, the requirement of biannual 
extension has been removed, so that the MSL now assumes a permanent place on the 
statute book. 
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police, prosecutors and the courts constantly being exhorted to use their 
best efforts to stem the tide of criminality which threatened and continues 
to threaten to engulf society.’554  
 
Chart 2555: Admission of prisoners for life sentence, 1997 - 2007 
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The impact the MSL has had on the number of prisoners sentenced to life 
sentences is evident in Chart 2 above. Since the coming into force of the 
MSL in 1998, the number of prisoners serving life sentences has increased 
dramatically. The skyrocketing in the numbers of prisoners admitted to life 
imprisonment between 2000 and 2001 is attributable to the fact that it was 
during that period that the majority of death sentences were commuted to 
life imprisonment. As mentioned earlier, by end of December 2008, 8764 
prisoners were serving life sentences. The wide discretion that courts had 
before the coming into force of the MSL was affected. The Supreme Court 
                                                            
554 S v Malgas 2001: para 7. 
555 Statistics acquired from the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Cape Town (2006). For the 
exact number of prisoners serving life sentences in each year between 1996 and 2007 see 
Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Annual Report for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 March 
2008 (2008) at 23 at 
http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/Annual%20Report%202007-2008.pdf 
(accessed 30 November 2008). 
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of Appeal acknowledges this fact and explains why this is the case in the 
following terms:  
 
It was, of course, open to the High Courts even prior to the enactment of 
the [minimum sentences] legislation to impose life imprisonment in the 
free exercise of their discretion. The very fact that [the MSL 
was]...enacted indicate[d] that Parliament was not content with that and 
that it was no longer to be “business as usual” when sentencing for the 
commission of the specified crimes.556  
 
The coming into force of the MSL meant that courts did not have their 
hitherto wide discretion of imposing life sentences when they deemed it 
suitable. Put differently, the MSL ensured that ‘court was not to be given a 
clean slate on which to inscribe whatever sentence it thought fit.’557 The 
law requires courts to approach sentencing in respect of some of the 
scheduled offences with the mindset that life imprisonment should be the 
starting point upon conviction unless there are ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances to justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the various ways in which the MSL-era 
substantially transformed the institution of life imprisonment in South 
Africa, it should also be noted that since 1993 South Africa passed a range 
of laws the violation of which empowers courts to sentence the offender to 
life imprisonment. These laws are discussed in detail in Chapter V558 and 
they include: the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
                                                            
556 S v Malgas 2001: para 7. 
557 S v Malaga 2001: para 8. 
558 Chapter V, 5.2.1. 
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(1993);559 the Defence Act (2002);560 the Nuclear Energy Act (1999);561 the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act (2002);562 the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act (2004);563 the Preventing and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (2004);564 and the Prevention of Organised Crimes 
Act (1998).565 However, as at the time of writing, February 2009, there has 
been no known case in which an offender has been sentenced to life 
imprisonment other than in cases of murder and rape. One could argue that 
whereas under all the aforementioned pieces of legislation a court could 
sentence an offender to life imprisonment, in practice it is the MSL which 
has been enforced. 
 
4.2.1.4 The constitutional challenge to the MSL 
 
South African case law attests to the fact that as early as 1943 some 
accused, or to be correct, the accused generally, have challenged the 
provisions of minimum sentencing legislation. Their arguments have, 
among other things, been that minimum sentences interfere with the 
judiciary’s powers to exercise its discretion when it comes to sentencing.566  
                                                            
559 Act 87 of 1993, section 26(1)(k)(v). 
560 Act 42 of 2002, section 24(3). 
561 Act 46 of 1999, section 56(2)(d). 
562 Act 27 of 2002, section 4(i). 
563 Act 33 of 2004, section 18(1)(a). 
564 Act 12 of 2004, section 26(1)(a). 
565 Act 121 of 1998, section 3. 
566 See Rex v Beyers [1943] AD 404 in which the accused unsuccessfully challenged the 
reasonableness of his conviction and sentence under the regulations that imposed a 
minimum sentence of five years on a person found in possession of unauthorized 
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The 2001 case of S v Dodo567 challenged the imposition of life sentence as 
a minimum and also maximum sentence in cases where the accused has 
been found guilty of one or more of the scheduled offences in 
circumstances that do not allow the court to impose a lesser sentence. In 
Dodo the issue was whether section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act,568 which allows a judge to sentence an accused, found guilty of one or 
more scheduled offences, to life imprisonment unless there are substantial 
and compelling circumstances, was unconstitutional. It was alleged to 
violate the right of everyone to be tried by an ordinary court and also to be 
inconsistent with the separation of powers principle. The Constitutional 
Court held that ‘[t]he construction of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ in section 51(3)(a) goes to the heart of these issues. The 
existence of these circumstances permit the imposition of a lesser sentence 
than the one prescribed. Establishing their true meaning has proved to be 
intractably difficult and has led to a series of widely divergent constructions 
in the High Courts.’569  
 
This ambiguity was settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas 
(discussed below). The Court held that courts still have a limited discretion 
whether to impose a life sentence or not and that such a discretion 
depended on whether or not substantial and compelling circumstances exist 
                                                                                                                                                     
explosives, the Court (Appellant Division) held that ‘…it cannot be regarded as 
unreasonable in existing circumstances to make a regulation imposing a minimum penalty 
for the possession of unauthorised explosives under a power to provide "for the defence of 
the Union, the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order and the effective 
prosecution of the war”.’ See page 410.     
567  S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC). 
568 Act 105 of 1997. 
569 S v Dodo 2001: para 10.(CC). 
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and that in view of this consideration the MSL was not unconstitutional. On 
the question of separation of powers, the Constitutional Court held that 
even though the Constitution recognises this principle, it does not envisage 
a strict separation of powers but rather one in which one arm of 
government, through checks and balances, would check but not cripple the 
functions and powers of the other and that South Africa will develop its 
own understanding of separation of powers principles in due course.570  The 
MSL therefore remained on the statute books through the periodical 
renewals by Parliament. 
 
4.2.1.5 Life imprisonment after December 2007 and beyond 
 
The 1997 MSL provided, inter alia, that if the Regional Court found the 
accused guilty of an offence that required the imposition of a life sentence, 
it was to commit the accused to the High Court for sentencing.571 But if the 
High Court thought that the accused had been incorrectly convicted, it was 
empowered to re-try the accused and establish his guilt or innocence and 
impose the relevant sentence where applicable.572 This meant that the 
accused had to adduce evidence and the witnesses had to be summoned 
again to testify against the accused. This process had its obvious problems. 
                                                            
570S v Dodo 2001: paras 15-33. (CC). 
571 Section 52(1). It was held in Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v 
Makwetsja 2004 (2) SACR 1(T) that regional courts did not have the discretion to 
determine whether the offence with respect to which the accused was found guilty justified 
the imposition of life imprisonment when such an offence was one listed under Part I of 
Schedule 2 or whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed. If the accused 
pleaded guilty or was found to have committed the offence under Part I of Schedule 2, the 
regional court was supposed to commit the accused to the High Court for sentencing.  
572 Section 52(2) - (3). 
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First of all, it created a backlog of cases in the High Courts573 and secondly, 
and most importantly, witnesses had to repeat evidence given in the 
Regional Court. This was especially traumatising for rape victims. It was 
observed in S v Gqamana where the High Court before sentencing the 
accused for the rape of a minor had to call the rape victim and her mother 
to give the same evidence they had adduced before the Regional Court that: 
 
It is, incidentally, an unfortunate consequence of this legislation that, as 
happened in this case, it will often be necessary to put the complainant in 
a rape case yet again through the unpleasant experience of having to go 
into the witness box and re-live the trauma of the crime by testifying on 
matters which are relevant to sentence. Sometimes … the complainant 
will have to travel a long way in order to do so. However, this is an 
inevitable result of the apparent determination of the legislature to achieve 
a situation where a man is to be convicted in one court and sentenced in 
another. The latter court cannot reasonably be expected, without having 
been steeped in the atmosphere of the trial, to decide whether or not to 
pass a sentence of imprisonment for life on a man without making some 
attempt to immerse itself in that atmosphere. No doubt that was an 
unintended consequence which did not occur to Parliament when it passed 
the Act.574 
 
Other criticisms were also levelled against the legislation by some courts, 
holding that it violated the accused’s right to a fair trial. This was because 
the accused was subjected to ‘a two-stage-trial’ when he appeared before 
the High Court for the sentencing hearing after his trial before the Regional 
Court. The High Court also held that the MSL violated the accused’s right 
to be tried within a reasonable time because of the delays that took place 
between the time when the accused was convicted by the Regional Court 
and when sentenced by the High Court.575 After realising the shortcomings 
                                                            
573  See O’Donovan and Redpath 2006. 
574 S v Gqamana 2001 (2) SACR 28 (C): 33-34. 
575 See S v Dzukuda; S v Tilly; S v Tshilo 2000 (2) SACR 51 (W). 
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of the MSL, Parliament embarked on a process of amending it. The 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill was introduced in 2007.576 It 
was passed into law later that year and became the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act.577  
 
The amendment introduced four fundamental changes with regard to life 
imprisonment. The first was that it extended the jurisdiction of the Regional 
Courts to empower them to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.578 The 
aims of increasing the jurisdiction of the Regional Courts, according to the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment 
Bill, were ‘…to expedite the finalisation of serious criminal cases, punish 
offenders of certain serious offences appropriately, and to avoid secondary 
victimisation of complainants, which, inter alia, happens when vulnerable 
witnesses have to repeat their testimony in more than one court’579  and 
endure cross examination.  
 
The second major amendment relates to the applicability of the minimum 
sentences to juvenile offenders. Section 51(1) and (2) provides that ‘any 
person’ who commits one or more of the scheduled offences shall be 
sentenced, where applicable, to life imprisonment unless there are 
substantial or compelling circumstances. Section 51(6) provides that 
section 51(1) and (2) do ‘not apply in respect of an accused person who 
                                                            
576 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill (B 15 – 2007).  
577 Act 38 of 2007 (came into force 31 December 2007). 
578 Section 51 (1)(a-b). 
579 See para 2.1. 
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was under the age of 16 years at the time of the commission of an 
offence...’ This means that as from the date the Amendment Act came into 
force, children above the age of 16 years, that is, for example, 16 years and 
one day old, who commit the offences under section 51 have to be 
sentenced to the prescribed minimum sentences, including life 
imprisonment, unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. 
The amendment is inherently flawed because it is an affront on the 
children’s rights and it was challenged in the Transvaal High Court 
Division on, inter alia, the following grounds: ‘that subjecting children to 
...life imprisonment, is in breach of children’s constitutional rights and in 
breach of South Africa’s international law obligations.’580 In agreeing with 
the applicant, Potterill AJ of the Transvaal High Court held that the 
impugned provision violated section 28 of the South African Constitution 
(which requires that a child should only be detained as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest time possible) because it effectively eliminated 
the ‘clean slate approach’ which is fundamental in sentencing children in 
conflict with the law. In Potterill AJ’s words: 
...with a clean slate approach the Court has many sentencing options to consider, 
although imprisonment is conceivable it is an option of last resort, but with the 
Amended Act the Court must start with the minimum sentence of life 
imprisonment ... as an option of first resort and then look to compelling and 
substantial circumstances and proportionality. The result will not always be the 
same and it is not purely academic. The Amended Act must adhere to the 
principles enshrined in the Constitution...581       
                                                            
580 See Founding Affidavit in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and others paragraph 8. See also paragraph 35 of the 
Affidavit for the detailed arguments relating to the impugned provisions and why they 
violate the Constitution and international law. On file with the author. 
581 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others 
(Case No. 11214/08, judgment of 4 November 2008): para 20. 
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The third significant change was that of an automatic right to appeal in 
cases where a person is sentenced by a Regional Court to life 
imprisonment.582 The fourth regards the manner in which courts interpret 
substantial and compelling circumstances in cases of rape. The discussion 
above illustrated that some courts have held that the fact that a victim of 
rape had not sustained serious physical injuries or psychological effects 
amounted to substantial and compelling circumstance to justify the 
imposition of a lesser sentence. The amendment expressly provides, inter 
alia, that when imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape ‘any 
apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant’ shall not constitute a 
substantial and compelling circumstance.583  One needs to ask whether 
these amendments will address some of the inherent problems associated 
with the implementation of the MSL, such as the case delays and backlogs 
in courts and the unlikely possibility that minimum sentences will reduce 
the violent crime rate in South Africa.584 One would also need to 
investigate the likely effect of the amendments on the size of the South 
Africa prison population. It is more likely that the number of prisoners 
sentenced to life imprisonment will increase further when Regional Courts 
also impose life sentences. In this scenario the quality of legal 
representation of persons facing life imprisonment becomes critical. The 
                                                            
582 Section 6 (ii).  
583 Section 51(3)(a A)(ii). The amendment also provides that that courts should not 
consider the following as substantial and compelling circumstances in cases of rape: (i) the 
complainant’s previous sexual history; (iii) an accused person’s cultural or religious 
beliefs about rape; or (iv) any relationship between the accused person and the 
complainant prior to the offence being committed.  
584 For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with the minimum sentence 
legislation see O’Donovan and Redpath 2006. 
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question of legal representation, especially legal aid, to persons charged 
with offences that attract life imprisonment is examined in Chapter V.585 
 
4.2.2 Mauritius 
 
As indicated above,586 in many jurisdictions in Africa life imprisonment is 
probably the most confusing sentence, primarily because, as the House of 
Lords observed, ‘the words, which the judge is required to pronounce, do 
not mean what they say.’587 Many of us should be forgiven if we thought 
that life imprisonment meant that a person would be imprisoned for the 
remainder of his life. Put differently, the sentence of life imprisonment, like 
any other criminal penalty, should be understood literally. However, as 
discussed above, legislation in many African countries points in the 
opposite direction. As illustrated above, in Uganda, Swaziland, and Sudan, 
for example, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is required to serve a 
maximum of 20 years.588 In South Africa, an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment is expected to be considered for parole after serving 25 
years,589 and in Botswana a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is 
expected to serve at least seven years before being considered for parole.590 
However, as shown earlier, there are countries, such as, Kenya, Ghana, 
                                                            
585 Chapter V, 5.5. 
586 See 4.1 (above). 
587 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Doody 1994: 549H-550B, as 
quoted in van Zyl Smit 2002: 2-3. 
588 See 4.1 (above). 
589 Section 73(6)(b)(iv)  of the Correctional Services Act, Act 111 of 1998. See generally 
Terblanche 2007: 234 – 235. 
590 Section 85(c) of the Prisons Act, 1980. 
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Tanzania and Zimbabwe, where life imprisonment is given its literal 
meaning.591 In these countries people sentenced to life imprisonment are 
aware from the first day of their sentence that they will spend the rest of 
their life behind bars unless pardoned by the State President. The judge 
who imposes the life sentence knows that it means life imprisonment. 
Members of the public also know, or are presumed to know, that life 
imprisonment does not have any other meaning. 
Unlike in the two categories above (where offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment either know that they will serve a certain number of years 
before their release or that they can only be released by the State President), 
in Mauritius, before 9 July 2008,592 there were two types of life 
imprisonment (known as penal servitude for life). The first was where 
persons sentenced to penal servitude for life were to spend the rest of their 
lives in prison unless pardoned by the President. These were offenders 
sentenced under the Criminal Code for the offences of murder and 
infanticide,593 inciting officers to mutiny,594 taking command of the armed 
forces,595 and manslaughter.596 The second, which still applies, is where the 
courts have the discretion to determine what penal servitude for life should 
mean. In this case it could mean anything between 3 (three) and 60 (sixty) 
                                                            
591 See 4.1 (above). 
592 On the 9 July 2008 the Privy Council held in De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 
[2008] UKPC 37 that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
release was arbitrary, disproportionate, and unconstitutional for violating the right to a fair 
trial under section 10 of the Mauritius Constitution. 
593 Section 222(1) of the Criminal Code, RL 2/59, 1982. 
594 Section 61 of the Criminal Code. 
595 Section 64 of the Criminal Code. 
596 Section 223(1) of the Criminal Code. 
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years.597 It is noteworthy that all offenders, apart from those found guilty of 
manslaughter, who were sentenced to penal servitude for life before 2007, 
are allowed to apply to the Supreme Court for their sentences to be 
reviewed.598 This means that different legal regimes apply to people 
sentenced to what appears to be the same sentence (penal servitude for life), 
and at the same time the supposedly same sentence could mean something 
different depending on the circumstances at the time of its imposition. 
However, before 2006 offenders who were serving penal servitude for life 
were being released after 20 years imprisonment. But in 2006 the Supreme 
Court held that a penal servitude for life should mean that the prisoner 
should spend the rest of his life in prison.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in this regard was overturned by the Privy 
Council in De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius599 in which it was held 
that a mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life where a prisoner was 
to spend the rest of his life in prison was arbitrary and disproportionate, and 
thus unconstitutional for violating the offender’s right to a fair hearing 
under section 10 of the Constitution. However, the Privy Council declined 
to rule whether penal servitude for life without the possibility of release 
also violated the right not to be subjected to inhumane punishment under 
section 7 of the Constitution.600 This section looks at the developments that 
                                                            
597 Section 150A of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2007. 
598 Section 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2007. See also De Boucherville 
v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 6. 
599 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
600 The Supreme Court of Mauritius held that the Privy Council ‘considered it unnecessary, 
in the circumstances, to decide whether there might have been a violation of section 7 of 
the Constitution…We also understand that the Judicial Committee, before which the effect 
of sect.75 of our constitution was not fully explored, refrained from deciding whether a 
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surrounded the abolition of the death penalty and how the abolition of the 
death penalty affected the sentence of life imprisonment, the change of 
penal servitude for life from 20 years to ‘penal servitude proper’, and later 
to the Privy Council’s ruling that penal servitude for life where the prisoner 
was to spend the rest of his life in prison was unconstitutional.  
Although the Privy Council came to the correct conclusion, it is regrettable 
that it did not hold that penal servitude for life, where the offender is to 
spend the rest of his life in prison, amounted to inhumane punishment. It is 
also lamentable that the Privy Council did not mention, even in passing, 
Mauritius’ international obligations under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights601 and under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights602 to substantiate its finding that a mandatory sentence of 
penal servitude for life, where the prisoner could not be released, violated 
the right to a fair trial. Drawing on the jurisprudence of other African 
                                                                                                                                                     
sentence of penal servitude for life in Mauritius would amount to degrading and inhuman 
treatment within the meaning of section 7 of the Constitution.’ De Boucherville Roger FP 
v The State of Mauritius 2009 SCJ 5, 8. While referring to the European Court of Human 
Rights decision in Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008, in which the Court held that life imprisonment 
in Cyprus where the offender had the possibility of being released however slim that 
possibility was not inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Mauritius held that 
‘[w]e understand that the applicant …did apply on several occasions to the Commission on 
the Prerogative of Mercy pursuant to section 75 of the Constitution to review his sentence 
albeit without success. [The Court then mentions one case in which an offender applied to 
the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy and his death sentence was commuted to 20 
years’ sentence] … Our system has also the singular advantage that any convicted person 
may, on his own initiative, petition the Commission to exercise its prerogative of mercy. 
The petition may be presented at any time and there does not appear to be any limitations 
as to the number of times it can be presented. We believe that on the reasoning adopted by 
the European Court in Kafkaris, section 75 of our Constitution would be amply sufficient 
to ensure that a sentence of penal servitude for life in Mauritius is not an irreducible life 
sentence with no possibility of early release and would thus not amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in breach of section 7 of the Constitution.’ See De 
Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 7 – 8. (Emphasis in original). 
601 Which Mauritius ratified on 19 June 1992. Article 7 of the African Charter protects the 
right to a fair trial.  
602 Which Mauritius acceded to on 12 December 1973. Article  14 of the ICCPR protects 
the right to a fair trial. 
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countries such as South Africa and Namibia, the author argues that there is 
evidence that imprisonment without a real prospect of release is a cruel, 
degrading and inhumane punishment.    
Mauritian courts are also given jurisdiction, in lieu of penal servitude for 
life for offences under the Criminal Code, to impose sentences of up to 60 
years of imprisonment where there are substantial and compelling 
circumstances to do so. As the discussion in Chapter V shows, there is only 
one known case where the Supreme Court has invoked substantial and 
compelling circumstances to impose a lesser sentence.  It is argued that the 
requirement that a court must impose a penal servitude for life unless there 
are substantial and compelling circumstances raises two issues which are 
resolved by drawing on the experience of South African jurisprudence. The 
first issue relates to the constitutionality of such lengthy sentences. The 
second issue relates to the likely challenges that courts will encounter in 
their attempt to define what amounts to substantial and compelling 
circumstances. 603    
4.2.2.1 The abolition of the death penalty and its impact on life 
imprisonment 
One could argue that the abolition of the death penalty is the main reason 
why penal servitude for life has attracted overwhelming attention in 
Mauritius. Before 1995 when the death penalty waas abolished an offender 
sentenced to penal servitude for life was required to spend the rest of his 
life in prison, at least theoretically. This is because, whereas the penalty of 
                                                            
603 Sections 61, 64, 222, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Act as amended by section 3 
of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2007.  
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penal servitude for life was provided for under the law, sections 50 to 52 of 
the Reform Institutions Act604 and the regulations accompanying it605 were 
silent on the remission of the sentence of penal servitude for life.606 This 
could be interpreted to mean that the legislature thought that a sentence of 
penal servitude for life meant that the prisoner was to spend the rest of his 
life in prison unless pardoned by the President. However, the practice was 
different. When prisoners were admitted to prison to serve a sentence of 
penal servitude for life, the prison authorities notified them of their 
‘E.D.R’, that is, ‘Earliest Date of Release’, as being after serving 30 years 
imprisonment, as shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life in Mauritius 
1986 - 2005607 
Year Number of offenders Earliest date of release 
1986 3 2016 
1988 2 2018 
1993 2 2023 
1995 3 2025 
1996 3 2026 
1997 2 2027 
1998 8 2028 
1999 4 2029 
2000 2 2030 
2002 1 2032 
                                                            
604 Reform Institutions Act 1988. 
605 Regulations made by the Minister under section 66 of the Reform Institutions Act 1988, 
Government Notice No. 19 of 1989.  
606 See De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
607 Statistics acquired from the Prisons Headquarters, June 2008 (original on file with the 
author). The author was unable to ascertain whether there were any prisoners sentenced to 
penal servitude for life  between 2006 and early 2008 when the statistics were acquired. 
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2003 1 2033 
2004 2 2034 
2005 4 2035 
 
Table 2 illustrates that by 2005 there were 37 offenders serving penal 
servitude for life in Mauritius.608 The table also demonstrates that when the 
death penalty was still lawful very few offenders were being sentenced to 
penal servitude for life. This is evidenced by the fact that in the last three 
years preceding the abolition of the death penalty in Mauritius, only seven 
offenders were sentenced to penal servitude for life. On the other hand, in 
the first seven years subsequent to the abolition of the death penalty, 21 
offenders were sentenced to penal servitude for life. However, caution 
should be exercised here, because during this period all the death penalties 
were converted to penal servitude for life. However, what is clear, is that 
since the abolition of the death penalty the total number of offenders 
sentenced to penal servitude for life has increased. This is attributable to the 
fact that life imprisonment is now the severest sentence that a court may 
impose.  
It is also important to note that before 2007, every prisoner admitted to 
prison to serve a sentence of penal servitude for life was notified that his or 
her earliest date of release would be after serving 30 years’ imprisonment. 
This explains the existence of the last column in Table 1. However, in 
practice prisoners were released after serving 20 years. Another important 
feature to note about prisoners serving penal servitude for life in Mauritius 
                                                            
608 13 were Indians; 2 Ugandans; 1 Taiwanese; 1 Congolese (DRC); 1 Malagasy; 1 
Kenyan; and the rest were Mauritian nationals. Three prisoners had been transferred to 
serve their sentences in their countries of nationality (2 to Tanzania and 1 to Holland).  
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is the manner in which they are categorised, which ultimately determines 
their dangerousness, which is used as a yardstick to assess whether they 
should be considered for early release or not. Of the 37 prisoners in Table 
1, 22 were categorised as A prisoners, six as B and 9 as C on the security 
scale, where A represented the most dangerous category of prisoners who 
should not be released even if their time for release had come.  
As mentioned earlier, even though the law did not provide for the release of 
prisoners serving penal servitude for life and, also, the prison records 
indicated that such prisoners’ earliest date of release was after they had 
served 30 years of imprisonment, in practice the position was different. 
Prisoners sentenced to penal servitude for life were being released after 20 
years. This is evidenced by the Supreme Court ruling in Dwarkamathsing 
Jeetun v the Commissioner of Police and others in the presence of the 
Attorney General,609 in which the applicant, Mr. Jeetun, who had been 
sentenced to penal servitude for life, applied successfully to the Court to 
order his release after serving 20 years. His application was not opposed by 
the respondents, one of whom was the Commissioner of Prisons. In State of 
Mauritius v Jeetun610 the government, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others611, in 
which it was held that penal servitude for life should be given its literal 
meaning (this case is discussed in detail later), argued that Mr. Jeetun 
                                                            
609 Dwarkamathsing Jeetun v The Commissioner of Police and others in the presence of 
the Attorney-General SCR/263/02, cited in State of Mauritius v Jeetun [2006] Mauritius 
Reports 140,142. 
610 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 140 
611 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others [2006] Mauritius Reports 20. 
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should be re-arrested so that he spend the rest of his life in prison. In 
dismissing the government’s application, the Supreme Court held that the 
principles of ‘finality in legal proceedings and of the non-deprivation of the 
benefit of the judgment which a litigant had lawfully obtained’612 prevented 
it from ordering the re-arrest of Mr. Jeetun. Most importantly, the Court 
also noted that every prisoner who had been sentenced to penal servitude 
for life before the abolition of the death penalty ‘had a legitimate 
expectation of being released after serving a term of penal servitude of 
twenty years for manslaughter613 and this legitimate expectation grew 
stronger’ after witnessing the release of other prisoners serving the same 
sentence.614  It thus concluded that 
it would be appropriate in the particular circumstances of this case to 
order the [Commissioner of Prisons] to treat all detainees who have been 
sentenced to a penal servitude for life, both before and after the coming 
into operation of the [Abolition of the Death Penalty] Act as if they had 
been sentenced to the maximum term of 20 years penal servitude the more 
so as the respondent [Mr. Jeetun] has benefited from such an 
interpretation of the law which cannot now be denied to others who are 
either in the same situation or have subsequently been sentenced to penal 
servitude for life for manslaughter.615   
One observation should be stressed from the above discussion. The 
meaning of penal servitude for life varied depending upon the perspective 
from which it was viewed and the time at which it was imposed. To a 
prisoner who had just been sentenced in court it meant that he or she was to 
spend the rest of his life in prison. However, on the day he or she arrived in 
                                                            
612 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 141. 
613 Manslaughter was punishable by penal servitude for life whereas murder was 
punishable by death.  
614 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153. 
615 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153. 
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prison he or she was told that the earliest date of release was actually after 
30 years. This meant that such prisoners entertained the hope of being, at 
least, released. After they spent more time in prison they learnt that actually 
many prisoners who were serving the same sentence were being released 
after 20 years. One, therefore, knew that release would take place after 20 
years. To the prison authorities it appeared that, although they knew that a 
prisoner serving a penal servitude for life was to be released after 20 years, 
they had to wait for such a prisoner to petition the court for release, and did 
not oppose the application. For the court, penal servitude for life meant 20 
years and thus it found no difficulty in ordering the prison authorities to 
release a prisoner sentenced to penal servitude for life after serving 20 
years. Was this not a confusing penal regime? Indeed it was. But what 
caused it? 
4.2.2.2 The root of the confusion and the solution 
The reason why prisoners serving a penalty of penal servitude for life were 
being released after 20 years, and, also, the reason why their earliest date of 
release was set at 30 years, was attributable to a misinterpretation by the 
courts and the prison authorities of the applicability of section 11 of the 
Criminal Code before and after 1985. Prior to 1985 section 11 of the 
Criminal Code provided: 
‘11. Penal servitude 
(1) The punishment of penal servitude is imposed for life or for a minimum 
term of 3 years. 
(2) Where in any enactment the punishment of penal servitude is imposed 
without a term being specified, the maximum term for which the 
punishment may be imposed is 20 years.’616  
                                                            
616 As cited in De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 21-22.  
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Section 11(2) of the Criminal Code was amended in 1985617 by replacing 
‘20 years’ by ‘30 years’. The prison authorities thought that a life sentence 
was one of the sentences whose term had not been specified within the 
meaning of section 11(2) of the Criminal Code. The result was that a 
prisoner sentenced to penal servitude for life for an offence committed 
before 1984 was understood to have been sentenced to 20 years, and the 
one sentenced to the same sentence for an offence committed after 1985 
was understood to have been sentenced to 30 years. This explains why, 
under Table 2 above, all prisoners sentenced to penal servitude for life after 
1985 have their ‘Earliest Date of Release’ projected to take place after 30 
years. Consequently, in the two cases of Dwarkamathsing Jeetun v the 
Commissioner of Police and others in the presence of the Attorney 
General,618 and Ramdin v Commissioner of Police and others619   when the 
prisoners who had been sentenced to penal servitude for life before 1985 
applied to the Supreme Court to order their release after serving 20 years, 
                                                            
617 Criminal Code (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 1985. 
618 Dwarkamathsing Jeetun v The Commissioner of Police and others in the presence of 
the Attorney General   2002, cited in State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 142. It is reported 
that ‘Jeetun’s application [to the Supreme Court] was preceded by a letter dated 4 April 
2002 from [the Commissioner of Prisons], addressed to the Secretary, Mauritius Bar 
Association, apparently in response to a letter dated 1 April 2002. The letter from the 
[Commissioner of Prisons] stated that Jeetun had been sentenced on 14 February 1986 to 
“life imprisonment” as was due for release on or about 13 February 2016. In the same way, 
two letters dated 5 March 2004 and 23 April 2004 from [the Commissioner of Prisons] and 
addressed to Mr. Rex Stephen, barrister-at-law, in which it was stated that [the] applicant 
will be due for release on 20 February 2016…’ see De Boucherville v Commissioner of 
Prisons and others 2006: 23. (Emphasis in original). 
619 Ramdin v Commissioner of Police and others Record No. 89034 1985, lodged on 11 
April 2005, cited in De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 22.  
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the prison authorities never opposed the applications and the Chief Justice 
ordered the release of those prisoners.620 
 
A literal interpretation of section 11 of the Criminal Code should lead to the 
inevitable conclusion that the sentence of penal servitude for life (under 
section 11(1)) was distinct from the sentence of imprisonment 
contemplated under section 11(2). This is because section 11(2) of the 
Criminal Code anticipated cases where the term had not been specified. But 
life imprisonment was a specified sentence. Thus, the Supreme Court 
rightly held that ‘[t]he very wording of section 11(1)... that “the punishment 
of penal servitude is imposed for life or for a minimum term of 3 years” 
indicates that penal servitude for life is a punishment for a specified term 
viz for life.’621 The Court succinctly concluded that: 
 
The proposition that penal servitude for life means 20 years in relation to a 
crime committed before 16 March 1985, the date (Act No. 1 of 1985) 
became operative, and 30 years in relation to a crime committed after that 
date is therefore wrong.622  
 
4.2.2.3 Substituting penal servitude for life for death sentences  
There is universal agreement, at least among human rights advocates, that 
the death penalty is a cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment.623 
Therefore, one could argue that one of the reasons that may have influenced 
                                                            
620 In Ramdin v Commissioner of Police and others 2005, ‘the applicant …had moved for 
“an order declaring and decreeing that the penal servitude for life imprisonment (sic) 
pronounced against him on 14 February 1986 for an offence committed in June 1983 
should be 20 years.’ 
621 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 24. 
622 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 24. 
623 See Chenwi 2007. 
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the legislature in Mauritius to remove the death penalty from the statute 
books was that it was a cruel and inhumane punishment which offended the 
Constitution.624 When the death penalty was abolished in 1995, the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty Act625 contained two fundamental 
provisions that related to life imprisonment. Section 2(2) provided that 
‘where under an enactment a Court is empowered to impose a sentence of 
death the Court shall instead of the sentence of death impose a sentence of 
penal servitude for life.’ Section 2(3) provided that ‘where any person has 
been sentenced to death, and at the commencement of this Act, the sentence 
has not been executed, the person shall be deemed to have been sentenced 
to penal servitude for life and shall undergo that sentence.’  
Section 2(2) was clear in the sense that it required the courts, from the 
coming into force of the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act, to impose a 
sentence of penal servitude for life in cases in which they would have 
imposed the death penalty. However, the problem was that the Act’s 
definitions section was silent on the meaning of ‘penal servitude for life.’ 
Arguably, the legislature thought that ‘penal servitude for life’ had to be 
given its natural meaning, or left it to the courts or the prison authorities to 
determine what it meant. Section 2(3), like section 2(2), was also clear in 
the sense that its coming into force automatically substituted all death 
sentences with sentences of penal servitude for life. However, the problem 
                                                            
624 Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Mauritius prohibits inhuman or degrading 
punishment. One also has to note that executions were rare in Mauritius. For example, 
from 1980 – 1995 only two death row inmates, who had been convicted of murder, were 
executed: Louis Leopold Myrtille, executed on 23 November 1984, and Essan Nanyeck 
alias Alexandre, executed on 10 October 1987. Statistics from the Office of the Mauritius 
Commissioner of Prisons, June 2008 (on file with the author).    
625 Act 31 of 1995. 
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was that it did not expressly stipulate whether such penal servitude for life 
had been antedated to the day when the death penalty had been imposed or 
commenced on the date the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act came into 
force.  
As a result of that ambiguity, prisoners, prison authorities and the Supreme 
Court all understood the drafters of the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act 
to have intended that penal servitude for life as a substitute for the death 
penalty had been antedated to the date the death penalty was imposed. This 
explains why in De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons626 the 
applicant, who had been sentenced to death in 1986 for murder, 
unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for his early release in 2002. 
However, the order for his release, was indirectly secured by the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in State of Mauritius v Jeetun in which the Court held 
that all the detainees who had been sentenced to penal servitude for life 
before or after the coming into force of the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Act were to be presumed to have been sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment.627 Therefore, it is submitted that when on 27 February 2007 
the prison authorities told Mr. De Boucherville that he was to be 
imprisoned for the remainder of his life, their interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence was incorrect and was justifiably challenged before 
the Privy Council.628 
                                                            
626 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons 2006: 20. 
627 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 140. 
628 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 5. 
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One vital observation should be made in the light of the procedure by 
which penal servitude for life was directly substituted for all the death 
sentences in Mauritius. Mauritius adopted a different approach to that 
adopted in South Africa which also abolished the death penalty at around 
the same time. In South Africa, as discussed above, when the Constitutional 
Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional in Makwanyane, the 
government responded by enacting the Criminal Law Amendment Act629 
which empowered the courts to assess the case of each prisoner on death 
row and to determine the appropriate sentence that should be imposed 
depending on the circumstances of each case. The result was that prisoners 
were sentenced to varying sentences, which included terms of 15 years, 25 
years, 30 years, 40 years, and 50 years, but the majority were sentenced to 
life imprisonment.630 Had Mauritius adopted the same approach as South 
Africa (by giving courts the discretion to determine the appropriate 
sentence that should be substituted for the death penalty), some prisoners 
would probably not have been sentenced to penal servitude for life. The 
automatic conversion of all death penalties into penal servitude for life 
meant that prisoners were denied an opportunity to prove to courts as a 
mitigating factor that they were not as dangerous in 1995 as they had been 
at the time the death penalty was imposed. This omission, as was rightly 
held by the Privy Council, rendered the sentences imposed arbitrary and 
disproportionate.631 
                                                            
629 Act 105 of 1997. 
630 See Mujuzi 2008(b): 18 -19. 
631 See De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228
4.2.2.4 The Supreme Court finally defines penal servitude for life: but 
was it right? 
As illustrated earlier, there was confusion with regard to the meaning of a 
sentence of penal servitude for life. It was through legal battles that the 
prisoners, who were serving penal servitude for life sentences before the 
coming into force of the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act, won the 
victory of ascertaining the exact meaning of the sentence they were serving. 
This was achieved especially through the Supreme Court ruling in State of 
Mauritius v Jeetun in which the Court held that all the prisoners who had 
been sentenced to penal servitude for life before and after the coming into 
force of the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act were to be deemed to have 
been sentenced to 20 years because they had the legitimate expectation to 
that effect.632  
However, that victory came at a higher cost especially for the prisoners 
who were sentenced to penal servitude for life after that judgment. In De 
Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others, where, as mentioned 
earlier, the applicant whose death sentence was commuted to penal 
servitude for life under section 2(3) of the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Act applied to the Supreme Court for his release after serving 20 years. The 
Court, in dismissing his application, held, amongst other things, that 
[t]he golden rule of interpretation remains that when a text is clear, a word 
must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning so that penal servitude for 
                                                            
632 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153. 
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life can but mean that the penalty is “for life”.633 In Mauritius, therefore, 
penal servitude for life means that the penalty is to be served for life.634 
In State of Mauritius v Jeetun, the applicant, basing its arguments on the 
aforementioned ruling in De Boucherville to the effect that penal servitude 
for life should be given its literal meaning, asked the Supreme Court to 
order the arrest of the respondent who had been serving a sentence of penal 
servitude for life but released by order of the Chief Justice of the same 
Court after he had served 20 years. The applicant contended that the 
decision on which the respondent’s release was based was wrong. The Full 
Bench of the Court, in dismissing the application, held that the De 
Boucherville decision was right that penal servitude for life should be given 
its literal meaning, but added that those who had been sentenced to penal 
servitude for life ‘before and after the coming into operation of the’ 
Abolition of the Death Penalty Act should be treated ‘as if they had been 
sentenced to the maximum term of 20 years penal servitude.’635 This was 
because they had ‘strong legitimate expectations of being released.’636  
The above ruling in Jeetun remained unclear, and therefore, susceptible of 
at least two irreconcilable interpretations in relation to the part which reads 
‘after the coming into operation’ of the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act. 
The first possible interpretation is that the Court meant those prisoners who 
had been sentenced to penal servitude for life before the abolition of the 
death penalty and those whose death sentences were commuted to penal 
                                                            
633 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 26. (Emphasis in 
original). 
634 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 27. 
635 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153. 
636 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153. 
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servitude for life under section 2(3) of the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Act. The second possible interpretation is, that the ruling covered three 
categories of inmates serving penal servitude for life: those who were 
serving penal servitude for life sentences before the abolition of the death 
penalty; those whose death sentences were converted into penal servitude 
for life; and those prisoners who were directly sentenced to penal servitude 
for life after the abolition of the death penalty but immediately before the 
ruling in Jeetun. These would be prisoners who were sentenced to penal 
servitude for life on or after 14 December 1995 when the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty Act came into force but before 16 March 2006 after the 
Jeetun decision was handed down. As a result, those who, for example, 
were sentenced to penal servitude for life on or after 16 March 2006 were 
to be in prison for the rest of their lives. Had the Privy Council not declared 
penal servitude for life, where the prisoner would spend the rest of his life 
in prison, to be unconstitutional637, and a choice would have to be made 
between the above two possible interpretations, the second interpretation 
would have been preferable, because it would accommodate many 
prisoners, and one would know with a degree of certainty when exactly 
penal servitude for life, which means a prisoner being imprisoned for the 
rest of his life, started to operate in Mauritius. 
One important question that needs to be answered is whether the Supreme 
Court was right in ruling that penal servitude for life should mean ‘for life’. 
The Court adopted a literal interpretation of ‘penal servitude for life’ 
because the phrase was not defined in any law in Mauritius. Had the Court 
                                                            
637 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
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adopted a historical interpretation of the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Act, which would have been the best approach, it would have arrived at the 
conclusion that the legislature never intended penal servitude for life to 
mean ‘for life’. This argument is based on two developments, both of 
which were not addressed by the Privy Council in De Boucherville v The 
State of Mauritius.638 One relates to the deliberations that took place in the 
National Assembly when the Abolition of the Death Penalty Bill was tabled 
and debated; and the other relates to the penalty that was to be imposed for 
murder after the abolition of the death penalty. 
4.2.2.5 Deliberations in the National Assembly: a recipe for confusion? 
At the time the National Assembly debated the issue of substituting penal 
servitude for life for the death penalty, the intention was clear that it was of 
the view that penal servitude for life should mean 20 years. This is 
evidenced by the Abolition of the Death Penalty Bill639 to which the 
President refused his assent unless clause 5 were revised. In its initial form 
clause 5 provided for the repeal of section 222 of the Criminal Code and 
replaced with the following: 
‘“Section 222 (1) Any person who is convicted of: 
(a) murder or murder of a newly born child shall be sentenced to 
penal servitude for life; 
(b) attempt at murder or attempt at murder of a newly born child, 
shall be liable to penal servitude for life or for a term not 
exceeding 20 years” 
The Bill also added a new subsection (4) which reads- 
                                                            
638 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
639 Bill No. XXVI of 1995 
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“(4) A person sentenced to penal servitude for life under subsection (1)(a) 
shall not be released before the expiry of 20 years from the 
commencement of his sentence.”’640  
It is evident that the National Assembly wanted the sentence of penal 
servitude for life, for the most serious of offences, to mean at least a 
minimum of 20 years. When presenting the Bill to the National Assembly, 
the Prime Minister stated that 
 
“[t]he purpose of the present Bill is to abolish the death penalty. This is in 
line with government policy and with the provisions of the Dangerous 
Drugs Act. The House will recall that it is intended that the death penalty 
should no longer apply for drug trafficking...It is therefore but natural that 
now Government should come forward with a proposal to abolish it for 
other criminal offences as well...We are substituting penal servitude for 
life whenever the death penalty was applicable. However, in aggravated 
crimes like murder where there are no mitigating circumstances the 
punishment has to be adequate. This is why we are providing that in case 
of murder or murder of a newly born child a person sentenced to penal 
servitude for life shall not be released until he has served at least 20 years 
of his sentence.”641 
 
The Prime Minister’s statement shows that the National Assembly never 
intended penal servitude for life to mean that the offender was to be 
detained for the rest of his life. The problem with the Bill, together with the 
accompanying explanation, was that it had the potential of breeding 
confusion with regard to offenders who had been sentenced to penal 
servitude for life. In the first place, whereas those who had not committed 
murder knew that their sentence of penal servitude for life could mean 
anything less than 20 years’ imprisonment, they would not know exactly 
what their sentence meant. This means that either the court would have had 
                                                            
640 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 25. 
641 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 25-26. 
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to impose a minimum period to be served before the offender could be 
released or the prison authorities had to devise a policy that prisoners 
sentenced to penal servitude for life were not to be released unless they had 
served a specified number of years. Either way, the court or the prison 
authorities had to devise a uniform policy applicable to all prisoners 
sentenced to penal servitude for life in cases other than murder to avoid a 
constitutional challenge, for example, on the ground that the policy was 
discriminatory.  
 
A second challenge would have resulted had the Bill been passed, setting 
20 years as the minimum for offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life 
for the serious offences, in the sense that some prisoners were likely to 
serve more years in prison than others. Whereas the Bill had proposed 20 
years as the minimum, it had not provided the maximum. That would have 
resulted in some prisoners being sentenced to a sentence of penal servitude 
for life which meant 20 years and others to a sentence of penal servitude for 
life which meant more than 20 years, and probably their whole life. This 
would have raised the constitutional issue of non-discrimination and would 
probably have been challenged in the courts. It should be underscored that 
the deliberations in the National Assembly showed that the legislature 
never intended penal servitude for life to mean ‘for life.’ As will be 
illustrated shortly, the reason why the President refused to assent to the Bill 
was not because he thought that penal servitude for life should mean that 
the prisoner must be detained for the rest of his life but because he thought 
that penal servitude for life which meant 20 years was a lenient sentence for 
murderers and those who attempted to murder. He probably wanted them to 
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be in prison for longer than 20 years. This explains why the mandatory 
term of 45 years for murder was introduced in the Bill and the President 
assented to it.  
 
4.2.2.6 The new sentence for murder: Mandatory 45 years    
 
When the President refused to assent to the Bill, it was revised by the 
National Assembly642 ‘with the avowed objective that the new clause 5 
would provide heavier penalties in respect of persons convicted of murder, 
attempt at murder, murder of a newly born child or an attempt thereof.’643 
The result was that section 222644 of the Criminal Code was amended to 
empower courts to impose a sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for 
offenders found guilty of murder. Curiously, section 223645 of the Criminal 
Code, which provided for a penalty of penal servitude for life for offenders 
found guilty of manslaughter was not amended at the time section 222 was 
amended. The result of these two developments was the two inherent 
challenges: one, that the sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment was 
mandatory for murder; and two, murder attracted 45 years’ imprisonment 
whereas manslaughter, which was a lesser serious offence, attracted penal 
servitude for life, which was arguably a heavier sentence than that imposed 
                                                            
642 The revised Bill was the Abolition of Death Penalty (No. 2) (Bill No. XXXIV of 1995) 
see De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 26. 
643 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 26. 
644 Section 222 Penalty for murder and infanticide  
(1) Any person who is convicted of – 
(a) Murder or murder of a newly born child, shall be sentenced to penal servitude for 45 years; 
645 Section 223 Penalty for manslaughter 
(1) Any person guilty of manslaughter preceding, accompanying or following another crime 
shall be liable to penal servitude for life. 
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for murder! It was clear that both of the above flaws could not survive the 
court’s scrutiny. 
 
After realising that the Criminal Code provided for a heavier penalty for 
manslaughter than it did for murder, the Supreme Court held that it 
believed that it was ‘more a matter of fine tuning which was obviously 
lacking at the time the law was amended and which ought to be remedied 
by the relevant authority in due course.’646 In its later decision the Supreme 
Court held that the law that provided for a heavier sentence for 
manslaughter than for murder was an ‘absurdity’ and that it could never 
have been the intention of the legislator to punish manslaughter more 
severely than murder.647 It concluded that the law had to be construed to 
mean that a person who had been convicted of murder had to be sentenced 
to 45 years’ imprisonment and that one convicted of manslaughter to 20 
years’ imprisonment.648 One could argue that had the Court not declared 
penal servitude for life to mean that the offender was to be detained for the 
rest of his life, the amendment to section 222 would not have resulted in an 
absurdity even if section 233 had been left intact. This is because a person 
convicted of murder would have to be sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment 
and one convicted of manslaughter would have to be sentenced to penal 
servitude for life, which in effect meant 20 years’ imprisonment. The result 
would be that a person convicted of manslaughter served a lesser sentence 
than one convicted of murder. 
                                                            
646 De Boucherville v Commissioner of Prisons and others 2006: 25. 
647 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 148. 
648 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 151. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236
As alluded to earlier, section 222 of the Criminal Code was amended to 
require courts to impose a sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment on offenders 
found guilty of murder. This meant that the sentencing court’s discretion to 
impose any sentence it thought fit in such cases was eliminated. Even if 
there were mitigating or extenuating circumstances that would have 
persuaded the court to impose a lesser sentence in cases of murder, they 
were irrelevant. This clearly would have to be challenged sooner or later. 
The constitutionality of section 222 was challenged in the case of Philibert 
and 6 others v The State649 in which it was argued that sections 222(1) of 
the Criminal Code and 41(3)650 of the Dangerous Drugs Act offended 
sections 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 of the Constitution, in the sense that they, inter 
alia, infringed the doctrine of separation of powers651 and were also 
incompatible with the concept of a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that 
‘...the problem relating to mandatory sentences in Mauritius ... [was] one of 
“proportionality” not of “separation of powers”.’652 The Court added that 
the issue to be resolved was ‘whether the imposition of a mandatory 
                                                            
649 Philibert and 6 others v the State (Supreme Court of Mauritius) Record No. 163 
Judgment of 19 October 2007 (unreported).  
650 Section 41(3) of the Dangerous Drugs Act provided that ‘…any person convicted of an 
offence under section 30 [drug dealing offences] shall be sentenced to penal servitude for 
45 years where it is averred and proved that, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case the person was a drug trafficker.’ As quoted in Philibert and 6 others v the State 
2007: 4.   
651 The applicants argued that ‘ …the mandatory sentence offend[ed] section 1 of the 
Constitution as it infring[ed] the doctrine of separation of powers, viz. the separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers implicit in the declaration that “Mauritius shall 
be a sovereign democratic state.” It was submitted that in fixing the penalty, Parliament 
had unjustifiably assumed judicial powers, that this was an interference with judicial 
power which was outside the competence of the legislature and was inconsistent with the 
principle of separation of powers ordained in section 1 of the Constitution.’ See Philibert 
and 6 others v the State 2007: 4.    
652 Philibert and 6 others v the State 2007: 8. 
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minimum sentence would be startlingly or disturbingly inappropriate...’ in 
the circumstances.653 It concluded thus: 
A law which denies an accused party the opportunity to seek to avoid the 
imposition of a substantial term of imprisonment which he may not 
deserve, would be incompatible with the concept of a fair hearing 
enshrined in section 10 of our Constitution.  A substantial sentence of 
penal servitude like in the present situation cannot be imposed without 
giving the accused an adequate opportunity to show why such sentence 
should not be mitigated in the light of the detailed facts and circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the particular offence or after taking into 
consideration the personal history and circumstances of the offender or 
where the imposition of the sentence might be wholly disproportionate to 
the accused’s degree of criminal culpability. We hold and declare that 
section 222(1) of the Criminal Code and section 41(3) of the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 2000 …contravened section 7(1) of the Constitution inasmuch 
as the indiscriminate mandatory imposition of a term of 45 years penal 
servitude in all cases contravened the principle of proportionality and 
amounted to “inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment” 
contrary to section 7(1) of the Constitution.654 
In its 2007 Annual report the Mauritius National Human Rights 
Commission recommended that all the prisoners who were sentenced to 45 
years’ imprisonment under the Dangerous Drugs Act, before it was 
declared unconstitutional, should have their sentences either reviewed by a 
specially constituted panel of Supreme Court judges, or Parliament should 
amend the law to stipulate how such prisoners’ sentences should be dealt 
with, or the prisoners may apply to the Commission on the Prerogative of 
Mercy. The Human Rights Commission also recommended that the 
Attorney – General should work hand in hand with the Minister of Justice 
and Human Rights to devise ‘the way forward out of this dilemma’ and 
ensure that the prisoners who were sentenced to the mandatory 45 years 
                                                            
653 Philibert and 6 others v the State 2007: 12. 
654 Philibert and 6 others v the State 2007: 15 - 16. (Emphasis in original). 
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had their sentences revised.655 The Privy Council ruled that the Supreme 
Court has the jurisdiction to review the sentences of all prisoners who were 
sentenced to a mandatory 45 years or to mandatory penal servitude for 
life.656   
4.2.2.7 Penal servitude for life ranging between 3 and 60 years: 
Different standards 
Section 150A of the 2007 Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act provides 
that ‘[w]here under any enactment other than the Criminal Code a Court is 
empowered or required to pass a sentence of penal servitude for life, the 
sentence may, at the discretion of the Court, be for a term of not less than 3 
years and not exceeding 60 years.’ Section 150A raises at least one 
interesting point: With respect to offences other than those under the 
Criminal Code that attract life sentences, the court has the discretion to 
determine, depending on the circumstances, the length of penal servitude 
for life. This means that, depending on, for example, the circumstances 
under which the offence was committed, the individual circumstances of 
the accused, the issue of proportionality, and what the court thinks should 
be the objective that will be attained by imposing a particular sentence, the 
court has the discretion to impose either of the following sentences: penal 
servitude for life, which meant being imprisoned for life before such a 
sentence was declared unconstitutional by the Privy Council657; or penal 
servitude for life, which means either 3 years’ imprisonment or something 
                                                            
655 Mauritius National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report for the Year 2007 
(published 27 March 2008): paras 133 – 134. 
656 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
657 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
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between three years’ imprisonment and 60 years’ imprisonment; or to 
impose 60 years’ imprisonment. It is argued that this provision is likely to 
cause confusion with regard to the meaning of penal servitude for life in 
Mauritius, in the sense that different courts or different judges of the same 
court might give a different meaning to a sentence of penal servitude for 
life. Consequently, probably the sentence will lose its meaning and 
members of the public and some policy makers will, in some cases, 
question the court’s reasoning in imposing a sentence of penal servitude for 
life. This is more likely to happen when newspapers report that an offender 
has been sentenced to penal servitude for life but will be released after three 
years. 
Another problem that is likely to be caused by the application of section 
150A relates to longer sentences. As mentioned earlier, courts have the 
discretion to determine what penal servitude for life should mean provided 
that, if they intend to impose a specified number of years, the sentence 
should not exceed 60 years. This means that some courts, depending on the 
nature of the offence committed by the offender and other aggravating 
circumstances, may decide to impose a sentence as long as 50 years or 
more. The Privy Council, though questioning the constitutionality of a 
mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life, did not question the 
constitutionality of lengthy prison terms.658 This means that Mauritian 
courts can still legally impose lengthy prison terms. If this were to happen, 
it would raise some human rights issues. It would mean, as the 
Constitutional Court of Namibia held, that such offenders have just been 
                                                            
658 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240
reduced to numbers behind bars because their release would be very 
unlikely.659  
This analysis should be viewed in the light of the fact that the Mauritius 
Reform Institutions Act has no provision under which a person sentenced to 
penal servitude for life may have his sentence remitted.660 The South 
African Constitutional Court has also held that sentences that effectively 
deny offenders the prospect of being released amount to cruel and 
inhumane punishment.661 The European Court of Human Rights has also 
held that for a sentence of life imprisonment to pass the human dignity test, 
the prisoner should have a real prospect of being released.662 International 
human rights law and international criminal jurisprudence are evidence that 
the international community has moved away from sentences where the 
offender may be detained until his death.663 It is, therefore, argued that if 
any court in Mauritius imposed a determinate sentence that could amount to 
the prisoner spending the rest of his life in prison, it may amount to a 
violation of section 7(1) of the Constitution which prohibits inhumane 
                                                            
659 S v Tcoeib 1996: 399. However, one has to recall that prisoners sentenced to lengthy 
prison terms qualify for early release under sections 50 – 51A of the Reform Institutions 
Act, 1988. The problem, as will be discussed below, is that some of these prisoners, in 
particular those sentenced under the Dangerous Drugs Act, do not qualify for remission or 
parole under the Reform Institutions Act. This means that they will have to serve the 
imposed prison term in full unless pardoned by the State President. 
660 See sections 50 – 51A of the Reform Institutions Act, 1988. The Privy Council rightly 
held that ‘[t]he provisions of the Reform Institutions Act 1988 relating to parole and 
remission both depend for their operation on the serving of a specified fraction of a 
determinate sentence, and so have no application where a prisoner is subject to a lifelong 
incarceration.’ See De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
661 Bull & Another v The State 2001: para 23. 
662 See generally Case of Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008. 
663 Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia 
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court make provision for the release of 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. See Mujuzi 2008(a): 180 -185. See also van Zyl 
Smit 2002: 183-185. 
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punishment.664 Mauritius would also be in violation of its international 
obligations under some of the treaties to which it is a State Party.665 
4.2.2.8 Penal servitude for life under the Criminal Code 
Section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act amended 
sections 61, 64, 222(1) and 223(1) Criminal Code by providing that an 
offender sentenced under any of the above sections should be sentenced to 
imprisonment “for life or, where the Court is satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser 
sentence and has entered those circumstances on the record of the 
proceedings, for a term not exceeding 60 years.”  This provision should be 
read together with section 150A discussed above. The combined effect was 
that a person sentenced to penal servitude for life under the relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Code was meant to remain in prison for the rest 
of their life. The human rights arguments raised above with regard to 
lengthy prison terms apply with equal force to the type of penal servitude 
contemplated under the Criminal Code. The Privy Council also held that 
penal servitude for life, where the offender was to be imprisoned for the 
rest of his life without being given a chance to plead in mitigation, is 
‘manifestly disproportionate and arbitrary and so contrary to section 10 [on 
the right to a fair trial] of the Constitution of Mauritius.’666  
                                                            
664 Section 7(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.’ 
665 Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibit cruel and inhumane 
punishment. 
666 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242
In some countries, like the United States of America, this type of life 
imprisonment is called life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.667 Courts in South Africa, Namibia and Germany, have held that life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a cruel and inhumane 
punishment.668 As already mentioned, the Constitution of Mauritius 
expressly prohibits inhumane punishment as do the international human 
rights treaties to which Mauritius is party and, therefore, under an 
obligation to promote and protect the rights and freedoms thereunder.669 
Therefore, penal servitude for life, as contemplated in the Criminal Code 
and as supported by the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence, is a cruel and 
inhumane punishment which contravenes the Constitution. It is unfortunate 
that the Privy Council did not express its opinion on whether a sentence of 
penal servitude for life, where the offender has no real and tangible 
prospect of being released, did not contravene section 7 of the Constitution 
of Mauritius, which prohibits inhuman and cruel punishment.670  
It could be argued that offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life could 
still be pardoned by the State President in terms of section 75(1) of the 
Constitution.671  The Privy Council also declined to release the appellant, 
                                                            
667 D van Zyl Smit 2002: 54-58. 
668 See generally Mujuzi 2008(a): 163 – 186. 
669 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights stated that ‘[w]hen countries 
ratify or sign international instruments, they do so willingly and in total cognisance of their 
obligation to apply the provisions of these instruments.’ See African Institute for Human 
Rights and Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean Refugees in Guinea) v Republic of 
Guinea) Communication No. 249/2002. Para 68. 20th Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (January – June 2006), Annex IV.  
670 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
671 Under section 75(1) the President may: 
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whose sentence of penal servitude for life it declared unconstitutional for 
violating his right to a fair trial, on the ground that he had not fully 
explored the possibility of his release under section 75 of the 
Constitution.672 This could be interpreted to mean that the Privy Council 
believed that offenders serving a sentence of penal servitude for life have a 
real and tangible prospect of being pardoned by the President under section 
75 of the Constitution.673 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Jeetun, after 
concluding that penal servitude for life should be given its literal meaning, 
was quick to add:  
[W]e agree with the National Human Rights Commission that “the 
sentence of penal servitude for life does not mean that the detainee has to 
spend the rest of his life in prison” - vide paragraph 54 of its 2004 Report 
et sequitur. It goes without saying that any person sentenced for any term 
of penal servitude or imprisonment may also have his sentence reviewed 
from time to time by the Commission and the Parole Board in an 
appropriate case – vide sections 51 and 51 A of the Reform Institutions 
Act.  In determining the sentence which a detainee has yet to serve, 
various factors might be taken into consideration, including pure 
retribution, expiation, expressions of the moral outrage of society, 
maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice, 
deterrence, the interests of victims, rehabilitation and, last but not least, 
mercy.674 
                                                                                                                                                     
(a) Grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either free or subject to lawful 
conditions; 
(b) Grant any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of 
any punishment imposed on that person for any offence; 
(c) Substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on any person for 
any offence; or 
(d) Remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on any person for an offence or any 
penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on account of any offence.  
672 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
673 The Supreme Court commuted the appellant’s penal servitude for life to an effective 25 
years’ imprisonment following the Privy Council ruling. See De Boucherville Roger FP v 
State of Mauritius 2009.   
674State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 154. 
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Two important observations need to be made with regard to the Supreme 
Court’s observation above. In the first place, one doubts whether the Court 
should have relied on the 2004 Report of the National Human Rights 
Commission to which it referred to support its position that offenders 
sentenced to penal servitude for life were in practice not to be detained for 
the rest of their lives. At the time when the Report was written the National 
Human Rights Commission believed genuinely that a person sentenced to 
penal servitude for life was not to spend the rest of his life in prison. It is 
argued that its belief was rooted in two factors: one, that the prison records 
indicated that a person who had been sentenced to life imprisonment was at 
most required to serve a term of 30 years imprisonment; and secondly, and 
perhaps most importantly, there was a practice, as alluded to earlier, that 
offenders who had been sentenced to penal servitude for life were being 
released by the Supreme Court after serving 20 years. However, in 2006 the 
position had changed. The Supreme Court had held that penal servitude for 
life had to be given its literal meaning, although this ruling was reversed by 
the Privy Council in July 2008. 
The second point to be noted from the above observation relates to the 
Court’s reference to sections 51 and 51A of the Reform Institutions Act. 
These two provisions do not expressly mention that a person who has been 
sentenced to penal servitude for life shall have his case reviewed after some 
period of time. Section 51675 refers to other prison terms. This could be 
                                                            
675 Section 51(1) establishes the Parole Board and empowers it to recommend to the 
Minister responsible for Reform Institutions, amongst other things,  under section 51(2), 
the ‘release on parole a convicted detainee who has served not less than one half of his 
sentence or at least 16 months thereof, whichever expires the later.’  Under Section 50 (1) 
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interpreted to mean that the legislature excluded prisoners serving penal 
servitude for life from the benefit of having their sentences reviewed after a 
certain period of time.676 As mentioned earlier, in jurisdictions like Uganda, 
Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa, where the legislature never 
intended life imprisonment to mean that the offender will be detained for 
the rest of his life, the legislative framework is in place that specifically 
governs the circumstances under which prisoners serving life sentences 
may be released. In fact Section 51A of the Reform Institutions Act 
excludes the following offenders from being granted parole or having their 
sentences remitted: ‘a person who has been convicted of (a) an offence 
under the Dangerous Drugs Act... [and] (b) a sexual offence on a child or 
handicapped person.’ The implication is that those sentenced to penal 
servitude for life under the Dangerous Drugs Act do not qualify for parole 
or to the remission of their sentence. This issue has also been emphasised 
by the Mauritius Human Rights Commission.677 Therefore, the Court’s 
interpretation of the ambit of sections 51 and 51A remained debatable, to 
say the least. This issue is dealt with in detail under Chapter VI.678 
4.2.3 Uganda 
4.2.3.1 Life imprisonment versus the death penalty 
 
Unlike South Africa which has a rich history of life imprisonment, the 
sentence of life imprisonment in Uganda has not been as often used as the 
                                                                                                                                                     
‘… a person sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding 31 days shall be eligible 
for discharge after having served two thirds of the period of sentence.’ 
676 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2006: para 23. 
677 See 4.2.3.8.5 (below). 
678 Chapter VI, 6.2. 
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death penalty. And unlike South Africa and Mauritius that abolished the 
death penalty, in Uganda the death penalty is still lawful and has been 
imposed for a long period of time even before colonialism.679 The penal 
history of Uganda has witnessed not only a large number of people 
sentenced to death but also a high number of executions dating back to as 
early as 1938 when of the 67 offenders sentenced to death in that year 38 
were executed.680 One has to recall that between 1966 and 1986 Uganda 
was characterised by political instabilities and gross human rights 
violations681 which saw the death penalty used not only to punish serious 
crimes such as murder and armed robbery, but also to silence political 
opponents and it was in some circumstances imposed by Military Tribunals 
that disregarded the basic principles of the right to fair trial.682 In Uganda 
the death penalty is still imposed for various crimes683 although the last 
executions took place in 1999 when 28 prisoners were executed.684  
                                                            
679 Chenwi 2007: 18. 
680 Kamugisha 2005: 11. 
681 In 1994, the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights after listen to 
evidence of gross human rights violations in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 noted ‘with 
dismay the vast scale of human rights violations which evidence brought before it 
indicates as having been committed during the period of its inquiry. Hundreds of 
thousands of Ugandans were affected by what happened either directly or indirectly. Many 
came forward to testify before the Commission but the great number did not, due to 
limited time and resources at its disposal, whenever it sat to hear testimonies.’ The Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations (1994): para 13:11(3). 
682 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations (1994): 147 – 234. For a detailed discussion of the 
concept of the right to a fair trial see Mujuzi 2008(c): 135 – 157. 
683 A person convicted of any of following offences under the Penal Code Act is liable to 
be sentenced to death, treason (section 23), detention with sexual intent (section 134), 
murder (section 189), kidnapping or detaining with intent to murder (section 243), robbery 
(section 286), smuggling (section 319); a person convicted of terrorism related offences is 
liable to suffer death under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (sections 7, 8, and 9). 
684 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations (1994): 172. 
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Since the early 1990s when Uganda embarked on the process of enacting 
the new Constitution which was adopted in 1995 and amended in 2005, the 
question of whether the death penalty should be retained for serious crimes 
has been widely debated. Some people have suggested that the death 
penalty should be replaced with life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. However, the majority of the Ugandans are not yet convinced that 
life imprisonment is as tough a penalty as the death penalty for heinous 
offences. Our attention now shifts to the Constitution-making process to 
illustrate how the Constituent Assembly justified the enactment of a 
constitutional provision that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. 
However, before the discussion of the 1995 Constitution-making process, 
the author deals with the issue of the death penalty in the constitutions of 
Uganda since 1962. 
 
4.2.3.2 The death penalty in the Constitutions of Uganda since 1962 
4.2.3.2.1 The 1962 Constitution (the Independence Constitution) 
 
Uganda got her first Constitution, the Independence Constitution, at 
independence on the 9 October 1962. The Independence Constitution was 
discussed by a few people in London, some from the Colonial Office and 
others from Uganda, and adopted in England.685 The Independence 
Constitution provided for human rights especially civil and political in 
nature.686Though the Independence Constitution provided for the right to 
                                                            
685 Kanyeihamba 1975: 59-65. For a list of the delegates at the 1961 London Constitutional 
Conference see Mukholi 1995: 85-86. 
686 Kanyeihamba 1975: 374-395. 
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life, the relevant provision was phrased in such a manner that this right was 
not absolute.687 The Independence Constitution had two major weaknesses: 
one, its drafters ostensibly wanted to create a federal as opposed to a 
unitary republic of Uganda but surprisingly the Independence Constitution 
treated the Buganda Kingdom, one of the federal states, as superior to the 
other federal states.688 This was a recipe for grievance among the less 
favoured federal states that justifiably, desired equal treatment and status as 
the Buganda Kingdom. The second problem with the Independence 
Constitution is that it vested too much Executive power in the Office of the 
President, the then Kabaka (King) of Buganda. The Prime Minister, who 
practically ran the affairs of independent Uganda, had very limited 
decision-making powers. There was thus always a power struggle between 
the President and the Prime Minister regarding which of the two was 
authorised to make executive decisions. This struggle led to the partial 
abrogation and suspension of the Independence Constitution in the 1966 
Buganda Crisis and the adoption of the Revolutionary Constitution of 1966 
(the 1966 Constitution).689  
 
4.2.3.2.2 The 1966 and 1967 Constitutions and the death penalty  
Kanyeihamba has argued that 
[l]ooking at the events that followed the suspension of the constitution [the 
Independence Constitution] and the provisions of the 1966 Constitution it is 
not true to say that the Independence Constitution was suspended or 
abolished. What happened was that only those parts which dealt with the 
                                                            
687 Article 18(1) provided that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save 
in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law of 
Uganda of which he has been convicted.’ 
688 Kanyeihamba 1975: 59-78. 
689 Kanyeihamba 1975: 78-100. 
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executive powers and the Head of the Government were altered in order to 
merge the post of the President and the Prime Minister into the executive 
president; and the abolition of the federal form of government.690   
The partial suspension and abrogation of the Independence Constitution did 
not have any effect on the human rights provisions and in particular on the 
provision relating to the right to life.691  As Kanyeihamba points out, it only 
affected the executive provisions of the Constitution. There could be 
various reasons why the ‘right to life’ provision was not one of the 
provisions that were amended, suspended or abrogated in 1966, but one 
reason could be advanced to explain this: In 1966, the death penalty was 
still widely used not only in Africa,692 but also in other parts of the world693 
and accordingly, Uganda had no incentive to abolish it. The 1966 
Constitution was only meant to ‘continue in force until such time as a new 
constitution would be enacted by a Constituent Assembly to be established 
by Parliament for that purpose.’694 On 8 September 1967, a new 
Constitution, the 1967 Constitution was promulgated. Mukholi argued that 
the 1967 Constitution was ‘in real terms [an] amended version’ of the 1966 
Constitution for it only introduced three fundamental changes: the abolition 
of the kingdoms; the investment of enormous powers in the hands of the 
President; and the high centralisation of power.695 The provision relating to 
the right to life in the 1967 Constitution was transferred verbatim from the 
                                                            
690 Kanyeihamba 1975: 90. 
691 Article 8 of the 1967 Constitution provided that the right to life could be taken away in 
the execution of a death sentence imposed by the court under the laws of Uganda. 
692 Chenwi 2007: 15 – 56. 
693 See generally Schabas 2002. 
694 Kanyeihamba 1975: 100. 
695 Mukholi 1995: 18. 
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1966 Constitution.  The 1967 Constitution was suspended in 1971 when Idi 
Amin came to power in Uganda in a coup d’etat.696  
The Amin regime and the other short-lived regimes that ruled the country 
(the Military Commission, the Military Council and Junta) until the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came into power 
committed some of the gravest human rights violations known in Ugandan 
history, which included the blatant disregard of the right to life. These 
regimes resorted frequently to the death penalty and it would have been too 
optimistic for one to have expected such dictatorial and brutal regimes to 
amend the Constitution to provide for more protection of the right to life.697 
The NRM overthrew the Military Junta on 26 January 1986. By Legal 
Notice 1 of 1986, some parts of the 1967 Constitution, in particular those 
regarding the executive and legislative powers, were suspended.  The NRM 
government promised that their ascent to power was not a mere ‘change of 
guard’698 but a radical change. But because the NRM government had 
relied on the death penalty during the war to discipline errant rebels (as will 
be illustrated later during the discussion of the Constituent Assembly 
debates) it supported the death penalty and would still execute people in 
1999 several years after coming into power.  
Initially the NRM government promised that it was intent to retaining 
power for only four years, during which period it would have enacted a 
new Constitution which would have been the basis on which to bring 
                                                            
696 Kanyeihamba 2002: 136 – 152.  
697 Kanyeihamba 2002: 126 – 221.  
698 See Museveni 1997: 172.  
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democratic rule in Uganda. In other words, it intended to ensure that by 
January 1990 democratic rule had been introduced in Uganda. However, by 
January 1990 the government had not promulgated, let alone drafted, the 
new Constitution. Legal Notice No.1 of 1990 was amended and the 
government extended its term of office to January 1994. One of the reasons 
it cited for extending its term of office was that there was a need for 
Ugandans to debate and adopt a new constitution.699 The discussion now 
turns to the constitution-making process and how the issues of life 
imprisonment and the death penalty were addressed. 
4.2.3.3 The Uganda Constitutional Commission  
The Uganda Constitutional Commission (the Odoki Commission) was 
established by the Uganda Constitution Commission Statute of 1988. The 
Odoki Commission consisted of 21 members, who were appointed by the 
President of Uganda.700 Its terms of reference were: 
A. To study and review the constitution with the view of making proposals 
for the enactment of a national constitution that would: 
i. guarantee the national independence and territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Uganda; 
ii. establish a free and democratic system of government that will 
guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of 
Uganda; 
iii. create viable political institutions that will ensure maximum 
consensus and orderly succession to government; 
                                                            
699 Mukholi 1995: 27. 
700 These members were: 1) Justice Benjamin J Odoki (Chairman); 2) Dr. Dan Mudhoola 
(Vice Chairman); 3) Prof. Phares Mukasa Mutibwa (Secretary); 4) Dr. Edward Kiddu 
Makubuya; 5) Mr. Jonathan Kateera (Member); 6) Mr. Justine A.O. Okot (Member); 7) 
Dr. Rev. Fr. John Mary Waliggo (Member); 8) Mrs. Immaculate Damali Angena Maitum 
(Member); 9) Prof. Fredrick Ssempebwa (Member); 10) Mr. Cyprian Rwaheru (Member); 
11) Prof. Andrew Otim (Member); 12) Dr. Eric Adriko (Member); 13) Mr. George 
Ofuyuru (Member); 14) Mrs. Gertrude Byekwaso (Member); 15) Mr. Sam Kirya Gole 
(Member); 16) Mr. Cuthbert Obwangor (Member); 17) Hon. Miria Matembe 
(Mrs.)(Member); 18) Mr. Medi Kaggwa (Member); 19) Lt. Col. Serwanga Lwanga 
(Member); 20) Hon. Jotham Tumwesigye (Member); and 21) Ms. Mary Amaitumu. 
Mukholi 1995: 28. For the qualifications and roles of each member during the 
constitutional making process see Odoki 2005: 1-18.    
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iv. recognise and demarcate division of responsibility among the state 
organs of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary and create 
viable checks and balances between them; 
v. endeavour to develop a system of government that ensures people’s 
participation in governance of their country; 
vi. endeavour to develop a democratic, free and fair electoral system that 
will ensure people’s representation in the legislature and at other 
levels; 
vii. establish and uphold the principle of public accountability by the 
holders of public offices and political posts; and  
viii. guarantee the independence of the Judiciary. 
 
B. Formulate and produce a draft constitution that will form the basis for the 
country’s new national constitution.701 
 
It is clear from the terms of reference that the Odoki Commission had the 
mandate to ensure that it came up with a constitution that established a 
government that would guarantee the rights and freedoms of the people of 
Uganda. As alluded to earlier, previous governments had committed gross 
human rights violations in blatant disregard of the human rights that had 
been enshrined in the successive constitutions. The Commission’s terms of 
reference did not specify which human rights it should emphasise. What it 
was required to do was to ensure that the draft Constitution established ‘a 
free and democratic system of government that w[ould] guarantee the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda.’ This meant that 
the Commission had wide mandate with regard to which human rights it 
would consult the public and which submissions with regard to human 
rights should be included in the draft Constitution and how those rights 
should be phrased for debate by the Constituent Assembly. 
 
 
                                                            
701 Mukholi 1995: 29. See also Odoki 2005.  
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4.2.3.4 Ugandans participating in the Constitution-making process  
 
To understand how the 1995 Constitution would allow the right to life to be 
taken away in some circumstances, it is useful to understand how Ugandans 
participated in the Constitution–making process. This would explain the 
role of public opinion in the Constitution-making process.   The Odoki 
Commission introduced mechanisms to ensure that all Ugandans 
participated in the constitution-making process. The Commission organised 
district and sub-county seminars in all the districts and sub-counties 
countrywide to brief local, civic and opinion leaders about the Constitution-
making process and the important issues to be addressed.702 The aim of 
these initiatives was to ‘enable the majority of Ugandans at the grassroots 
to actively participate in the constitution-making process.’703 Seminars for 
institutions and special interest groups, like women, were also organised.704 
Odoki was of the view that the major objective of seminars for institutions 
and special interest groups was ‘to stimulate discussion and debate and the 
secondary objective was to collect views.’705 Publicity campaigns were also 
launched ‘to stimulate public discussion of constitutional issues amongst 
individuals and groups throughout the country.’706 Thousands of 
memoranda on what people thought should be included in the new 
Constitution were collected from all parts of Uganda and from special 
                                                            
702 Odoki 2005: 46-74. 
703 Odoki 2005. 
704 Odoki 2005: 75-84. 
705 Odoki 2005: 75. 
706 Odoki 2005: 107. 
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interest groups.707 Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also 
submitted their views.708 Some of the issues raised in these memoranda 
were that the new constitution should include a comprehensive Bill of 
Rights and that it should incorporate international human rights.709 
According to Odoki ‘every major group - religious, political, professional, 
cultural, social or economic presented a memorandum.’710 
4.2.3.5 The inclusion of the death penalty friendly provision in the 
Draft Constitution and the rejection of life imprisonment   
The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights was one of 
the interest groups the submitted proposal to the Odoki Commission. It 
proposed that ‘[t]he right to life should be protected. No life should be 
taken or death sentence imposed in the manner prescribed [sic] by law.’711 
It is very unlikely that the authors of proposal sought the prohibition of the 
death penalty under all circumstances. Arguably, what the authors meant 
was that no life should be taken or death sentence imposed in a manner 
‘proscribed’ not ‘prescribed’ by law. In other words, the authors 
contemplated that the Constitution incorporate safeguards that under no 
circumstances should the death penalty be imposed in a manner contrary to 
the law. Put differently, guaranteeing that the new Constitution should 
                                                            
707 Odoki 2005: 135-154. 
708 Odoki 2005: 145. 
709 Odoki 2005: 146. 
710 Odoki 2005: 146.  
711 Constitutional Proposals by the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human 
Rights to the Uganda Constitutional Commission, CHR. 105/91, 29 January 1992: para 
6.1, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations (1994): Appendix 7. 
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provide for circumstances where the death penalty could be imposed, but in 
accordance with the law.  
 
Thus, in its report to the Constituent Assembly, the Odoki Commission 
stated that ‘[t]he debate on abolition of capital punishment did not receive 
substantial submissions. This may be a reflection of the past history of the 
country.’712 The Commission added that people advanced various reasons 
in support of the retention of the death penalty and one of them was that 
‘[h]istory has shown that as each new regime came to power, prisoners 
sentenced to life sentences for murder have used the confusion to escape 
and to again terrorise society and commit murders.’713 Those who opposed 
the death penalty, argued, amongst other things, that the death penalty was 
neither advantageous to the State nor to ‘the family which has lost a person, 
or the criminal who is condemned to death. It is therefore better to convert 
it to life imprisonment which may bring some some benefit both to society 
and to the criminal.’714 The Commission thus concluded as follows: 
We have considered the arguments of both sides with care, critically 
analysed the international attitude to capital punishment and especially the 
praiseworthy campaign of Amnesty International for the abolition of the 
death penalty and consideration of the fact that the death penalty has been 
abolished in several countries, including a few African countries.  We 
fully understand the need for a change of attitude to capital punishment.  
                                                            
712 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (1992): para 7.120. 
713 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (1992): para 7.120(c). Other reasons 
given in the support of the death penalty were: it is a deterrent sentence; it protects society 
from criminals especially murderers; those who commit murders do so intentionally and 
they deserve to be punished for their crimes; that the death penalty indicates that life is 
sacred; and that countries that abolished the death penalty were considering bringing it 
back. 
714 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (1992): para 7.121(d). 
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We have, however, not found sufficient reasons to justify going against 
the majority views expressed in submissions to us.715 
It is upon that background that the Odoki Commission recommended that:  
 
(a) Capital punishment should be retained in the new Constitution; (b) 
[c]apital punishment should be the maximum sentence for extremely 
serious crimes, namely murder, treason, aggravated robbery, and 
kidnapping with intent to murder; (c) It should be in the discretion of the 
Courts of Law to decide whether a conviction on the above crimes should 
deserve the maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment; (d) the issue 
of maintaining the death penalty should be regularly reviewed through 
national and public debates to discover whether the views of the people on 
it have changed to abolition or not.716 
 
The above two paragraphs raise important points. The Odoki Commission 
weighed the views of the majority of Ugandans who supported the death 
penalty against those of international organisations such as Amnesty 
International, which wanted the death penalty abolished.  The Commission 
‘fully’ understood the ‘need for change of attitude to capital punishment’ 
but its hands were tied because the majority of Ugandans supported it and 
there were no sufficient justifications for its abolition. However, the 
Commission recommended that capital punishment should be the 
‘maximum’ not ‘mandatory’ sentence for extremely serious offences and 
that courts should have the discretion to determine whether a person 
convicted of such serious offences ‘should deserve the maximum penalty of 
death or life imprisonment.’ It is argued that the Commission thought that 
whereas the court should be given the discretion to impose the death 
                                                            
715 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (1992): para 7.122. See also Attorney 
– General v Susan Kigula and 416 others, Constitutional Petition No. 03 of 2006 
(Judgment of 21 January 2009, unreported, Supreme Court of Uganda) 21 (emphasis 
removed).   
716 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (1992): para 7.123. See also Attorney 
– General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 22. (Emphasis removed).   
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penalty, in the event that it did not impose it for ‘extremely serious crimes’, 
it had to impose life imprisonment. Put differently, the court had two 
options: either the death sentence or life imprisonment. However, the 
Commission recommended that the question of the death penalty should be 
reviewed regularly to establish whether or not Ugandans still supported its 
retention. 
 
During the Constituent Assembly debates, three views emerged with 
respect to the way the death penalty should be treated in the new 
Constitution: ‘[o]ne which is the most extreme – to abolish it; the other one, 
to retain it generally on criminal offences; and the third one which specifies 
the type of criminal offences.’717  Because the Odoki Commission had 
recommended the retention of the death penalty in the new Constitution, 
the motion by some delegates that the death penalty be abolished prompted 
the Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly to state that ‘...these 
Amendments depart from the text. The one that departs furthest is one 
which seeks to totally abolish the concept of the death sentence or capital 
punishment...’718 Some of the Constituent Assembly delegates who 
opposed the death penalty argued that the death penalty does not achieve 
one of the major objectives of punishment – reform (in the sense that a 
person who has been executed cannot be reformed) and that the execution 
of the death penalty is not punishment of the offender but ‘instead it is a 
punishment to the rest of the family, relatives and friends’ and that there is 
                                                            
717 Submission by Mr. ML Ojulla, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official 
Report) 2 September 1994: 1875. 
718 Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly 
(Official Report) 2 September 1994: 1875. 
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no ‘sufficient information to conclude that death [the] sentence necessarily 
can deters [sic] people from committing ... crimes.’719  
 
Delegates supporting the abolition of the death penalty advanced a variety 
of reasons in support of their contention. Some of reasons were: that (a) the 
‘better substitute’ for the death penalty was life imprisonment, on condition 
that ‘life imprisonment not meaning 16 years that are presently prescribed 
in Law. But actual life imprisonment...720 and that ‘if life sentence means 
life sentence’ the offender will not come out of prison and reoffend and that 
such an offender will be ‘utilised in prison, he will be able first of all to 
reform and will probably render some service to this country through hard 
labour in prison’721; (b) that ‘capital punishment originated from primitive 
society’, (c) the argument that the death penalty is deterrent ‘is false’, (d) 
that the ‘death penalty is not only wicked and cruel as a punishment but it is 
responsible for making human life as cheap as fish’722; (e) the death penalty 
was the same as revenge yet ‘revenge is better’ and that it could be used to 
eliminate political opponents;723 and (f) the death penalty was ‘barbaric’ 
and that ‘it is not a deterrent’ but, controversially, that ‘death penalty is 
                                                            
719 Submission by Dr. Magezi, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 
2 September 1994: 1875. 
720 Submission by Dr. Magezi, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 
2 September 1994: 1875. 
721 Submission by Dr.Magezi, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 2 
September 1994: 1895. 
722 Submission by Mr. Odur, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 2 
September 1994: 1876. 
723 Submission by Mr. K Pecos, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 
2 September 1994: 1876 – 1877.  
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more lenient than giving someone life in prison ... [because] if you left [the 
offender] in prison ... he can suffer more than just this instant death.’724   
 
One delegate gave three reasons for his support for the death penalty, 
explaining, too, why he was opposed to life imprisonment as a substitute 
for the death penalty: 
[T]he death sentence has been effective enough in reducing murder cases. 
Secondly ... we will be setting a dangerous precedent between the 
bereaved family and the murderer’s family in such away that the bereaved 
family will be forced to appease them on their own. Thus reverting to the 
years where it used to be the only means of settling such cases. Thirdly ... 
from the economic point of view, this abolition of the maximum sentence 
from death to life imprisonment will create unnecessary ability to the 
Government in maintaining these murderers. (Applause). Even more or 
less it will increase cases of corruption because given time these 
murderers will want to buy their way out of prison.’725 
 
As mentioned earlier, Uganda’s history has been characterised by gross 
human rights violations especially by military regimes. It is upon that 
background that one of military officers in the Constituent Assembly 
supported the retention of the death penalty by arguing that it was a 
deterrent because it ‘had worked very well in the Army’ and that the 
abolition of the death penalty would lead to ‘lawlessness’ because ‘a soldier 
                                                            
724 Submission by SK Kiwanuka, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official 
Report) 2 September 1994: 1877. 
725 Submission by Mr. K Robinson, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official 
Report) 2 September 1994: 1875. One delegate submitted that people from his 
constituency were ‘opposed to the abolition of the death sentence vigorously so. To them 
they think and they are sure this punishment is deterrent [sic]. It deters more people who 
would commit murders. The only thing is that it is not possible to measure exactly how 
many are deterred but it has an effect on the community. The second reason is that 
although the death sentence does not compensate the bereaved ones, it creates or gives 
some mental satisfaction with [sic] the fact that he killed our person he is also dead 
(Applause). It also discourages people – bereaved ones from taking the Law into their own 
hands. Thirdly it will discourage mob justice. If the community knows that the person who 
killed the other will eventually get away, they will not arrest whoever is suspected. They 
will go in for him and kill him. They will not take him to Court. They appeal to Members 
to uphold a death sentence as par our Law books.’ See submission by Mr. Kiwagama: 
1876.     
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will kill somebody in the village and will keep on rotating with his gun 
everywhere eating some food ... in prison, we shall not even administer this 
Army. (Applause).’726 One delegate who rejected life imprisonment as the 
substitute for the death penalty argued that the death penalty is a deterrent, 
‘it is a way of getting rid of the bad element from society. (Applause) Those 
Delegates who say that we give the man or women life imprisonment if that 
man or woman is a bad element in society, wherever he or she goes, he can 
commit murder. He can commit murder in prison.’727 One delegate argued 
that he supported the retention of the death penalty and that the majority of 
people in his constituency (30 of the 450 who discussed the issue) 
supported the retention of the death sentence on the ground that ‘life 
sentence ... is only to encourage people to go to Luzira [Uganda’s 
maximum security prison] and do management by remote-control for their 
families ... and the nation spends a lot of money on [them]...’728   
 
Some delegates argued for the retention of the death penalty while others 
argued for its abolition. It would have taken the Constituent Assembly 
longer to debate this issue if each and everyone was allowed to take the 
floor and make submissions. The submissions for or against the death 
penalty also became repetitive, with delegates either agreeing with what 
others had already said or emphasising the points made earlier. It is against 
this background that one of the delegates suggested to the Chairperson of 
                                                            
726 Submission by Lt Col. Sserwanga Lwanga, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly 
(Official Report) 2 September 1994: 1877. 
727 Submission by Mr. S Kizito, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 
2 September 1994: 1878. 
728 Submission by Mr. G Kinyata, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official 
Report) 2 September 1994: 1878 – 1879. 
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the Constituent Assembly that since he (the Chairperson) had the names of 
those who were for or against the death penalty, ‘people by indication 
would give their views whether they support [the death penalty] or not 
without necessarily spending ten or twenty minutes debating the obvious 
principles.’729 When the motion was put to vote, 144 delegates supported 
the retention of the death penalty, 26 supported the abolition of the death 
penalty, and three abstained.730 When the Constitution was adopted and 
promulgated, it provided under Article 22(1) that  
No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution of a 
sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in 
respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction 
and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court. 
 
Most of the delegates who supported the abolition of the death penalty were 
of the view that life imprisonment, which meant the offender would spend 
the rest of his life in prison would have been a better substitute.  Those who 
supported the death penalty saw life imprisonment as not sufficiently 
deterring. They also argued that it would be expensive for the state to keep 
a person in prison for the rest of his life. Although it is not a strong point to 
justify the retention of the death penalty, the financial consequences for a 
person who has been imprisoned for the rest of his or her life cannot be 
underestimated. We are talking about people who would grow old in 
prisons, who cannot do any prison labour because of old age, and who need 
constant medical attention, which may not even be available in prisons. 
One has to recall that in many prisons in Uganda prisoners are being 
                                                            
729 Submission by Mr. R Kaijuka, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official 
Report) 2 September 1994: 1880. 
730 Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report) 2 September 1994: 1881 – 
1884. 
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detained under conditions that are below internationally accepted standards. 
This exposes them to many infectious diseases and could explain why the 
Supreme Court recommended that ‘[t]he government and all those who 
inspect prisons must ensure that the conditions under which all prisoners 
are kept strictly conforms [sic] to the law and to international standards.’731 
 
4.2.3.6 Attempts to revise the death penalty provision: the life 
imprisonment issue emerges again 
 
In 2002 the government appointed the Constitutional Review Commission 
whose mandate was to seek the views of Ugandans on whether or not 
several aspects of the Constitution needed to be amended, and if so, what 
the amendments should be.732 The Commission was required to elicit the 
public’s views on whether or not some provisions of the Bill of Rights 
needed to be amended. In its report, the Commission stated that ‘the people 
are in agreement that the [human rights] provisions in the Constitution are 
adequate.’733 In respect of the Bill of Rights, the Commission was 
mandated also to consider particularly ‘whether the death penalty should be 
                                                            
731 Attorney General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 50. 
732 The mandate of the Constitutional Review Commission covered the following areas: 
political systems and good governance; executive authority in relation to the role of 
parliament and the judiciary; the role and function of parliament; the electoral process 
(elections and elections and succession to government); Bank of Uganda; local 
government  and whether federalism should be introduced where required; human rights 
and the Uganda Human Rights Commission; citizenship; protection of children; death 
penalty; constitutional bodies (the Inspector General of Government, the Uganda Law 
Reform Commission, the Uganda Land Commission, and  National Planning Authority); 
Service Commissions; land management, dispute resolution and compulsory acquisition of 
land; access to justice and efficiency of courts; cultural institutions; language (whether 
Uganda should adopt a national language and another official language) . See generally 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) Findings and 
Recommendations, 10 December 2003. 
733 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 10.2. 
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abolished...’734 After reviewing the relevant international human rights 
instruments, the Commission found that ‘[i]t is apparent ... that the death 
penalty is not outlawed by international law. However, a trend towards its 
abolition is evident.’735 The Commission reported that ‘[t]he people 
responded widely on this issue. The majority who responded argued in 
favour of retaining the death penalty’ for several reasons.736 The 
Commission also added that ‘[a] substantial percentage of those who 
support the penalty want it to be retained for only the most heinous 
crimes.’737  
 
Some of the supporters of the death penalty also ‘expressed concern about 
the long stay of convicts before execution, a burden to the tax payer, and 
recommended expeditious executions.’738 Those opposed to the death 
penalty supported their position with arguments ranging from human rights 
concerns to religious issues.739 Of interest were the recommendations made 
by the Uganda Prisons Service, the institution charged not only with the 
                                                            
734 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 1(r). 
735 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 13.4. 
736 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 13.5. The 
reasons were: it is a just penalty for serious crimes such as murder, rape and defilement of 
minors; it demonstrates society’s disapproval of serious crimes; without the death penalty, 
serious crimes will be on the increase; the people of Uganda approve of the death penalty, 
if it is abolished, the people will resort to mob justice; and that those who urge abolition of 
the death penalty are not concerned about the rights of the victms.  
737 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 13.5. 
These crimes include murder, kidnapping with intent to murder, defilement of minors, and 
intentionally spreading AIDS. 
738 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: 13-173. 
739 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: 13-173. The 
reasons were: the death penalty is a cruel and inhuman punishment; it simply terminates 
the  life of the condemned person and therefore serves no purpose; there is no credible 
evidence that the existence of the death penalty deters people from committing crimes; 
God does not permit killing; and that civilised societies are abolishing the death penalty.  
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imprisonment of those sentenced to life imprisonment, but also with the 
execution of the death sentence. Like many other people who supported the 
abolition of the death penalty, it recommended that the death penalty be 
substituted with life imprisonment without reprieve. The submission is 
worth reproducing: 
 
As an alternative to the death penalty most of the people who want it 
abolished have proposed life imprisonment without any reprieve. Some 
have proposed that the convict be engaged in productive labour; that some 
of the proceeds of that labour should compensate the victims of the crime. 
The Uganda Prisons Service made a submission ... calling for the abolition 
of the [death] penalty. They stated that the execution of the death sentence 
is very traumatising to the Prison staff. “It affects the life of the officers 
carrying it out because of their professional relationship to the inmates. 
They recommended that the death penalty should be replaced by life 
imprisonment; that life imprisonment should imply “imprisonment until 
death.” “In this way, the death of the offender can be achieved without 
hanging him”.740   
 
This submission needs to be assessed in the light of the following two 
factors: One, the Uganda Prisons Service has never dealt with offenders 
who are to be imprisoned for the rest of their lives and therefore has never 
faced the challenge of dealing with prisoners who know that even if they 
misbehaved in prison all the sentences imposed on them will have no 
practical effect. Two, the only reason why the Uganda Prisons Service 
opposed the death penalty was because it traumatises the officers who 
execute it. That explains why the Prison officers recommended to the 
Commission that ‘if executions have to continue, this gruesome exercise be 
privatised and performed away from prison.’741  
 
                                                            
740 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: 13-173. 
741 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: 13-174. 
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The Commission finally recommended the retention of the death penalty 
because the majority of Ugandans still supported it. But recommended that 
the death penalty be retained and remain a mandatory sentence for the 
crimes of murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping with intent to murder, 
and the defilement of minors below fifteen years of age.742 The 
Commission also recommended that since ‘[e]xecuting the sentence of 
death by hanging with the rope until the convict dies is painful[,] [that] 
[t]he sentence should be implemented by a method which ensures instant 
death.’743 In its White Paper, the Government accepted the 
recommendations of the Commission on the death penalty and noted that 
‘article 22 of the Constitution that relates to protection of right to life will 
not require any amendment.’744 In its report on the Government White 
Paper, the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs also agreed with the 
government’s recommendations that the death penalty should be retained 
and the mode of execution revised.745 This meant that the only way that the 
death penalty could be challenged was through courts of law because the 
proposed amendments had retained Article 22 intact.   
 
 
 
                                                            
742 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 13.7(i). 
743 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) 2003: para 13.7(ii). 
744 Government White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional 
Review) and Government Proposals not Addressed by the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry (Constitutional Review), September 2004: para 12.3. 
745 The Report of the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee on the Government 
White Paper on Constitutional Review and Political Transition, 20 December 2004: 49. 
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4.2.3.7 Challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty: Supreme 
Court and its order substituting death penalties by life 
imprisonment without remission  
 
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court of Uganda handed down the long-
awaited judgment of Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and 416 others (the 
Kigula case).746 It was a result of an appeal against the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling, inter alia, that the death penalty was not unconstitutional, 
but that the mandatory death sentence in the Penal Code Act for murder 
was.747 Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, both the government 
and death row inmates appealed to the Supreme Court with the government 
arguing, inter alia, that the Constitutional Court erred in law when it found 
that the mandatory death penalty for murder was unconstitutional.748 On the 
other hand, the death row inmates appealed against the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling that the death penalty was not unconstitutional and therefore 
not a cruel, inhuman and degrading form of punishment because it was 
provided for under the Constitution.749 They also appealed against the 
Constitutional Court’s finding that hanging, as a form of execution, was not 
a cruel and inhuman punishment within the meaning of Article 24 of the 
Constitution, and therefore not unconstitutional.750   
                                                            
746 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009. 
747 See Susan Kigula and 417 Others v Attorney – General, Constitutional Petition No.6 of 
2003 (Judgment of 5 June 2005).The Constitutional Court held that the mandatory death 
sentence was unconstitutional because it violated the accused’s right to a fair trial in the 
sense that he could not be heard in mitigation once found guilty of murder. The Court also 
held that hanging as a method of execution did not violate Article 24 of the Constitution 
which prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.  
748 Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 10. 
749 Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 10. 
750 Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 2. 
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While the appeal against the Constitutional Court’s judgment was pending 
before the Supreme Court,751 the sentencing of offenders who had been 
found guilty of murder became not only a source of considerable 
uncertainty at the High Court level but had also almost come to a standstill 
in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. With regard to the High 
Court, some judges held the view that the death penalty was still a 
mandatory sentence for murder and sentenced offenders accordingly.752 
Other High Court (and also Court of Appeal) judges were of the view that 
the death sentence was a discretionary sentence in cases of murder, and 
imposed lesser sentences where there were mitigating circumstances.753 At 
the Court of Appeal754 and Supreme Court levels, sentencing in several 
                                                            
751 Under Article 132 of the Constitution the Supreme Court is the final Court of Appeal in 
constitutional matters. 
752 For example, in Uganda v Wepondi Robert alias Mutto [HCT-04-CR-SC-0003 of 
2005)[2005] (14 July 2005), which was decided just over a month after the Constitutional 
Court had declared the mandatory death sentence to be unconstitutional, the accused was 
convicted on three counts of  murder and in sentencing him to death, the High Court 
observed that ‘[o]n counts 1, 2 and 3 there is only one sentence authorized by the law and 
that is that you shall suffer death in a manner authorised by the law.’   
753 For example, in Uganda v Bizimana (HC-00-CR-SC-0122 of 2005)[2006]UGHC 46 
(16 January 2006) the accused was convicted of nine counts of murder  (he and others 
murdered tourists) and the Court before sentencing him to 15 years’ imprisonment instead 
of death held that ‘[i]n Constitutional Section [sic] No.6 of 2003 the Constitutional Court 
ruled and declared that Section 189 of the Penal Code which prescribes a mandatory death 
sentence is inconsistent with Article 21, 22(1), 24, 28, and 44(a) and 44(b) of the 
Constitution. The court ordered that in capital offence the trial court must, before 
sentencing the convict afford him/ her a hearing on mitigation of sentence.’ In Okwang 
William v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 2002)[2007]UGCA 59 (21 May 2007) the 
appellant’s appeal against his conviction for murder was confirmed by the Court of Appeal 
which then observed that ‘[t]he death sentence was passed against the appellant on 
8/5/2002. This was before Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the mandatory death 
sentence... we have taken into account all the mitigating factors. We have found no 
mitigating factors deserving reduction of the sentence. We are of the considered view that 
this was a brutal murder...The ground on mitigation of the sentence that was imposed on 
the appellant also fails.’  Of the 47 offenders who were serving life imprisonment in 
Uganda in July 2008, five had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment instead of death. Mujuzi 2008(a): 167.  
754 For example, Absolom Omolo Owiny v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2003) 
[2008] UGCA 2 (8 April 2008) the appellant’s appeal against his conviction for murder 
was dismissed and on the issue of the sentence of death imposed on him, the Court of 
Appeal ‘regarding ground 4 of the memorandum of appeal which concerns mitigation of 
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judgments where the appeals of offenders who had been convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death had been dismissed was put on hold because 
the judges were waiting for the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty and the constitutionality of the 
mandatory death sentence for murder.755  
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court finally handed down its judgment 
and held: first, that the death penalty is constitutional because it is 
sanctioned under the Constitution and that the framers of the Constitution 
took into consideration Uganda’s history of grave human rights violations 
before including Article 22(1) in the Constitution, which provides that the 
right to life can be taken away as long as the manner in which it is taken 
away is not ‘arbitrary’; second, that the mandatory death sentence is 
unconstitutional because it violates the offender’s right to a fair trial in the 
sense that he or she cannot be heard in mitigation at the sentencing stage. It 
also infringed the doctrine of separation of powers because it eliminated the 
judge’s discretion in determining which sentence fitted both the offence 
and the offender; finally, that hanging, as a form of execution, is not a 
                                                                                                                                                     
sentence, we would say that we cannot enforce our decision in … Susan Kigula and 416 
Ors v Attorney-General because it is pending confirmation of the Supreme Court, on 
appeal.’ 
755 For example, in Enock v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2004] [2007] UGSC 3 
(30 May 2007) the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s conviction for murder but 
held that ‘because of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Constitutional Court 
Petition No. 6 of 2006 (Susan Kigula & 417 Others v Attorney General) from which an 
appeal is pending in this Court, we exercise our discretion and postpone confirmation of 
sentence in this case under Article 22(1) of the Constitution, until determination of the 
pending Constitutional Appeal in this Court’; in Susan Kigula Sserembe and Anor v 
Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 1of 2004)[2008] UGSC 15 (15 October 2008) the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal against their conviction for murder but held that 
‘[t]he sentence of death imposed upon the appellants is suspended pending the 
determination of Constitutional Appeal No.3 of 2006.’ See also Bagatenda Peter v 
Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2006) [2007] UGSC 15 (16 October 2007); Sekandi 
Hasan v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2005) [2007] UGSC 12 (5 July 2007).  
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cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 24 
of the Constitution. It was therefore not unconstitutional and that there was 
no evidence that other methods of execution, such as, lethal injection, were 
less painful than hanging; and third and most importantly for our 
discussion, that when a prisoner sentenced to death spends three years in 
detention after his appeal has been dismissed by the highest court and his 
application for the President to exercise his prerogative of mercy and 
commute his sentence has not been dealt with, to know whether he has 
been granted reprieve or remission or would be executed, the death row 
phenomenon sets in. The Court held that the death row phenomenon is a 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and that executing a prisoner who 
has spent three years on death row is cruel, inhuman and degrading. The 
Court ordered that a prisoner who has been on death row for three years 
and more his sentence should automatically be commuted to ‘imprisonment 
for life without remission.’756 The Court’s ruling attracted considerable 
media coverage both in Uganda757 and abroad.758However, it also had the 
                                                            
756 Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 63. 
757 Afedraru et al ‘Uganda Supreme Court Upholds Death Sentence’ Daily Monitor, 22 
January 2009 at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Ugandan_Supreme_Court_upholds_death
_sentence_78608.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009); Editorial, ‘Positives from Ruling on 
the Death Penalty’ Daily Monitor, 23 January 2009 at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/opinions/Positives_from_ruling_on_the_death_
penalty_78644.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009); A Mugisa et al  ‘Death Sentence 
Judgment Puzzles Lawyers’ The New Vision, 22 January 2008 at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/668974 (accessed 24 January 2009); and Mugisa and 
Nsambu, ‘Supreme Court Retains Death Penalty’ The New Vision, 21 January 2009, at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/668812 (accessed 24 January 2009); Mujuzi, 
‘Implications of the Death Penalty Ruling’ The Monitor, 28 January 2009 at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/opinions/Implications_of_the_death_penalty_rul
ing_78887.shtml (accessed 19 February 2009). 
758 ‘Uganda Court Keeps Death Penalty’ BBC News, 21 January 2009 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7841749.stm (accessed 24 January 2009); and ‘Uganda’s 
Supreme Court Declares Death Penalty Right’ Guardian Newspaper, 22 January 2009 at 
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/africa/article02//indexn3_html?pdate=220109&ptitle=U
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effect of confusing prison authorities on how they should deal with 
prisoners who had exhausted their appeals and had been on death row for 
more than three years.759  The Court should be applauded for declaring the 
mandatory death sentence unconstitutional. At least this would save many 
people who would have been convicted of murder, but with mitigating 
circumstances, from being sentenced to death. In the words of the Court: 
Not all murders are committed in the same circumstances, and all 
murderers are not necessarily of the same character.  One may be a first 
offender, and the murder may have been committed in circumstances that 
the accused person deeply regrets and is very remorseful.  We see no 
reason why these factors should not be put before the court before it 
passes the ultimate sentence.760 
Consequently, the Court ordered that 
[f]or those respondents whose sentences arose from the mandatory 
sentence provisions and are still pending before an appellate Court, their 
cases shall be remitted to the High Court for them to be heard only on 
mitigation of sentence, and the High Court may pass such sentence as it 
deems fit under the law.761 
The South African experience shows that it is not unlikely that several 
offenders who were on death row could be re-sentenced to life 
                                                                                                                                                     
ganda's%20supreme%20cour%20declares%20death%20penalty%20right&cpdate=240109 
(accessed 24 January 2009).    
759 See Butagira et al ‘Death Penalty Ruling Puzzles Prison Bosses’ Saturday Monitor, 24 
January 2009 at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Death_penalty_ruling_puzzles_prison_bos
ses_78725.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009) where it is reported that ‘The Supreme Court 
ruling that prisoners, who have stayed on death row for more than three years, after 
exhausting all appeals, should not be executed but imprisoned for life has confused prison 
officials. Saturday Monitor has learnt that the officials are puzzled about how to handle 
condemned persons still in formal confinement. Dr. Johnson Byabashaija, the 
[C]ommissioner [G]eneral of Uganda Prisons, said the government needs to clarify if the 
…decision, a rising from a petition by some 417 death row inmates to have the court quash 
the death sentence, would apply retrospectively. “We are going to write to the Attorney 
General…for advice because the Supreme Court ruling has got implications on all persons 
who have gone through all appeals [and stayed thereafter] on death row for more than 
three years”.’  
760 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 43. 
761 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 64. 
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imprisonment or lengthy prison terms pursuant to the Court’s order after 
being heard in mitigation.762 However, in Uganda some offenders could 
still be sentenced to death when the High Court deems it fit that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The 
Court should also be applauded for holding that keeping death row inmates 
for longer than three years in detention after they have exhausted their 
appeals which allowed the death row phenomenon to set in was cruel, 
inhuman and degrading. The Court ordered that: 
[f]or those respondents whose sentences were already confirmed by the 
highest Court, their petitions for mercy under article 121 of the 
Constitution must be processed and determined within three years from 
the date of confirmation of the sentence.  Where after three years no 
decision has been made by the Executive, the death sentence shall be 
deemed commuted to imprisonment for life without remission.763 
The Court held that it should not be misunderstood as calling upon the 
government to execute expeditiously prisoners whose appeals and 
application for clemency have been dismissed. However, in what appears to 
be a contradiction, it held that ‘a delay [in] carrying out [a] sentence 
beyond three years from the date when the sentence of death was confirmed 
by the highest court constitutes unreasonable delay’764 consequently, the 
execution of a prisoner after the expiry of that period would be cruel and 
inhuman and therefore unconstitutional.  
It is argued that there are three possible implications that could flow from 
the above ruling. One, when all prisoners who have been sentenced to death 
                                                            
762 See 4.2.1.2.1 (above). 
763 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 63. 
764 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 57. 
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apply for clemency, there is no requirement that the President must 
consider those applications on a first-come-first-serve basis. Therefore, 
there is a perceived danger that some applications (of, for example of 
political prisoners, ritual murderers or people who have committed the 
worst forms of murder) being fast-tracked and quickly declined so that the 
prisoner is executed as soon as possible before the death row syndrome sets 
in.  This is not unlikely because in his reaction to the Supreme Court ruling, 
the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, reportedly said that he 
was happy that the Court had not abolished the death penalty and that 
‘those who kill innocent Ugandans deserve nothing less than death.’765  
The second consequence is the most obvious one: if within three years of 
the application the President’s decision on the application for clemency is 
still pending, the death sentence is automatically commuted to life 
imprisonment without remission. The third consequence is that the 
President could commute many death sentences to either lengthy prison 
terms or life imprisonment.   
The Court could have gone too far in ordering that those prisoners whose 
applications for clemency have not been attended to within three years 
should have their death sentence deemed to have been commuted to 
imprisonment for life without remission. It should not have overlooked the 
fact that the prison authorities have the discretion to grant remission to 
offenders for meritorious behaviour in prison. This discretion derives from 
                                                            
765 See Vision Reporter, ‘Museveni Backs Court on Death Penalty’ The New Vision, 26 
January 2009, at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/669387 (accessed 27 January 2009). 
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sections 84 to 86 of the Prisons Act.766 Remission of a sentence is always 
an incentive for good conduct in prison. Evidence from other countries like 
Mauritius shows that prisoners who are aware that they are not entitled to 
remission are hard to manage and can be troublesome.767 However, unlike 
the Constitutional Court, which held that if the death penalty is to be 
abolished life imprisonment should mean that the prisoner would be 
imprisoned for the rest of his life, the Supreme Court held that death 
sentences would be commuted to life imprisonment without remission. It is 
argued that there is a difference between life imprisonment where the 
prisoner is imprisoned for the rest of his life on the one hand and life 
imprisonment without remission. In the latter case, a prisoner sentenced to 
life imprisonment would have to be imprisoned for 20 years because under 
the Uganda Prisons Act life imprisonment means a maximum of 20 years’ 
imprisonment. However, in practice, prisoners sentenced to life 
imprisonment are released after serving 16 years, 8 months and 10 days if 
they behaved well while in prison and earned credits.768 However, in the 
former scenario, the prisoner would be imprisoned until his death.  
                                                            
766 Prisons Act, Act 17 of 2006. 
767 The Mauritius National Commission on Human Rights reported that ‘[t]he Security 
Audit Committee commented on the fact that those convicted of drug offences are not 
entitled to any remission. Other prisoners are entitled as of right to one third of their 
sentence as remission. Misconduct on their part is sanctioned by a loss of remission. There 
is an incentive for them to be of good conduct. On the other hand, as drug offenders are 
not entitled to remission, they have no incentive to be of good behaviour. We endorse the 
view of the Security Audit Committee that a measure of remission would be beneficial to 
both offenders and the prisons administration. It is hoped that the authorities will come 
forward with appropriate measures.’ See The 2001 Annual Report of the National Human 
Rights Commission of Mauritius (February 2002): paras 76 – 77.  
768 Personal interview with 10 prisoners who are serving life imprisonment in the Luzira 
Maximum Security prison, Kampala, Uganda on 14 January 2008. (One of the prisoners 
interviewed was to be released in the following month because he had served 16 years and 
7 months). The prison officers also informed the author that it is true that prisoners 
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The Supreme Court’s ruling could also be interpreted to mean that an 
offender whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment 
without remission should remain in prison for the rest of his life. This 
interpretation would be disputable on at least two grounds: One, if the 
Supreme Court wanted to hold that life imprisonment should mean life 
imprisonment where the prisoner would be imprisoned for the rest of his 
life, it should have expressly stated so. But it chose to rule that such 
prisoners are not entitled to remission. Second, as indicated above, after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, the Prison authorities said they were in the process 
of seeking the Attorney-General’s advice on whether or not the judgment 
applied retrospectively.769 The Attorney-General’s advice would guide 
them on when the relevant prisoners would be eligible for release.   
Current positive Ugandan law does not permit imprisonment of a prisoner 
until his death. However, as mentioned earlier, the Constitutional Court 
held that if the death penalty is to be abolished, life imprisonment should 
mean that the prisoner will be imprisoned until his death. The discussion 
now turns to the Constitutional Court ruling and it will deal with why the 
law in Uganda should not be amended to allow life imprisonment without 
the possibility of release. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
sentenced to life imprisonment could serve the maximum of 20 years and that in practice if 
they behaved well their sentence could be remitted to 16 years, 8 months and 10 days. 
769 See Butagira et al ‘Death Penalty Ruling Puzzles Prison Bosses’ Saturday Monitor, 24 
January 2009 at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Death_penalty_ruling_puzzles_prison_bos
ses_78725.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009). 
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4.2.3.8 Challenging ‘whole life’ imprisonment as suggested by the 
Constitutional Court 
 
In Uganda section 86(3) of the Prisons Act770 provides that ‘[f]or the 
purpose of calculating remission of sentence, imprisonment for life shall be 
deemed to be twenty years’ imprisonment.’ Courts that have been imposing 
life sentences in Uganda have always understood life imprisonment to 
mean a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 20 years. In the 1975 
Court of Appeal decision of Wasaja v Uganda,771 the appellant was found 
guilty of the offences of robbery and threatening to use violence. The High 
Court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment and to 24 strokes with a 
cane after already having spent nearly two years in custody. He appealed 
against the sentence. The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and 12 strokes on the ground that it was excessive, stating 
that ‘[t]he maximum sentence of imprisonment [for the offences the 
accused had committed] is life, which we take to be equivalent to a 
sentence of 18-20 years.’772   
In 1994 the Supreme Court of Uganda set aside a High Court decision in 
which it convicted the appellant of manslaughter and sentenced him to 18 
years’ imprisonment.773 The High Court had sentenced the appellant after 
she had already spent two years in prison. The Supreme Court set aside the 
High Court’s decision on the ground that the appellant had been effectively 
sentenced to 20 years which was in effect a life sentence under the Prisons 
                                                            
770 Act 17 of 2006. 
771 Wasaja v Uganda [1975] E.A. 181. 
772 Wasaja v Uganda 1975: 184. 
773 Kakooza v Uganda [1994] V KALR 54. 
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Act. In 2003 in Wanaba v Uganda,774 the Court of Appeal held that ‘a 
sentence of life imprisonment means 20 years imprisonment.’775 However, 
in its 2005 judgment of Susan Kigula & 416 others v The Attorney 
General776 the Constitutional Court was of the view that imprisonment for 
life should not merely mean 20 years. But, in the words of Appleton and 
Grφver, ‘whole-life.’777  
 
In 2006, a few months after the Constitutional Court’s decision, a new 
Prisons Act was enacted which retained the provision as is in the old 
Prisons Act to the effect that life imprisonment means 20 years’ 
imprisonment. In January 2007, in Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda778 in which 
the appellant, a 22-year old man was sentenced by the High Court (in 2004) 
to life imprisonment for defiling a two-and-a-half-year-old baby, the Court 
of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument that ‘life imprisonment was 
almost as bad as death.’779 This means courts still consider life 
imprisonment to mean 20 years’ imprisonment. As at 30 September 2007, 
                                                            
774 Wanaba v Uganda Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 2001, (decided on 22 July 2003), 
(unreported). 
775 Wanaba v Uganda 2003: 8. 
776 Susan Kigula and 416 others v the Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition No.6 of 
2003(Judgment of 20 June 2005, unreported): 140-142. In this case the petitioners had 
been sentenced to death and they petitioned the Constitutional Court for declaration that 
the death penalty was unconstitutional inter alia that because it amounted to torture, cruel 
or degrading and inhuman treatment and that it violated the right to life. The Constitutional 
Court held that the death penalty was not unconstitutional because according to the 
constitution (article 22(1)) the right to life is not absolute and it can be taken away 
provided due process of law has been followed. However, the Court held that mandatory 
death penalty was unconstitutional because it eliminated the discretion of the courts in 
sentencing. The court held that mandatory death penalty in cases of murder meant that it 
was the executive and the legislature passing the sentence and not the courts. 
777 Appleton and Grφver 2007: 603. 
778 Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda Criminal Appeal No. 289/2003 (unreported). 
779 Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda 2003: 2. 
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43 prisoners, only two of whom were female, were serving life sentences in 
Uganda for the following offences: five for robbery; five for murder (all 
sentenced after February 2006 when the Constitutional Court declared the 
mandatory death penalty for murder unconstitutional in the Kigula case); 
six for manslaughter; one for rape and manslaughter; 20 for defilement; one 
for failure to protect war material (sentenced by a military court); one for 
attempted murder; one for aggravated robbery; one for kidnap with intent to 
murder; one for simple robbery; and one for rape. Only three had been 
sentenced by military courts and the rest by the High Court.780 
The aim of this section is to highlight the challenges associated with 
‘whole-life’ life imprisonment and recommend that the law in Uganda 
should not be amended to provide that an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment should be in prison for the rest of his life. However, before 
arguing this issue, it is important to reproduce the statement made by the 
Constitutional Court to justify its support for life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release. 
 
In the case of Susan Kigula & 416 others v The Attorney General781 Justice 
Amos Twinomujuni held as follows:  
I hold the view that section 47(6) of the Prisons Act (cap 304 Laws of 
Uganda), should be brought into conformity with the Constitution. It states:- 
“For the purpose of calculating remission of a sentence, imprisonment 
for life shall be deemed to be twenty years imprisonment.” To my 
understanding, this provision has the effect of fettering the discretion of 
courts to pass a sentence of imprisonment which is greater than 20 years! 
Suppose, during sentencing, the court does not use the term “life 
                                                            
780 Statistics obtained from Uganda Prisons Headquarters, Kampala, in January 2008 (on 
file with the author). 
781 Susan Kigula and 416 others v Attorney-General 2005. 
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imprisonment” and for example simply imposes a sentence of 50 years, 
does this provision confer the discretion on the Prisons authorities to deem 
20 years imprisonment as the maximum sentence imposed? Is this not 
another attempt by the legislature to pre-determined [sic] sentences without 
hearing the parties in order to determine an appropriate sentence? If a “life 
imprisonment” sentence is pronounced, why can’t the convict serve 
imprisonment for life? I do appreciate that there will be cases where a 
person sentenced to serve imprisonment for life deserves remission for good 
behavior[sic] while in prison or indeed for any other just cause. Couldn’t 
such a case be taken care of under article 121(1) of the Constitution where 
the President has the power to grant remissions of sentences to deserving 
prisoners? In my opinion, if the Supreme Court confirms a sentence of Life 
Imprisonment, it will only do so in conformity with article 126 of the 
Constitution. It will only do so to give effect to the peoples [sic] wish that 
the convict is an undesirable character in society and should be removed 
and kept away forever. It would be unconstitutional for Parliament to 
authorise Prisons authorities to alter the sentence in the guise of 
calculating remission. Such a person is not entitled to any remission at all. 
If, however, the Prisons Authorities think such a person is entitled to 
remission, they should make a representation to the President to exercise 
his constitutional powers under article 121 of the Constitution. Other than 
the President and in accordance with the constitution, nobody should be 
allowed to alter the order of the Supreme Court passed in accordance with 
the Constitution of Uganda. In the circumstances, where the courts must 
fully comply with articles 22(1), 28 and 44(c), life imprisonment is a 
realistic alternative to a death penalty and it can only be a viable 
alternative if it means imprisonment for life, and not a mere twenty years as 
it is currently understood to mean.782 
In order to discuss of the Constitutional Court’s opinions above properly, it 
is useful to divide them into a two broad categories, namely: (1) the 
constitutionality or otherwise of sentences imposed to prevent prison 
authorities from releasing certain offenders; and (2) the implications of 
‘whole-life’ life sentences. 
4.2.3.8.1 The constitutionality of sentences longer than life 
imprisonment 
In the above quotation, the Constitutional Court poses a question to the 
effect that supposing the court imposed a sentence of 50 years instead of 
                                                            
782 Susan Kigula and 416 others v Attorney-General 2005: 140-142. (Emphasis in bold in 
original judgment. Emphasis in italics added). 
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life sentence, would the prison authorities go ahead and release a prisoner 
after he/she has served twenty 20 years. It might be useful in addressing 
this question, to look to see how other African jurisdictions have 
approached this issue. In Botswana, for example, there are cases where 
courts have imposed sentences where the offenders would be required to 
spend more years in prison before being eligible for release on parole than 
they would have had spent had they been sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Section 85(c) of the Prisons Act of Botswana783 provides that ‘... a prisoner 
shall be eligible for release from prison on parole if he is serving – a term 
of imprisonment for life or is confined during the President’s pleasure and 
has served seven years imprisonment.’ However, there are cases where 
offenders have been sentenced to 35 years’784 and 25 years’785 
imprisonment. What is vital to note about these cases is that the law 
empowers courts to impose them. Even though courts in Botswana are 
allowed to impose such lengthy sentences, such sentences must be 
proportional to the offence committed, otherwise they would be found to be 
inhuman.786  
Even in cases where lengthy sentences have been imposed, the Botswana 
Prisons Act provides that such persons are eligible for parole after serving a 
                                                            
783 Chapter 21:03 of 1980. 
784 S v Mokhe (CLCLB-068-07) [2008] BWCA 65 (24 July 2008), the High Court found 
the accused guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances and sentenced him to an 
effective 35 years’ imprisonment. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced the 
sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment.  
785 S v Monnapudi (CLCLB-039-08) [2008] BWCA 58 (1 July 2008), the accused, an HIV 
– positive man, was found guilty of rape and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment by the 
High Court although the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 25 years. 
786 S v Seguma (117 of 2003) [2008] BWCA 30 (24 April 2008) where the Court of Appeal 
held that a cumulative sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment for rape in the circumstances 
was inhuman. 
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stipulated number of years. In other words, the court is aware that the 
prisoner will not stay in prison for the rest of his life. On the other hand, 
what the Constitutional Court of Uganda is impliedly suggesting is that in 
some cases, where courts predict that the prison authorities would release a 
prisoner earlier than what such courts would prefer, a court may impose a 
sentence that would in effect mean that the prisoner should never be 
released until he/she has served a very long period of time: this would be a 
period longer than he/she would have served had he been sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Jurisprudence emanating from the Supreme Court of Appeal 
of South Africa will be used to analyse the human rights implications of 
sentences where the prisoner would in practice be required to spend the rest 
of his life in prison. 
Following the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa, and the 
increase of violent crime countrywide, the courts resorted to imposing 
excessively lengthy sentences. The aim was to ensure that such prisoners 
are, to use the words of the Constitutional Court of Uganda, ‘kept away 
forever.’ This happened at a time when a sentence of life imprisonment 
meant 20 years. In Mhlakaza and Others v S787 the accused were convicted 
of a number of offences, including the murder of a police officer. The first 
accused was sentenced to an ‘effective’788 sentence of 47 years’ 
imprisonment and the second accused to 38 years’ imprisonment.  The 
                                                            
787 Mhlakaza and Others v S [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) 
788 According to the judgment effective sentence meant ‘the difference between the 
cumulative and suspended sentence.’ See page 185. ‘Appellant No.1 was sentenced 
cumulatively to 62 years of which 15 years were suspended; No 2, who was similarly to 62 
years, had 20 years of his sentence suspended and further two years were ordered to run 
concurrently. The so-called effective sentences were thus 47 and 38 years respectively.’ 
See page 187.  
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Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the sentences holding that they were 
excessive.  In Nkosi and Others v S789 the appellants were convicted of a 
number of offences, including murder. The first appellant was sentenced to 
an effective period of 120 years’ imprisonment; the second and third 
appellants were sentenced to an effective period of 65 years’ imprisonment; 
and the fourth appellant was sentenced to an effective term of 45 years’ 
imprisonment. While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that: 
the courts are discouraged from imposing excessively long sentences of 
imprisonment in order to avoid having a prisoner being released on parole. 
A prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment will be considered for 
parole after serving at least 20 years of the sentence, or at least 15 years 
thereof if over 65 years, according to the current policy of the Department of 
Correctional Services. A sentence exceeding the probable life span of a 
prisoner means that he [or she] will have no chance of being released on the 
expiry of the sentence and also no chance of being released on parole after 
serving one half of the sentence. Such a sentence will amount to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment.790 
The holding by the Supreme Court of Appeal above should answer the 
question asked by the Constitutional Court of Uganda with regard to 
sentences the aim of which is to prevent the release of a prisoner on parole. 
Such sentences would amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treating or 
punishment under Article 24 of the Constitution of Uganda, Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights791 and Article 5 of the 
                                                            
789 Nkosi and Others v S [2002] JOL 10209(SCA). 
790 See page 1 of 10209(SCA). 
791 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
Uganda ratified the ICCPR on 21 September 1995 without reservations or interpretative 
declarations. See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm> (3 October 
2007). For a discussion on the meaning and legal implications of reservations and 
interpretative declarations in international law, see Mujuzi 2008(d): 41-61. See also 
Brownlie 2008: 612 – 616. 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which Uganda ratified on 
10 May 1986. As judges Tulkens, Carbral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, 
Spiellmann and Jebens rightly wrote in their dissenting opinion in Kafkaris 
v Cyprus, ‘[u]nless one chooses to ignore reality, a sentence ... with no 
hope of release... constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment.’792 
Related to the above is the issue of imposing sentences of more than 20 
years with the aim of protecting society from such criminals. Over time, 
researchers have found that lengthy prison sentences are not effective in 
deterring offenders from re-offending when released, neither are they 
effective in reducing the crime rate.793 As the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa observed in Makwanyane794 the possibility of a would-be offender 
being arrested has a more deterring effect than the severe punishment of the 
unlucky few offenders who get arrested.795 Luckily, no Ugandan court has 
ever imposed a sentence as severe as 50 years’ imprisonment as the 
Constitutional Court noted. 
4.2.3.8.2 The implications of ‘whole-life’ life imprisonment 
As mentioned earlier, in some countries such as Zimbabwe, Ghana, and 
Kenya, life imprisonment means spending the rest of the offender’s life in 
                                                            
792 Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008: para 6. 
793 Giffard and Muntingh have stated that ‘…there is no evidence to suggest that longer 
sentences reduce crime levels, except in so far as they keep some offenders in custody, 
who are thus unable to commit offences in free society… long sentences place greater 
strain on the resources of the criminal justice system, undermine the rehabilitative ideal, 
and thus make it more likely that …offenders will re-offend.’ See Giffard and Muntingh 
2006: 47. See also O’Donovan and Redpath 2006: 22-33.  
794 S v Makwanyane and another 1995. 
795 S v Makwanyane and another 1995: para 126. 
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prison.796 The Constitutional Court of Uganda, too, would like life 
imprisonment in Uganda to change from 20 years to whole-life. This will 
raise problems which are discussed in the next section. 
4.2.3.8.3 Denial of parole to prisoners serving life sentences: Cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment   
Section 89 of the Uganda Prisons Act797 provides that a prisoner who is 
serving a sentence of imprisonment for a period of three years or more may 
be released on parole within six months of the date he is due for release on 
conditions and for reasons approved by the Commissioner General of 
Prisons. The prisoner’s temporary absence from prison shall not be greater 
than three months. Such a prisoner is supposed to obey the parole 
conditions imposed by the Commissioner General. Failure to do so will 
result in the person being called back to prison.798  Section 84 of the Act 
provides for the remission of a sentence of any convicted prisoner 
sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one month. As indicated 
above, for purposes of remission life imprisonment means 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Unlike the South African Correctional Services Act,799 
which specifically provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence may be 
considered for parole after 25 years,800 and which lays down in detail the 
                                                            
796 See 4.1 (above). 
797 Act 17 of 2006. 
798 Section 89(2-4). 
799 Act 111 of 1998. 
800 Section 73 (6)(b)(iv). 
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conditions that may be imposed on such a prisoner released on parole,801 
the Uganda Prisons Act is not so detailed.  
Section 86(3) should therefore be read together with sections 89 and 84 to 
mean that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall also be released on parole 
within six months of the date he/she is due for release on conditions that 
may be imposed by the Commissioner General of Prisons. This means that 
if prisoners serving a life sentence were to serve ‘whole-life,’ they would 
not only be deprived of the benefit of sections 84 and 89, but they will 
never have a chance of expecting to be released at all unless pardoned by 
the President whose decision depends on many unknown factors. As the 
dissenting judges in the European Court of Human Rights in Kafkaris v 
Cyprus rightly put it, for a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment to wait 
for a presidential pardon for his release which is a matter dependant on 
unknown factors, such a prisoner would not have ‘a real and tangible 
prospect of release.’802 One has to recall that parole is an administrative 
decision which must be exercised in line with Article 42 of the 
Constitution, which provides that any administrative decision must be taken 
justly and fairly. Parole is not a right. As the European Court of Human 
Rights rightly observed in the case of Ezeh and Connors v The United 
Kingdom,803  
[T]he early release, the remission, the conditional release, the parole or 
whatever one chooses to call it, cannot be a prisoner's right. It may be a 
                                                            
801 Chapters VI and VII. 
802 Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008, joint dissenting judgment of judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, 
Fura- Sandström , Spielmann and Jebens, para 6. 
803 Ezeh and Connors v The United Kingdom (Applications nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98) 
Judgment of 9 October 2003. 
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factual “expectation”, even a reasonable one, but at bottom it is still a 
privilege. The privilege may or may not be granted.804   
However, the above-cited decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ should be interpreted on a case by case basis, with the importance 
of preserving human dignity undergirding the considerations feeding into 
such a decision. If prisoners serving a 10-year sentence, for example, were 
to be denied parole, it could be argued that they can still serve the 10 years 
without their right to human dignity being infringed. The reason being that 
they expect to be, and will be, released after 10 years. However, in a 
situation where a person has been sentenced to a ‘whole-life’ sentence, 
such a person does not expect to be released unless by a presidential 
pardon. Courts have held that such a sentence would amount to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment. The Supreme Court of Appeal of 
South Africa observed that ‘…it is the possibility of parole which saves a 
sentence of life imprisonment from being cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment.’ 805 The Supreme Court of Namibia held that  
a sentence of life imprisonment…can therefore not be constitutionally 
sustainable if it effectively amounts to an order throwing the prisoner into 
a cell for the rest of the prisoner’s natural life as if he was a ‘thing’ instead 
of a person without any continuing duty to respect his dignity (which 
would include his right not to live in despair and helplessness and without 
any hope of release, regardless of the circumstances).806   
The Constitutional Court of Uganda is correct to assume that a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment, even where life imprisonment means 
‘whole-life’, can be pardoned by the President under Article 121 of the 
                                                            
804 Ezeh and Connors v. The United Kingdom 2003: para 5. 
805 Bull and another v The State 2001: para 23. 
806 S v Tcoeib 1996: 399. 
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Constitution.807 The problem with such an approach is that the prisoner will 
never know if and when the pardon will be granted. The Federal 
Constitutional Court of German rightly held that ‘…the principle[s] of legal 
certainty… [and]…natural justice require that conditions, in terms of which 
a prisoner serving a life sentence is released and the procedure to be 
followed in securing his release, should be determined by legislation.’808  
Practice has also shown that in cases where the President has pardoned 
prisoners, no one serving a life-sentence has ever been pardoned.809 As the 
Constitutional Court held, this all depends on whether or not the prison 
authorities recommend to the President that such a person to be considered 
for release. Such a recommendation could be made after 10 years, 20 years 
or 50 years depending on the way prison authorities work.810 This means 
that at sentencing, the prisoner will know that he/she will be in prison for 
                                                            
807 See Susan Kigula and 146 others v Uganda 2005: Issue No. 5 (iii). In early February 
2003 the President pardoned 92 prisoners including a Member of Parliament who were 
serving prison sentences in prisons in Uganda. It was impossible to establish whether 
anyone of them was serving a life sentence. See 
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/115199/Mulindwa%20Birimumaaso%20pardoned> 
(accessed 4 October 2007). 
808 BVerfGE, 45, 187, 246, as cited in van Zyl Smit 2006: 409.  
809 In February 2007, the President pardoned over 170 prisoners but none of them was 
serving a life sentence. See Candia and Jaramoji ‘President Pardons over 170 inmates’ The 
New Vision 27 February 2007 at 
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/551457/prisoners%20pardoned> (accessed 4 
October 2007). In December 2004, the President also pardoned 173 prisoners and none of 
them was serving a life sentence. See J Etyang & H Kiirya ‘Museveni Pardons 173 
Inmates’ The New Vision 8 December 2004 at 
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/404696/prisoners%20pardoned> (accessed 4 
October 2007); in January 2009 the President pardoned two death row inmates and 
commuted the death sentences of three death row in mates to life imprisonment. See 
Butagira, ‘Rwakasisi Pardoned’ Daily Monitor, 21 January 2009, at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Rwakasisi_pardoned_78559.shtml 
(accessed 19 February 2009). 
810 Van Zyl Smit has argued that ‘[i]t must be recognised that the many decisions taken by 
the prison authorities at every step in this process [of ensuring that prisoners serving life 
sentences are released] may have a bearing on when the prisoner is eventually released. 
For example, an administrative decision not to transfer a prisoner to an open facility may 
lead to a parole board deciding not to release the lifer conditionally.’ See van Zyl Smit 
2006: 415.   
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the rest of his/her life, which would surely infringe the right to human 
dignity as the South African and Namibian courts have held. Dünkel and 
van Zyl Smit state that ‘[t]he sentences of life without any prospect of 
parole….should be condemned as fundamentally cruel and inhumane as the 
prospect of freedom is a fundamental human right.’811 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, although it supports life 
imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty,812 also supports the 
view that prisoners should have a chance of being released on parole, and 
where possible, they should have their sentences remitted.813 The 
recommendation is therefore that there is no need to amend section 86 (3) 
of the Prisons Act to provide that offenders sentenced to life imprisonment 
should be detained for the rest of their lives.  
4.2.3.8.4 Life imprisonment and rehabilitation of offenders 
Under section 5 (b) and (c) of the Ugandan Prisons Act, the functions of the 
Prisons Service include: facilitating the social rehabilitation and 
reformation of prisoners through specific training and education 
programmes; and easing the re-integration of prisoners into their respective 
communities. The question that should be put into consideration before 
                                                            
811 Van Zyl Smit & Dünkel 2001: 846.  
812 The African Commission has called on African states to ‘at least commute death 
sentences into life imprisonment…’ See Resolution Calling on States Parties to Observe 
the Moratorium on the Death Penalty, ACHPR/Res.136(XXXXIIII). 08 of 24 November 
2008.   
813 See Prisons in Cameroon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions 
of Detention in Africa (Report to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the 
Visit of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa From 2-
15 September 2002) ACHPR/37/OS/11/437 where, under the section ‘General 
recommendations’ the Special Rapporteur recommends that ‘[m]easures such as parole, 
judicial control, reductions of sentences, community service, diversion, mediation and 
permission to go out should also be developed.’    
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Parliament amends the law to the effect that life imprisonment should mean 
‘whole life’ is whether it is possible for the Prisons Service to exercise the 
above-stated functions with regard to prisoners who are aware that they will 
never be released. Why would prisoners participate in any rehabilitation or 
reintegration programme when they know that the possibility of being 
released is almost non-existent? In Kenya, where life imprisonment means 
‘whole life’, the High Court has held that if the objective of imprisonment 
is to rehabilitate or reform the offender, a court that sentences an offender 
to life imprisonment defeats that objective because life imprisonment is not 
conducive to rehabilitation.814  
Even in South Africa, where the law provides that a prisoner serving a life 
sentence will be considered for parole after 25 years, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held in S v Sikhipha, 815 where the appellant, a 31-year-old man, 
was found guilty of raping a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to life 
imprisonment, that ‘[t]he sentence of life imprisonment required by the 
Legislature is the most serious that can be imposed. It effectively denies the 
appellant the possibility of rehabilitation…’816 The Court reduced the 
sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court held that ‘[t]he prison institutions also have a duty in the case of 
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, to strive towards their 
                                                            
814 In Paul Ngure Ngige v Republic [2006]eKLR 1, the appellant was convicted of defiling  
a 4 year old girl and sentenced to life imprisonment being the maximum sentence for 
defilement. In allowing his appeal and substituting the sentence of life imprisonment with 
that of 15 years imprisonment with hard labour, the High Court held that ‘In matters of 
sentencing we should never loose [sic] sight of the fact that imprisonment is meant to 
reform and or rehabilitate the convict. I do not see how we can achieve the foregoing with 
a life sentence.’ At 3 
815 S v Sikhipa 2006 (2) SACR 439. 
816 S v Sikhipa 2006: para 19. (Emphasis added). 
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resocialization [read rehabilitation], to preserve their ability to cope with 
life and to counteract the negative effects of incarceration…’.817  
Were the Ugandan law to be amended to provide that life imprisonment 
means ‘whole-life’, it would mean that prisoners sentenced under the 
‘whole-life’ idea would most probably not be rehabilitated.818 This would 
not only make sections 5(b) and (c) redundant as far as this category of 
prisoners is concerned, but would also fly in the face of Uganda’s 
international obligation under Article 10(3) of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights.  Article 10(3) of the ICCPR states that the 
essential aims of the prisons system is to reform and rehabilitate 
prisoners.819 It would also mean that our society would effectively have 
treated such prisoners as those sentenced to death - people that will never 
come back and make any contribution to the development of the society. As 
pointed out above ‘to lock up a prisoner and take away all hope of release is 
to resort to another form of death sentence.’820 Moreover, as Wright avers, 
prisoners sentenced to ‘whole-life’ ‘“vehemently disapprove of their 
sentences” and would prefer to be executed rather than kept alive behind 
                                                            
817 BVerfGE, 45, 187, 238, as cited in van Zyl Smit 2006: 408. 
818 In their joint partly dissenting opinion in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008: para 5, 
judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens observed in 
relation to the parliamentary debates surrounding the abolition of the death penalty in the 
United Kingdom in 1964 that ‘as a general rule “experience shows that nine years, ten 
years, or thereabouts is the maximum period of confinement that normal human beings can 
undergo without their personality decaying, their will going, and their becoming 
progressively less able to re-enter society and look after themselves and become useful 
citizens”.’  
819 See van Zyl Smit 2002(a): 5. 
820 Appleton and Grφver 2007: 606. 
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bars for the rest of their lives.’821 The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has also emphasised the importance of rehabilitating 
prisoners, an unattainable gaol if prisoners are sentenced to ‘whole-life’ life 
sentences.822 
4.2.3.8.5 Disciplining prisoners serving ‘whole life’ sentences 
Under section 68 of the Prisons Act, ‘[e]very prisoner shall be subject to 
prison discipline and to all laws, orders and directions relating to prisons 
and prisoners during the whole time of imprisonment…’ Many prison 
officials are of the view that one of the most difficult tasks is to keep prison 
order. Another challenge is how to discipline prisoners who breach prison 
rules and laws without subjecting them to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishments. Parole has always acted as an incentive to ensure that 
prisoners obey prison rules and regulations because the more a prisoner 
follows the rules, the higher the chances that he/she may be released on 
parole at the earliest available opportunity.  
However, in cases of prisoners serving ‘whole-life’, ‘the “carrot” of parole 
cannot be used as an incentive to ensure the compliance and cooperation of 
those who have neither hope of release nor any thing to lose.’823 Research 
has suggests that ‘imposing [‘whole-life’] sentences on violent offenders 
                                                            
821 Wright 1991: 346, as cited in Appleton and Grφver 2007: 607. For a discussion of some 
of the perceptions of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, see Stokes in Yorke (ed) 2008: 281 – 302.   
822 See Report on the Visit to Prisons in Zimbabwe by Professor E.V.O. Dankwa, Special 
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention, 10th Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1996/97, Annex VII, in which the 
Special Rapporteur recommended that ‘[t]he prison service should help orient public 
attitude to accepting that rehabilitation does occur in the prisons of Zimbabwe by 
employing ex-convicts whenever there is the opportunity to do so.’ Recommendation 7.   
823Appleton and Grφver 2007: 604. 
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could result in a new class of “superinmates”…uncontrollable in prison 
because they have nothing else to lose.’824 While commenting on the 
situation of prisoners not entitled to remission of their sentences, the 
National Human Rights Commission of Mauritius observed as follows: 
             The Security Audit Committee commented on the fact that those 
convicted of drug offences are not entitled to any remission.  Other 
prisoners are entitled as of right to one third of their sentence as remission.  
Misconduct on their part is sanctioned by a loss of remission. There is an 
incentive for them to be of good conduct.  On the other hand, as drug 
offenders are not entitled to remission, they have no incentive to be of 
good behaviour. We endorse the view of the Security Audit Committee 
that a measure of remission would be beneficial to both offenders and the 
prisons administration.  It is hoped that the authorities will come forward 
with appropriate measures.825 
Prisoners who are not entitled to remission or parole, especially those 
serving ‘whole life’ are aware that even if they broke prison rules, any 
sentence of imprisonment imposed will run concurrently with the sentence 
they are already serving and in effect they would not have been punished 
for disobeying prison rules.826 As Lord Parker observed in R v Foy in which 
a lower court imposed a sentence of imprisonment consecutive to life 
imprisonment: 
Life imprisonment means imprisonment for life. No doubt many people 
come out while they are still alive, but, when they do come out, it is only on 
                                                            
824 Appleton and Grφver 2007: 604. ‘ “In her report...in 2004, the Ombudswoman 
criticised the Cypriot authorities’ interpretation of life sentence as imprisonment for the 
rest of the convicted person’s life...The Deputy Director of the Central Prison spoke of the 
difficulties in dealing with those currently serving life sentence...both in terms of the 
prisoners’ morale, and security issues. The usual incentives for encouraging good 
behaviour in prisoners were inevitably of no use in relation to those serving life sentences, 
and this posed security problems both for the warders and for the other prisoners”.’ See 
Follow-up report on Cyprus (2003-2005) “Assessment of the progress made in 
implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights” Doc. Comm. DH (2006) 12 cited in  Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008: para 73. 
825 The 2001 Annual Report of the National Human Rights Commission of Mauritius 
(February 2002): paras 76-77. 
826 See generally Rahman 2000: 87.    
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licence, and the sentence of life imprisonment remains on them until they 
die. According, if the court makes any period of years consecutive to life, 
the court is passing a sentence which is no sentence at all, in that it cannot 
operate until the prisoner dies.827  
To use the language of the Botswana Court of Appeal, had the ‘scourge of 
corporal punishment’828 not been declared a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment in Simon Kyamanya v Uganda829 and subsequently abolished 
by the Penal Code Act,830 some people could have argued that such 
prisoners could be subjected to corporal punishment. It appears under the 
Prisons Act that the only serious punishment that could be imposed on a 
prisoner serving a ‘whole-life’ would be punishment by close confinement 
under section 94. But even then, before this punishment is imposed, the 
medical officer must first examine such a prisoner and certify in writing 
that he/she is fit to under go such punishment. The medical officer is also 
required to advise the officer in charge to terminate such a confinement if 
he/she considers it necessary on the ground of physical or mental health. It 
is also unlikely that prisoners, in the name of punishment, can be denied 
their rights such as the right to food and to exercise as these are rights under 
sections 69 and 70 of the Prisons Act not privileges. Any punishment 
imposed is required also to comply with Rules 27-32 of the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.831 What this 
                                                            
827 R v Foy [1962] 2 All ER 246, 247. 
828 S v Ndou (CLCLB-029-08) [2008] BWCA 60 (1 July 2008): para 50. 
829 Simon Kyamanya v Uganda Constitutional Reference No. 10 of 2000. 
830 Section 1 of the Penal Code (Amendment) Act of 2007 provides that ‘corporal 
punishment is abolished and accordingly, all references to corporal punishment in the 
Penal Code Act…are repealed.’ 
831 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and 
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discussion has attempted to illustrate is that for proper discipline among 
prisoners, it is essential that they should expect to be released.  
4.2.3.8.6 Does ‘whole-life’ imprisonment have support in 
international criminal law?  
Under contemporary international criminal law, one would have to look at 
the law and decisions of four international bodies to ascertain whether the 
‘whole-life’ approach has any support at the international level.832  These 
                                                                                                                                                     
Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 
May 1977.  
832 It should also be recalled that both the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(the Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the 
Tokyo Tribunal) sentenced some war criminals to life imprisonment. The Nuremberg 
Tribunal sentenced three defendants to life imprisonment (Rudolf Hess, Walter Funk and 
Erich Raeder). See The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany. Part 22 (22 – 31 August 
1946 and 30 September – 1 October 1946) (1950): 529. Funk and Raeder were released in 
1957 and 1955 respectively because their health had deteriorated.  Even though his health 
had deteriorated, Hess’ release was continuosly vetoed by the Russian government. He 
subsequently committed suicide in prison. See   Kress and Sluiter in Casese 2002: 1762. 
The Spandau Prison in Berlin where the World War II German prisoners were serving 
their sentences, ‘was administered and guarded jointly by the four Allied Powers: the 
Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States’ and therefore all the 
representatives of all the Allied Powers had to consent for any prisoner to be released. See 
Kamchibekova 2007: 124. The reason why Hess was not released could be attributed to 
the fact that the Soviet Judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Major General IT Nikitchenko, 
wrote a dissenting judgment holding that Hess should have been sentenced to death by 
hanging instead of life imprisonment. After indicating clearly the role Hess had played in 
the Nazi government, Major General IT Nikitchenko held that ‘[t]aking into consideration 
that among the political leaders of Hitlerite Germany Hess was third in significance and 
played a decisive role in the crimes of the Nazi regime, I consider the only justified 
sentence in his case can be death.’ See Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Member of the 
International Military Tribunal in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings 
of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany. Part 22 (22 – 31 
August 1946 and 30 September – 1 October 1946) (1950): 541. On the other hand, the 
Tokyo Tribunal sentenced the following persons to imprisonment for life: Araki Sadao, 
Hashimoto Kingoro, Hata Shunroku, Hiranuma Kiichiro, Hoshino Naoki, Kido Koichi, 
Koiso Kuniaki, Minimi Jiro, Oka Takasumi, Oshima Hiroshi, Sato Kenryo, Shimada 
Shigetaro, Suzuki Teiichi, Kaya, Shiratori and Umezu. See Röling and Rüter 1977: Vol. 1, 
465-466. It has been observed in relation to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment by 
the Tokyo Tribunal that ‘[n]ot a single Tokyo defendant…actually served his life sentence 
“unless he died of natural causes within a very few years. They were all paroled and 
pardoned by 1958”.’ See Penrose 2000: 564-565. Footnotes omitted. It should also be 
recalled that unlike the life sentences imposed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, where there 
was no law specifically stipulating the minimum number of years to be served before a 
prisoner could be released for parole, as regards the sentences imposed by the Tokyo 
Tribunal, ‘[t]he Supreme Commander General did lay down criterion for early release:… 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment were to be considered for parole after they had 
served 15 years.’ See van Zyl Smit 2005: 359  
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courts are the ICTR; the ICTY; the ICC and the SCSL. Of the four courts, 
emphasis will be put on the ICTR because it is the only one that has 
sentenced and actually has prisoners serving life sentences.  
4.2.3.8.7 The ICTR 
The background to the establishment of the ICTR and its jurisdiction has 
been illustrated under Chapter III.833 Under article 23 the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction to impose the following sentences: 
(1.)The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment.  In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial 
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison 
sentences in the courts of Rwanda.(2) In imposing the sentences, the Trial 
Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity of the 
offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. (3) In 
addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any 
property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means 
of duress, to their rightful owners. 
Another important feature to note with regard to the punishments that can 
be imposed by the ICTR is under article 27 which provides that: 
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted 
person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of 
sentence, the State concerned shall notify the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda accordingly.  There shall only be pardon or commutation of 
sentence if the President of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, in 
consultation with the judges, so decides on the basis of the interests of 
justice and the general principles of law.834 
                                                            
833 Chapter III, 3.4. 
834 Van Zyl Smit has pointed out that ‘[t]he major difficulty [with a provision such as this 
one] is that the trigger lies in the national law of the states, which may vary greatly. This 
results in the same sentence being implemented for different for different periods 
depending on where it is served.’ See van Zyl Smit 2002(a): 9. See also Rules 124-126 of 
the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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Whereas the ICTR has sentenced some offenders to short terms of 
imprisonment, ranging from six to 15 years;835 long prison sentences 
ranging from 25 to 45 years;836 life imprisonment;837 and ‘imprisonment for 
the remainder of the offender’s life’,838 the statistics show that the ICTR 
has sentenced more people to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives 
than to life imprisonment.  
Under Article 23, the Tribunal has powers to impose the penalty of 
‘imprisonment’ among other penalties. The Statute does not stipulate the 
maximum or minimum numbers of years to which the Tribunal can 
sentence a person to imprisonment.839  But the Tribunals’ Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provide under Rule 101(A) that ‘[a] person 
                                                            
835 See Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana Case No. ICTR-00-60 (the offender was sentenced 
to 15 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Samuel Imanishimwe Case No. ICTR-97-36 (the 
offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Elizapah Ntakirutimana 
Case No. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17 (the offender was sentenced to 10 years’ 
imprisonment); Prosecutor v Joseph Nzabirinda Case No. ICTR-01-77 (the offender was 
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment); Prosecutor v Georges Ruggiu Case No. ICTR-97-32 
(the offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Joseph Serugendo 
ICTR-2005-84 (the offender was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v 
Omar Serushago Case No. ICTR-98-39 (the offender was sentenced to 15 years’ 
imprisonment); Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi Case No. ICTR-2000-55 (the offender 
was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); and Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba Case No. 
ICTR-2001-66.  
836 Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeli Case. No. ICTR-98-44 (the offender was sentenced to 
45 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Gerald Ntakirutimana Case No. ICTR-96-10 and 
ICTR-96-17 (the offender was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Obed 
Ruzindana ICTR-95-1 and ICTR-96-10 (the offender was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment); Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza Case No. ICTR-97-20 (offender sentenced 
to 35 years’ imprisonment); and Prosecutor v Jean Bosco Barayigwiza Case No. ICTR-97-
19 (offender was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment). 
837 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4; Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda 
1998; Prosecutor v Alfred Musema Case No. ICTR-96-13; and Prosecutor v Georges 
Rutaganda 1999. 
838 Prosecutor v Sylvester Bacumbitsi Case No. ICTR-2001-64; Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu 
Kamuhanda Case No. ICTR-99-54; Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema Case No. ICTR-95-
1; Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhima Case No. ICTR-95-1; Prosecutor v Emmnuel 
Ndimdabahizi Case No. ICTR-2001-71; Prosecutor v Eliezer Niyitegeka 2003; Prosecutor 
v Ferdinand Nahimana Case No. ICTR-96-11; and Prosecutor v Hassan Ngeze Case No. 
ICTR-97-27.  
839 Van Zyl Smit 2002: 186.    
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convicted by the Tribunal may be sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed 
term or the remainder of his life.’840 Cassesse rightly puts it that 
‘[i]nternational courts do not have any prison available in which to detain 
convicted persons. Consequently they must of necessity turn to states to see 
whether they may hold those persons in jail.’841 One could argue that even 
in cases where the Tribunal has condemned the offenders to imprisonment 
for the rest of their lives, this may not mean exactly that. Cassese has agued 
that: 
International provisions stipulate that the state where the convicted person 
serves his sentence is not allowed to reduce or change the penalty, or 
release the person, before expiry of the sentence pronounced by the 
international tribunal...Only the international tribunal may decide upon 
any change in the sentence. However, conflicts may arise between the 
general legislation of the state enforcing the penalty and international 
prescriptions. It may happen that in the state at issue detainees are entitled 
to a reduction of sentence, or to early release, or to special treatment (for 
instance, parole) after serving the sentence for a certain number of years, 
or in case of good behaviour. If these conditions are not applied to persons 
convicted by an international tribunal, this might be deemed to constitute 
discrimination against international convicts.842   
Cassese commented on the possibility of the early release of an offender 
sentenced by the ICTR in the following terms: 
On the face of it [Article 27 of the ICTR Statute], the matter is ‘decided’ 
by the President of the Tribunal in consultation with judges. The power of 
pardon would thus seem ultimately to belong to the international body, in 
contrast to the regulation of most national constitutions.843 
                                                            
840 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as 
amended on 15 June 2007). 
841 Cassese 2008: 431. 
842 Cassese 2008: 432. 
843 Cassese 2008: 433. 
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Countries like Rwanda844 and Swaziland845 have signed agreements with 
the ICTR to enforce the sentences imposed by the Tribunal. In Rwanda846 
and Swaziland, an offender sentenced to life imprisonment serves 20 years 
after which he has to be considered for early release. Therefore if some of 
the prisoners were transferred to Rwanda or Swaziland, Article 27 could be 
invoked and such people considered for release without spending their 
natural lives in prison. However, the President of the ICTR in consultation 
with judges would have to approve the early release of the prisoners. 
Therefore, the ‘whole-life’ approach has little support, if any, under 
practical implementation of the sentences imposed by the ICTR. 
4.2.3.8.8 The SCSL, ICTY and ICC 
The SCSL is a hybrid court that was established by the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone pursuant UN 
Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000.847 As at the 
time of writing, the SCSL had handed down three judgments. In The 
Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, it sentenced the three accused as 
follows:  two to 50 years and one to 45 years of imprisonment. In 
Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, the offenders were 
                                                            
844 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the United Nations 
on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda of 4 
March 2008. 
845 Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the United Nations on the 
Enforcement of the Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 30 
August 2000. 
846 Article 3 of the Organic Law on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Organic Law No. 
31/2007 of 25 July 2007. For a detailed discussion of this organic law see, Mujuzi 2009(a). 
847 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu 2007: para 2. For a detailed discussion of this judgment see Mujuzi 
2007: 105-137. 
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sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment each for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.848 In Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao the offenders were convicted of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity and sentenced to 52, 47 and 25 years’ imprisonment 
respectively.849 As Schabas rightly argues, the SCSL does not have the 
jurisdiction to impose life sentences because its Statute and Rules of 
Procedure do not authorise it to do so.850 As with the ICTR, prisoners 
sentenced by the SCSL may be released before completing the determinate 
sentences imposed by the Court,851 but the President of the SCSL, in 
consultation with the judges, has to decide whether such prisoners should 
be released ‘on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles 
of law.’852 This means that whereas the Court imposed excessive sentences 
on the offenders, there is a possibility that they may be pardoned, 
depending on the laws in countries they will serve their sentences should 
the President of the SCSL agree to such. 
At the time of writing, the ICTY had one case in which the accused had 
been sentenced to a life sentence.853 In one case of Prosecutor v Milomir 
Stakić,854 the offender had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial 
Chamber but on appeal the sentence was reduced to ‘a global sentence of 
                                                            
848 Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa Case No. SCSL-04-14-A (judgment 
of 28 May 2008): para 565. 
849  Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T (sentencing judgement of 8 April 2009).  
 
850 See Schabas 2006: 549.  
851 Cassese 2008: 433. 
852 Article 23 of the Statute of the SCSL. 
853 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić 2006. 
854 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić 2006. 
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40 years’ imprisonment, subject to credit being given under Rule 101(C) of 
the Rules for the Period the Appellant has already spent in detention.’855 
However, there is practice that many offenders sentenced by the ICTY have 
been granted early release. Dumbl illustrated that 15 percent of the ICTY 
offenders have been granted early release.856 At the time of writing, the 
ICC had not convicted any criminal but what is vital to note is that under 
Articles 77(1)(b), 78(3) and 101(3) of the Rome Statute, a person sentenced 
to life imprisonment by the ICC shall have his/her sentence reviewed by the 
ICC to determine whether such a sentence should be reduced when such a 
person has served 25 years imprisonment. Cassese857 and Strijards858 have 
discussed the law and procedure governing the early release of offenders 
sentenced by the ICC. This clearly demonstrates that the Constitutional 
Court of Uganda’s ruling that life should mean ‘whole-life’ does not have 
support under international criminal jurisprudence.859 
                                                            
855 See XII. Disposition. The ‘reluctance’ of the ICTY to impose life sentences could be 
attributed to the fact that its Statute does not expressly allow it to impose life sentences. As 
one scholar observes ‘[t]he argument is not that life sentence is necessarily an 
inappropriate ultimate penalty for the Yugoslavia Tribunal to impose. But if the Security 
Council had wanted to allow the Tribunal to impose sentences of more than twenty years 
with life imprisonment as its ultimate penalty, it should, in the interest of legal certainty, 
have made this explicit in the Statute of the Tribunal rather than requiring the Tribunal to 
have recourse to “the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the 
former Yugoslavia.’ See van Zyl Smit 2002(a): 8. Footnotes omitted. Schabas observes 
that ‘[i]n Jelisić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that “it falls within the Trial 
Chamber’s discretion to impose life imprisonment.” Perhaps this was a message to the 
Trial Chambers, as none of them had previously seen fit to pronounce such a sentence.’ 
See Schabas 2006: 550. Footnote omitted.   
856 Drumbl 2007: 57. For a brief analysis of the law and procedure governing the early 
release of offenders sentenced to imprisonment by the ICTY, see Kittichaisaree 2008: 323. 
857 Cassese 2008: 433. 
858 Strijards in Triffterer 2008: 1647, 1683.  
859 As early as 1990 the International Law Commission never supported ‘whole-life’ 
sentences. During that time, ‘the Commissioners…considered whether life imprisonment 
as an alternative ultimate penalty [to the death sentence] would satisfy human rights 
norms. Of particular concern was the notion that no system of punishment that recognized 
human dignity of offenders could impose a penalty that excluded them permanently from 
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the relevant legal and historical developments 
relating to life imprisonment in South Africa, Mauritius and Uganda. It 
showed that the abolition of the death penalty directly affects the sentence 
of life imprisonment in the sense that the government and the judiciary pay 
more attention to the meaning of life imprisonment when the death penalty 
has been abolished. This explains why the number of offenders serving life 
imprisonment in South Africa and Mauritius rose when the death penalty 
was abolished. The ruling by the Supreme Court of Uganda that the 
mandatory death penalty for murder and other serious offences is 
unconstitutional means that the number of offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment is likely to increase. This is because judges now have to 
weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors in determining whether 
to impose the death penalty or any other sentence, which could be life 
imprisonment, in cases where the murder was brutal but not heinous 
enough to attract a death sentence. Unlike in Uganda and South Africa 
where the prison laws specifically regulate the release of offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment, Mauritius has no such regulations. It is 
recommended that there is a need for Mauritius to amend its prisons laws to 
specifically provide for the release of offenders serving life imprisonment. 
It should be underscored that should Uganda abolish the death penalty, it 
would not be necessary to introduce life imprisonment without parole. The 
human rights and administrative shortcomings of life imprisonment without 
                                                                                                                                                     
society. Not only was the death penalty fundamentally unacceptable from this perspective 
but life sentence prisoners would also have the prospect of release.’ See van Zyl Smit 
2002(a) 6. Footnotes omitted. 
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parole have been highlighted and have to be avoided.  The next chapter 
examines the law and practice relating to life imprisonment in South 
Africa, Mauritius and Uganda. 
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CHAPTER V 
OFFENCES THAT ATTRACT LIFE IMPRISONMENT, 
DISCRETION OF COURTS, AND THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
COURTS HAVE EMPHASISED IN SENTENCING OFFENDERS TO 
LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
5. Introduction 
One important component of the study of life imprisonment is the 
understanding of the offences for which the sentence of life imprisonment 
could be imposed, and how much discretion judges have in deciding 
whether or not to impose this sentence. In answering these two different, 
but related, questions, the three countries, namely, of South Africa, Uganda 
and Mauritius will be studied separately. The aim is to see whether there 
are any similarities and differences. As illustrated in Chapter II, there are 
three major theories of punishment: retribution, deterrence and 
rehabilitation. Apologists of each of these theories of punishment invoke 
different moral justifications of punishment. Chapterr II also discusses 
arguments of fervent supporters of retribution who contend that there is 
nothing wrong with the court invoking other theories of punishment at the 
penalty fixing stage.860 Chapter III shows that, in practice, some 
international tribunals, such as, the ICTR have invoked all the three 
theories of punishment when imposing sentences of life imprisonment and 
imprisonment for the remainder of the prisoner’s life.  
This chapter deals with: offences that carry life imprisonment; the courts 
having jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment; the manner in which the 
                                                            
860 Chapter II, 2.4.2.3. 
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courts have exercised their discretion in imposing life sentences; the right 
to legal representation of accused facing charges for offences that attract 
life imprisonment; and the theories of punishment that courts in Uganda, 
South Africa and Mauritius have emphasised in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment. With regard to the theories of punishment, it is important to 
investigate whether in Uganda, where the death penalty is still lawful and 
where life imprisonment is not a minimum sentence for any offence, courts 
emphasise the same theories of punishment in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment as courts in South Africa and Mauritius, where the death 
penalty was abolished and life imprisonment is the maximum sentence that 
could be imposed and the minimum sentence for some offences.   Put 
differently, do judges in these two different penal regimes regard the 
sentence of life imprisonment as serving similar or different objectives of 
punishment? 
5.1 Uganda  
5.1.1 Offences for which an offender could be sentenced to life 
imprisonment 
In Uganda, a person is ‘liable to imprisonment for life’861 if he/she: 
commits any acts intended to alarm, annoy or ridicule the President;862 
conceals treason;863 engages in or carries out acts of terrorism;864 aids, 
                                                            
861 While interpreting the term ‘liable’ in relation to attempted murder, the High Court held 
that ‘[a] person convicted of attempted murder is liable to life imprisonment. The sentence 
is not mandatory.’ See Saymon Muganga v Uganda, HCT-O5-CR-CN-0022-2003 
(Judgment of 4 April 2005, unreported) 6. 
862 Section 24 of the Penal Code. These acts are: to wilfully throw any matter or substance 
at or upon the person of the President; to wilfully strike the person of the President; and to 
wilfully assault or wrongfully restrain the person of the President. 
863 Section 25 of the Penal Code. 
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finances, harbours or in any way renders supports to a person knowing that 
such support will be used in the preparation or commission of acts of 
terrorism;865 promotes war on chiefs, body or group of persons;866aids 
prisoners of war to escape;867takes any unlawful oath or engagement, not 
being compelled to do so;868 riots and pulls down or begin to pull down or 
destroy any building, railway, machinery, structure or property;869 rescues 
or attempts to rescue from lawful custody any person sentenced to death or 
imprisonment for life or charged with an offences punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life;870 attempts to commit rape;871commits or allows 
another person to commit on him an unnatural offence (homosexuality, 
bestiality or anal sex);872commits incest with a person under the age of 18 
years;873commits manslaughter;874 attempted murder;875 being a convict 
serving a sentence of imprisonment of three or more years attempts to 
commit murder;876 aids suicide;877 kills an unborn child;878disables another 
                                                                                                                                                     
864 Section 26(1) of the Penal Code. 
865 Section 26(2) of the Penal Code. 
866 Section 27 of the Penal Code. 
867 Section 31(1) of the Penal Code. 
868 Section 45(b) of the Penal Code. 
869 Section 72 of the Penal Code. 
870 Section 108(1)(a) of the Penal Code. 
871 Section 125 of the Penal Code. 
872 Section 145 of the Penal Code. For a detailed discussion of the issue of homosexuality 
in Uganda see, Mujuzi 2009(b). 
873 Section 149 of the Penal Code. 
874 Section 190 of the Penal Code. 
875 Section 204 of the Penal Code. 
876 Section 205 of the Penal Code. 
877 Section 209 of the Penal Code. 
878 Section 212 of the Penal Code. 
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person in order to commit a felony or misdemeanour;879stupefies in order to 
commit a felony or misdemeanour;880 commits any act intended to cause 
grievous harm or prevent arrest;881unlawfully prevents any person from 
escaping from wreck;882intentionally endangers the safety of persons 
travelling by railway;883organises or participates in cattle 
rustling;884commits robbery and is convicted by the High Court;885 is 
convicted by the High Court of attempted robbery;886commits arson;887casts 
away ships;888maliciously damages a dwelling property, vessel, bank 
railway etc using explosives;889forgets a will and negotiable instruments 
being a banker or a businessman;890counterfeits coin;891 and, prepares 
coin.892 There are also several offences under the Uganda People Defence 
                                                            
879 Section 214 of the Penal Code. The section provides in detail that ‘any person who, by 
any means calculated to choke, suffocate or strangle, and with intent to commit or to 
facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanour, or facilitate the flight of an 
offender after the commission or attempted commission of a felony or misdemeanour, 
renders or attempts to render any person incapable of resistance commits a felony is liable 
to imprisonment for life.’  
880 Section 215 of the Penal Code. 
881 Section 216 of the Penal Code. 
882 Section 217 of the Penal Code. 
883 Section 218 of the Penal Code. 
884 Section 266(1) of the Penal Code. 
885 Section 286(1)(b) of the Penal Code. 
886 Section 287(2)(b) of the Penal Code. 
887 Section 327 of the Penal Code. 
888 Section 332 of the Penal Code. 
889 Section 335(2) and (3) of the Penal Code. 
890 Section 348(1) of the Penal Code. 
891 Section 363 of the Penal Code. 
892 Section 364 of the Penal Code. 
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Forces Act where an offender is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for 
life.893 
5.1.2 Discussion of legal issues surrounding offences that attract life 
imprisonment  
The question that needs to be answered with regard to Uganda is this: why 
is it that at the end of 2007 there were only few offenders serving life 
sentences despite the many offences for which a person could be sentenced 
to life imprisonment? The answer, it is submitted, lies in the fact that life 
imprisonment is not a mandatory sentence. In other words, courts have a 
wide discretion to determine whether or not to sentence an offender to life 
imprisonment. This is because in all the above provisions, the law provides 
that the convicted person is ‘liable to imprisonment for life.’ Unlike in 
South Africa and Mauritius, and in some African countries such as Rwanda 
where life imprisonment is the minimum sentence in some circumstances, 
in Uganda a judge is not obliged to sentence an offender to life 
imprisonment. This is because life imprisonment is not imposed for the 
most heinous offences such as murder, treason and armed robbery. As 
illustrated in Chapter IV, prior to the Supreme Court decision in January 
2009 that the mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional,894 offences 
such as treason, murder, and armed robbery, attracted mandatory death 
penalty.895 Courts were not permitted to consider whether or not there were 
                                                            
893 See discussion (5.4) on courts with the jurisdiction to impose life sentences. 
894 Chapter IV, 4.2.3.7.  
895 Under section 23(1), (2), and (3) of the Penal Code, any person found guilty of treason 
and other offences against the State ‘shall suffer death’; under section 189 ‘any person 
convicted or murder shall be sentenced to death’; section 286(2) of the Penal Code 
provides that where any person convicted uses a deadly weapon during robbery or causes 
the death or grievous bodily harm to any person during a robbery, ‘shall, on conviction by 
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any mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This explains why as at the 
time of writing, there were over 900 prisoners on death row in Uganda,896 
most of whom were convicted of murder and armed robbery.897  
One could argue that if Uganda abolished the death penalty, it could take 
one of the two following approaches to life imprisonment: one, the 
sentence of life imprisonment would probably be a mandatory penalty for 
serious offences such as murder, treason and armed robbery. This was an 
approach taken by Rwanda. In Rwanda, when the death penalty was 
abolished, the government enacted the Organic Law on the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty which provides that all sentences that were punishable with 
the death penalty in the past are now punishable with life imprisonment or 
life imprisonment with special provisions as mandatory sentences.898 In 
                                                                                                                                                     
the High Court, be sentenced to death’; and under section 319(2) of the Penal Code a 
person found guilty of smuggling using a deadly weapon or who causes the death or 
grievous bodily harm to any person during smuggling, ‘shall, on conviction by the High 
Court, be sentenced to death.’ The Constitutional Court of Uganda held that the word 
‘shall’ in the law is mandatory not directory. See Fox Odoi Oywelowo and another v 
Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No.8 of 2003)[2004]UGCC 2 (30 March 2004). 
The Supreme Court of Zambia held that where the word ‘shall’ is used in a statute, it is 
mandatory and not directory. See Mutale v Attorney General and another (18/2007) 
[2007]ZMSC 14 (where it was held that the provision of the law which provided that the 
petitioner ‘shall’ sign the petition was mandatory not discretionary). 
896 See ‘Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Uganda’ at 
http://fhri.or.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=68 (accessed 
5 March 2009). 
897 Telephone interview with Mr. Robert Omita, Commissioner in Charge of 
Rehabilitation, Uganda Prisons Service, 5 March 2009.  
898 The law provides that ‘in all legislative texts in force before the commencement of this 
Organic Law, the death penalty is substituted by life imprisonment or life imprisonment 
with special provisions…’ see Article 3 of Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25/7/2007 
Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty. For a detailed discussion of the meaning 
and human rights implications of life imprisonment with special provision see Mujuzi 
2009(a). In November 2008, Rwanda amended this law to provide that life imprisonment 
with special provisions was not applicable to persons accused of genocide and crimes 
against humanity transferred from the ICTR or other states. See Article of Organic Law 
No.66/2008 of 21/11/2008 Modifying and Complementing Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 
25/07/2007 Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty. This was after the ICTR 
refused to order the transfer of cases to Rwanda on amongst other grounds that fear that 
the offenders if convicted could be sentenced to life imprisonment with special provisions. 
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Mauritius, after the abolition of the death penalty, penal servitude for life 
was introduced as a mandatory sentence for drug trafficking under the 
Dangerous Drugs Act.899 And the second approach would be making life 
imprisonment the minimum sentence in cases of serious offences. This was 
the approach taken by South Africa and Mauritius, at a later stage. As 
indicated in Chapter IV, before the death penalty was abolished in South 
Africa, courts had wide discretion in deciding whether or not to impose life 
imprisonment. However, after the abolition of the death penalty, courts are 
now obliged to send offenders convicted of murder or rape in certain 
circumstances to life imprisonment, unless there are substantial and 
compelling circumstances, in which case a lesser sentence is imposed.900 
However, a country does not have to abolish the death penalty before 
making life imprisonment a mandatory sentence for some serious 
offences.901 In Kenya, for example, prior to 2006, a person convicted of 
defilement was ‘liable to imprisonment with hard labour for life’ in terms 
                                                                                                                                                     
See The Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi (Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against 
Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis) Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis (Appeals Chamber 
judgment of 8 October 2008); The Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana Case No. 
ICTR-00-55B R11bis (Decision on Prosecutor’s Request on Referral of the Case of 
Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda) (Decision of 19 June 2008); and The Prosecutor v 
Kanyarugiga, Decision on Request for Referral, Case No.ICTR-2002-78-Rule 11bis 
(judgment of 6 June 2008).  
899 See the discussion of Mauritian courts and theories of punishment below (7.3) for 
jurisprudence on mandatory life sentences for offenders convicted of drug trafficking.  
900 For a detailed discussion of the concept of substantial and compelling circumstances, 
see Chapter IV, 4.2.1.3. 
901 Under the Penal Code of Sudan (2003) the death penalty is still imposed for various 
offences, including murder. However, section 334 provides that ‘if robbery is committed 
with the use of [a] fire arm, [the offender] shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and may 
also be liable to [a] fine.’ For example, section 238(2) of the Criminal Code of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No.414/2004, punishes ‘crimes against the 
Constitution or the State’ and provides that ‘[w]here the crime has entailed serious crisis 
against public security or life, the punishment shall be life imprisonment or death.’ 
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of section 145(1) of the Penal Code.902 During this period, courts imposed 
different sentences for defilement903, including not only life 
imprisonment,904 but also life imprisonment with hard labour.905  As at the 
time of writing, the death penalty is mandatory in Kenya for offences such 
as treason,906 murder907 robbery,908 and attempted robbery.909 There were 
thousands of inmates on death row910 although the last execution took place 
                                                            
902 Section 145(1) of the Penal Code. See also section 145(2) of the Penal Code. 
903 For example, in Apui Achau Lopui v Republic [2006]eKLR 1, the appellant was 
convicted of defilement on his plea of guilty and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment. On 
appeal against the sentence, the High Court dismissed his appeal stating that ‘the appellant 
was convicted for defiling a girl aged 3 ½ years…taking into account the totality of the 
facts of this case, the sentence that was imposed was lenient. The maximum sentence for 
an accused person who is convicted of the offence of defilement is life imprisonment’ page 
2; in Hamisi Ngala Chupli v Republic [2005]eKLR 1, the appellant, a 50 – year – old man, 
was convicted of defiling a 15 – year – old girl and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. 
In dismissing his appeal against the sentence, the High Court held that ‘[t]he punishment 
for this offence is life imprisonment with hard labour. It is clear the trial Magistrate 
considered all facts in coming to the sentence of 20 years with hard labour instead of 
imposing life imprisonment with hard labour…I find no reason to interfere with the 
sentence’ at 1-2; Peter Kariuki Michinga v Republic [2007]eKLR 1, the appellant was 
convicted of defilement and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. In allowing the appeal 
and reducing the appellant’s sentence to 8 years’ imprisonment, the High Court held that 
‘[t]he appellant was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. The offence carries a maximum 
sentence of imprisonment for life plus hard labour…I am however of the view that the 
sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment was harsh and manifestly excessive.’ At 6.    
904 In George Mwaura Njoki v Republic [2007] eKLR 1, the appellant was convicted of 
defilement and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour. In reducing his sentence 
to 15 years, the High Court held that ‘…since the [a]ppellant pleaded guilty to the charge 
showing his remorse and also saving the court precious time, taking into account he is a 
young person, a life sentence was in the circumstances harsh and excessive.’ At 2-3.  
905 For example, in James Koril v Republic [2006] eKLR 1, the appellant was convicted by 
the magistrate of defiling his 12 year old niece and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 
dismissing the appeal, the High Court held that the magistrate had erred in sentencing the 
accused to life imprisonment without hard labour. The High Court ‘order[ed] that the life 
sentence imposed will be hard labour.’ 5. (Emphasis in original).  
906 Section 40(3) of the Penal Code. 
907 Section 204 of the Penal Code. 
908 Section 296(2) of the Penal Code. 
909 Section 297(2) of the Penal Code. 
910 As at end of 2008, there were 4,420 prisoners on death row in Kenya. Information 
acquired from Ms Rhoda Ngweta of Kenya National Human Rights Commission, 5 March 
2009 (by email). R Omungo, ‘Death Penalty Kenya: Call for Abolition as Thousands 
Await Execution’ 9 July 2007, IPS at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38474 
(accessed 5 March 2009). 
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in 1987.911 However, section 145(1) of the Penal Code was amended by 
section 8(1) of the 2006 Sexual Offences Act which provides that ‘a person 
who commits an offence of defilement with a child aged eleven years or 
less shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for life.’ And 
since the coming into force of that provision some offenders have indeed 
been sentenced to imprisonment for life with the court observing rightly 
that it is a mandatory sentence.912  
In Kenya another situation where life imprisonment is mandatory relates to 
the conviction of a pregnant woman of an offence punishable with death. 
Section 211 of the Penal Code provides that ‘where a woman convicted of 
an offence punishable with death is found ... to be pregnant, the sentence to 
be passed on her shall be a sentence of imprisonment for life instead of 
sentence of death.’ It should be mentioned in passing that this provision is 
in line with Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights which Kenya acceded to on 1 May 1972913 which provides that the 
‘sentence of death shall not be carried out on pregnant women.’ One could 
argue that the Penal Code of Kenya actually offers better protection to 
pregnant women than the ICCPR because the latter contemplates that the 
said woman could still be executed after giving birth without the state party 
                                                            
911 Chenwi 2007: 29. 
912 In Robert Njuguma Mungai v Republic [2008] eKRL 1, the appellant was convicted of 
defiling a 7 – year – old girl in terms of section 8(1)(2) of the Sexual Offences Act and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. In upholding the sentence and conviction, the High Court 
observed that ‘the sentence of life imprisonment [under section 8] is the mandatory 
sentence provided by law.’ 
913 See ICCPR Status of Ratification at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (accessed 10 January 2009). 
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violating its obligations under the treaty. However, a discussion of that 
issue falls outside the scope of this work.  
The position in the Penal Code of Kenya in relation to a pregnant woman 
found guilty of an offence punishable with death should be distinguished 
from that under the Penal Code of Botswana.914 Section 26(3) of the Penal 
Code of Botswana provides that ‘[w]here a woman convicted of an offence 
punishable with death is found...to be pregnant, she shall be liable to 
imprisonment for life and not to sentence of death.’ It is argued that unlike 
under section 211 of the Penal Code of Kenya, where the court has no 
alternative but to sentence such a woman to life imprisonment, section 
26(3) of the Penal Code of Botswana gives the court wide discretion to 
determine which sentence to impose, with life imprisonment being the 
maximum sentence that could be imposed. If Uganda, or any other country, 
wanted to amend its law to ensure that a pregnant woman is not sentenced 
to death when convicted of an offence punishable with the sentence of 
death, I would recommend the approach under section 26(3) of the Penal 
Code of Botswana instead of that under section 211 of the Penal Code of 
Kenya. This is because the approach under the Penal Code of Botswana 
gives court wide discretion to determine which sentence to impose after 
taking into consideration factors such as the personal circumstances of the 
offender, the circumstances in which the offence was committed and the 
objective that the punishment to be imposed would serve. Put differently, 
                                                            
914 Section 211 of the Penal Code of Kenya and section 26(3) of the Penal Code of 
Botswana should be distinguished from section 120(1) of the Criminal Code of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No.414/2004, which provides that ‘[i]n the 
case of a woman with child and such child is born alive and the mother has to nurse such 
child, the death sentence may be commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life.’ 
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the discretion courts have under section 26(3) of the Penal Code of 
Botswana allows them to impose a sentence proportionate to the offence. A 
provision that gives court discretion to impose a sentence that fits both the 
offence and the offender enables court, as was rightly observed by the High 
Court of Kenya, to reserve the maximum sentence of life imprisonment for 
the serial offenders915 or the worst offences. 
5.1.3 South African and Mauritian or Rwandan approach    
The question that arises is which of the two approaches Uganda should be 
recommended to follow in the event of the abolition of the death penalty, 
assuming that it abolishes it. Should it follow the South African and 
Mauritian approach of making life imprisonment a minimum sentence 
unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances, or the Rwandan 
approach where life imprisonment is mandatory regardless of the personal 
circumstances of the offender and the circumstances under which the 
offence was committed? I would recommend the South African and 
Mauritian instead of the Rwandan approach because, courts would still 
have the discretion to determine the sentence proportionate to the offence. 
                                                            
915 In Paul Ngure Ngige v Republic [2006]eKLR 1, the appellant was convicted of defiling  
a 4- year old girl and sentenced to life imprisonment being the maximum sentence for 
defilement. In allowing his appeal and substituting the sentence of life imprisonment with 
that of 15 years’ imprisonment with hard labour, the High Court held that ‘the 
[a]ppellant’s act was and is reprehensible. However to have imposed a life sentence on the 
Appellant who was a first offender would appear…to be harsh and excessive…maximum 
sentence should be left to those who are serial criminals. For instance, in this case if it had 
been shown that the Appellant is a serial child molester and or defiler, life sentence would 
have been well deserved… [E]ven if it had been shown that the Appellant though not a 
serial defiler but had a record of sorts, the sentence … [of life imprisonment] would not 
have looked out of place. In matters of sentencing we should never loose [sic] sight of the 
fact that imprisonment is meant to reform and or rehabilitate the convict. I do not see how 
we can achieve the foregoing with a life sentence.’ 3.   
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Jurisprudence emanating from countries such as Botswana916 and 
Zimbabwe917 shows that courts have upheld the constitutionality of 
mandatory sentences on, amongst other grounds, that such sentences do not 
infringe the offender’s right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. However, it has to be recalled that in all those cases courts were 
not dealing with the question of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence. 
Life imprisonment which could mean imprisonment for the whole life of 
the offender or more than 20 years, as would be the case today if Uganda 
abolished the death penalty, would be a substantial punishment which 
would require courts to weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors 
before imposing such a sentence. Both the Constitutional Court of Uganda 
and the Supreme Court are not supportive of mandatory sentences. A 
                                                            
916 In the case where two youthful offenders were sentenced to the statutory minimum 
sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment for rape and robbery, while commenting on the 
rationale and constitutionality of such sentences, the Supreme Court of Botswana held 
‘[T]he enactment by the legislature of the mandatory minimum sentences for robbery and 
rape was clearly in order to put in place deterrent steps in order to curb the incidence of 
such offences and their increase and to protect the interests and rights of law-abiding 
citizens…They are not unconstitutional… and, because of the increasing prevalence of 
such offences, and particularly because of the violence so often accompanying their 
commission, the  Government intended to crack down on robbers and rapists in reaction to 
overwhelming public sentiment in regard to such crimes.’ See S v Keboseke (CLCLB-012-
08 and CLCLB-016-08)[2008]BWCA 32 (24 April 2008) para 16. See also Moatshe v The 
State; Motshwari and Others v The State (Criminal Appeal No.26 of 201; Criminal Appeal 
No.2 of 202)[2003]B.L.R.1 (CA) where the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a 
10- year minimum sentence under the Motor Theft Act and the Penal Code Act and the 
Court of Appeal held that ‘…the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences is justifiable 
where the public weal would require them.’ Para 18. 
917 In upholding the sentence minimum sentence of 20 years imposed on the appellant for 
dealing in drugs, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that ‘[t]he legislature, in 
prescribing the minimum sentence which can be imposed…has taken a strong view of the 
dangers caused to society by the use of certain drugs. When one has regard to the possible 
deleterious effect of the drugs, the mandatory sentence cannot be described as grossly 
disproportionate…regard must be had to the fact that Parliament is in a better position to 
determine the class of crimes which endanger the economic and moral fabric of the nation 
and the extent of the damage caused by that particular offence…Because the legislature, 
being representative of the people, has its ear to the ground, it is also fair to say that it is in 
a better position to determine both the attitude of society to specific crimes and the type of 
sentence which would be acceptable by society for certain types of criminal conduct. The 
minimum sentence prescribed in this case was then regarded by the legislature as the 
appropriate sentence for this kind of offence.’ See Chichera v Attorney General of 
Zimbabwe (300/00) (SC 98/04) [2004] ZWSC 98, 105-106 (5 May 2004).    
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mandatory life sentence may not pass the constitutional test. In declaring 
the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional, Byamugisha J of the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda held that: 
I am aware that Parliament has the power to pass a legislation prescribing 
sentences for certain crimes and in some of them setting a minimum 
sentence that a court can impose. This of course curtails the discretion of 
the court in the sentencing process. However, a mandatory death sentence 
makes the circumstances under which the offence was committed 
irrelevant and has the effect of depriving the courts their legitimate 
jurisdiction in determining the appropriate sentence. The provisions of the 
Constitution providing for equality before the law, fair trial, and those 
against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment were 
intended to guard against situations that the petitioners are complaining 
about. The superimposition of the mandatory death penalty on the courts 
is old fashioned and backward in this age... There is of course another 
aspect to the mandatory death sentence. The Constitution reiterates in 
article 128(1) that courts " in the exercise of judicial power shall be 
independent and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any 
person or authority". It can therefore be said that strict adherence to the 
principle of independence of the judiciary presupposes that courts are not 
to be guided by legislative provisions since such provisions deprive the 
courts independence in the exercise of their judicial power. I therefore 
consider it cruel and degrading to tell an accused person that he or she has 
no right of being heard about the sentence to be imposed. It is not 
Parliament that tries criminal cases where a mandatory death penalty is 
imposed. In all fairness, the legislature should not determine for the court 
what sentence it should impose. This issue was well founded and it would 
be answered in the affirmative.918 
 
In declaring the mandatory death sentence unconstitutional, by upholding 
the above ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court held that: 
the administration of justice is a function of the Judiciary under article 126 
of the Constitution.  The entire process of trial from the arraignment of an 
accused person to his/her sentencing is, in our view, what constitutes 
administration of justice. By fixing a mandatory death penalty Parliament 
removed the power to determine sentence from the Courts and that, in our 
view, is inconsistent with article 126 of the Constitution...In any case, the 
Laws passed by Parliament must be consistent with the Constitution as 
provided for in article 2(2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
                                                            
918 Susan Kigula and Others v The Attorney – General 2005: 27 – 29, Judgment by 
Byamugisha J. (Emphasis in the original). 
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Constitution provides for the separation of powers between the Executive, 
the Legislature and the Judiciary.  Any law passed by Parliament which 
has the effect of tying the hands of the judiciary in executing its function 
to administer justice is inconsistent with the Constitution...The Court has 
power to confirm both conviction and sentence.  This implies a power 
NOT to confirm, implying that court has been given discretion in the 
matter.  Any law that fetters that discretion is inconsistent with this clear 
provision of the Constitution. We therefore agree with the Constitutional 
Court that all those laws on the statute book in Uganda which provide for 
a mandatory death sentence are inconsistent with the Constitution and 
therefore are void to the extent of that inconsistency.919   
The above reasoning would be applicable to mandatory life sentences with 
equal force. Like a mandatory death penalty, a mandatory life 
imprisonment would curtail the discretion of the court in the sentencing 
process, make the circumstances under which the offence of was committed 
irrelevant and therefore make a mockery of the principle of proportionality 
in sentencing,920 would amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
and finally would infringe the doctrine of separation of powers. 
5.1.4 Special feature of life imprisonment in Uganda  
Another feature to be noted about the penalty of life imprisonment under 
the Penal Code of Uganda is that it is the maximum penalty that the court 
can impose on conviction for any of the above offences but the law does 
not impose a minimum sentence. In other words, courts have the discretion 
to determine the minimum sentence that could be imposed when they 
decide not to impose the life sentence. The same approach is taken in the 
Penal Code of Kenya where people found guilty of several offences are 
                                                            
919 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 44 - 45. 
920 Courts in Germany and Australia have held that a mandatory life sentence even in cases 
of murder ignores the principle of proportionality. See van Zyl Smit in Kahn 1995: 310 – 
315. 
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‘liable to imprisonment for life.’921 However, unlike the Ugandan Penal 
Code, the Kenyan Penal Code gives courts express discretion to impose a 
sentence less than life imprisonment in cases where the offender is liable to 
be sentenced to life imprisonment.922 However, with regard to sexual 
offences, Kenya has taken a different approach to life sentencing than of 
Uganda. In Kenya, under the 2006 Sexual Offences Act923, a person 
convicted of the offences of rape924 and sexual assault925 shall be sentenced 
to a minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment with life imprisonment being the 
maximum sentence; and a person convicted of gang rape shall be sentenced 
to no less than 15 years’ imprisonment with life imprisonment being the 
maximum.926  
Section 205 of the Penal Code of Uganda raises an unlikely, though not 
impossible, but interesting scenario. It provides that ‘any person, who, 
being under the sentence of imprisonment for three years or more, attempts 
to commit murder is liable to imprisonment for life, with or without 
                                                            
921 See sections 42(b)( concealment of treason); 43 (treasonable felony); 43A (treachery); 
44 (promoting war-like undertaking); 47 (inciting mutiny); 50 (aiding prisoners of war to 
escape); 59 (unlawful oath to commit capital offences); 60(3)(piracy); 83 (riot after 
proclamation); 84 (preventing or obstructing proclamation); 85(rioters demolishing 
buildings); 122 (1)(a) (attempting to rescue a person from lawful custody); 205 
(manslaughter); 220 (attempted murder); 221 (attempted murder by convict); 222 
(accessory after the fact of murder); 225 (aiding suicide); 228 (killing unborn child); 229 
(disabling in order to commit a felony or misdemeanour); 290 (stupefying in order to 
commit a felony or misdemeanour); 232 (preventing escape from wreck); 233 
(intentionally endangering safety or persons travelling by railway); 234 (grievous harm); 
332 (arson); 339(2) and (3) (malicious injury to property); 343(a)(sabotage); 365 
(counterfeiting coin); and 366 (preparation for coining). 
922 Section 26(2) of the Penal Code provides that ‘save as may be expressly provided by 
the law under which the offence concerned is punishable, a person liable to imprisonment 
for life…may be sentenced to a shorter term.’ 
923 Sexual Offences Act, Chapter 3 of 2006. 
924 Section 3(3). 
925 Section 5(2). 
926 Section 10. 
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corporal punishment.’ The question that arises is: What would happen if a 
person serving a life sentence attempted to commit murder and he was 
sentenced to a life imprisonment to run consecutively to the life sentence he 
is already serving in terms of section 205? Would it mean that such a 
person would be released after serving 40 years (because life imprisonment 
means 20 years under the Prisons Act)? In countries like South Africa there 
are instances where courts have sentenced offenders to more than one life 
sentence.927 However, such sentences are practically of academic value 
because under section 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services Act a prisoner 
who, let us say, was sentenced to four life sentences and 200 years’ 
imprisonment would have to be considered for parole after 25 years928 and 
under section 39(2)(a)(ii) ‘one or more life sentences...run concurrently.’ 
Which means that if the parole granting authority decides that such a 
prisoner qualifies for parole after serving 25 years he would have to be 
granted parole. However, the Prisons Act of Uganda does not cater for such 
a scenario and that could explain why the Constitutional Court asked what 
would happen if an offender was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment? 
Would the prison authorities release him after serving 20 years? This is an 
issue that would have to be resolved by Parliament.  
                                                            
927 For example, in S v De Kock 1997, the offender was sentenced to two life sentences and 
212 years imprisonment for committing several serious political crimes including murder; 
in S v Sidyno 2001 (2) SACR 613 (T) the accused was convicted of seven counts of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on each count; and in S v Van Wyk 1997 (1) 
SACR 345(T), the accused was convicted of several counts of murder and robbery and 
sentenced, inter alia, to three terms of life imprisonment.  
928 Section 73(6)(a) provides that ‘a prisoner serving a determinate sentence many not be 
placed on parole until such prisoner has served either the stipulated non-parole period, or if 
no non-parole period was stipulated, half of the sentence, but parole must be considered 
whenever a prisoner has served 25 years of a sentence or cumulative sentences.’ 
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The law needs to be amended to provide for the maximum number of years 
that a person serving any sentence should serve, after which he should be 
considered for parole. Secondly, Parliament needs to amend the Prisons Act 
to provide specifically that more than one life sentence imposed on one 
person should run concurrently, and also that any sentence of imprisonment 
imposed on a prisoner serving a life sentence should run concurrently with 
the life sentence. It is not necessary here to comment on the sentence of 
corporal punishment under section 205 because, as mentioned earlier, the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda, in the case of Simon Kyamanywa v The 
Attorney General, declared it to be unconstitutional, and it was 
subsequently outlawed by an amendment to the Penal Code Act.929  
However, under section 142 of the Penal Code of Botswana, a person 
convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment, being the maximum 
sentence, could also be sentenced to corporal punishment. Even if there are 
discussions by international and regional human rights courts to the effect 
that corporal punishment is inhuman and degrading930, Botswana still 
retains it notwithstanding persistent calls from the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to abolish it.931 
Still on the issue of the possibility of a court sentencing an offender to two 
or more consecutive life sentences, in reacting to the increasing number of 
serious offences, including rape, in 1998 Botswana amended its Penal Code 
                                                            
929 Section 1(1) of the Penal Code Amendment Act, 2007 provides that ‘corporal 
punishment is abolished and accordingly, all references to corporal punishment in the 
Penal Code Act…are repealed.’ 
930 For a general discussion of national, regional and international jurisprudence on the 
issue of corporal punishment see, O’Neil 2008: 60 – 78.  
931 See Mujuzi 2008(e) 73 – 77.   
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and created ‘a regime of more severe sentences for serious and prevalent 
crimes...[by] providing for minimum sentences of imprisonment for certain 
grave offences.’932 Section 142 of the Penal Code was amended933 to 
provide that a person convicted of rape shall be sentenced to a minimum of 
10 years, 15 years’ or 20 years’ imprisonment depending on the 
circumstances in which the rape was committed and to ‘a maximum term of 
life imprisonment.’934 The most controversial aspect of section 142 was 
clause 5 which provided that ‘[a]ny person convicted and sentenced for the 
offence of rape shall not have the sentence imposed run concurrently with 
any other sentence whether the other sentence be for the offence of rape or 
any other offence.’ This meant, for example, that a person sentenced to life 
imprisonment for murder with extenuating circumstances,935could, if, for 
example, he raped a prison nurse, still be sentenced to life imprisonment for 
rape and both sentences had to run consecutively.936 The constitutionality 
of section 142(5) was challenged in S v Matlho937 in which the appellant 
was convicted on two counts of rape and sentenced to two consecutive 
                                                            
932 S v Ndou (CLCLB-029-08)[2008]BWCA 60 (1 July 2008): para 40. 
933 For details of other amendments to provide for minimum sentences see S v Matlho 
(CLCLB 019-07)[2008]BWCA 26 (1 January 2008). 
934 See section 142 (1) – (4) of the Penal Code of Botswana. 
935 Under section 203 of the Penal Code of Botswana, a person convicted of murder shall 
be sentenced to death unless there are extenuating circumstances. While upholding the 
appellant’s sentence of life imprisonment for murder, The Court of Appeal of Botswana 
held that, ‘…[ previously] this court said that “A sentence of life imprisonment should be 
confined to the more serious convictions of murder with extenuating circumstances”. The 
case of this appellant is an example of such a conviction.’ See Baeti Ntsimanyana v The 
State (Criminal Appeal No.7 of 1981)[1981]BWCA 4,page 8.  
936 In order to avoid cases where the sentences of life imprisonment could run 
consecutively, section 252 of the Penal Code of Sudan (2003) provides that ‘Murder by 
Life-Convict: Whoever being under sentence of imprisonment for life commits murder, 
shall on conviction be punished with death.’ See also section 259(3) (a person serving a 
life sentence for murder found guilty of attempted murder ‘may’ be sentenced to death). 
937 S v Matlho (CLCLB 019-07)[2008]BWCA 26 (1 January 2008). 
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sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment, which amounted to 20 years. He 
argued that section 142(5) violated Article 7(1) of the Constitution of 
Botswana, which prohibited inhuman and degrading punishment. In a 
unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal found in the appellant’s favour 
and ruled that:  
[s]ection 142(5) of the Penal Code, because of the prevalence of rape 
offences ...will often come into operation in the future, resulting, as it 
must, in cumulative sentences of lengthy periods many of which will be 
grossly excessive. [The Court] therefore hold that the provisions of 
Section 142(5), that sentences are to run consecutively is in violation of 
Section 7(1) of the Constitution and is accordingly struck down.938 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Constitutional Court of Uganda is of the opinion 
that if an offender has been sentenced to life imprisonment, it should mean 
that he should be imprisoned for the rest of his life and not merely 20 years. 
The Court also highlighted the fact that there could be instances where an 
offender has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment that is in effect 
longer than a life sentence if life imprisonment means 20 years. The 
arguments against longer prison terms have been highlighted already939 and 
will not be repeated here. However, the Constitutional Court of Uganda’s 
concerns should not be ignored because in countries such as Botswana an 
offender serving a life sentence could be eligible for parole earlier than an 
offender serving a determinate sentence.940 This must be confusing, 
especially to lay people, who assume, and rightly so, that a person 
                                                            
938 S v Matlho 2008: 30. 
939 Chapter IV, 4.2.3.8.1. 
940 Under section 85(c) of the Prisons Act, 21:03, an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment is eligible for parole after serving seven years’ imprisonment. For countries 
where offenders could serve sentences longer than life imprisonment, see generally Stokes 
in Yorke 2008: 281-302.  
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sentenced to life imprisonment should serve a longer sentence than any 
other prisoner.      
5.2 South Africa 
Unlike in Uganda where courts in all cases have wide discretion to 
determine whether the offender, who has committed an offence for which 
life imprisonment is the maximum sentence, should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment or not, or in Kenya, where in some instances life 
imprisonment is a mandatory sentence,941 in South Africa offences that 
attract life imprisonment can be categorised into two groups: One, where 
courts have wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be 
sentenced to life imprisonment (as in Uganda) – cases where life is not the 
minimum sentence; and two, where life imprisonment is the minimum 
sentence unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances which 
justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. Life imprisonment under the 
latter category has been dealt with already and that discussion will not be 
repeated here. What follows is the discussion of the offences for which 
courts have wide discretion in determining whether to impose the sentence 
of life imprisonment or not. 
5.2.1 Offences where courts have wide discretion 
Since 1993 South Africa passed a range of laws whose breach empowers 
courts to sentence the offender to life imprisonment. These laws include the 
                                                            
941 In Sudan there are cases where life imprisonment is the lightest sentence that can be 
imposed. For example, section 96 of the Penal Code (2003) provides that ‘[w]hoever 
wages war against the New Sudan or attempts to wage such war or abets the waging of 
such war, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall forfeit all his 
properties.’ See also sections 98(C) (espionage) and 251 (murder). 
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Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1993)942 where a 
person convicted of intentionally using or threatening to use a weapon of 
mass destruction against a citizen of or a person ordinarily resident in  the 
Republic of South Africa whether that person is in South Africa or outside 
South Africa; any person within South Africa; any property that is owned, 
leased or used by a South African citizen or resident or government 
whether the property is in or outside South Africa;943 or where a person is 
found guilty of threatening, attempting, conspiring with any other person, 
aiding, abetting, inducing, inciting, instigating, instructing, commanding, 
counselling or procuring to commit the foregoing offences under section 
26(1)(j) is ‘liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period up 
to imprisonment for life.’944 Under the Nuclear Energy Act945, any person 
who, inter alia, intentionally obtains nuclear material by means of theft, 
robbery, embezzlement or fraud or intentionally demands nuclear material 
by threat or use of force or by any other mode of intimidation ‘is liable, on 
conviction...to a fine or to imprisonment for a period up to imprisonment 
for life.’946  
Section 4(1) of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act (2002)947 provides that a person found guilty of 
genocide, a crime or crimes against humanity, and a war crime or crimes, 
                                                            
942 Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, Act 87 of 1993. 
943 Section 26(1)(j) (aa – cc). 
944 Section 26(1)(v). 
945 Nuclear Energy Act, Act 46 of 1999. 
946 Section 56(2)(d). 
947 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, Act No. 
27 of 2002. 
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‘...is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment, including 
imprisonment for life, or such imprisonment without the option of a fine, or 
both a fine and such imprisonment.’ Section 3(1) of the Prevention of 
Organised Crimes Act (1998)948 provides that a person found guilty of 
racketeering ‘shall be liable to a fine not exceeding R1000 million or to 
imprisonment to a period up to imprisonment for life.’ The Preventing and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (2004)949 provides that a person 
convicted of any of the following offences: general offences of corruption, 
offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to specific persons (i.e. 
public officers, foreign public officers, agents, members of legislative 
authority, judicial officers and members of prosecuting authority), offences 
of receiving or offering unauthorised by or to party to an employment 
relationship, offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to specific 
matters (i.e. to witnesses and evidential material during certain 
proceedings, contracts, procuring and withdrawal of tenders, auctions, 
sporting events and gambling games or games of chance), ‘in the case of a 
sentenced to be imposed by a High Court, to a fine or to imprisonment up 
to a period of imprisonment for life.’950  
The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act (2004) provides that any person guilty of participating in, 
financing, aiding or abetting serious terrorist activities ‘is liable in the case 
of the sentence to be imposed by a High Court, to a fine or to imprisonment 
                                                            
948 Act 121 of 1998, section 3. 
949 Act 12 of 2004. 
950 Section 26(1)(a). 
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for a period up to imprisonment for life.’951 Section 24(3) of the Defence 
Act (2002)952 is to the effect that a person found guilty of piracy ‘is liable to 
a fine or to imprisonment for any period, including life imprisonment.’ 
However, as at the time of writing, there was no known case in which an 
offender had been sentenced to life imprisonment other than in cases of 
murder and rape. One could argue that whereas under all the 
aforementioned pieces of legislation a court could sentence an offender to 
life imprisonment, in practice it is the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
which has been enforced.  
As mentioned earlier, it is clear that when a court finds a person guilty of 
any of the offences in the above pieces of legislation, it has wide discretion 
to determine whether to impose life imprisonment or a shorter term of 
imprisonment and in some cases even a fine is sufficient. At sentencing, the 
court would weigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors to 
decide which sentence to impose. It is argued that in determining whether 
to impose the sentence of life imprisonment or not under the above pieces 
of legislation, courts could be guided by some of the factors that were 
considered to impose or not to impose the sentence of life imprisonment 
before the death penalty was abolished. These have been mentioned 
earlier953 and will not be rehearsed here. Life imprisonment under the 
above mentioned pieces of legislation can only be imposed by the High 
Court. However, as has been illustrated earlier, since 31 December 2007 
                                                            
951 Act 33 of 2004, section 18(1)(a). 
952 Act 42 of 2002. 
953 Chapter IV, 4.2.1.1. 
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the jurisdiction of the Regional Courts was increased to empower regional 
magistrates to impose life imprisonment under the MSL.954  
One of the striking things about life imprisonment in South Africa is that 
for serious and international offences like war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, the court, while playing its complementary role to 
the ICC955 under the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act, has wide discretion to determine whether 
to sentence the offender to life imprisonment or not whereas, as illustrated 
earlier, in cases of murder or rape under certain circumstances, the court is 
required to sentence the offender to life imprisonment unless there are 
substantial and compelling circumstances. This means that a person could 
be convicted of acts of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity 
which could have resulted into the death of several people, for example, 
and not sentenced to life imprisonment (it should be recalled that the ICTY, 
ICTR956 and SCSL957 jurisprudence show that not all people convicted of 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are sentenced to lengthy 
prison terms like life imprisonment).  
                                                            
954 Chapter IV, 4.2.1.5. 
955 Article 1 of the ICC Statute provides that the Court ‘…shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.’ For a discussion of the complementary role of the national 
courts under the ICC Statute see, Burke-White 2008: 53- 108; Yang 2005: 121-132; and 
Kleffner and Kor (eds) 2006.  
956 Schabas 2006: 545-584. 
957 For example, in Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Case No.SCSL-04-
14-A (Judgment of 28 May 2008) the Appeals Chamber sentenced both the appellants to 
20 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity and war crimes (see para 565). In 
justifying the sentence of 20 years imprisonment, the Appeals Chamber held that ‘[w]hat 
should be one of the paramount considerations in the sentencing of an accused person 
convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes is the revulsion of mankind, 
represented by the international community, to the crime and not the tolerance by a local 
community of the crime; or the lack of public revulsion in relation to the crimes of such 
community; or local sentiments about the persons who have been found guilty of the 
crimes.’ Para 564.   
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One the other hand, a person convicted of, for example, the murder of one 
person in certain circumstances has to be sentenced life imprisonment 
unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. The reason the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act gives wide discretion to courts to determine whether life imprisonment 
should be imposed or not could be attributed to the fact that Article 77(2) of 
the ICC Statute does not require that life imprisonment should be a 
mandatory or minimum sentence for offenders found guilty of offences that 
fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC or domestic courts. This is attributable 
to the ICC’s drafting history which was characterised by, amongst other 
things, disagreements on the issue of penalties.958 Article 77(2) provides 
that ‘...the Court may impose ... [a] term of life imprisonment when 
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person.’ It has been argued that ‘[g]iven the 
severity of the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the requirement of 
“extreme gravity” for a life sentence seems to be superfluous.’959  
Countries that have enacted legislation implementing the ICC Statute have 
provided for different penalties for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. In Australia, for example, life imprisonment is a mandatory 
                                                            
958 It has been observed that given the contentious issue of punishment, ‘it should hardly 
be surprising that the negotiations on the penalties proved both difficult and time 
consuming.’ See Fife in Lee (ed) 1999: 322. It has been demonstrated that ‘[d]uring the 
negotiations for the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a 
small but determined group of states, mainly from Arabic and Islamic countries and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, argued that the new institution should impose capital 
punishment. Perhaps surprisingly, the United States voiced opposition to capital 
punishment …and argued that if the International Court, if empowered to impose the death 
penalty, would fail because a large number of states would simply refuse to transfer 
criminals to the Court.’ See Schabas 2003: 581. 
959 Glickman 2004: 259. 
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sentence for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
in the most heinous manner;960 in Canada, life imprisonment is mandatory 
for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity if ‘an intentional 
killing forms the basis of the offence’961; and in Germany, a person found 
guilty of genocide, war crimes and crimes against  humanity ‘shall be 
imprisoned for life’ where death, amongst other things, resulted from the 
commission of such crimes.962 The Criminal Code of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina provides that a person found guilty of genocide, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity ‘shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not 
less than ten years or longer-term imprisonment.’963  
Pieces of legislation from the above four countries indicate that the 
legislatures have ensured that the court’s discretion is limited in cases 
where the offender has been found guilty of genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. In the first three countries – Australia, Canada and 
German – courts have no discretion but to impose the sentence of life 
imprisonment in the above mentioned circumstances. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the other hand, the minimum sentence is 10 years’ 
imprisonment although courts have the discretion to impose a longer prison 
                                                            
960 See International Criminal Code (Consequential Amendments) Act, Act No. 42 of 
2002, sections 268.3 – 268.9(1),268.24(1), 268.35,268.37(1),268.38,268.39, 268.41 – 
268.44,268.47,268.48(1),268.49,268.50,268.66(1),268.70,268.71(1),268.76(2),268.77,268.
78(1),268.79(1),268.90, 268.91, 268.92, 268.93(1), 268.97,and 268.98. Although under the 
Act penalties ranging from 5 to 25 years’ imprisonment could be imposed for various 
offences not serious enough to attract life imprisonment.   
961 See Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000, c.24), sections 4(2)(a) and 
6(2)(a). 
962 Code of Crimes against International Law (2002), sections 6,7. 
963 Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Adopted by the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Parliamentary Assembly and published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
37/03) Articles 171 – 176(1). 
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term. Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are serious crimes 
that should attract serious sentences. It is recommended that the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act should be amended so that life imprisonment is the minimum sentence 
for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – unless there are 
substantial and compelling circumstances in which case the judge should 
impose a lesser sentence or the amendment should provide for the 
minimum number of years of imprisonment to which the offender found 
guilty of such offences should be sentenced with life imprisonment being 
the maximum sentence. This would ensure that the sentence to be imposed 
on people found guilty of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity 
is not left entirely to the discretion of the court, which could impose lighter 
sentences failing to reflect the grave nature of the offences. 
5.3 Mauritius  
Section 150A of the Criminal Code provides that: 
Where under any enactment other than the Criminal Code, a Court is 
empowered or required to pass a sentence of penal servitude for life, the 
sentence may, at the discretion of the Court, be for a term of not less than 
3 years and not exceeding 60 years. 
The above provision indicates that there are circumstances where the court 
is ‘empowered’, that is, the court has the discretion to decide whether or not 
to impose a penal servitude for life, and where the court is ‘required’, that 
is, where the court must, impose life imprisonment. It also indicates that life 
imprisonment is provided for under different pieces of legislation including 
the Criminal Code. There are several offences for which an offender can be 
sentenced to penal servitude for life (life imprisonment). These offences 
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will be divided into two categories: first, where life imprisonment is a 
mandatory sentence, that is, where the court is ‘required’ to impose a life 
sentence; and second, where life imprisonment is a discretionary sentence, 
that is, where the court is ‘empowered’ to impose a life sentence. 
5.3.1 Offences where life imprisonment is mandatory 
Whereas section 150A of the Criminal Code contemplates that there may 
be other legislation apart from the Criminal Code where life imprisonment 
is mandatory, the author was unable to come across any. It is only under the 
Criminal Code where the author was able to identify provisions where life 
imprisonment is mandatory. A person found guilty of any of the following 
offences ‘the punishment shall be penal servitude for life’: killing another 
person by explosives;964 stirring up war against the state;965 inciting citizens 
or other inhabitants of Mauritius to rise up in arms against the State;966 
attempting or plotting to stir a civil war by arming or by inciting the 
inhabitants of Mauritius to arm themselves against one another or carry 
devastation, massacre or plunder;967 castration or amputation or destruction 
of any organ necessary to generation resulting to the death of the victim;968 
and arson causing death.969  
                                                            
964 Section 66 of the Criminal Code (Supplementary) RL 2/137 of 12 June 1982. 
965 Section 51 of the Criminal Code. 
966 Section 60 of the Criminal Code. 
967 Section 62 of the Criminal Code. 
968 Section 234(2) of the Criminal Code. 
969 Section 347 of the Criminal Code. 
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As discussed earlier, in Philibert and 6 others v The State970 the Supreme 
Court of Mauritius held that sections 222(1) of the Criminal Code and 
41(3) of the Dangerous Drugs Act which required courts to impose 45 
years’ imprisonment for murder and penal servitude for life dealing in 
dangerous drugs, respectively, was held to be unconstitutional for violating 
the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reasoned that mandatory 
sentences under those provisions violated the sentencing principle of 
proportionality in the sense that an offender was denied an opportunity to 
plead in mitigation for the court to impose a lesser severe sentence. 
However, none of the above mentioned provisions that require the court to 
impose a mandatory life sentence was impugned in the Philibert judgment. 
This means, it is argued, that an offender convicted of an offence under the 
Criminal Code where the court is ‘required’, in the light of section 150A of 
the Criminal Code, to impose a life sentence, the Court has no alternative 
but to impose a life sentence.  
It is argued that, like sections 222(1) of the Criminal Code and 41(3) of the 
Dangerous Drugs Act, the Criminal Code provisions which require the 
court to impose a life sentence on an offender convicted of the relevant 
offence or offences, violate the right to a fair trial and cannot pass the 
constitutionality test. It could be argued that one of the reasons why the 
constitutionality of the above provisions in the Criminal Code, which 
require courts to sentence an offender to life imprisonment, have never 
been challenged is that no person has ever been convicted of and sentenced 
for an offence under any of those provisions. This means that since their 
                                                            
970 Philibert and 6 others v the State 2007.  
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inception, they have been ‘dormant.’ However, this does not mean that they 
will never be activated once a person commits an offence punishable with a 
mandatory life sentence.  
In the author’s opinion, there are two options to ensure that mandatory life 
imprisonment is removed from the Criminal Code: One, any person 
sentenced to life imprisonment under any of those provisions should 
challenge their constitutionality on the ground that they violate the rights to 
a fair trial and not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment 
and rely on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Philibert judgment to 
substantiate his argument. The offender’s right to challenge the 
constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence flows from Article 17(1) of 
the Constitution of Mauritius which provides that ‘[w]here any person 
alleges that any of sections 3 to 16 has been, is being or likely to be 
contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action 
with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, that person may 
apply to the Supreme Court for redress.’ However, the foregoing is not 
readily available and could take longer unless in the near future a person is 
convicted and sentenced under the relevant provision. The second and 
readily available option is for Parliament to amend the relevant provisions 
and make life imprisonment a discretionary sentence.  
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5.3.2 Offences where life imprisonment is discretionary  
A person convicted of any of the following offences: inciting an officer to 
mutiny;971 taking command of an armed force;972 murder or homicide;973 or 
manslaughter accompanying or preceding another crime:974  
[s]hall be punished by penal servitude for life or, where the Court is 
satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify 
the imposition of a lesser sentence and has entered those circumstances on 
the record of the proceedings, for a term not exceeding 60 years. 
Courts are required by sections 61, 64, 222(1) and 223(1) of the Criminal 
Code, as amended by the 2007 Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, to 
sentence to penal servitude for life offenders convicted of offences under 
those sections unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. 
The challenge is that the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act does not 
define or describe ‘substantial and compelling circumstances.’ 
Consequently, courts have a wide discretion to determine, on a case by case 
basis, what constitutes substantial and compelling circumstances. 
Experience from South Africa, where the same phrase was introduced in 
1997975, makes one anticipate that different judges are likely to come to 
confusing, and at times conflicting, interpretations of what constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances. The Privy Council appears to 
reason that there is no difference between substantial and compelling 
                                                            
971 Section 61 of the Criminal Code. 
972 Section 64 of the Criminal Code. 
973 Section 222 of the Criminal Code. 
974 Section 223(1) of the Criminal Code. 
975 See Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997. 
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circumstances, on the one hand, and mitigating factors, on the other 
hand.976  
The Privy Council’s equating of substantial and compelling circumstances 
with mitigating factors appears to have opened an avenue for the courts in 
Mauritius to also invoke mitigating factors that have always formed their 
basis to depart from when imposing heavy penalties, as substantial and 
compelling circumstances.977 Whether this would be the correct position or 
not will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court or the legislature in 
guiding lower courts on what substantial and compelling circumstances 
should include or by the legislature amending the law to enumerate what 
substantial and compelling circumstances should include or exclude, 
respectively. In my opinion, by equating substantial and compelling 
circumstances with mitigating factors, the Privy Council appears to have 
ignored the intention of the legislature, which expressly provided for 
substantial and compelling circumstances instead of mitigating factors.  
                                                            
976 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 6. 
977 It has to be recalled that before the Privy Council’s ruling, judges appear to have held 
that view that substantial and compelling circumstances were slightly different from 
mitigating circumstances. In The State v Takah P and another 2007 SCJ 174, the Supreme 
Court found the accused guilty of murder and before sentencing the first accused to 32 
years’ imprisonment and the second accused to 26 years’ imprisonment instead of the 
maximum 45 years’ imprisonment, the Court held that it had ‘given due consideration to a 
number of mitigating factors which have been highlighted in the course of the hearing: (1) 
the accused readily confessed the guilt and adopted a cooperative attitude with the police; 
(2) they had spent about 14 months in custody whilst on remand before they were released 
on bail; (3) they adopted a repentant attitude in Court and tendered their apologies in Court 
to the victim’s family; (4) they expressed feelings of remorse and regret and have pledged 
to behave properly in future; (5) they both have a clean record; and (6) they both are young 
and immature and were led into the commission of the offence as a result of the temptation 
for money. I consider that the above-mentioned factors constitute substantial mitigating 
circumstances … The cumulative effect of the mitigating factors and the timely guilty plea 
would in the light of the circumstances of the of the present case constitute “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” to justify a lesser sentence…’ see 176. (Emphasis in 
original).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
334
Experience from South Africa tells us that if the legislature had wanted 
courts to take mitigating factors into account, it would have expressly 
stated so, and would not have used the ‘composite yardstick’ of substantial 
and compelling circumstances. In South Africa the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1997 requires courts to sentence offenders convicted of 
some serious offences, such as, murder and rape to life imprisonment 
unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. Until 2001 the 
South African High Courts devised confusing, and at times conflicting, 
interpretations of what amounted to substantial and compelling 
circumstances. In 2001 the Supreme Court of Appeal, in the famous case of 
S v Malgas, established detailed guidance on what the legislature intended 
to mean by substantial and compelling circumstances. It held that: 
A Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the courts' discretion in 
imposing sentence in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 
2 (or imprisonment for other specified periods for offences listed in other 
parts of Schedule 2). B Courts are required to approach the imposition of 
sentence conscious that the legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or 
the particular prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence that 
should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed 
for the listed crimes in the specified circumstances. C Unless there are, 
and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a different response, 
the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a severe, 
standardised and consistent response from the courts. D The specified 
sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons. 
Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, 
aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy 
of the policy underlying the legislation, and marginal differences in 
personal circumstances or degrees of participation between co-offenders 
are to be excluded. E The legislature has however deliberately left it to the 
courts to decide whether the circumstances of any particular case call for a 
departure from the prescribed sentence. While the emphasis has shifted to 
the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective 
sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to 
be ignored. F All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally 
taken into account in sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral 
guilt) thus continue to play a role; none is excluded at the outset from 
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consideration in the sentencing process. G The ultimate impact of all the 
circumstances relevant to sentencing must be measured against the 
composite yardstick ("substantial and compelling") and must be such as 
cumulatively justify a departure from the standardised response that the 
legislature has ordained. H In applying the statutory provisions, it is 
inappropriately constricting to use the concepts developed in dealing with 
appeals against sentence as the sole criterion. I If the sentencing court on 
consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is satisfied that 
they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be 
disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, so that 
an injustice would be done by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to 
impose a lesser sentence. J In so doing, account must be taken of the fact 
that crime of that particular kind has been singled out for severe 
punishment and that the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed 
sentence should be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which 
the legislature has provided.978 
As illustrated in Chapter IV,979 since the Malgas judgment above, the South 
African courts have developed what are regarded as substantial and 
compelling circumstances. In Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, 
Transvaal v Makwetsja it was held that the ‘youthfulness [of the offender] 
per se is a substantial and compelling circumstance.’980 In S v Ferreira and 
others981 the first appellant, a woman in an abusive relationship, contracted 
the second and third appellants to murder her partner, believing that his 
death was the only way by which she could escape from the abusive 
relationship. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the belief that the only 
way to escape an abusive relationship was to kill her partner was a 
substantial and compelling circumstance which necessitated the imposition 
of a term of imprisonment of six years instead of life imprisonment. Courts 
have held that it is a substantial and compelling circumstance where the 
                                                            
978 S v Malgas 2001: para 25. 
979 Chapter IV, 4.2.1.3. 
980 Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Makwetsja 2004: 3. See also Brandt 
v S 2005: 1.  
981 S v Ferreira and others 2004: 454. 
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rape of the victim was ‘not one of the most serious manifestations of 
rape.’982 Courts have also held that the absence of previous convictions, and 
the fact that the accused had ‘displayed remorse and was a good candidate 
for rehabilitation’ are substantial and compelling circumstances.983 It has 
also been held that the fact that the accused was of a low IQ is a substantial 
and compelling circumstance.984 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the fact that the appellant had a dependant wife and children, and was 
gainfully employed, were substantial and compelling circumstances.985 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal also held in S v Thebus and another986 that the 
fact that the accused had played a minimal role in the commission of the 
crime was one of the substantial and compelling circumstances justifying 
departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.987  
 
The above cases show that courts determine what amount to substantial and 
compelling circumstances, depending on the circumstances under which the 
offence was committed, the personal characteristics of the offender, and the 
effects the crime had on the victim, amongst other things. It is evident that 
even in South Africa, where the law requiring the imposition of life 
                                                            
982 S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W). See also S v M 2007 (2) SACR 60 (W); S v Ncheche 
2005 (2) SACR 386 (W).    
983 S v Malan en ‘n ander 2004 (1) SACR 264 (T) at 267. See also S v Obisi 2005 (2) 
SACR 350 (W); S v Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA); Rommoko v Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA). 
984 S v Riekert 2002 (1) SACR 566 (T). 
985 S v Sikhipha 2006. See also S v Boer en andere 2000 (2) SACR (NC).   
986 S v Thebus and another 2002 (2) SACR 566 (SCA). 
987 However, in S v Vuma 2003 (1) SACR 597 (W) the appellant was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for murder even though it was proved to the Court that the following 
favourable circumstances existed: he was employed, had a family to assist financially, he 
attended church regularly, was not a violent person, and had no previous convictions.   
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imprisonment on offenders found guilty of serious crimes unless there are 
substantial and compelling circumstances, has been on the statute book for 
over a decade now, an exhaustive list of scenarios of what amount to 
substantial and compelling circumstances has not been compiled. Using 
their discretion and the Malgas criteria as guide, the South African courts 
will continue developing their jurisprudence in this area until such time as 
an exhaustive list of scenarios, or something close to an exhaustive list, of 
what amount to substantial and compelling circumstances is developed. 
Courts in Mauritius are also likely to follow the same route as that of South 
Africa. Mauritian courts could refer to South African jurisprudence as a 
persuasive interpretation tool in their attempt to define or enumerate what 
are substantial and compelling circumstances. However, this does not mean 
that courts in Mauritius are not at liberty to construct their own 
understanding of substantial and compelling circumstances without being 
influenced by the South African jurisprudence. 
 
5.4 Courts with jurisdiction to impose life sentences and the right to 
appeal against the sentence 
It is important to make note of courts with jurisdiction to impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment in the three jurisdictions of Uganda, South 
Africa and Mauritius. This could help to explain, amongst other things, the 
weight the legislature attaches to the sentence of life imprisonment and the 
frequency with which the sentence of life imprisonment could be imposed.  
In almost all jurisdictions the imposition of heavy penalties is reserved for 
the superior courts of record such as the High Court, Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court and light penalties are reserved for lower courts such as 
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magistrate courts although the superior courts have unlimited jurisdiction 
and can impose any sentence permissible under the law. Superior court 
trials are usually presided over by some of the most skilled and seasoned 
legal practitioners in country, and this explains why they are always 
empowered to impose the most serious penalty in many jurisdictions. In 
Uganda it is the High Court,988 the Chief Magistrates Court989, the Division 
Court Martial990 and General Court Martial991 that have the jurisdiction to 
impose life sentences. The Division Court Martial and the General Court 
Martial have jurisdiction to sentence offenders to life imprisonment when 
they commit some of the offences under the Uganda Peoples’ Defence 
Forces Act.992 Of the 47 people who were serving life sentences in Uganda 
                                                            
988 Section 14(1) of the Judicature Act, Chapter 13 of the Laws of Uganda. 
989 See section 161(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Uganda 
provides that ‘(a) a chief magistrate may try any offence other than an offence in respect of 
which the maximum penalty is death; (b) a magistrate grade I may try any offence other 
than an offence in respect of which the maximum penalty is death or imprisonment for 
life.’ However, the author is aware of only one case where the Chief Magistrates Court has 
ever sentenced an offender to life imprisonment. Because the offender appealed against his 
conviction to the High Court which upheld the sentenced imposed by the Chief Magistrate, 
the Prisons Records indicates that the prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment by the 
High Court. See Saymon Muganga v Uganda 2005, unreported). The appellant was 
convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Chief 
Magistrate.   
990 Section 198(c) of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act, 2005. 
991 Section 197(2) of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act, 2005 provided that ‘[t]he 
General Court Martial shall have unlimited original jurisdiction under this Act…’ 
992 The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force Act, 2005. A person subject to military law found 
guilty of any of the following offences is ‘liable to life imprisonment’: cowardice in action 
not resulting in failure of operation or loss of life (section 120(1); breaching concealment 
not resulting in loss of life (section 121(1)); failure to brief not resulting in loss of life 
(123(1)); personal interests endangering operational efficiency (section 124); careless 
shooting in operation (section 125); several offences relating to operation e.g. breaking 
into any house or other place with intention to plunder, without orders from his or her 
superior, improperly destroys or damages any property etc (section 126); offences by 
persons in command when in action e.g. giving premature orders to attack resulting in 
failure of operation (section 128); mutiny not resulting in failure of operation, loss of life 
or destruction of military operational materials (section 132); disobeying lawful orders not 
resulting in failure of operation or loss of life (section 133(1)); failure to execute one’s 
duty not resulting in failure of operation or loss of life (section 134); spreading harmful 
propaganda not resulting in failure of operation or loss of life (section 137(1)); 
malingering or maiming (section 138); desertion provided the desertion does not endanger 
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in 2008, three had been sentenced by the General Court Martial and the rest 
by the High Court.993  
However, those sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court have the 
right to appeal against the sentence to the Court of Appeal.994 If the Court 
of Appeal upholds the sentence, the offender has a right to appeal to the 
Supreme Court which ‘the final court of appeal.’995 Many of the offenders 
serving life imprisonment in Uganda appealed their sentences up to the 
Supreme Court which confirmed such sentences and some were in the 
process of lodging the appeals.996 However, unlike the death penalty that 
cannot be executed unless it has ‘been confirmed by the highest appellant 
court’,997 a life sentence does not have to be confirmed by the Supreme 
Court to be served. 
In South Africa, as mentioned earlier, both the High Court and the Regional 
Courts have the jurisdiction to impose life sentences under the MSL.998 
                                                                                                                                                     
life or leads to loss of life, he has not deserted with arms and ammunition or other war 
materials and he does not desert and join the enemy (section 146); commits dangerous acts 
in relation to aircraft (section 154); disobedience of Captain’s orders (section 155); 
fraudulently using, concealing or receiving military marks (section 160); and causing fire 
(section 165). Under section 221 (4)(a) ‘every person who on conviction for a service 
offence is liable to life imprisonment ... may be sentenced to imprisonment for a shorter 
term.’   
993 Mujuzi 2008(a): 167. 
994 Article 132(2) of the Constitution. 
995 Article 132(1) of the Constitution. 
996 Personal interview with offenders serving life imprisonment, Luzira Maximum Security 
Prison, 14 January 2008. 
997 Article 22(1) of the Constitution. 
998 Before the December 2007 amendments which extended the jurisdiction of the regional 
courts to impose life imprisonment, there were some regional courts’ magistrates who 
argued that they did not have the jurisdiction to try offenders for offences that attracted life 
imprisonment. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Kwazulu-Natal) v Regional Magistrate, 
Mtubatuba 2002 (1) SACR 31 (N), the High Court held that a regional magistrate had the 
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However, as already indicated, it is only the High Court with the 
jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment under other pieces of legislation. 
As indicated earlier, a person sentenced by the Regional Court to life 
imprisonment under the MSL has an automatic right of appeal to the High 
Court. However, when the High Court upholds the sentence, that person 
can appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal when granted leave to appeal 
by the High Court. An offender can only appeal to the Constitutional Court 
when his appeal raises a constitutional issue. Most of the offenders serving 
life sentences in South Africa were sentenced by the High Court under the 
MSL although some have been sentenced by the Regional Courts since the 
2007 amendments to the MSL.999 In Mauritius, it is only the Supreme 
Court, which has the jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment.1000 
Offenders aggrieved by the Supreme Court’s decision may appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in terms of section 81(1) of the 
Constitution1001 and section 116 of the Courts Act on condition that the 
                                                                                                                                                     
jurisdiction to try offences that attracted life imprisonment under the MSL and that he was 
required to refer the offender to the High Court for sentencing.  
999 For a full discussion of this issue, see Chapter IV, 4.2.1.5.  
1000 Section 70A of the Courts Act, Act 5 of 1945 (as amended by the Courts (Amendment 
Act, Act No.21 of 2008). The Supreme Court while commenting on the jurisdictions of 
courts under the Courts Act held that the District Court ‘is not competent to try cases 
which are punishable by penal servitude for life...’ see Muktar Ali and Gulam Rasool v R 
1991 MR 138, 342. 
1001 Under section 81(1) ‘An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court to the Judicial Committee as of right in the following cases- (a) final 
decisions, in any civil or criminal proceedings, on questions as to the interpretation of this 
Constitution…’ In Sumodhee S.I. and ors v The State 2006 SCJ 171, where the appellants 
were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to penal servitude for life, they sought 
leave from the Supreme Court to appeal to the Judicial Court on the ground that, inter alia, 
that their right to a fair trial had been violated because they had not been tried by a jury. In 
declining their application, the Supreme Court held that they had not ‘established that there 
was a question as to the interpretation of any of the provisions the Constitution on which 
there has been a final decision…’ and that it was not ‘established that there [was] any 
ground which, by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise, ought to be 
submitted to the Judicial Committee…’ see 176.    
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appeal raises an issue of ‘great public importance or otherwise, ought to be 
submitted to the Judicial Committee’.1002 
5.5 Legal representation for people charged with offences that carry 
life imprisonment     
Closely related to the issue of the court’s jurisdiction to impose life 
imprisonment is the question of legal representation of people accused of 
offences that attract a life sentence. In Uganda, Article 28(3)(e) of the 
Constitution provides that ‘in case of any offence which carries a sentence 
of ... imprisonment for life, [the accused shall] be entitled to legal 
representation at the expense of the state.’1003 However, under section 2 of 
the Poor Persons Defence Act an indigent accused appearing before the 
High Court is also entitled to legal representation although not facing an 
offence carrying a life sentence.1004 In its recent judgment, the Supreme 
Court of Uganda referred to Article 28(3)(e) and held that ‘it gives an extra 
safeguard to a person ...[who is faced with a life sentence], i.e., legal 
representation at the expense of the state’1005 and that ‘[t]his can only be 
because the framers of the Constitution deemed that an offence carrying 
...[a life sentence] is so heavy and so important that all help and latitude 
                                                            
1002 Section 116 of the Courts Act, Act 5 of 1945 (as amended by the Courts (Amendment 
Act, Act No.21 of 2008). 
1003 Rule 25(2) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions, Statutory Instrument 
13 – 10 provide that ‘[i]n accordance with 28(3)(e) of the Constitution, the applicant or 
appellant shall be entitled to be assigned an advocate …in the case of an offence which 
carries a sentence of death or imprisonment for life.’ 
1004 A prisoner who is poor and charged before the High Court with an offence that do not 
carry death or life sentence can also get legal representation at the expense of the state 
‘[w]here it appears for any reason that it is desirable, in the interest of justice, that a 
prisoner should have legal aid in the preparation and conduct of his or her defence at his or 
her trial…’ section 2 of The Poor Persons Defence Act, Chapter 20 of the Laws of 
Uganda, 1998. The means test is applied in these circumstances. 
1005 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 24. 
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must be given to the accused person for that person to have a fair trial.’1006 
All offenders serving life imprisonment in Uganda who were interviewed 
by the author said that they had received legal representation paid for by the 
state.1007   
On the other hand, although the right to legal representation is guaranteed 
in the constitutions of Mauritius and South Africa, there is no express 
provision in those constitutions that a person accused of committing an 
offence that attracts a life sentence is entitled to legal representation at the 
expense of the state. Article 10(2)(d) of the Constitution of Mauritius 
provides that ‘[e]very person who is charged with a criminal offence shall 
be permitted to defend himself in person or, at his own expense, by a legal 
representative of his choice or, where so prescribed, by a legal 
representative provided at the public expense.’ Article 10(2)(d) with regard 
to who qualifies for legal aid at the ‘public expense’ is operationisalised by 
section 4 of the Legal Aid Act1008 which sets two conditions for a person to 
qualify for legal aid: one, a person who wishes to obtain legal aid in 
criminal proceedings ‘shall’ apply to the court before which he is being 
charged for legal aid and that application should state his ground of 
defence; and two, a person applying for legal aid must make a sworn 
statement that (a) excluding his wearing apparel and tools of trade and the 
subject matter of the proceedings, he is not worth 75,000 rupees; and (b) his 
                                                            
1006 Attorney – General v Susan Kigula and 416 others 2009: 41. 
1007 Personal discussion with 14 offenders serving life imprisonment, 14 January 2008, 
Luzira Maximum Security Prison, Kampala, Uganda. 
1008 The Legal Aid Act, Act 57 of 1973 (as amended by Act No.18 of 2003). 
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total monthly earnings are less than 5000 rupees.1009  Under section 7 of the 
Legal Aid Act an application for legal aid cannot succeed unless it satisfies 
the requirements under section 4 and that application must be ‘well-
founded.’ Thus, the only criterion on which a person qualifies for legal aid 
in Mauritius is his inability to pay for his legal representation.1010 
Under section 35(3)(g) of the Constitution of South Africa, ‘[e]very 
accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right to have a 
legal practitioner assigned to ...[him] by the state and at the state expense, if 
substantial injustice1011 would otherwise result, and to be informed of this 
right promptly.’1012 While interpreting section 35(3)(g), the Cape High 
Court held that the ‘right to legal representation has three separate and 
distinct forms ...(a) the right to a legal practitioner of one’s choice; (b) the 
right to a legal practitioner assigned to one at the State’s expense; and (c) 
the right to a legal practitioner furnished by the Legal Aid Board.’1013 In 
South Africa, an accused qualifies for legal aid when he is an ‘indigent 
person’ or cannot afford the costs of his legal representation within the 
                                                            
1009 Section 4 of the Legal Aid Act. 
1010 However, under section 7A of the Legal Aid Act, a minor charged with any offence or 
misdemeanour must be granted legal aid if he applies for it irrespective of his parent’s or 
guardian’s income.  
1011 For a definition of substantial injustice, see paragraph section 1 of Legal Aid Guide 
(2002), drafted in line with Section 3A of the Legal Aid Act, Act No. 22 of 1969 (as 
amended in 1996).  
1012 For a detailed discussion of the right to legal representation in South Africa see, Du 
Toit et al 2007: Chapter 11. See also Vawda 2005: 234 – 247, who has argued that 
‘…access to justice has routinely come to be interpreted as the right of the accused persons 
to legal representation, particularly where a sentence of imprisonment of some length 
might be imposed, in order to circumvent the “substantial injustice” potentially befalling 
an unrepresented accused.’  At 236.  
1013 S v Cornelius and another 2008 (1) SACR 96 (C), 97. 
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meaning of section 3 of the Legal Aid Act as interpreted by section 1 of the 
Legal Aid Guide.1014  
However, it has been held that the ‘means test’ applied by the Legal Aid 
Board to assess whether the accused qualifies for legal aid is ‘completely 
wrong’ because ‘that is not what the Constitution requires.’1015 What the 
Constitution requires, it has been emphasised, is that every accused person 
‘is entitled to legal representation at State expense if substantial injustice 
would occur in the case, if the trial is conducted without him being legally 
represented.’1016 However in practice, before the court refers the accused’s 
case to the Legal Aid Board for legal aid, it has to consider factors such as 
the personal circumstances of the accused, the nature and gravity of the 
alleged offence, and ‘any other factor which in the opinion of the court 
should be taken into account.’1017 It has been held that in cases where the 
accused is charged with an offence that carry direct imprisonment, the 
Legal Aid Board is constitutionally ‘obliged to provide legal assistance to 
the accused in order that he...should realise his...right to legal 
representation at State expense’ and that the Court must advise the accused 
and the Legal Aid Board accordingly.1018  
                                                            
1014 Section 1 of the Legal Aid Guide defines an indigent person to mean ‘a natural person 
who qualifies for legal aid in terms of the means test set out in t[he] Guide or a natural 
person who is unable to afford the cost of his/her own legal representation (in 
circumstances where substantial injustice would otherwise arise…’ 
1015 S v Cornelius and another 2008: 97. 
1016 S v Cornelius and another 2008: 97. 
1017 Section 3B of the Legal Aid Act. 
1018 S v Cornelius and another 2008: 97. 
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However, cases have arisen where although the accused was being charged 
with an offence or offences that carried life imprisonment on conviction, 
the court did not advise him to obtain legal representation.1019 And where 
the accused was charged with rape in circumstances where on, conviction, 
he was to be sentenced to life imprisonment unless there were substantial 
and compelling circumstances, the court did not warn him that failure to 
acquire legal representation could prejudice his defence.1020 Thus, it has 
been held that: 
Where an accused is charged before the High Court with an offence for 
which a penalty of life imprisonment is in prospect and he has not made 
arrangements for his own defence, extreme seriousness of the charge will 
be sufficient by itself to render it obligatory to assign defence counsel to 
him at State expense without any initiative from his side.1021 
The Durban Coastal Division of the South African High Court has warned 
that in cases where offenders rely on legal aid lawyers for representation 
during their trial, ‘it was not unusual to find inexperienced counsel 
representing accused persons’ and that ‘judges ...[are] frequently required 
                                                            
1019 S v Mbambo 1999 (2) SACR 421(W), the accused appeared in the regional court on the 
charge of raping a girl of nine years where, on conviction, he was to be sentenced to life 
imprisonment unless there were substantial and compelling circumstances. There were no 
substantial and compelling circumstances. However, the magistrate did not encourage him 
to obtain legal representation and the accused conducted his own defence. When the case 
was referred to the High Court for sentencing, the court held that failure to encourage the 
accused to obtain state-funded legal representation amounted to an irregularity and 
referred the case back to the regional court for retrial so that the accused could get legal 
representation. In S v Mkhondo 2001(1) SACR 49 (W), the regional court convicted the 
accused of rape, although he had no legal representation during his trial, and referred his 
case to the High Court to impose a life sentence should it not find substantial and 
compelling circumstances. The High Court set aside the conviction and referred the matter 
back to the regional court for retrial. In S v Ndlovu 2001(1)SACR 204 (W), the regional 
court convicted the accused of rape, although he did not have legal representation, and 
referred to his case to the High Court for sentencing although ‘it was not clear whether he 
had been fully informed of his right to legal representation or encouraged to accept legal 
representation.’ At 204. 
1020 S v Dickson 2000 (2) SACR 304(C). 
1021 S v Mkhondo 2001 (1) SACR 49(W), 50. 
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to play an active role in assisting counsel in order to ensure a fair trial.’1022  
It has been emphasised that ‘the right to legal representation mean[s] a right 
to representation that ...[is] competent and of a quality and nature that 
ensure[s] that the trial ...[is] indeed fair.’1023  
The difference between Uganda on the one hand and Mauritius and South 
Africa on the other hand, with respect to the right to legal representation for 
people accused of offences that carry life imprisonment, is that in Uganda 
that right is constitutionally protected irrespective of the accused’s ability 
to pay for his legal representation whereas in Mauritius and South Africa it 
is dependant on amongst other factors, the accused’s inability to pay for his 
legal representation. Unlike in South Africa where both the accused’s 
inability to pay for his legal representation and the seriousness of the 
offence have to be assessed before he qualifies for legal aid in order to 
avoid substantial injustice, in Mauritius, as mentioned earlier, the only 
criterion is the accused’s inability to pay for his legal representation.  
5.6 Courts and theories of punishment in imposing life imprisonment 
As indicated in Chapter II, there are three major theories of punishment: 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. In Chapter III it has been 
illustrated that the international criminal tribunals have emphasised one or 
more of the above theories in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. It 
                                                            
1022 S v Mseleku 2006(2) SACR 574(D), 574. The accused was convicted of rape by the 
regional court. His case was referred to the High Court for sentencing in terms of the MSL. 
Court records showed that the regional court did not mention the age of the victim, inter 
alia. The prosecution argued before the High Court that that oversight did not prejudice 
the accused’s right to a fair trial because he had a legal representative during the trial.   
1023 S v Tandwa and others 2008(1) SACR 613 (SCA), 614. The accused were convicted of 
robbery and on appeal one of them argued that his right to a fair trail was violated because 
his lawyer was incompetent and misled him on the consequences of not testifying. 
However, the appeal was dismissed. 
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has to be mentioned at the outset that, as mentioned in Chapter III, unlike 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals such the ICTR, ICTY and the 
SCSL with are required by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions 
that formed the backbone of their establishment to consider some of the 
above theories of punishment in sentencing offenders,  in Uganda, South 
Africa and Mauritius the relevant penal provisions under which a person 
could be sentenced to life imprisonment do not require judges to put any of 
the above theories of punishment into consideration in sentencing 
offenders. Instead, what the judges do is to weigh mitigating factors against 
aggravating factors to determine whether to impose a life sentence or any 
other sentence or, in the cases of South Africa and Mauritius, to establish 
whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances to deviate from 
imposing life imprisonment. However, in practice, judges have invoked one 
or more of the above theories of punishment in sentencing offenders not 
only to life imprisonment but also to other sentences. As indicated in 
Chapter IV, in Uganda the death penalty is still lawful, whereas in South 
Africa it was abolished after the Constitutional Court’s ruling. In Mauritius 
it was abolished by an Act of Parliament. The question that one needs to 
answer is whether courts in these three different jurisdictions emphasise the 
same or different theories of punishment in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment. 
5.6.1 Uganda 
As shown above, in Uganda, unlike in South Africa and Mauritius where 
life imprisonment is a minimum sentence in some respects, courts have a 
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wide discretion in deciding whether or not to impose a life sentence.1024 
There are no instances where life imprisonment is a mandatory or minimum 
sentence in Uganda. This means that courts weigh various factors before 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. These factors have included the 
heinous manner in which the offence was committed and the remorseless 
conduct of the offender;1025 the effect the crime, such as defilement, had on 
the victim;1026 the manner in which the offence was committed, the 
behaviour of the accused during arrest and the fact that the accused is a 
danger to society;1027 that the offence is rampant;1028 and the fact that the 
offender was a recidivist and appeared ‘to be taking pride in his crimes.’1029 
With regard to theories of punishment, courts have emphasised 
                                                            
1024 See 5.1.1 – 5.1.2 (above). 
1025 For example, in Sayson Muganga v Uganda 2005, the appellant was convicted of 
attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Chief Magistrate. While 
dismissing his appeal against the conviction and the sentence, the High Court held that ‘I 
am persuaded by neither the circumstances of this case nor the arguments of counsel to 
disturb the sentence. The act was ghastly and revolving and no remorse whatsoever was 
shown by the appellant.’ 6. In Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda Criminal Appeal No. 289/2003 
(judgment of 22 January 2007, unreported), the Court of Appeal in dismissing the 
appellant’s appeal against his life imprisonment sentence for defiling a 2 ½ - year – old 
girl, held that ‘[t]he appellant acted savagely.’ 3.   
1026 Uganda v Matumbwe William, Criminal Session No. 24 of 2000 (High Court of Mbale, 
judgment of 26 September 2002, unreported) the accused, a 40-year old man was 
convicted of defiling a five – year – old girl, and in sentencing the accused to life 
imprisonment, the Court held that offender made the victim’s ‘life traumatized till she 
dies.’ 14; Uganda v Guloba Muzamiru 2003: 7, where the accused, aged 22, was convicted 
of defiling a 2 ½ - year – old girl, the Court held that ‘[t]here is no excuse whatever for 
him to do such a thing to this innocent child. The child was penetrated bleeding…’ 7. 
1027 Uganda v Kasozi Lawrence, Case No. HCT-00-CR-0001 of 2002 (judgment of the 
High Court of Kampala, 13 December 2003): 13 – 14. 
1028 Uganda v Togolo Musa, HCT-04-CV-SC-0207/2002 (Judgment of the High Court of 
Mbale of 13 August 2003) the accused, aged 25, was convicted of defiling a 7 – year – old 
girl. 
1029 Uganda v Baguma Moses, High Court Criminal Session Case. No.72/2001 (High 
Court of Fort Portal, Judgment of 10 December 2002, unreported), where the accused was 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for rape which was to run consecutively to the 
sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment he was serving for rape.  
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deterrence,1030 protection of the society or community,1031 and a 
combination of deterrence and protection of society.1032 In Uganda v 
Kikonyogo Swaibu, the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment for 
defiling his one-year old baby and the High Court used a very strong 
language to justify the imposition of a life sentence: 
The accused is a first offender. However, he is a first offender who has 
started his journey to crime in high gear. His act of seeking sexual 
gratification from a baby shows a dangerous level of sexual perversion 
which, unless the convict is put out of circulation for a long time, could 
manifest itself on yet another victim either in accused’s home village or 
anywhere else in this country...The upcoming generation must be 
protected from people of the accused’s insatiable sexual appetite 
especially for toddlers. Therefore, even if [the] convict is a first offender, 
                                                            
1030 For example, in Kikonyogo Swaibu v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No.27 of 2002, 
(Judgment of 26 September 2005, unreported). The appellant was convicted of defiling his 
one – year – old daughter and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal in 
dismissing his appeal against the sentence held that ‘the sentence of life imprisonment 
passed on the appellant was not illegal…The offence committed by the appellant on his 
own baby daughter was a heinous one and warrants a deterrent sentence.’ 5 -6; in Uganda 
v Guloba Muzamiru 2003: 7, where the accused, aged 22, was convicted of defiling a 2 ½ - 
year – old girl, the Court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held ‘[t]he child was 
penetrated [and] started bleeding, so I shall pass a deterrent sentence since this offence is 
so rampant and also the circumstances in which he did it were deadly.’; in Uganda v 
Togololo Musa 2003: 7, the accused was convicted of defilement and in sentencing him to 
life imprisonment, the Court held that ‘[t]he … convict is a first offender, this offence is 
rampant and when the circumstances are considered in which it was committed, it was so 
brutally done under threat that he would kill the victim if she raised an alarm…I shall 
therefore pass a deterring sentence and taking into account the period he has been on 
remand he is sentenced to life imprisonment (20) years. So that the other potential defilers 
can learn.’; in Uganda v Matumbwe William 2002: 14, the accused, a 40-year old man was 
convicted of defiling a 5 – year – old girl, and it sentencing the accused to life 
imprisonment, the judge held that ‘I shall pass a deterrent sentence since he is first 
offender… He is sentenced to life imprisonment.’ 
1031 In Uganda v Wofeda Stephen, HCT-04-CV-SC-0293/2002 (Judgment of the High 
Court of Mbale of 7 August 2003), the accused was convicted of defilement and in 
sentencing him to life imprisonment, the Court held that it had ‘a duty to protect the 
Society against such animalism as demonstrated by the convict.’ 7; Uganda v Kasozi 
Lawrence 2003: 14, in sentencing the convict to life imprisonment for robbery, the Court 
held that ‘[t]he manner in which the offence was committed and the way he behaved when 
he was being arrested show clearly that this is a man that is dangerous to society. Court 
should protect society from the likes of the accused. He is sentenced to life imprisonment.’  
1032 In Uganda v Bahingana William, CHT-01-CR-SC-0071-2001 (Judgment High Court 
of Fort Portal of 22 May 2002, unreported) the accused, a 55 – year – old man, was 
convicted of defiling a 2 ½ - year – old baby girl. In sentencing him to life imprisonment, 
the Court held that the ‘court had to be merciless if society is to learnt that’ the severe 
penalty provided for under the law for defilement ‘is not a formality but that it is meant to 
be a deterrent to would be defilers.’ 
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the ends of justice require that he gets a harsh punishment. He is a brute 
who deserves incarceration throughout his life. For the reasons above, I 
sentence him to life imprisonment.1033 
The above quotation shows that the Court was of the view that the only 
sentence that could keep the accused ‘out of circulation’ for a very long 
period of time was life imprisonment. The Court was clear that the reason 
why the accused was being sentenced to life imprisonment was the need for 
the society as a whole and future generations to be protected from people 
such as the likes of the accused. The Court did not hold that the sentence 
was meant to reform the offender so that by the time he gets out of prison, 
society would be safer as a result of his rehabilitation. It could be agued 
that in cases where courts have emphasised deterrence and protection of the 
society in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment, they are not concerned 
whether the offender will be rehabilitated while in prison or not. That is 
why the judge never mentions that the sentence would enable the appellant 
to be rehabilitated while in prison. In the case where court was of the view 
that a lengthy prison term would serve a rehabilitative role, it mentioned so 
expressly.1034 In some situations, the court although imposes a sentence of 
life imprisonment with a deterrent objective in mind, it does not expressly 
mention deterrence.1035  
                                                            
1033 Uganda v Kikonyogo Swaibu, Criminal Session Case No. 0023 of 2002 (Judgment of 
the High Court of Jinja of 21 March 2002, unreported) 5. 
1034 In Kalibobo Jackson v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2001 (judgment of 5 
December 2001), the High Court convicted the appellant of rape and sentenced him to 17 
years’ imprisonment. In justifying the imposition of a lengthy sentence, the Court held that 
‘I shall pass a deterrent sentence taking into account the 2 years he has stayed on remand. 
Since the maximum sentence for this offence is death, the accused being a young man can 
reform. He is therefore sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment.’ 4. However, on appeal the 
Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to seven years’ imprisonment. 
1035 For example in Uganda v Tigo Stephen, HCT-04-CV-SC-0176/2002 (judgment of 12 
August 2003, unreported) the accused was convicted of defiling an eight – year – old girl 
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Of all the cases reviewed, the author did not come across a case in which 
the court referred to retribution in sentencing an offender to life 
imprisonment.1036 This could be attributed to the fact that of all the cases 
reviewed, there was no instance where the prosecution directly asked court 
to impose a retributive sentence. In most cases, the prosecution asked court 
to impose a deterrent sentence.1037 However, there were cases where the 
prosecutor did not mention the objective the punishment imposed should 
serve and just called upon the court to, for example, impose a ‘severe 
sentence’1038, ‘an appropriate sentence’1039 ‘a maximum sentence of 
death’1040, ‘stiff punishment’1041 or the ‘maximum sentence.’1042 One could 
                                                                                                                                                     
and in sentencing him, the High Court held that ‘I take into account the fact that he has 
been on remand for 2 years, so taking that in account he is sentenced to life imprisonment 
(20 years). So that the rest who intend to do the same can stand warned.’  8. 
1036 It would be a generalisation to argue that courts in Uganda never refer to retribution in 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. It was not possible for the author to study all 
the cases in which offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment. This is because most of 
them are not reported. As regards those used in the study, the author had to visit different 
courts in Uganda and perused through volumes of files to identify them. Probably a study 
of all cases where life imprisonment was imposed could reveal that courts have in some 
instances emphasised retribution.  
1037 For example in Uganda v Tigo Stephen 2003: 7 – 8, the accused was convicted of 
defiling an 8 – year – old and the prosecution submitted that ‘[t]he small girl has to be 
traumatized throughout her life. I therefore pray for a still deterring sentence.’ In Uganda v 
Kasozi Lawrence 2003: 13, the prosecution submitted that ‘[r]obbery is a rampant offence 
which has caused severe sufferings to victims. Pray that the accused is given a deterrent 
sentence.’ 13; in Uganda v Senyondo Umaru, Criminal Session Case No. 0018/99 
(Judgment of the High Court of Masaka of 5 April 2000) the offender was convicted of 
defiling a 7 – months – old baby, and before he was sentenced to life imprisonment, the 
prosecution prayed that ‘a deterrent sentence be imposed on the accused and the would be 
defilers to respect other people’ 16; in Uganda v Guloba Muzamiru, HCT-04-CV-SC-
0004/2003 (High Court of Mbale, judgment of 27 July 2003, unreported) the prosecution 
submitted that ‘[t]he child he defiled was so young. I therefore pray that a deterrent 
sentence be passed’ 6; and in Uganda v Togololo Musa 2003: 7, the prosecution prayed 
that ‘the Court passes a sentence which is deterrent.’ 
1038 In Uganda v Walubiri George, Criminal Session No. 37/2001 (judgment of the High 
Court of Jinja of 22 November 2001), the offender was convicted of defilement and before 
he was sentenced to life imprisonment the prosecution asked court that ‘a severe sentence 
be meted out.’ 18. 
1039 In Uganda v Wofeda Stephen 2003: 6. 
1040 Uganda v Kikonyogo Swaibu 2002: 5. 
1041 Uganda v Baguma Moses 2002: 7. 
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argue that in such cases, the prosecution thought that the punishment would 
achieve a retributive objective because the offender was not being punished 
for purposes such as deterrence or retribution but for breaking the law. As 
discussed in Chapter II, some of those who argue that punishment should 
serve a retributive role are of view that punishment cannot be justified on 
grounds such as deterrence and rehabilitation. In one case where the 
offender was convicted of defilement, the prosecutor asked the court to 
impose a ‘stiff punishment’ because ‘society need [sic] protection.’1043 This 
submission, one could argue, reflects both the retributive and deterrent 
objectives of punishment.   
It is also vital to note that in most of the cases reviewed, although the 
prosecution called upon the court to impose a deterrent sentence, the 
defence did not directly submit that the court should not impose a deterrent 
sentence. The defence instead argued that the court should be lenient 
towards the offender and impose a light sentence without explaining which 
objective of punishment that light punishment would serve.1044 In Uganda v 
                                                                                                                                                     
1042 Uganda v Bahingana William 2002: 6. 
1043 Uganda v Baguma Moses 2002: 8. 
1044 In Uganda v Togolo Musa 2003: 7, the defence prayed ‘for leniency’; in Uganda v 
Guloba Muzamiru 2003: 7, the defence prayed ‘for leniency’; in Uganda v Bahingana 
William 2002: 7 the defence prayed to ‘Court to impose a lenient sentence commensurate 
with the offence committed’; in Uganda v Wofeda Stephen 2003: 7, the defence asked the 
court to exercise ‘mercy’ in sentencing  the offender. However, in Uganda v Nuhuu 
Asuman Kibuka, Criminal Session Case No.507/99 (Judgment of the High Court of 
Kampala of 5 May 2000) the accused was convicted of kidnapping with the intent to 
murder. At sentencing, the prosecution submitted that ‘[t]he offender [sic] attracts a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment. A maximum sentence should be given.’ The 
defence argued that the accused had health problems and that he had spent some time on 
remand and that the ‘period on remand should be taken into account so that the accused 
can be reformed if released early.’ At 19 and 20.   
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Twinomugisha Moses,1045 the accused was convicted of manslaughter 
which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The Court took 
into consideration the fact that the convict was young at the time he 
committed the offence (18 years old) and although the prosecution prayed 
for ‘a deterrent sentence’, the Court sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment 
and held that it could not sentence the offender to life imprisonment 
because ‘[i]t is not in the interest of justice to convict such a young man to 
long custodial sentence. It will nor[sic] reform him. The convict should be 
given a chance to reform and live [as] a useful citizen.’1046  This could be 
interpreted to mean that the Court was of the view that lengthy prison 
terms, such as life imprisonment, are not good for rehabilitation and that if 
courts want offenders to reform, they should sentence them to short prison 
terms.  
Whereas courts are justified in expressing their views with regard to the 
objective the sentence they have imposed should achieve, courts need to be 
careful not to phrase their judgments in a language that casts doubt on the 
ability of the prison authorities to rehabilitate offenders.1047 By holding 
that, if an offender is to reform he should not be sentenced to a long 
custodial sentence, the court is by implication suggesting that prison 
authorities have failed in their duty of rehabilitating offenders and that the 
court should try all it can to ensure that offenders capable of rehabilitation 
are sentenced to short prison terms. It is argued that the reasoning that 
                                                            
1045 Uganda v Twinomugisha Moses (HCT-05-CR-SC-124 of 2003)[2005] UGHC 50 (15 
September 2005). 
1046 Uganda v Twinomugisha Moses 2005: 57. 
1047 Mujuzi 2008(f): 331- 341.  
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courts should not sentence offenders to lengthy custodial terms if they want 
such offenders to reform could violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 
The judiciary should not interfere in the work of the executive (the prison 
authorities) unless the latter’s actions or omission violates the Constitution. 
There were cases where the defence counsel did not even mention the 
theory of punishment the court should rely on in sentencing the offender 
although the prosecution called upon the court to impose a deterrent 
sentence.1048 However, in the cases reviewed, courts did not give reasons 
why they preferred deterrence over rehabilitation. Another important factor 
is that there are cases where offenders have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the court mentioning which objective the 
punishment imposed is meant to achieve. What the court does is to 
emphasise the seriousness of the offence and the aggravating factors and 
then impose a life sentence.1049 In all cases reviewed courts did not engage 
in a detailed discussion of the theories of punishment. As shown in Chapter 
III even judges at international criminal tribunals, such as the ICTR, do not 
engage in a detailed discussion of the theories of punishment although they 
mention them at sentencing.1050 As indicated earlier, most of the offenders 
serving life imprisonment in Uganda were convicted of offences that attract 
                                                            
1048 For example in Uganda v Tigo Stephen 2003: 8, where the accused was convicted of 
defiling an 8 – year – old girl, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Although the 
prosecution prayed for the imposition of ‘a stiff deterring sentence’ the defence submitted 
that ‘[t]he convict is remorseful and sorry. He has a family. He prays for leniency. He has 
been on remand for 2 years. I pray that, that is taken into account.’ 
1049 See, for example, Uganda v Senyondo Umaru 2000: 17 – 18, where the accused was 
convicted of defiling and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without stipulating 
the objective the sentence it imposed was to a achieve although it emphasised the 
seriousness of the offence; and Sayson Muganga v Uganda 2005: 6. 
1050 Chapter III, 3.4.1 – 3.4.2. 
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the death sentence as the maximum sentence.1051 In some of the cases, the 
prosecutors asked the court to impose ‘the maximum sentence’ a ‘stiff 
sentence’ or an ‘appropriate sentence’ without specifically asking the court 
to impose a life sentence. What this has meant is that courts have looked at 
life imprisonment as a lenient sentence resorting to statements such as the 
following  
The convict is a first offender who has been in detention for 2 years and 
10 months. This offence is a serious one which attracts a maximum 
sentence of death ... I shall pass a deterrent sentence since he is a first 
offender having taken into account the period he has been on remand. He 
is sentenced to life imprisonment.1052 
Or 
I consider the convict a first offender. I also consider his age and health as 
pleaded to court by his counsel...Doing the best I can, the only leniency 
which this court can extend to him is to reduce the punishment from death 
to life imprisonment. I accordingly condemn and sentence the convict to 
life imprisonment... I have had to pass this harsh sentence in the hope that 
it will act as a deterrent to the accused who certainly deserves to be out of 
circulation for a long time and those with similar criminal inclinations.1053 
There are cases where offenders have been sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the court mentioning that the offender has been sentenced to life 
imprisonment. All that the courts mention in such cases is the number of 
years of imprisonment to which the offender has been sentenced.1054 For 
                                                            
1051 Chapter IV, 4.2.3.8. 
1052 Uganda v Mutumbwe William 2002: 14. The offender was convicted of defiling a 5-
year old girl. 
1053 Uganda v Walubiri George 2001: 21 – 22. 
1054 In Nuuhu Asuman Kibuuka v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.3 of 2004) (Judgment of 4 
November 2005) the appellant was convicted of kidnapping with intent to murder and 
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. In dismissing his appeal against both the sentence and 
the conviction, the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he sentence of 20 years imprisonment is 
not unlawful. The ground [of appeal] must therefore fail.’ See also Nuuhu Asuman 
Kibuuka v Uganda, (Criminal Appeal No.54 of 2002)[2004]UGCA 17 (20 July 2004) the 
decision which the appellant appealed against to the Supreme Court. In Zungu Denis v 
Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 2003)[2007]UGCA 61 (23 March 2007), the 
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example, in Uganda v Muwonge John,1055 the accused was convicted of 
defiling a 5-year old girl. The Court considered the fact that he was a first 
offender and had a family to care for and held that it ‘will not pass the 
maximum sentence of death. However, considering all the circumstances of 
this case the Accused is sentenced to nineteen (19) years imprisonment. 
Sentence takes [in account] the fact that the Accused has been on remand 
for one years [sic] otherwise he would have been sentenced to 21 years 
imprisonment.’1056 When the prison officials look at the number of years to 
which the offender has been sentenced, they notify him that he was in fact 
sentenced to a life sentence.1057 In some cases courts have mentioned that 
the offender has been sentenced to life imprisonment and the judge goes to 
the extent of mentioning what the sentence means in practice. In Uganda v 
Tigo Stephen, for example, the offender was convicted of defiling an 8-year 
old girl and while sentencing him, the court held that ‘I take in account the 
fact that he has been remand for 2 year, so taking that in account he is 
sentenced to life imprisonment (20 years).’1058 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
appellant had been convicted of defilement and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment by 
the High Court although the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and fanally acquitted him.  
1055 Uganda v Muwonge John (HCT-00-CR-SC-0116 of 2002)[2003]UGHC 10 (20 June 
2003). 
1056 Uganda v Muwonge John 2003. It is argued that probably the Court could have 
intended to impose 20 years’ imprisonment instead of 21 years’ imprisonment because life 
imprisonment means 20 years’ imprisonment. In Baguma Fred v Uganda (Criminal 
Appeal No.7 of 2004)[2005]UGSC 24 (4 November 2005) the appellant was convicted of 
defilement and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In dismissing his appeal against the 
sentence, the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he sentence of 20 years imprisonment is not 
unlawful. The ground [of appeal] must therefore fail.’  
1057 Discussion with Uganda Prisons officials (who preffed to remain anonymous), Luzira 
Prison, 14 January 2008. 
1058 Uganda v Tigo Stephen 2003: 8. 
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5.6.1.1 Conclusion on Uganda 
The above discussion has illustrated that in sentencing offenders to life 
imprisonment, Ugandan courts have a wide discretion. They consider 
factors such as the personal circumstances of the accused, the manner in 
which the offence was committed and the effects the offence had on the 
victim. This wide discretion enables courts to ensure that the punishment 
imposed fits both the offender and the offence. Courts have put more 
emphasis on the deterrence and protection of society as the objectives that 
the sentence of life imprisonment should serve. This could be interpreted to 
mean that if the judge is of the view that the sentence he/she is to impose 
would serve a reformative or rehabilitative objective, he/she would 
sentence the offender to a prison term shorter than life imprisonment. This 
could be gathered, for example, from the sentences imposed where 
offenders have been convicted of defilement. As the discussion above has 
shown, in most of the cases where offenders were sentenced to life 
imprisonment for defilement, the court either emphasised deterrence or 
protection of society or both. However, in cases where offenders have been 
convicted of defilement and sentenced to prison terms as of less than 10 
years, courts have emphasised rehabilitation.1059  
Ugandan courts have not emphasised retribution as an objective of 
punishment in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. This, as has been 
mentioned earlier, could be attributed to the fact that the prosecutors at 
                                                            
1059 For example, in Akampulira Samuel v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 209 of 
2003)[2006]UGCA 12 (3 February 2006), the appellant was convicted of defilement and 
sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. In dismissing the appeal against the sentence, the 
Court of Appeal held that ‘[t]he appellant is supposed to learn something while in prison if 
he is capable of doing so.’ 
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sentencing have often called upon courts to pass deterrent sentences. 
Because of the fact that in some of the cases the accused have been 
convicted of offences that carry the death penalty, courts have tended to 
regard the sentence of life imprisonment as a lenient sentence. As we have 
seen in Chapter III, judges at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals also 
viewed life imprisonment as a relatively lenient sentence compared to the 
death penalty. However, the situation with regard to the ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL and the ICC is quite different, in that life imprisonment is reserved 
for the most heinous offences. This is because, as we saw earlier, it is the 
maximum penalty that these courts can impose.1060 The discussion now 
turns to how courts in South Africa have considered theories of punishment 
in cases where offenders have been sentenced to life imprisonment. 
5.6.2 South Africa 
We have seen in Chapter IV that the sentence of life imprisonment has 
gone through various changes in South Africa.1061 In Chapter IV we have 
also seen the various factors that courts have considered in sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment during the period when the death penalty 
was lawful and also when the death penalty was abolished.1062 Those 
factors will not be repeated here. This section, however, examines the 
theories of punishments that courts emphasised in sentencing offenders to 
life imprisonment in the immediate aftermath of the abolition of the death 
penalty (when life imprisonment was discretionary for all serious offences) 
                                                            
1060 Chapter III, 3.3 – 3.6.  
1061 Chapter IV, 4.2.1. 
1062 Chapter IV, 4.2.1.1 – 4.2.1.2.2. 
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and during the MSL era (when life imprisonment was introduced as a 
minimum sentence for murder and rape committed in certain 
circumstances). The question this chapter attempts to answer is whether 
courts have tended to emphasise different or the same theories of 
punishment in the above two different penal structures when sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment.  
It should be mentioned at the outset that the analysis of case law on life 
imprisonment in South Africa poses one big challenge – thousands of 
offenders who have been sentenced to life imprisonment. This means that 
thousands of cases are not reported. The analysis is therefore confined to all 
life imprisonment cases reported in the South African Criminal Law 
Reports and the South African Law Reports between 1995 (when the death 
penalty was abolished) and January 2009 (when this analysis was carried 
out). A reading of all cases, both reported and unreported, would probably 
lead to a different conclusion or conclusions from the one based solely on 
the reading of reported cases. 
5.6.2.1 Courts and theories of punishment in the immediate aftermath 
of the abolition of the death penalty 
This section discusses the theories of punishment that courts emphasised in 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment during this period. Terblanche 
illustrates that South African courts have always emphasised the following 
purposes or theories of punishment in imposing sentences: deterrence, 
prevention, rehabilitation, retribution and restorative justice.1063 The 
question is how did courts treat those theories of punishment when they 
                                                            
1063 Terblanche 2007: 146 – 178.   
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imposed life imprisonment, which was the maximum sentence after the 
abolition of the death penalty, during that era? 
The well-known case of S v De Kock1064 shows how the court weighed the 
theories of punishment against one another before concluding which of 
them was to be relied on in sentencing the offender to life imprisonment.  
In this case, the accused was found guilty of various political offences, 
including several murders. In sentencing him to two life imprisonment 
terms and 212 years’ imprisonment, the Court considered the four theories 
of punishment: deterrence; prevention; rehabilitation; and retribution. The 
Court held with regard to deterrence and prevention that ‘it remained 
important that the repetition of such behaviour would not be tolerated.’1065 
With regard to rehabilitation, it held that ‘[r]eformation was aimed 
primarily at the offender and where the causative factors for the crimes had 
been removed… rehabilitation was not a prime consideration.’1066 On the 
issue of retribution, the Court held that ‘retribution still played a decisive 
role in sentencing in certain cases.’1067 The Court held that ‘imprisonment 
for life was appropriate where a court wished to protect society effectively 
and permanently against an accused. Imprisonment for life was also the 
ultimate deterrent.’1068 The Court added that life imprisonment ‘especially 
                                                            
1064 S v De Kock 1997. In S v Van Wyk 1997, the appellant was convicted of politically 
related murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. Although the court emphasised the 
seriousness of the offence in imposing the sentence, it did not mention the theory of 
punishment it relied on to impose the sentence. 
1065 S v De Kock 1997: 178. 
1066 S v De Kock 1997: 178. 
1067 S v De Kock 1997: 178. 
1068 S v De Kock 1997: 181. 
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in view of the abolition of the death penalty as the ultimate sanction.’1069 
And that 
imprisonment for life was competent not only where an offender was not 
susceptible to rehabilitation and therefore had to be prevented from 
committing further crimes, but also where the offence committed was so 
abhorrent that it justified the strongest condemnation that society was 
capable of expressing in a sentence. Imprisonment for life was not, 
however, a sentence that left an offender with no hope of release.1070 
The above judgment raises interesting points with regard to the theory of 
punishment that the court thought the sentence of life imprisonment would 
serve. It is clear that the court excluded rehabilitation. It was of the view 
that the serious nature of the offence did not favour the emphasis of 
rehabilitation. It also mentioned that retribution has a role to play when 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment for serious offences. The court 
based its sentence on deterrence (specific deterrence) and the protection of 
the society rather than on retribution.  The court was of the view that by 
sentencing the offender to life imprisonment, society would be protected 
from him and that he would not be able to commit further crimes against 
members of the society as long as he was in prison. The court also seems to 
reason that life imprisonment could be justified on, amongst other grounds, 
the fact that the offender is ‘not susceptible to rehabilitation.’ As will be 
discussed below, even in the MSL era, some courts have held the view that 
the prospect of rehabilitation is one of the substantial and compelling 
circumstances the existence of which has been invoked to avoid sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment.   
                                                            
1069 S v De Kock 1997: 180. 
1070 S v De Kock 1997: 181. 
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Unlike in the De Kock decision where the court mentioned, although it did 
not discuss in detail, the four theories of punishment and indicated which of 
them it based its sentence on, in some cases courts mentioned just one 
theory of punishment which they regarded to be that which a life sentence 
should serve. In S v Martin, for example, the accused was found guilty on 
four counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder, and although 
the state prayed for the imposition of a life sentence as the appropriate 
sentence, the court sentenced the offender to 21 years’ imprisonment 
because, in the court’s opinion, ‘life imprisonment [should] only be 
imposed in exceptional cases, namely those cases where the established 
need to use detention as a means of preventing repetition of crime was a 
reality.’1071 In S v Matolo en ‘n ander the accused were convicted of armed 
robbery and murder.1072 In sentencing them to life imprisonment, the court 
held, amongst other things, that ‘the community has to be protected against 
the onslaughts of such an unscrupulous aggressor by his removal from 
society for the rest of his life.’1073 In S v Schoeman, the court, in sentencing 
the offenders to life imprisonment for murder, held that ‘a sentence of life 
imprisonment is a form of imprisonment which must be considered...where 
the protection of society is an imperative consideration.’1074 In S v 
Stonga1075 the appellant was convicted of rape and murder of an eight-year-
                                                            
1071 S v Martin 1996 (1) SACR 172 (W): 173. 
1072 S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O). 
1073 S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1998: 208. 
1074 S v Schoeman 1995 (1) SACR 423 (T): 424. 
1075 S v Stonga 1997 (2) SACR 497(O). 
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old girl and sentenced to life imprisonment. In upholding the sentence of 
life imprisonment, the High Court held that the manner in which the 
appellant committed the offences meant that ‘he be permanently removed 
from society. To achieve this goal he as a person had to be subordinated to 
the interests of society.’1076 And in S v T, where the accused was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for rape, the court held that the sentence of life 
imprisonment was appropriate ‘where the convicted person represented a 
danger to the physical and mental well-being of other persons sufficiently 
serious to warrant his detention for an indefinite period…’1077  
 
At this point it is important to highlight one important aspect from the 
above five decisions. In all cases the courts, emphasised the protection of 
the community or society against the individual as the justification for the 
imposition of a life sentence. The courts held that by imposing a lengthy 
sentence, the individual, at least for duration of the life term, would be 
removed from society, the assumption being that the society would be safe 
without him.  
 
The case of S v Ngcongo and another1078 is indicative of how the court was 
less clear on the theories of punishment that it believed should be 
emphasised in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment after the abolition 
of the death penalty. The accused were convicted of murder and in 
sentencing them to life imprisonment, the judge concluded thus: 
                                                            
1076 S v Stonga 1997:  498. 
1077 S v T 1997 (1) SACR 496 (SCA): 496. 
1078 S v Ngcongo and another 1996 (1) SACR 557 (N). 
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I must also look at the possibilities of reforming or rehabilitating the … 
accused in this matter. The prison service is equipped to enquire into the 
causes of criminality and provide therapy to help reform the criminal. The 
viciousness and depravity of the deeds of the accused viewed with the 
catalogue of their previous convictions does not inspire optimism that this 
process will be successful. Taking into account all the arguments of 
counsel and the circumstances of this case, I believe that the objects of 
punishment, ie deterrence, prevention, reformation and retribution can 
only be fulfilled by life imprisonment. I am of the view that the 
community can only properly be protected if both accused are 
permanently removed from society.1079 
 
At least three observations can be made from the above quotation. One, the 
court was of the view that the offenders were incapable of rehabilitation 
even though the Department of Correctional Services is equipped to reform 
criminals. Two, the court was of the opinion that the sentence of life 
imprisonment would serve the four objectives of punishment including 
rehabilitation! Three, although the court pointed out that all the objectives 
of punishment could be served by life imprisonment, it is clear that the 
sentence was based on general deterrence when it held that the ‘community 
can only properly be protected if both the accused are permanently 
removed from society.’ This shows that in some cases one needs to be more 
critical to understand the theory of punishment that courts emphasise in 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. This is not isolated to the South 
Africa courts. As we observed in Chapter III, there are cases in which the 
ICTR sentenced offenders to life imprisonment in circumstances that makes 
it difficult to know which theory of punishment the tribunal emphasised.1080 
It is recommended that courts should be clearer with regard to which 
objective they aim to achieve by imposing a life sentence. This would be 
                                                            
1079 S v Ngcongo and another 1996: 559. 
1080 Chapter III, 3.4.1. 
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especially important for the offender to know that, apart from the fact that 
he/she was convicted of a serious offence the lengthy detention is also 
meant to serve another objective, such as, general deterrence.  
Clarity on the objective of punishment could also help the offender on 
appeal to give reasons or adduce evidence why the trial judge could have 
erred in emphasising a particular objective of punishment. It is also 
important that during sentencing both the prosecution and the defence 
submit to the court what objective they regard the sentence to be imposed 
should achieve. In S v De Kock, the prosecution argued that the ‘effective 
imprisonment of so many years be imposed’ whereas that defence was of 
the view that ‘the accused was no longer a danger to society and that it was 
therefore not necessary that he be removed from society for the rest of his 
life.’1081 The fact that the defence raised the issue of the accused no longer 
being a danger to society could explain why the court mentioned different 
objectives of punishment and identified what it thought were applicable in 
the case before it. In all the cases mentioned above, where the court 
emphasised one objective of punishment, records do not show that either 
the defence or the prosecution asked the court to emphasise a particular 
objective of punishment in sentencing. 
As mentioned earlier, when the death penalty was abolished and before the 
minimum sentences legislation was introduced, courts imposed longer 
sentences where people had been convicted of serious offences such as 
                                                            
1081 S v De Kock 1997: 180. 
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murder and rape.1082 It is also important to identify the objectives of 
punishment that courts invoked to impose such lengthy prison terms. In S v 
Mhlakaza and another, the Supreme Court of Appeal in sentencing the 
accused ‘to an effective 38 years’ imprisonment’1083 for several serious 
offences, including murder, warned that ‘since the scrapping of the death 
penalty, sentences of imprisonment in cases where the death penalty would 
have been imposed before the advent of the new Constitution, would 
inevitably be long and such sentences could become more common.’1084 In 
S v M, for example, the appellant was found guilty of murder and rape and 
sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. In reducing his sentence to 33 years, 
the High Court held that ‘sentences in excess of 25 years' imprisonment 
were becoming more common’1085 although it noted that ‘sentences as long 
as this [35 years] were foreign in our law.’1086 The Court held that ‘a 
sentence should be long enough to express society's disapproval of an 
accused's conduct but not so long as to cause him to lose his incentive to 
rehabilitate himself.’1087 In S v Maseko, the accused was convicted of 
robbery and murder and sentenced to an effective 50 years’ imprisonment 
by the trial judge.1088 In reducing the 50 year sentence to 35 years, the 
Court held that such lengthy sentences were meant ‘to try to protect the 
                                                            
1082 In S v Qamata and another 1997 (1) SACR 497 (E), the accused were sentenced to 30 
years’ imprisonment for murder; 
1083 S v Mhlakaza and another 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA): 516. 
1084 S v Mhlakaza and another 1997: 515. 
1085 S v M 1998 (1) SACR 47 (O): 49. 
1086 S v M 1998: 49. 
1087 S v M 1998: 49. 
1088 S v Maseko 1998 (1) SACR 451 (T): 453. 
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public’ from people like the accused because armed robberies ‘were on the 
increase.’1089 As in the cases of life imprisonment imposed during this 
period, in cases where offenders were sentenced to lengthy prison terms of 
30 years or more, courts emphasised the protection of society to justify 
such sentences. However, some judges took note of the fact that lengthy 
prison terms could dissuade the offenders from participating in 
rehabilitation programmes as there would be no incentive to do so. 
In all of the cases studied above, no court mentioned retribution as the 
objective that a life sentence it imposed was to serve. Also no court 
mentioned that the life sentence it imposed was meant to enable the 
prisoner to spend more time in prison for rehabilitation. On the contrary, 
courts were of the view that lengthy prison terms would be a disincentive 
for the offender to participate in rehabilitation programmes. Courts seemed 
to hold the view that a life sentence was justified in protecting the 
community against the offender. In other words, courts were of the view 
that a life sentence would serve both specific and general deterrence 
objectives. Although this was not mentioned in any of the judgments above, 
it could be gathered from the language the courts used when they 
emphasised that life sentences were meant to protect the community from 
the offender. 
5.6.2.2 Minimum sentences legislation era    
In terms of the MSL, a court convicting the offender for murder or rape in 
stipulated circumstances is required to impose a life sentence when there 
                                                            
1089 S v Maseko 1998: 453. 
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are no substantial and compelling circumstances. We have already seen 
what courts have held to be substantial and compelling circumstances to 
avoid sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.1090 It should also be noted 
that some of the factors courts considered as extenuating circumstances or 
mitigating circumstances not to impose the death penalty are now being 
reintroduced as substantial and compelling circumstances to avoid 
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.1091 This is so, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal put it clearly that ‘[s]peculative 
hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to 
imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy 
underlying the legislation, and marginal differences in personal 
circumstances or degrees of participation between co-offenders are to be 
excluded.’1092 While commenting on sentencing under the MSL and in 
particular the criteria that the court has to apply in order to determine 
whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances to avoid 
imposing a life sentence, the High Court recently held that ‘[t]he concept of 
substantial and compelling circumstances has engaged the attention of the 
courts on numerous occasions’1093, and that it has made sentencing ‘one of 
the most difficult and onerous duties imposed upon a judicial officer.’1094  
In sentencing offenders to life imprisonment, some courts have emphasised 
deterrence (without mentioning whether it is specific or general 
                                                            
1090 Chapter IV, 4.2.1.3. 
1091 For these factors see, Chapter IV, 4.2.1.1. 
1092 S v Malgas 2001: para 25(d). 
1093 S v Ntozini 2009(1) SACR 42(E) 46. 
1094 S v Ntozini 2009: 49. 
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deterrence).1095 There are cases where courts have invoked the protection of 
the community or society to justify the imposition of a life sentence. For 
example, it was held that ‘the community is entitled to expect that the 
offender will not escape life imprisonment’1096 where he has convicted of 
an offence under the MSL unless there are substantial and compelling 
circumstances. In S v Hlongwane and another where the accused were 
found guilty of murdering a policeman, the court sentenced them to life 
imprisonment because ‘[a]lthough any murder was detestable, the deterrent 
element of punishment and the interest of society at large seemed to be of 
great importance when it concerned the killing of a member of the police 
force.’1097 In S v Mojaki, the accused was convicted of raping a 10-year-old 
girl, and in sentencing him to life imprisonment, the Court held that ‘[w]hat 
society would we all be if ten-year olds cannot play in the street without 
feeling vulnerable and unsafe? Such innocence must be protected.’1098 In S 
v Ncheche, the court, while sentencing the offender for rape, held that ‘[a] 
woman's body is sacrosanct and anyone who violates it does so at his peril 
and our Legislature, and the community at large, correctly expect our courts 
to punish rapists very severely.’1099 In some instances courts have 
emphasised deterrence in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. For 
example, in S v Khathi where the accused was convicted of murdering a 
                                                            
1095 Dikana v S [2008] 2 All SA 182(E), where the accused was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for arson resulting into death and the trial court emphasised deterrence. On 
appeal, it was held that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances for the 
appellant to be sentenced to a lesser sentence and that the trial judge had come to the right 
conclusion.  
1096 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA): 200. 
1097 S v Hlongwane and another 2000 (2) SACR 681 (W): 682. 
1098 S v Mojaki 2006(2) SACR 590(T): 592. 
1099 S v Ncheche 2005 (2) SACR 386 (W): para 35. 
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traffic officer and robbing him of his gun, the court in sentencing him to 
life imprisonment held that ‘a merely lengthy sentence was unlikely to be 
viewed as an appropriate deterrent. The only appropriate sentence on the 
murder count was one of life imprisonment.’1100  
 
The reason why courts have tended to emphasise deterrence over 
rehabilitation could be explained by the fact that in all the cases reviewed 
above, the offenders were convicted of very serious and rampant crimes 
such as murder and rape. One judge made it clear in the following terms: 
‘[i]t is indeed true that the modern day approach to punishment should lay 
emphasis on rehabilitation and prevention… however, I am of the view that 
deterrence should play a more prominent role because of the seriousness 
and prevalence of the offence.’1101 The Constitutional Court also appears to 
hold the view that life imprisonment should be reserved for those who 
commit either violent crimes or whose pose ‘danger to society.’1102 In other 
words, the Constitutional Court is of the view that people should be 
sentenced to life imprisonment because society is safer when such 
offenders are behind bars. In a case where an offender between the ages of 
16 and 18 was convicted of an offence that attracts a life sentence, it was 
held that ‘[t]he sentence of life imprisonment may only be considered in 
exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances would be present where the 
offender is a danger to society and there is no reasonable prospect of his or 
                                                            
1100 S v Khathi 2008 (2) SACR 589 (W): 590. 
1101 S v Ncheche 2005: para 22 (the judges on appeal quoting with approval statements by 
the trial judge). 
1102 S v Niemand 2001 (2) SACR 654 (CC): para 19. The Constitutional Court found 
section 286 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1977) to be unconstitutional on grounds, inter 
alia, that it could justify the indeterminate detention of a non violent habitual criminal.  
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her rehabilitation.’1103 In S v Tikini the court in sentencing the offender to 
life imprisonment for sodomising and murdering a six-year-old boy, held 
that the accused was ‘an immense danger to society in general and to 
children in particular.’1104 Courts have also emphasised ‘the interests of the 
community’ in imposing life sentences.1105   
 
There are cases where a judge would not expressly mention the objective of 
punishment that a life sentence is to achieve although the words used show 
that he indeed emphasised general deterrence. In S v Olivier, for example, 
in sentencing the offender to life imprisonment for indecent assault and 
murder, the court held that ‘[c]ourts need to send a clear message that it 
will act firmly against the offenders of such heinous crimes lest the 
members of the community take the law into their own hands.’1106 In S v 
Segole, in sentencing the offenders to life imprisonment and other prison 
terms for various serious offences including aggravated robbery and 
hijacking, the Court held that ‘a message must be sent out to criminals that 
society is sick and tired of living in fear…’1107 
  
                                                            
1103 S v Nkosi 2002 (1) SA 494 (W), 505. 
1104 S v Tikini 2008(1) SACR 42(E) para 22. 
1105 S v Obisi 2005 (2) SACR 350 (W) 354, the accused, a 21 – year – old man, was 
convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. In S v Olivier 2007 (2) 
SACR 596 (C): para 35, the Court, in sentencing the offender to life imprisonment for 
indecent assault and murder held that ‘the object of sentencing is to serve the public 
interest and not necessarily to be swayed by public opinion.’ In S v Roslee 2006(1) SACR 
537 (SCA): para 37, the offender was convicted of murder, with the Court emphasing the 
interests of the community in sentencing him to life imprisonment. 
1106 S v Olivier 2007: para 36. 
1107 S v Segole and another 1999(2) SACR 115 (W): 126. 
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Courts have approached the issue of life imprisonment and rehabilitation as 
an objective of punishment in three different ways. First, some courts have 
justified sentencing offenders to life imprisonment on the ground that they 
are unlikely to be rehabilitated. In other words, an offender is sentenced to 
life imprisonment not that his long stay in prison would enable the prison 
authorities to rehabilitate him, but rather because the court thinks that the 
offender should be removed from society for a longer period of time 
because he is a danger to society.  In S v Sidyno, for example, the offender 
was sentenced to life imprisonment because of, inter alia, ‘his unlikely 
[prospect of] rehabilitation.’1108 As indicated earlier, there are numerous 
cases where courts have specifically mentioned that some offenders are 
incapable of rehabilitation.1109 The criteria that a judge uses to determine 
whether an offender is capable or incapable of rehabilitation are not clear 
although courts have repeatedly held that some offenders are incapable of 
rehabilitation. Courts have sometimes based their conclusion on the fact 
that the offender is a repeat offender, especially with regard to serious 
crimes, to conclude that he is incapable of rehabilitation. It was held in case 
where an offender was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment for murder and 
robbery that ‘the prospects of the appellant's rehabilitation must be doubtful 
in the light of his steadfast denial of any involvement in the crimes in 
question.’1110  
 
                                                            
1108 S v Sidyno 2001(2) SACR 613(T): 614. The accused was convicted of seven counts of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on each of the counts. 
1109 See Chapter IV, 4.2.1.3. 
1110 S v Bailey 2007 (2) SACR 1 (C): para 49. 
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It is submitted that unless a complete list of the characteristics or features of 
a person capable or incapable of rehabilitation is developed to guide judges 
in determining which offender falls in which category, it will always be a 
subjective and vague conclusion whether the offender is capable of 
rehabilitation or not.1111 Different courts will always look for different 
reasons to conclude that an offender is either capable or incapable of 
rehabilitation.    
 
The second approach has been for the courts to hold that offenders capable 
of rehabilitation could also be sentenced to life imprisonment. Put 
differently, there are cases where courts have held the view that life 
imprisonment should not be reserved for those offenders categorised as 
being incapable of rehabilitation. In S v Beukes en ‘n ander, for example, it 
was held that ‘life imprisonment was not only to be imposed where the 
accused was incapable of being rehabilitated.’1112 One could argue that in 
cases where offenders have been sentenced to life imprisonment and courts 
do not expressly mention that the sentence is based on the fact that the 
                                                            
1111 The Supreme Court of Appeal has warned judicial officers against conducting 
themselves as psychologists in approaching the question of sentencing. The Court held that 
‘prison [is] primarily an institution of punishment not cure. The approach of the sentencing 
officer [is] not the same as that of a psychologist. The sentencing officer [has] to take into 
account all the recognized aims of sentencing, including retribution; the psychologist [is] 
concerned with diagnosis and rehabilitation. To focus on the well-being of the accused at 
the expense of the other aims of sentencing, such as the interest of the community, [is] to 
distort the process and produce, in the likelihood, a warped sentence.’ See S v Botha 
1998(2) SACR 206 (SCA): 206 (applying the dictum in S v Lister 1993 (2) SACR 228(A): 
232). See also S v Salzwedel and others 1999 (2) SACR 586 (SCA) where the court 
applied the same dictum in reversing a suspended sentence that had been imposed on the 
accused for the racially-motivated murder of black people. The psychologist had 
recommended to the trial court that the murderers should be given a suspended sentence 
because their crimes had been motivated by their hate of black people. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal substituted the suspended sentence with 12 years’ imprisonment. 
1112 S v Beukes en ‘n ander 2000 (2) SACR 412 (T), where the accused’s death sentence 
for murder was commuted to life imprisonment. 
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offender cannot be rehabilitated, some courts are of the view that an 
offender sentenced to life imprisonment is capable of being rehabilitated. 
This is because courts are aware, or are expected to be aware, that the 
Department of Correctional Services has different rehabilitation 
programmes in most of the South African prisons in which offenders 
serving life sentences also participate.1113 For instance, in S v Blaauw,1114 
the accused was found guilty of raping a 5-year-old girl. The Court held 
that it could not impose a life sentence because, among other factors, the 
accused could be rehabilitated. The court went on to recommend ‘that the 
accused be placed as soon as possible in … [a] rehabilitation programme in 
the prison.’1115 However, whether prisoners sentenced to short prison terms 
other than life imprisonment could be rehabilitated remains debatable in the 
light of at least two factors: One, that the Department of Correctional 
Services spends only three percent of its budget on rehabilitation 
programmes;1116 and two, the Cape High Court has warned that ‘most 
prison inmates belong to a gang’ and that ‘without addressing and solving 
the problems of prison gangs, prisons will remain the best guarantee of 
continued crime at the level and intensity which is currently experienced’ in 
South Africa.1117 
 
                                                            
1113 For a discussion of rehabilitation as an objective of punishment and for sources on 
rehabilitation programmes being implemented in South African prisons, see Mujuzi 
2008(f): 331 – 441.    
1114 S v Blaauw 2001 (2) SACR 255(C). 
1115 S v Blaauw 2001: 257. 
1116 Mujuzi 2008(f): 339. 
1117 S v Mark and another 2001(1) SACR 572(C): 584. Where the accused were charged 
with the murder of a fellow prisoner while being transferred from one prison to another. 
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The third approach is for the courts to hold that life imprisonment defeats 
the objective of rehabilitation. In S v Ntozini, the Court, in sentencing the 
offender to 20 years’ imprisonment for rape, held that ‘[t]he sentence of life 
imprisonment required by the Legislature is the most serious that can be 
imposed. It effectively denies the appellant the possibility of 
rehabilitation.’1118 In S v Tshisa en‘n ander the court held that although the 
offender had been convicted of premeditated murder ‘an injustice would be 
committed if life imprisonment was imposed’ and the court sentenced them 
to 22 years’ imprisonment because ‘they could still develop into 
responsible adults.’1119 The challenges associated with relying on the 
possibility of rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling circumstance to 
avoid the imposition of life imprisonment have already been highlighted 
are discussed shortly in the context of the S v Nkomo decision, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was divided on the issue of whether the prospect 
of rehabilitation could be invoked as a substantial and compelling 
circumstance to avoid sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.1120 
However, in what appears to be a reaction to the continued emphasis of the 
fact that the offender should be sentenced to life imprisonment where 
evidence shows that he is incapable of rehabilitation, it was held in S v 
Solomon and another, where the accuseds’ life sentences for murder were 
reduced to 10 years imprisonment, that ‘[t]he potential of rehabilitation 
does not in itself mean that life imprisonment should not be imposed.’1121  
                                                            
1118 S v Ntozini 2009: 48. 
1119 S v Tshisa en ‘n ander 2003(1) SACR 171(O): 172. 
1120 S v Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA). 
1121 S v Solomon and another 2008(2) SACR 149(E): para 24. 
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5.6.2.3 Departing from or watering down one of the criteria in Malgas? 
When the death penalty was declared unconstitutional in Makwanyane,1122 
the government reacted by introducing the MSL which, amongst other 
measures, provided that a person found guilty of some of the scheduled 
offences, in particular of the offences under Part 1 of Schedule 2, was to be 
sentenced to imprisonment for life unless there were substantial and 
compelling circumstances. The CLA did not define what amounted to 
substantial and compelling circumstances. Various courts attached different 
various and confusing meanings to these words. The matter was ‘finally’ 
settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas,1123 which was 
approved by the Constitutional Court in S v Dodo.1124 The word ‘finally’ is 
in quotation marks, because the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
S v Nkomo1125 attests to the fact that even at present, almost a decade since 
the Supreme Court of Appeal laid down the criteria that courts should 
follow to determine what amounts to substantial and compelling 
circumstances, the boundaries seem to be shifting. It is possible that one 
could argue that the criteria set in S v Malgas1126 are either being 
disregarded in some respects by the same court that set them or being 
modified to suit the realities of the situation – that is, to limit number of 
offenders being sentenced to life imprisonment. The Nkomo decision is 
                                                            
1122 S v Makwanyane 1995. 
1123 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA): Para 25.  
1124 S v Dodo 2001. 
1125 S v Nkomo 2007. 
1126 For the criteria set out in Malgas para 25, see, 5.3.2 (above). 
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discussed to illustrate how the Supreme Court of Appeal could have 
watered down one of the criteria laid down in the Malgas decision. And the 
contention here is that this could be a recipe for confusing lower courts 
when they have to decide whether substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist before they impose a life sentence. 
5.6.2.4 S v Nkomo 
A. Facts 
The appellant was convicted in the regional court of rape and kidnapping. 
The complainant testified that she was at the bar drinking a cold drink, 
given to her by the appellant and which he had laced with alcohol. The 
appellant forced her into a hotel room that he had hired, forced her to 
undress and raped her. The appellant locked her in the room and went back 
to the bar for more drinks. She attempted to escape from the room by 
jumping out of a window. She fell some ten metres to the ground and 
injured her leg. Unfortunately, where she fell was where the appellant had 
been sitting and drinking. He forced her back into the hotel room and raped 
her four more times during the course of the night. He also forced her to 
perform oral sex on him, and slapped her, pushed her and kicked her. He 
prevented her from leaving the room again by taking her clothes away. 
When the complainant managed to escape the following morning, she went 
to the police station straight away. The appellant was arrested and charged. 
The regional court sentenced him to a three-year sentence on the 
kidnapping charge and referred him to the High Court for sentence on the 
charge of rape. The High Court did not find any substantial and compelling 
circumstances and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in terms of 
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section 51(1) of the CLA.1127 The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal against the sentence. 
B. Holding 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (the majority) allowed the appellant’s appeal 
and replaced the sentence of life imprisonment with that of 16 years’ 
imprisonment. Most importantly, the Court observed that ‘[t]he factors that 
weigh in the appellant’s favour are that he was relatively young at the time 
of the rapes [he was 29 when he raped the complainant], he was employed, 
and that there may have been a chance of rehabilitation.’1128 Theron AJA 
dissented and held, inter alia, that ‘[t]here is hardly any person of whom it 
can be said that there is no prospect of rehabilitation.’1129 Theron AJA held 
further that she could not agree that the prospect of rehabilitation, of which 
there was no evidence, was a substantial and compelling circumstance 
‘within the meaning of that expression and [is] truly [a] convincing reason 
for departing from the minimum sentence ordained by the Legislature.’1130 
Whereas the majority seemed to think that the prospect of rehabilitation 
amounted to a substantial and compelling circumstance, the minority did 
not agree. 
The language of the Malgas case is very instructive.1131 Courts have to 
make sure that those who have been found guilty of committing the 
scheduled offences are punished severely in order to reflect the intention of 
                                                            
1127 Act No. 105 of 1997. 
1128 S v Nkomo 2007: para 13. 
1129 S v Nkomo 2007: para 30. 
1130 S v Nkomo 2007: para 31. 
1131 See 5.3.2 (above). 
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the legislature in enacting the MSL, unless there are substantial and 
compelling circumstances. This explains why the Court says that ‘the 
specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy 
reasons. Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue 
sympathy...are to be excluded’ and that ‘courts are required to approach the 
imposition of sentence conscious that the legislature has ordained life 
imprisonment... as the sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of 
weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the specified 
circumstances.’ One needs to answer the question whether the prospect of 
rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling circumstance does not fall 
within the ambit of what the Supreme Court of Appeal termed ‘speculative 
hypotheses favourable to the offender’ and ‘undue sympathy.’ To answer 
this question, we need to refer to the discussion of rehabilitation as an 
objective of punishment in Chapter II. 
As shown earlier, rehabilitation as an objective of punishment has a long 
history dating back to the Enlightenment period in Europe.1132 
Rehabilitation has also been part of the South African criminal justice 
system for decades.1133 Whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal considers 
the prospect of rehabilitation to be a substantial and compelling 
circumstance, it does not explain or define what it means by 
‘rehabilitation.’1134 Although the word rehabilitation is used at least on one 
                                                            
1132 See generally Dubber 1998: 113-146. See also Chapter II, 2.4.4. 
1133 In 1915, for example, Gardiner J of the Cape Provincial Division emphasized the 
importance of rehabilitation as the aim of punishment for juvenile offenders. See Rex v 
Hlatse [1915] CPD 1.  
1134 It is the same with the International Criminal Court Statute. It has been suggested that 
‘[a]lthough there is scope for the individual rehabilitation of offenders to be 
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occasion in relation to prisoners in the Correctional Services Act of 
1998,1135 no attempt is made to define it.1136 Rehabilitation is probably 
easier to describe than to define.1137 And this is exactly what the 2005 
White Paper on Corrections in South Africa does. It states that: 
Rehabilitation is the result of a process that combines the correction of 
offending behaviour, human development and the promotion of social 
responsibility and values. It is a desired outcome of processes that involve 
both departmental responsibilities of Government and social 
responsibilities of the nation. Rehabilitation should be viewed not merely 
as a strategy to preventing crime, but rather as a holistic phenomenon 
incorporating and encouraging: social responsibility; social justice; active 
participation in domestic activities; empowering with life-skills and other 
skills; and a contribution to making South Africa a better place to live in. 
Rehabilitation is achieved through the delivery of key services to 
offenders, including both correction of the offending behaviour and the 
development of the human being involved. The correction of offending 
behaviour and development are two separate, but linked responsibilities. 
Rehabilitation is achieved through interventions to change attitudes, 
behaviour and social circumstances. The desired outcome is rehabilitation 
and the promotion of social values and responsibility.1138   
From the above description we can extract the following as the features of 
rehabilitation: rehabilitation is the initiative(s) taken by the prison 
authorities to model the offender’s life during his time in prison in such a 
way that when he is released from prison, either on parole or after serving 
                                                                                                                                                     
accommodated within the ambit of sentence individualisation permitted under Article 
78(1) [of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] by implication, there is no 
attempt made to define the possible meaning of rehabilitation in the wider context of 
international trials, or explain the nature of the values and attitudes that underpin it.’ See 
Henham 2003: 89.  
1135 Act 111 of 1998. 
1136 Under s 18(1) of the Correctional Services Act, ‘[e]very prisoner must be allowed 
access to available reading material of his or her choice, unless such material constitutes a 
security risk or is not conducive for his or her rehabilitation.’ Rehabilitation was also not 
defined in the 1959 Correctional Services Act (which was repealed by the 1998 
Correctional Services Act). See Lidovho 2003: 417.   
1137 In the United States it has been shown that ‘[w]hile most juvenile court practitioners 
agree the purpose of the system is rehabilitative, there is lack of consensus on the meaning 
of rehabilitation.’ See Vieth 2001: 49.   
1138 White Paper on Corrections in South Africa (February 2005), Department of 
Correctional Services: paras 4.2.1 - 4.2.3. 
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his full sentence, he has been reformed to such an extent that he is not 
likely to re-offend; and that the said initiatives could include various 
programmes that are implemented in a manner which ensures that the 
prisoner is reformed holistically.1139 Thus, the Correctional Services Act 
indirectly recognises this point by providing, in section 36, that ‘the 
implementation of a sentence of imprisonment has the objective of enabling 
the sentenced prisoner to lead a socially responsible and crime-free life in 
the future.’1140 The White Paper on Corrections recognises that 
‘rehabilitation is best facilitated through a holistic sentence planning 
process that engages the offenders at all levels – social, moral, spiritual, 
physical, work, educational/intellectual and mental. It is premised on the 
approach that every human being is capable of change and transformation if 
offered the opportunity and resources.’1141 It thus makes it compulsory for 
prisoners to participate in rehabilitation programmes.1142 
                                                            
1139 For the rehabilitation programmes being implemented in prisons and corrections see 
Department of Correctional Services Annual Report for the 2006/2007 Financial Year: 16-
23. It has been suggested that ‘[t]he essence of rehabilitation is to bring about positive 
change in offenders and their fundamental behaviour. This means that the disposition, 
attitude and behaviour of the individual must be changed.’ See Cilliers and Smit 2007: 84.   
1140 It has been stated that ‘[s]ection 36 of the Correctional Services Act defines the 
purpose of imprisonment: after having due regard that the deprivation of liberty serves the 
purposes of punishment, the purpose of a term of imprisonment is to enable the sentenced 
prisoner “to lead a socially responsible and crime free-life in the future”. It is in this 
formulation that the constitutional justification for the rights limitations imposed on 
sentenced prisoners is found.’ See Muntingh, Prisons in South Africa’s Constitutional 
Democracy (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Criminal Justice 
Programme) (2007) 8 available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/correctional/prisonsinsa.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2008. 
(Emphasis in original). Footnotes omitted. 
1141 White Paper on Corrections 2005: para 4.2.4. The White Paper lists various 
government departments that the Department of Correctional Services has to work with to 
holistically rehabilitate offenders. At paras 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. 
1142 White Paper on Corrections 2005: para 4.4.1. For a discussion of optional 
rehabilitation programmes, see Braman 2006: 1180.      
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The Correctional Services Act enumerates the manner in which the above 
objectives will be achieved by requiring a sentenced prisoner to participate 
in various programmes and activities.1143 The Act also provides for the 
custody of prisoners under humane conditions, and this could be interpreted 
to mean that such a step is meant to ensure that prisoners are detained in 
conditions that facilitate their rehabilitation.1144 Community corrections are 
also implemented to facilitate the rehabilitation and re-integration of the 
offenders,1145 so are the parole procedures and conditions.1146 After 
describing what rehabilitation is in the South African context, as provided 
for in the White Paper on Corrections, one needs to look at the problems 
associated with it so as to highlight the likely challenges if its prospect were 
                                                            
1143 Section 37 of the Correctional Services Act provides that 
(1) In addition to the obligations which apply to all prisoners every sentenced 
prisoner must – (a) participate in the assessment process and the design and 
implementation of any development plan or programme aimed at achieving the 
said objective; and (b) perform any labour which is related to any development 
programme or which generally is designed to foster habits of industry, unless the 
medical officer or psychologist certifies in writing that he or she is physically or 
mentally unfit to perform such labour. 
(2) In addition to providing a regime which meets the minimum requirements of this 
Act, the Department must seek to provide amenities which will create an 
environment in which sentenced prisoners will be able to live with dignity and 
develop the ability to lead a socially responsible and crime-free life. 
(3) ... 
(4) ...the disciplinary system for sentenced prisoners shall have the particular aim of 
promoting self-respect and responsibility on the part of the prisoner.  
1144 Chapter III of the Correctional Services Act. Cilliers and Smit 2007: 86, agree that 
rehabilitation cannot take place ‘without first providing inmates with conditions that are 
consistent with human dignity.’  
1145 Chapter VI of the Correctional Services Act. Rabie and Strauss 1985: 31, are of the 
view that ‘successful rehabilitation can take place only within the community and not in 
isolation thereof.’   
1146 Chapter VII of the Correctional Services Act. It has been observed in relation to the 
United States that ‘[t]he relationship between rehabilitation and parole is deeply imbedded 
in the law…In its opinion in Campbell County, the Supreme Court said that rehabilitation 
programs are “intrinsically beneficial and extrinsically essential to parole considerations.’ 
See Lawson 2006-2007: 42. Footnotes omitted. 
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to be mainstreamed as one of the substantial and compelling circumstances 
enabling courts to depart from imposing life sentences. 
C. Challenges facing rehabilitation  
Rehabilitation is largely based on the assumption that the offender, after 
undergoing the various training, and attending the relevant courses in 
prison, will lead a crime-free life.1147 This emerges in the language of the 
White Paper on Corrections where it uses phrases such as ‘rehabilitation is 
achieved through interventions to change attitudes, behaviour and social 
circumstances.’ Thus, for the Supreme Court of Appeal to invoke the 
prospect of rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling circumstance, it is 
contemplating that the offender will be rehabilitated by serving a shorter 
prison term other than life imprisonment. The Court is also invoking 
‘undue sympathy’ towards the offender in the sense that it thinks that life 
imprisonment may be a very severe punishment for him, and that is why it 
opts to impose a lesser sentence. 
Related to the above are the following two issues: First is the matter of 
funding existing rehabilitation programmes; and second are the 
achievements that the Department of Correctional Services has registered 
over time with regard to rehabilitation.  
Whereas the Department of Correctional Services has a huge budget for the 
years 2009 - 2010,1148 this budget has been declining in real and relative 
                                                            
1147 It has been rightly put that ‘the theory of rehabilitation implies that we know how to 
rehabilitate offenders and that facilities exist for the treatment of offenders.’ See Rabie and 
Strauss 1985: 30. 
1148 Approximately R13.7 billion. See Vote 18, Correctional Services at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/ene/18%20correction.pdf 
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values over the past few years. The result is that and that the Department 
has also been unable to meet its rehabilitation targets.1149 As Muntingh 
succinctly put it: 
Indicative of the difficulties in spending on rehabilitation and reintegration 
is the fact that the DCS planned in 2005/6 to have 23% of all offenders 
assessed in respect of their risk profile, a prerequisite for the development 
of a sentence plan that would assist in their rehabilitation. This target was 
not met and risk profiling will now begin in 2007/8 after the necessary 
tools have been approved. Similarly the Department set itself a target of 
30 000 inside work opportunities for sentenced prisoners in 2005/6, but 
only 3400 opportunities were realised. The challenge emerging from this 
is not one of lack of funds, but rather of how to effect spending on the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners. The Corrections Programme 
budget makes specific mention of the new programmes developed and 
planned in line with the White Paper but the amounts involved are small 
and comprise less than 3% of the programme budget. One is therefore left 
with the impression that allocations aimed at implementing rehabilitation 
and reintegration are not strongly articulated in the budget vote.1150 
The question that arises is whether the Supreme Court of Appeal will 
ensure that those people it has sent to prison to be rehabilitated indeed get 
rehabilitated despite the declining real funds of the Department and its 
failure to meet its rehabilitation targets. If the Court is of the view that the 
Department has the capacity to rehabilitate offenders when they are in a 
prison serving sentences other than life imprisonment, why does it hold the 
view that the Department does not have the capacity to rehabilitate 
prisoners serving life sentences? This could be attributed partly to the fact 
                                                                                                                                                     
(accessed 19 March 2009). For the year 2000/2001, the budget for the Department of 
Correctional Services was just over R 5 billion. See 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/1998/review/chapter_01.pdf 
(accessed 19 March 2009).   
1149 Muntingh, ‘Correctional Services Budget 2007/08 to 2009/10’ Civil Society Prison 
Reform Initiative Newsletter, No. 21, March 2007, available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Civil-Society-Prison-
Reform/newsletter/cspri-newsletter/archive-of-cspri-
newsletter/CSPRI%20Newsletter%2021 accessed on 22 October 2007. 
1150 Muntingh 2007. 
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that the Department lacks rehabilitation programmes specifically designed 
for people serving life sentences irrespective of the fact that the number in 
that category of prisoners is growing rapidly.1151  
As pointed out earlier, Theron AJA observed in her dissenting judgment in 
the Nkomo case that there is no person of whom it can be said that he is 
incapable of rehabilitation. This view, as already mentioned, is also 
supported by the White Paper on Corrections which states that ‘every 
human being is capable of change and transformation if offered the 
opportunity and resources.’1152 However, without any ideological 
explanation, some judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal have adopted the 
position that some offenders are incapable of rehabilitation.1153 What this 
means is that the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to reason that offenders 
who are capable of rehabilitation should not be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and by implication, that life imprisonment should be 
reserved for those incapable of rehabilitation. By suggesting that some 
prisoners cannot be rehabilitated, the Supreme Court of Appeal is not only 
casting doubt on the ability of the Department of Correctional Services to 
rehabilitate all prisoners, but it is also indirectly suggesting that the prison 
environment in South Africa is not conducive to rehabilitating offenders. 
                                                            
1151 Personal informal conversation with senior Department of Correctional Services 
officials, 4 September 2007 (National Parliament, Old Chambers Assembly, Cape Town, 
at public hearings on the Correctional Services Amendment Bill). In its 2006/2007 Annual 
Report, the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons indicates that most prisons in South Africa lack 
rehabilitation programmes, and as a result most prisoners spend 23 hours a day in their 
cells. At 21-22.  
1152 White Paper on Corrections 2005: para 4.2.4. 
1153 In Boy and another v S [1999] JOL 5392 (A) in which the accused, who were prisoners 
serving life sentences for killing their fellow inmate by strangulation, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, in sentencing them to life imprisonment held that they were ‘irretrievably 
beyond any possibility of rehabilitation.’ 3.  
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The Court is probably taking cognisance of the fact that, as illustrated 
earlier, the number of prisoners serving life imprisonment is skyrocketing, 
and that many prisons are overcrowded and not conducive for rehabilitation 
purposes, especially for prisoners serving life sentences.1154 The Court 
could also be aware that many South African prisons, as the Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons has pointed out, are characterised by a gang culture 
which is not conductive for rehabilitation.1155 Peacock and Theron 
concluded that ‘[g]ang activities permeate almost every sphere of prison 
life in South Africa.’1156 One could also argue that, by sentencing offenders 
to life imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Appeal believes that because of 
the offences they have committed, the personal characteristics of prisoners 
and the circumstances under which they committed the said offences, 
would take them time to be rehabilitated, thus justifying why they should 
be kept in prison for longer. If this were the view, one would have to assess 
it in light of what the Constitutional Court said in the Dodo case: that it 
                                                            
1154 It has been reported that ‘[d]espite the overall reduction in prison numbers, there are 
numerous prisons that are still badly overcrowded. While 74 prisons [of the 240 prisons in 
South Africa] had less than 100% occupation, 161 exceeded 100% with 72 having more 
than 150% including 38 with more than 175%.’ See Annual Report of the Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons 2005-2006 : para 7.2. In its 2006/2007 Annual Report: 40, the 
Department of Correctional Services also notes that overcrowding is a serious problem in 
prisons. For the latest challenges resulting from overcrowding also see Annual Report of 
the Office of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons 2006/2007: 11. 
1155 ‘It is common cause that many prisoners do not accept the authority of correctional 
officials nor do they necessarily obey lawful instructions. The best examples of these are 
the involvement of many prisoners in prison gangs, gang assaults, and the smuggling of 
contraband. Based on our observations and the reports of Independent Prisons Visitors 
(IPVs), these acts of defiance are common to most prisons…The JIOP receives daily 
reports and complaints from prisoners and their families of assaults and intimidation by 
…prison gangs.’ Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons 2006/2007 supra 
(64) 15. See also S v Mark and another 2001: 584. 
1156 Peacock and Theron 2007: 63. For a discussion of how some gangs formed in prison 
affect communities outside prison see, van Wyk and Theron 2005: 51- 60.   
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would be a violation of the offender’s right to human dignity were he to be 
sentenced to a lengthy period of time in prison for reformative purposes.1157 
By ruling that offenders should not be sentenced to life imprisonment 
because life imprisonment will deny them the opportunity to be 
rehabilitated, the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to be adopting an 
understanding of the purpose of prison sentences that is different from that 
stipulated in the White Paper on Corrections. The White Paper provides 
that ‘rehabilitation needs to be understood in the courts, by those sentenced 
and by the correctional officials as the key reason for sentencing.’1158 This 
should ordinarily include life sentences.  
One important issue that merits discussion, however briefly, relates to the 
question of separation of powers. In addressing this issue we need to ask 
ourselves one question and answer it honestly and directly: should courts be 
reasonably expected to look at the White Paper on Corrections to inform 
their understanding of rehabilitation? Put differently, would not the 
principle of separation of powers be violated if courts were expected to 
refer to a document of the Executive or a government policy, in this case 
the White Paper on Corrections, to establish what does or does not amount 
to rehabilitation? This question is hard to answer. It needs an understanding 
of what is meant by the principle of separation of powers in the South 
African context. 
                                                            
1157 At para 38. It has been stated that ‘[South Africa’s] traditional prisons are not…ideally 
suited to the task of rehabilitation, although valuable work is done there by inter alia social 
workers, clinical psychiatrists, educationists and clergymen’ See Rabie and Strauss 1985: 
30-31. 
1158 White Paper on Corrections 2005: para 4.4.1. 
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The principle of separation of powers is expressly provided for as 
Constitutional Principle VI, which requires that there shall be separation of 
powers between the three arms of government, that is, the executive, the 
judiciary and the legislature, but that there have to be ‘appropriate checks 
and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.’1159 
The Constitutional Court held in the Dodo that ‘[t]here is under our 
Constitution no absolute separation of powers between the judicial 
function, on the one hand, and the legislature and the executive on the 
other’1160, and that ‘[w]hen the nature and process of punishment is 
considered in its totality, it is apparent that all three branches of the state 
play a functional role and must necessarily do so.’1161 It thus follows that 
when courts impose sentences, they should do so in a manner that does not 
seek to eliminate the role of the Executive in the sentencing process and 
outcome unless it is clear that by doing so, that is, by accommodating the 
role of the Executive, courts will be violating the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court adds that the Executive and legislature ‘have a general 
interest in sentencing policy, penology and the extent to which correctional 
institutions are used to further the various objectives of punishment’1162, 
rehabilitation being one of them.  
The extent to which the judiciary should allow the Executive or the 
legislature to influence its sentencing policy, but within the ambit of the 
Constitution, is ‘incapable of comprehensive abstract formulation, but must 
                                                            
1159 S v Dodo 2001: para 14. 
1160 S v Dodo 2001: para 22.  
1161 S v Dodo 2001: para 22. 
1162 S v Dodo 2001: para 23. Footnotes omitted. 
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be decided as specific challenges arise.’1163 The specific challenge which 
has arisen, and needs to be dealt with, relates to the extent to which courts 
can rely on the definition or description of rehabilitation in the White Paper 
on Corrections to inform their approach with respect to rehabilitation. In 
the light of the above discussion, it would not amount to a violation of the 
principle of separation of powers if courts referred to the White Paper on 
Corrections for guidance on what constitutes to rehabilitation in the South 
African context. This is because it is through the White Paper on 
Corrections that the Executive communicates to the judiciary what it thinks 
rehabilitation should mean, and unless by adopting that understanding of 
rehabilitation the courts will be violating the Constitution, there is no 
reason why they should not do so. Otherwise courts could develop an 
understanding of rehabilitation which is not in line with the Executive’s, 
and the result would be, as happened in the Nkomo case, that the court will 
consider as the role of punishment (in this case rehabilitation) in a manner 
opposed to that of the Executive.  
We have to recall that there are at least two occasions when the 
Constitutional Court referred to White Papers in its decisions, which 
supports our view that courts can refer to the White Paper on Corrections. 
In Die Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole 
Dimakatso Ann Nkiane v Die Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaat the White 
Paper on Education was referred to in a case where the applicants 
challenged the Province’s policy of ‘terminating bursaries and transport 
subsidies for pupils attending what were known as “state-aided-
                                                            
1163 S v Dodo 2001: para 26. 
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schools”.’1164  Recently, and most importantly, in M v S (Centre for Child 
Law Amicus Curiae), the Constitutional Court expressly relied on the White 
Paper for Social Welfare, which emphasises the importance of the family in 
society and in the upbringing of children, to hold that ‘the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of family care’ is one of the factors that must be 
considered by the sentencing court, especially where the convicted person 
is the primary caregiver.1165 
Unless a comprehensive study were carried out to evaluate the 
effectiveness on prisoners of the rehabilitation programmes being 
implemented by the Department of Correctional Services,1166 the prospect 
of rehabilitation remains highly speculative, and there is indeed no 
guarantee that some of the prisoners sentenced to prison terms other than 
life imprisonment will be rehabilitated. The White Paper acknowledges that 
‘to achieve rehabilitation, serious study is needed into the ...rehabilitative 
effects of various alternative sentences in order to develop, as an integrated 
justice system, guidelines to assist the judiciary in sentencing convicted 
individuals.’1167 The Supreme Court of Appeal will need to set the record 
straight by either explaining what it meant for the prospect of rehabilitation 
to be one of the substantial and compelling circumstances, or to revisit its 
ruling in the Malgas case and explain what it meant by speculative 
                                                            
1164 Die Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir Staatsondersteunde Skole Dimakstso Ann 
Nkiane v Die Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaat 1998(3) SA 692: para 1. 
1165 M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 2007(12) BCLR 1312(CC): para 38. 
1166 In the United States, it has been pointed out that ‘…a comprehensive 1998 report to 
Congress funded by the National Institute of Justice reviewed all of the relevant research 
conducted since the mid-1980s, and concluded that rehabilitation programs can indeed 
effectively change offenders.’ See Warren 2007: 1308.  
1167 White Paper on Corrections 2005: para 6.1.4. 
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hypotheses and undue sympathy to the offender as factors that should be 
excluded from the composite yardstick of what amounts to substantial and 
compelling circumstances. The Court will also need to develop criteria that 
should be used to gauge whether a particular offender is capable of 
rehabilitation or not, so that the lower courts can be able to follow the 
Court’s reasoning without much confusion. Otherwise, one is left with no 
option but to conclude that the majority ruling in the Nkomo case has paved 
the way for future confusing interpretations of what amounts to substantial 
and compelling circumstances, which we had hoped had been ‘finally’ 
settled in the Malgas case. 
Still on the question of theories of punishment, there are cases in which 
courts have sentenced offenders to life imprisonment without mentioning 
the theory of punishment that has been relied to justify the sentence. What 
courts have done is to emphasise the seriousness of the offences and the 
aggravating factors and hold that there are no substantial and compelling 
circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence.1168 In S v Snoti, 
for example, the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment for raping a 
nine-year old girl when he knew that he was HIV positive. The court did 
not mention the objective that the punishment it imposed would serve 
although it mentioned that the offence placed the case ‘within the worst 
category of rape cases.’1169In S v Van Wyk the offender was convicted of 
rape and in sentencing him to life imprisonment the court emphasised that 
                                                            
1168 See, for example, S v Robiyana and others 2009 (1) SACR 104(Ck), where the 
offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment for serious offences such as murder and 
where the court held that life imprisonment in the circumstances was not shockingly 
disproportionate. 
1169 S v Snoti 2007 (1) SACR 660 (E): 663. 
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‘[t]his is not a case which could be considered to be a borderline 
rape…This was a deliberate act of savagery which all too commonly occurs 
in South Africa.’1170 In S v Vermeulen the accused were found guilty 
murder in that they buried the deceased alive causeing her death. In 
upholding the sentence of life imprisonment that had been imposed by the 
High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not mention the theory of 
punishment that the upheld sentence would serve. Instead it emphasised the 
seriousness of the offence and held that ‘[t]he killing was cruel, inhuman 
and degrading and no self-respecting society can tolerate deeds of this 
nature.’1171  
One could argue that in cases where offenders have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the courts mentioning the objective of punishment 
that the sentence should achieve, courts probably have a retributive 
objective in mind. This is because, as we saw in Chapter II, retribution is 
premised on the notion that the offender should be punished because he 
committed an offence and not because of any other reason such as 
rehabilitation or deterrence.1172 It could be argued that by emphasising the 
seriousness of the offence in imposing a life sentence, courts are punishing 
the offender not for no reason other than he/she committed a serious 
offence. The MSL does not require the court to take into consideration any 
objective of punishment in determining whether or not to impose a life 
sentence. What the court is required to do is to determine whether there are 
                                                            
1170 S v Van Wyk 2000 (1) SACR 45(C): 51. 
1171 S v Vermeulen 2004(2) SACR 174(SCA): para 33. 
1172 Chapter II, 2.4.1.1. 
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substantial and compelling circumstances that justify the imposition of a 
sentence less than life imprisonment. 
The case of S v Vuma1173 shows one of the consequences flowing from the 
inability of the courts to establish the existence of substantial and 
compelling circumstances. The accused was convicted of murder ‘in that he 
had participated in the death of the deceased while acting in common 
purpose with the actual killer.’ Although the court found that ‘the accused 
had favourable personal circumstances’ they were not strong enough to 
reach the threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances.1174 In 
sentencing him to life imprisonment, the judge was of the view that he ‘was 
convinced that the sentence [he] was about to impose was grossly and 
utterly inappropriate’ but that he was ‘compelled, most reluctantly and 
under protest’ to do so.1175 However, the judge ‘recommend[ed], possibly 
irregularly, that the accused be considered for all available reductions or 
remissions of sentence and for the earliest possible parole’ and ‘direct[ed] 
that a copy of this judgment accompany his detention warrant and be 
brought to the attention of the relevant authorities.’1176 
5.6.2.5 Conclusion on South Africa 
There are several observations that could be made from the above 
discussion; One, courts seem to be leaning more towards deterrence and 
protection of the community than towards retribution and rehabilitation in 
                                                            
1173 S v Vuma 2003(1) SACR 597(W). 
1174 S v Vuma 2003: 597. 
1175 S v Vuma 2003: 605. 
1176 S v Vuma 2003: 605. 
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sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. Ugandan courts are also similary 
inclined towards deterrence; Two, there are cases where courts do not 
mention the theory of punishment on which the sentence of life 
imprisonment is based. This could be attributed to the fact that the MSL 
does not require courts to impose sentences with certain punishment 
objectives in mind. This should be distinguished from the jurisprudence of 
the international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR, ICTY and the SCSL 
where the founding documents emphasise the objectives of punishment that 
should be imposed on those convicted of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.1177  
5.6.3 Mauritius 
Courts in Mauritius have emphasised ‘retribution, the protection of society, 
the prevention of crime and the reformation of the offender [as] the aims of 
legal punishment.’1178 One can safely say that whether the court will 
emphasise or highlight the objectives that a sentence of penal servitude for 
life will serve has been influenced by the offence of which the offender has 
been convicted, and the nature of punishment provided for under the 
relevant legislation. In cases where courts have the discretion to determine 
whether to sentence an offender to penal servitude for life or to lesser 
sentence, courts have not only weighed the mitigating and aggravating 
                                                            
1177 See Chapter III generally. 
1178 Rex v Millien 1949 MR 35: 48. The accused was convicted of sedition. In Francis 
Stephen Joseph v The State 1994 SCJ 372 where the offender was sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment for drug trafficking, the Court emphasised deterrence but also observed that 
are other theories of punishment such as incapacitation, desert, and protection of society 
but warned that too much theory could cloud the purpose of sentencing. In Hummujuddy v 
The Queen 1961 MR 158, in sentencing the appellant for involuntary homicide, the 
Intermediate Court emphasised ‘just retribution’ although the Supreme Court set aside 
both the conviction and sentence. 
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circumstances, but have also mentioned the objective of punishment that 
the sentence of penal servitude for life should serve. In State v Kung Tai 
Yan, for example, the offender was convicted of five counts of 
manslaughter. In sentencing him to penal servitude for life, the Supreme 
Court held that  
[t]he sentence that can be imposed for the offence of Manslaughter is 
penal servitude for life or for a term not exceeding 20 years.  I take into 
consideration the accused’s plea of guilty, his age and his clean record.  
However, given the circumstances of the offence, I am of the view that 
penal servitude for life is the appropriate sentence which the accused 
deserves in respect of each count, when looked at individually, although 
he can only have but one life span.  I therefore sentence him to penal 
servitude for life under counts I, III, IV, VII and X, the sentences to run 
concurrently.1179 
Although the Court does expressly mention that it based its sentence on 
retribution as a theory of punishment, it is submitted that by holding that 
penal servitude for life was the sentence that the accused ‘deserved’ for the 
offences he committed, the Court based its sentence on retribution. As we 
have seen in Chapter II, retribution is founded on the principle of just desert 
which holds that the offender is punished not for any other purpose such as 
his rehabilitation or deterrence but because he ‘deserves’ to be punished for 
the offences he committed.1180 In State v Sockalingum Veeren, the accused 
pleaded guilty to the murder and rape of a nine-year-old girl. In sentencing 
him to penal servitude for life for manslaughter and 30 years’ imprisonment 
for rape, the court emphasised the facts that the accused had previous 
criminal records and that the accused had to get a severe sentence because 
he committed his offences ‘at a time when the State and the international 
                                                            
1179 State v Kung Tai Yan 1999 SCJ 273, 275. 
1180 Chapter II, 2.4.1.1. 
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community are pressing for better protection of children.1181 It could be 
argued that in this judgment the Court based its sentence not only on the 
seriousness of the offences that the accused had committed, but also on the 
need to protect children from people such as the accused. The Court was of 
the view that by sentencing him to penal servitude for life, it would further 
the efforts of the international community and the State in protecting the 
rights of children. 
There were cases where the accused were sentenced to penal servitude for 
life without the court mentioning the objective the punishment it imposed 
was to serve. These were cases where offenders were sentenced under the 
Dangerous Drugs Act which prescribed a mandatory penal servitude for life 
for drug trafficking. The judge merely mentioned the offence or offences 
for which the accused had been convicted, the law under which the 
sentence was provided for, the offence and then concluded that the accused 
has been sentenced to ‘penal servitude for life.’1182 In those cases, the judge 
                                                            
1181 State v Sockalingum Veeren 1995 SCJ 246: 248. 
1182 See for example, State v Eric Solomon John 1998 SCJ 117, the accused was sentenced 
to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking;  State v A.M. Shaik 1997 SCJ 399, accused 
sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; State v Juma Ali Saidi Weta 1998 
SCJ 131, where the accused was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking;  
State v Mrs Rajwantee Wooseye and others 1995 SCJ 421, where the first accused was 
sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; State v Satianan Urjoon and anor 
1999 SCJ 193, in which the first accused was sentence to penal servitude for life for drug 
trafficking;  The State v Hamood Said Hamood AL-BUSAID 2000 SCJ 251, the accused 
was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; The State v A.M. Sardar 
1996 SCJ 319, the accused was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; 
The State v G.Ariyayakrishnan 1998 SCJ 350, here the offender was sentenced to penal 
servitude for life for drug trafficking; in The State v Habib Hasham Jam 1998 SCJ 316, the 
offender was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; The State v 
Ramburrun N. and Luchun S 2002 SCJ 95, the offender was sentenced to penal servitude 
for life for drug trafficking; The State v Mamitiana Thomson Rasamoelina 1998 SCJ 396, 
the offender was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking;  The State v 
Mohamed Abzein Alawy 1998 SCJ 56, the accused pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and 
was sentenced to penal servitude for life; The State v Rakesh Kumar Lakar 1998 SCJ 341, 
the offender was sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking; The State v Syed 
Parvez Syed Abdul Kader 1996 SCJ 368, the offender was sentenced to penal servitude for 
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was not required to motivate why he had sentenced or not sentence the 
offender to penal servitude for life. What the judge was required to do was 
to hold that the accused had been found guilty of an offence that attracted a 
sentence of penal servitude for life and to state that he had no alternative 
but to impose the sentence. However, even in cases where the penal 
servitude for life was a mandatory sentence, it was possible to gather from 
the language used in some of the judgments that the judge, apart from 
imposing the required sentence, also regarded the sentence as serving a 
particular objective of punishment. For example, in The State v Fazal 
Hussain, the accused was convicted of drug trafficking. In sentencing him, 
the Court made the following statement: 
[f]rom the evidence adduced and from the account given by accused 
himself, it is clear that the accused has knowingly joined the band of 
traffickers.  On account of their insatiable greed for money those sinister 
vultures trade and feed on the life of their victims by proliferating such a 
deadly substance like heroin which, they know fully well, destroys and 
kills.  Drug traffickers are the enemies of mankind and represent a 
permanent threat to man and humanity.  The ultimate consequence of their 
sordid activities is the destruction of numerous innocent and valuable 
lives.  
The Legislator ha[s] provided a special penalty under S 38 (4) for offences 
committed under S 28 (1) (c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act.  Those who 
have committed such offences as traffickers should be subjected to the full 
rigour of the law. By virtue of S 28 (1) (c) and S 38 of the Dangerous 
Drugs Act ... as amended and pursuant to S 2 (2) of the Abolition of Death 
Penalty Act ... I sentence the accused to undergo penal servitude for 
life.1183 
 
Whereas the Court does not say so directly, the language used could be 
interpreted to mean that the Court held the view that the sentence it was 
                                                                                                                                                     
life for drug trafficking; and The State v Winstone 2001 SCJ 201, the offender was 
sentenced to penal servitude for life for drug trafficking. 
1183 The State v Fazal Hussain 1996 SCJ 305A: 51. 
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about to impose was to serve both the retributive and deterrent objectives. It 
is retributive in the sense that the offender was being punished severely for 
the offence he committed. It is deterrent in the sense that the Court wanted 
to send out a clear message to potential drug traffickers that should they 
join that business, the Legislature provided for heavy penalties which 
awaits them and the courts are ready and willing to impose those penalties. 
One could also argue that the language of the Court could be interpreted to 
mean that the Court wanted society to be protected from people like the 
accused who deal in substances that not only destroy but also kill those who 
use them. 
    
In some cases the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against 
the conviction for the offence for which the penal servitude for life was 
imposed without highlighting the objective the sentence of penal servitude 
for life should serve. The Court did not even highlight the seriousness of 
the offence. What it mentioned was that the appellant was rightly convicted 
and sentenced accordingly.1184 This approach could be attributed to the fact 
that in most of the cases reviewed,1185 no appellant appealed against the 
                                                            
1184 See for example, Mrs S.B. Chharee v The State 2000 SCJ 328, where the appellant’s 
appeal against the conviction in trafficking in heroin for which she was sentenced to penal 
servitude for life was dismissed by the Supreme Court; in Ramburrun Navin and Luchun 
Sanjay v The State 2004 SCJ 219, the Supreme Court upheld the appellants’ conviction 
and sentence of penal servitude for drug trafficking by only highlighting the fact that the 
appellants were rightly convicted; Wadud M.A.R.A v The State 1999 SCJ 187, where the 
appellant’s appeal against the conviction for drug trafficking for which she was sentenced 
to penal servitude for life was dismissed; Ariyakrishnan G v The State 1999 SCJ 103, 
where the appellant’s appeal against a conviction for drug trafficking was dismissed; and 
David Ibanda v The State 1997 SCJ 106, where the appellant’s death sentence for 
trafficking heroin was converted into penal servitude for life. 
1185 In Unmole H and v State 2006 SCJ 138, the appellant was sentenced to penal servitude 
for life for drug trafficking and he appealed against the sentence, arguing that it was 
excessive. The court dismissed his appeal and held that the sentence of penal servitude for 
life was not manifestly harsh or excessive.  
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severity of the sentence imposed.1186 Most of them appealed against the 
conviction. This could be attributed to the fact that if the appellant is 
acquitted, the sentence of penal servitude for life automatically falls away, 
and, if the appeal is dismissed, the court has no alternative but to impose a 
sentence of penal servitude for life. As we have seen earlier, because of the 
fact that courts in Uganda and South Africa have the discretion to impose 
life sentences in all cases, some of the appellants have appealed against the 
severity of the sentence imposed and the appellate courts have had to 
justify why in the circumstances the appellant had to be sentenced to life 
imprisonment.   
Because of the fact that life imprisonment was a mandatory sentence for 
drug trafficking and courts did not have to consider aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances,1187even if the accused pleaded for leniency and 
                                                            
1186 In Lacloche v The State 1961 MR 91, the appellant was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment for the possession of explosives. He appealed against both the conviction 
and the sentence and argued that the sentence was excessive. The court held that the 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment was not excessive in the light of the fact that the 
appellant could have been sentenced to penal servitude for life. 
1187 In State v A.M. Shaik 1997 SCJ 399: 314 in sentencing the offender, the Supreme 
Court held that ‘[u]nder section 38(4) of the Dangerous Drugs Act…read in conjunction 
with section 2(2) of the Abolition of Death Penalty Act… a mandatory sentence of penal 
servitude for life is provided for in the case of a person who is convicted of importation of 
heroin under section 28(1)(c) of the Act and is found to be a trafficker. Therefore the 
question of mitigating circumstances does not arise. I accordingly sentence the accused to 
undergo penal servitude for life.’ In State v Mukasa James Kanamwanje and anor 1997 
SCJ 411, the accused were convicted of drug trafficking and the prosecution submitted that 
both of them had not previous convictions. The Court held that ‘[b]y virtue of S 38(4) of 
the Dangerous Drugs Act… pursuant to section 2(2) of the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty Act… there being a fixed penalty provided for a person convicted under S 
28(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act…as trafficker, there is no room for mitigation. I 
accordingly sentence…[both the accused] to undergo penal servitude for life.’ See 409, 
emphasis in original. In The State v Akbar Ali and Anwar Ali Abjani 2000 SCJ 112 both 
the accused were convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to penal servitude for life. It 
had been argued that accused one did not have a previous record and he had cooperated 
with the police in arresting the second accused but the Court in sentencing him to penal 
servitude for life held that ‘the sentence imposed by the law for such an offence is 
mandatory.’ At 120. In The State v Maryam Abdul Razak Abdul Wadud 1998 SCJ 210, the 
offender was convicted of drug trafficking and in sentencing the offender to penal 
servitude for life the Court held that ‘[u]nder section 38(4) of the Dangerous Drugs 
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was remorseful,1188 or the objective the punishment to be imposed was to 
serve, in one instance the Supreme Court imposed a penal servitude for life 
on an offender not because he had been charged with and convicted of the 
same serious offences as his co-accused, but because it was of the opinion 
that because his co-accused had been sentenced to penal servitude for life 
he also automatically qualified for the same sentence.1189 However, the 
error was rectified latter and the offender was sentenced to 18 years’ 
imprisonment instead of penal servitude for life.1190    
However, in cases where offenders have not been sentenced to penal 
servitude for life and where courts have the discretion to impose the 
appropriate sentence, courts have invoked different theories of punishments 
                                                                                                                                                     
Act…read in conjunction with section 2(2) of the Abolition of Death Penalty Act… a 
mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life is provided in the case of a person who is 
convicted of importation of heroin under section 28(1)(c) of the Act and is found to be a 
trafficker. Therefore the question of mitigating circumstances does not arise.’ At 213. 
1188 In State v M Nawakwi 1998 SCJ 93, the accused was convicted of trafficking in drugs 
and although she pleaded for lenience and said she was remorseful, the Court sentenced 
her to penal servitude for life without making a comment on her remorseful character. In 
State v Prem Raaj 1997 SCJ 426, accused was convicted of drug trafficking and at 
sentencing he told court that ‘he had never been involved in drug dealing before and that 
he was ashamed of what had happened and prayed for clemency…[H]e acted out of mere 
childishness and foolishness. He regretted having spoilt the bright future he had ahead of 
him and begged for mercy.’ The Court held that ‘[t]he accused having been found to be a 
trafficker, the question of mitigating circumstances does not arise. Pursuant to section 
38(4) of the Dangerous Drugs Act…and section 2(2) of the Abolition of Death Penalty 
Act…I sentence the accused to undergo penal servitude for life.’ See 428 and 429. 
1189 In R.K. Dussaruth and others v The State 1996 MR 189, the three appellants were 
convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. The first appellant 
was charged with aiding the procuring and transportation of drugs an offence that carried a 
lesser sentence than drug trafficking which carried a mandatory term of penal servitude for 
life. The Supreme Court revised the sentencing error on the part of the judge and 
substituted the 18 years’ sentence by penal servitude for life which was the mandatory 
sentence for drug trafficking.   
1190 Dussaruth R.K. v The State 1996 SCJ 349A where the Court held that ‘[f]urther to our 
judgment, we have now ascertained that a mistake has been made in respect of the 
sentence passed on appellant Dussaruth. Counsel on all sides at the hearing unfortunately 
did not draw the attention of the Court that the sentence of penal servitude for life could 
not apply to appellant Dussaruth. In the circumstances, in order to comply with the 
provisions of section 38(3) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1986, we amend our judgment by 
substituting for the sentenced passed on appellant Dussaruth one of fine Rs 52,000 
together with penal servitude for a term of 18 years.’ 
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to justify the sentences imposed. These theories have included 
deterrence;1191 the fact that the sentence would ‘meet the ends of 
justice’;1192 the court must ‘send a clear signal that those who are guilty of 
[serious] crimes...will be dealt with severely’;1193 and that it is ‘essential to 
protect the community against such offenders for along time... [and] to 
demonstrate as clearly as possible to others who may be tempted to resort 
to such serious crimes that they would not be treated with leniency.’1194 
Courts have also emphasised rehabilitation especially in cases of petty 
offenders,1195 but also in cases where offenders have been convicted of 
serious offences.1196  
                                                            
1191 For example, in Hurrucksing Jacques Desire Edley v The State 1996 SCJ 284, the 
Supreme Court in dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction and 3 year’s 
sentence for dealing in drugs held that the sentence was justified because the appellant had 
not been ‘deterred’ by previous convictions and sentences for related offences; in The 
State v Robertson JJ 2008 SCJ 203, the accused was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment 
for murder and the court emphasised deterrence;  
1192 The State v Momus Joseph Rajesh and another 2006 SCJ 67, where offenders pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment instead of the 20 
years’ maximum sentence. The court also took into consideration the fact that they had 
spent two years in custody awaiting trial. 
1193 The State v Robertson JJ 2008: 308 (quoting the previous decisions of State v A. 
Ghumaria 2008 SCJ 184; State v S. Vyapooree 2008 SCJ 136; and State v P. Taka and 
anor 2007 SCJ 174, in which the court emphasised similar objectives of punishment.’    
1194 The State v Takah P and anor 2007: 7, where the two accused were sentenced to 32 
years’ and 26 years’ imprisonment for murder, respectively. 
1195 In Gokhool K S v The State 2008 SCJ 340, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to 
four months’ imprisonment for possession of a small amount of cannabis. The Supreme 
Court set aside the sentence and remitted the case to the magistrate to impose an 
appropriate sentence that could facilitate the appellant’s rehabilitation. In Sunnotah D v 
The State 2008 SCJ 277, the Supreme Court held that the appellant’s sentence of two 
years’ imprisonment for offering cannabis for sale could not prevent him from being 
rehabilitated. In Thodda v The State 2005 SCJ 67, the appellant’s 18 months’ 
imprisonment for larceny was reduced to nine months to facilitate his rehabilitation.  
1196 For example, in Leboeuf LG v The State 2009 SCJ 30, in reducing the appellant’s 
sentence for murder from 45 to 30 years’ imprisonment, the Court considered the fact that 
he had been of good conduct in prison and that also participated in the prison’s 
rehabilitation activities. 
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Following the 2007 Supreme Court ruling that the mandatory penal 
servitude for life for drug trafficking was unconstitutional,1197 the 
government amended the outlawed provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act 
to provide, inter alia, that a person found guilty of drug dealing is liable to 
be sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 – 60 years, 
depending on the street value of the drugs.1198 These provisions clearly give 
the court a wide discretion to determine which sentence to impose on an 
offender convicted of drug trafficking, depending on different factors, 
including the seriousness of the offence and the personal characteristics of 
the offender. This wide discretion also gives the court room to invoke 
theories of punishment to justify the sentence imposed on the offender. 
Since the 2007 amendment, courts have sentenced drug traffickers to 
lengthy prison terms, and deterrence and protection of society are the only 
theories of punishment that have been highlighted in all the cases reviewed 
in this study.1199 In many judgments, the Supreme Court has held that it has 
‘continuously and repeatedly emphasis[ed] the catastrophic consequences 
on Mauritian society of the drug scourge and the imperative need for a 
severe penalty which can serve as an effective deterrent. The 
sentence...must also act as a clear and unequivocal signal to offenders of 
that sort, who are very much on the increase, that no leniency can be 
                                                            
1197 Chapter IV, 4.2.2. 
1198 Sections 30 and 41 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The higher the street value of the 
drugs, the severer the sentence to be imposed. 
1199 The author reviewed all the sentences since the 2007 amendment when offenders were 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment of more than 10 years for drug trafficking. All the 
judgments reviewed are referred to in this section.  
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expected.’1200 In State v Bruls BT and another, in sentencing both the 
accused to 24 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking, the Supreme Court 
held that it ‘has repeatedly stated that the sentence passed must reflect the 
seriousness of the offence and also to serve as a deterrent to would-be 
offenders’ and that it is ‘the duty of the Court to protect society against the 
drug scourge.’1201 In State v Charles LJ, in sentencing the offender to 28 
years’ of imprisonment for drug trafficking, the Supreme Court held that 
‘the sentence passed must...act as a deterrent’ and that if the Court imposed 
                                                            
1200 State v Bajiji RSM 2008 SCJ 234, 242. The offender was sentenced to 32 years’ 
imprisonment for drug trafficking. In State v Gooranah 2008 SCJ 239, 249 in sentencing 
the accused to 32 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking, the Court emphasised that 
drugs ‘cause considerable harm to Mauritian society and its youth in particular’, that ‘it 
has been repeatedly highlighted in all the judgments’ that drug traffickers ‘must be 
severely dealt with…The sentence imposed…must also act as a deterrent which may 
effectively deal with the drug trafficking scourge.’ In State v Du Preez GI 2008 SCJ 56, 
57, in sentencing the offender to 10 years’ imprisonment for importing drugs into 
Mauritius, the Court held that ‘the sentence should be commensurate with the gravity of 
the offence in order to act as a deterrent to any potential offenders of that sort.’ In State v 
Erasmus A.E 2008 SCJ 87, the Court emphasised deterrence and protection of society in 
imposing a 10 year prison term on the offender for dealing in drugs. In State v Fangamar 
LDL 2008 SCJ 105, in sentencing the accused to 26 years’ imprisonment for drug 
trafficking, the Court held that it ‘has repeatedly and unreservedly emphasised the need to 
impose a sentence which is commensurate with the gravity of the offence. This is also 
essential in order to act as a deterrent to such offenders who are very much on the increase 
and who cannot be expected to be treated leniently.’ See 120.  In State v Nathan A.M 2008 
SCJ 5, in sentencing the offender to 10 years’ imprisonment for importing drugs in 
Mauritius, the Court held that it ‘has repeatedly laid stress on the need to impose penalties 
which can effectively act as a deterrent and serve as a strong signal to any potential 
offenders.’ See 6. In State v Ramsun D 2008 SCJ 50, in sentencing the offender to 11 
years’ imprisonment for being in possession of drugs, the Court held that ‘[o]nly a penalty 
which is commensurate with the gravity of the offence can effectively serve as a deterrent 
to potential offenders...’ See 51.  In State v Scharrer EDG 2008 SCJ 3, in sentencing the 
offender to 11 years’ imprisonment for importing drugs to Mauritius, the Court held that it 
‘has repeatedly emphasised the need for a deterrent sentence with regard to such offences 
which would act as a clear and strong signal to any potential offenders.’ See 4. In State v 
Theodore JM and another 2008 SCJ 27, in sentencing the accused who had been found 
guilty of possessing small amounts of drugs to 9 and 11 years’ imprisonment, respectively, 
the Court held that it ‘has repeatedly laid stress on the necessity of imposing penalties 
which can act as a deterrent and to send a strong signal to any potential offenders…’ see 
29. The objectives of punishment in State v Theodore have been reproduced verbatim in 
the following cases (where State v Theodore is also quoted): State v Sivathree G 2008 SCJ 
166, in which the offender was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking; 
State v Chambolle LCL 2008 SCJ 158 in which the offender was sentenced to 12 years’ 
imprisonment for importing a small amount of drugs in Mauritius.  
1201 State v Bruls BT and another 2008 SCJ 78, 81 and 82. The reasoning underpinning 
sentencing in this case was repeated in State v Peh Sing IP 2008 SCJ 176, where the 
offender was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking. 
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a lenient sentence ‘it would be failing in its duty...and sending the wrong 
signal to the public at large.’1202 It has been held that imposing a deterrent 
sentence for drug trafficking ‘is of utmost necessity in order to cope with 
the scourge of drug proliferation...’1203 and that ‘[t]he Court must send the 
right signal that, as the fight against the drug scourge is a long and 
relentless battle, those caught and found guilty, would face a long custodial 
sentence.’1204 This means that retribution and rehabilitation are not 
considered or are overlooked by the courts in sentencing offenders to 
lengthy prison terms for drug trafficking. Courts are of the view that by 
providing for stiff penalties for drug trafficking, the Legislature wanted to 
deter people from engaging in such a risky activity. It was held, for 
example, in State v Bajiji, where the offender was sentenced to 32 years’ 
imprisonment for drug trafficking, that ‘the penalty which has been 
prescribed conveys in no uncertain terms the clear intention of the legislator 
as to the severity of the sentences that should be imposed in such cases [of 
dealing in drugs].’1205 In State v Fangamar L, in sentencing the offender to 
26 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking, the Court held that in order to 
deal with the ‘proliferation of dangerous drugs’ which have caused 
‘considerable problems with catastrophic consequences’ in Mauritius, ‘the 
legislator ... prescribe[d]...penalties... which may effectively deal with the 
                                                            
1202 State v Charles LJ 2008 SCJ 142, 143 and 143. 
1203 State v Makinana PV 2008 SCJ 36, 37. In which the offender was sentenced to 11 
years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking.  
1204 State v Puttaroo NAR 2008 SCJ 92, 108. Where the offender was sentenced to 35 
years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking.  
1205 State v Bajiji RSM 2008: 242. 
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scourge of drug trafficking.’1206 The legislator’s emphasis of deterrence 
could explain why courts have also emphasised deterrence instead of other 
objectives of punishment in sentencing offenders to lengthy prison terms. 
Although the Court has been imposing severe penalties to deter potential 
offenders from drug trafficking, it appears to doubt whether such sentences 
have had any effect on crime. Lam Shang Leen J thus held as follows: 
I must say that it seems that the fight against the drug scourge has not 
been won in view of the number of cases of possession of 
drugs…trafficking coming before our Courts. The Courts have shown 
sympathy in certain cases...Despite the fact that severe sentences ha[ve] 
been passed, it seems that there ha[s] been no deterrent effect.  The 
message which must be passed is that those who are engaged in drug 
trafficking would be dealt with severely’1207 
It is also important to note that, as mentioned earlier in Chapter IV,1208 
when the Supreme Court declared the mandatory 45 years’ imprisonment 
for murder to be unconstitutional, the government amended section 222 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act and provided that a person found guilty of 
murder shall be imprisoned ‘for life or, where the Court is satisfied that 
substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition 
of a lesser sentence and has entered those circumstances on the record of 
the proceedings, for a term not exceeding 60 years.’ This means that the 
judge is required to enter those substantial and compelling circumstances 
on the record should he decide not to sentence the offender to penal 
servitude for life. Although there is one known case where the Court 
emphasised substantial and compelling circumstances in order not to 
                                                            
1206 State v Fangamar LDL 2008 SCJ 105, 120. 
1207 State v Unmole H and others 2005 SCJ 142, 168. Where the offenders were sentenced 
to terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 14 years for drug trafficking. 
1208 Chapter IV, 4.2.2.6. 
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sentence the offender to penal servitude for life for murder,1209 there are 
cases where the court has emphasised deterrence or aggravating factors 
instead of substantial and compelling circumstances to send a murderer to a 
sentence other than penal servitude for life.1210 This could be interpreted to 
mean that some judges are still of the view that what they are required to do 
is to look at other circumstances other than substantial and compelling 
circumstances to decide whether or not to impose a penal servitude for life 
for murder.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has dealt with the offences that attract life imprisonment in 
Uganda, South Africa and Mauritius. It discussed the discretion that courts 
have in deciding whether to impose a life sentence or not. This chapter has 
also addressed the issue of legal representation for the suspects facing 
charges that carry the sentence of life imprisonment. The theories of 
punishments that courts emphasise in sentencing offenders to life 
                                                            
1209 The State v Takah P and anor 2007. 
1210 For example, in Philibert P v The State 2008 SCJ 289, the Court held that it was 
required to put into consideration the existence or otherwise of substantial and compelling 
circumstances in deciding which sentence to impose on the appellant for murder after 
setting aside the mandatory 45 years’ imprisonment that had been imposed. Although the 
Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to 30 years, it did not mention that there were 
substantial or compelling circumstances. The courts considered the facts that the appellant 
had pleaded guilty and had stayed on remand awaiting trial for six years. In State v 
Ghumaria A 2008 SCJ 184, the Court, in sentencing the offender to 35 years’ 
imprisonment for the murder of his wife and the child did not mention substantial and 
compelling circumstances. However, it mentioned that it considered as mitigating factors 
that the accused had pleaded guilty, had cooperated with the police, was remorseful, and 
had spent time on remand awaiting trial, but that ‘public interest’ required that it impose a 
heavy penalty. In State v Nachheje S 2008 SCJ 250, the Court, in sentencing the accused to 
35 years’ imprisonment for the murder of his wife considered the mitigating factors, that 
is, ‘the plea of guilt, the remorse and apologies accused expressed…the period spent on 
remand pending trial…[and] the state of mind of the accused when he committed the 
irreparable reprehensible act’, but held that the accused’s offence called ‘for a long 
custodial sentence …which would also serve as a deterrent.’ See 253 and 254. In State v 
Vyapooree S 2008 SCJ 136, in which the Court, when sentencing the offender to 35 years 
for the murder of his son, emphasised deterrence, the seriousness of the offence, and the 
public interest. The Court did not mention of substantial and compelling circumstances. 
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imprisonment have been discussed. In all three jurisdictions, courts have 
emphasised deterrence over other theories or objectives of punishment. 
This is so notwithstanding the fact that these are three different legal 
systems in which the punishment of life imprisonment is approached from 
different angles. However, in South Africa, courts have gone to a greater 
length than in Uganda and Mauritius to explain why rehabilitation as an 
objective of punishment is not appropriate in cases of life imprisonment. 
The fact that courts in all the three jurisdictions are emphasising deterrence 
in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment is worrying in the light of the 
fact that the prisons authorities in these countries consider the rehabilitation 
of the offender as their major objectives. Offenders leave courts knowing 
that their stay in prison is meant to serve a deterrent objective but when 
they arrive in prison they are told that their stay in prison would help them 
rehabilitate. Another important feature to note about life imprisonment in 
these three countries is that in Uganda, most of the offenders serving life 
imprisonment were convicted of defilement whereas in South Africa the 
offenders were convicted for  rape and murder, and in Mauritius, drug 
trafficking. This shows that sentencing is not only influenced by the 
decision the judge makes but also by the statutory law itself. 
The next chapter discusses the law governing the release of offenders 
serving life imprisonment South Africa, Uganda and Mauritius.     
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RELEASE OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT 
 
6. Introduction 
It has already been illustrated in Chapter IV that life imprisonment in 
Uganda, South Africa and Mauritius does not mean that the offender will 
be detained for the rest of his life. There are laws and/or mechanisms that 
govern the release of an offender serving life imprisonment in these 
countries. The law and practice relating to the release of offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment by the international criminal tribunals has 
been discussed above.1211 This Chapter illustrates the laws and procedures 
governing the release of offenders sentenced to life imprisonment in South 
Africa, Mauritius and Uganda. The author shows the differences in the 
release laws and procedures, identifies the advantages and disadvantages in 
each system, if any, and makes recommendations, where necessary, on how 
the laws governing the release of offenders could be improved the three 
countries.  
6.1 South Africa 
It has been illustrated in Chapter IV that life imprisonment in South Africa 
has gone through different changes.1212 These changes have not only 
affected the jurisdiction of the courts in imposing life sentence and the 
offences that attract life sentences but also the length of the sentence of life 
                                                            
1211 Chapter IV, 4.2.3.8.6 – 4.2.3.8.8. 
1212 Chapter IV, 4.2.1. 
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imprisonment and the release procedure of an offender serving a life 
sentence. What follows is a discussion of the laws that govern the release of 
offenders serving life imprisonment since the abolition of the death penalty. 
The discussion of the circumstances under which an offender serving a life 
sentence was released before the abolition of the death penalty has been 
dealt with elsewhere else and it is not necessary to repeat it here.1213  
6.1.1 Prisoners sentenced before 1998 
In 1996 the Department of Correctional Services published its Release 
Policy in the Government Gazette in which it stipulated that a prisoner 
sentenced to life imprisonment was to be considered for parole after serving 
at least 20 years of the sentence or, once he had reached the age of 65 
years, after serving 15 years.1214 In the following year, the Parole and 
Correctional Supervision Amendment Act (PCSAA)1215 amended section 
65(5) and (6) of the Correctional Services Act by providing under section 9 
(d) (v) that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall not be released on parole 
before serving at least 25 years of the sentence. However, the same section 
included a proviso to the effect that parole could be granted to a prisoner 
who reached the age of 65 years while serving his sentence on condition 
that such a prisoner had served at least 15 years of his prison term.1216 The 
PCSAA also substituted section 63 of the Correctional Services Act to give 
                                                            
1213 Van Zyl Smit and Dünkel (eds) 2001: 601-602. 
1214 See the Department of Correctional Services Release Policy published in Government 
Gazette No. 17386 of 30 August 1996 by Notice 1222 of 1996 as referred to in S v Bull 
and another; S v Chavulla and others 2002: para 23. 
1215 Act 87 of 1997 (assented to by the President on 26 November 1997 and came into 
force on 12 December 1997, see Government Gazette No. 18503). 
1216 S v Bull and another; S v Chavulla and others 2002: para 23. 
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the parole board the following functions in relation to prisoners serving life 
sentences: 
Section 63(2) A parole board shall, in respect of any prisoner serving a 
sentence of life imprisonment, submit a report with recommendations on 
the possible placement of the prisoner concerned on parole or on day 
parole, and the conditions under which the prisoner may be so placed to 
the court which sentenced the prisoner. 
 
The PCSAA also inserted section 64B(1) into the Correctional Services Act 
which gave the court (to which the report mentioned in section 63(2) was to 
be submitted) the power to ‘order that the prisoner concerned be placed on 
day parole and determine the conditions on which the prisoner shall be so 
placed.’ Section 64B(2) provided that should the court decide that a 
prisoner serving a life sentence ‘should not be placed on parole or day 
parole, it shall determine the period of imprisonment which the prisoner 
shall serve before the prisoner may again be considered for placement on 
parole or on day parole.’ Therefore, prisoners who were sentenced to life 
imprisonment before 12 December 1997, the date on which the PCSAA 
came into force, are governed by the law and policies which were 
operational during that time, that is, section 65 of the Correctional Services 
Act and the 1996 Release Policy. This fact is also acknowledged under 
section 24 of the PCSAA, which provides that any person serving a prison 
sentence immediately before the commencement of the PCSAA shall have 
his sentence and release governed by the law that was in place at the time 
he was sentenced. Consequently the PCSAA governs those offenders who 
were sentenced to life imprisonment on or after 12 December 1997. In 
practice, the first prisoner serving a life sentence whose parole is governed 
by the 1996 Release Policy will have to be considered for release in 2016 
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and the one whose parole is governed by the PCSAA will have to be 
considered for release in 2022. 
    
6.1.2 Prisoners sentenced after 1998 under the minimum 
sentences legislation 
In 1998, the new Correctional Services Act was enacted but the provision 
relevant to the release only came into force in October 2004. Section 
73(6)(b)(iv) provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence ‘may not be 
placed on parole until he or she has served at least 25 years of the sentence 
but a prisoner on reaching the age of 65 years may be placed on parole if he 
or she has served at least 15 years of such a sentence.’ Under section 
73(5)(a)(ii), read together with section 75(1)(c), before the court releases 
the prisoner on parole, such a prisoner’s release has to be recommended to 
the court by the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board.1217 The latter, 
before recommending to the former that a prisoner may be released on 
parole, has to study the Case Management Committee’s report on that 
prisoner.1218 Under section 73(5)(a)(ii) it is the court which has to 
determine whether the date on which a prisoner sentenced to life 
imprisonment on or after 1 October 2004 should be placed on day parole or 
parole. Terblanche submits that the above 
  
[A]mendments should lay to rest most of the concerns judges may have 
that life prisoners will be released early. However, this procedure may not 
necessarily be popular. The judge considering the release of the prisoner 
will rarely be the same judge who presided over the trial, simply because 
                                                            
1217 For a brief historical discussion of this provision see A Dissel, A Review of Civilian 
Oversight over Correctional Services in the Last Decade (CSPRI Research Paper No. 4, 
2003) 26- 28. 
1218 Terblanche 2007: 234.  
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of the time that will have lapsed. This means that the procedure will 
simply add to the workload of judges.1219 
 
Under section 136(3)(a) of the Correctional Services Act1220 ‘any prisoner 
serving a sentence of life imprisonment immediately before [1 October 
2004] is entitled to be considered for day parole and parole after he or she 
has served 20 years of the sentence.’1221  Such prisoners ‘may only be 
released on parole by the Minister of Correctional Services, after the 
recommendation by the National Council.’1222   This means that ‘specific 
regard [has] to be given to the interests of society and to the reports of the 
parole board.’1223 Terblanche adds that with regard to prisoners sentenced 
to life imprisonment before 1 October 2004, 
 
The discretion really rests with two bodies: the National Council and the 
Minister of Correctional Services. If the [National Council] does not 
recommend release, the Minister has no say in the matter. But if the 
National [Council]...does recommend release, the Minister has the final 
say and is authorised not to accept the recommendation. There are, 
therefore, at least some checks and balances in the exercise of the 
discretion. The final responsibility to protect society lies with the 
Minister.1224   
 
What one observes is that the parole regime governing prisoners serving 
life sentences went through different and at times unclear and confusing 
                                                            
1219 Terblanche 2007: 234-235.  
1220 Which deals with transitional arrangements. 
1221 This provision is subject to confusing interpretation in the light of the fact that 
immediately before 1 October 2004, there were prisoners serving life sentences whose 
release was regulated by the 1997 PCSAA (see detailed discussion under 3.3 above). It is 
argued that this ambiguity could be escaped by invoking the ‘later-in-time’ rule which 
dictates that when an earlier legislative provision conflicts with the subsequent legislative 
provision, the latter prevails. The effect would be that even prisoners sentenced at the time 
when the PCSAA was in force should be released after 20 years instead of 25 years.    
1222 Terblanche 2007: 235.  
1223 Terblanche 2007: 235. 
1224 Terblanche 2007: 235. 
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changes. There were prisoners who were serving life sentences each time a 
new change in the parole regime was effected. This meant that the 
Department of Correctional Services had prisoners serving the same 
sentence, life imprisonment, but with varying durations/tariffs and different 
release procedures and bodies. This, as one would expect, caused confusion 
among many prisoners who did not know which policy applied to them and 
which body was responsible for their release or to recommend their release 
and under what circumstances. This could explain why there have been 
various applications before courts in which prisoners have challenged their 
continued imprisonment, arguing that it was illegal because according to 
the parole regime that was applicable at the time of their imprisonment they 
were entitled to an earlier release than that contemplated by the relevant 
authorities.1225 The 1998 Correctional Services Act also established a new 
Parole Board system involving civilians. One could argue that this added 
confusion to the existing complex set of rules and procedures.1226  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1225 See for example in S v Matolo en ‘n ander 1998, where it was held that the court does 
not have jurisdiction to order the Department of Correctional Services never to release a 
prisoner serving a life sentence on parole; in Van Vuren v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and another 2007 (8) BCLR 903 (CC) the applicant who had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment petitioned court for his release arguing that the parole 
policies that applied to him were those that existed at the time of his sentence in 1992 and 
not those that were adopted after. 
1226 See Sloth-Nielsen Submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services relating to Parole and the Proposed Amendments concerning parole 
in the Correctional Services Amendment Bill 31 August 2007, at 
<http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2007/070905sloth-nielsen.htm> (accessed 21 May 2008). 
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6.1.3 The release of prisoners serving life sentences after 
the coming into force of the Correctional Services 
Amendment Act of 11 November 2008 
 
On 8 November 2008, the South African President assented to the 
Correctional Services Amendment Act1227 which, at the time of writing, 
March 2009, was yet to come into force.1228 The Act was published in the 
Government Gazette on 11 November 2008.1229 It should be noted that 
when this Act comes into force, it will introduce two fundamental changes 
with regard to prisoners serving life imprisonment. First, the prisoners 
would cease to be called prisoners but ‘offenders’; a prison would cease to 
be called a prison but a ‘correctional centre’, and the sentence of life 
imprisonment would become known as ‘life incarceration.’1230 Second, and 
most importantly, the Amendment Act provides a different regime under 
which offenders incarcerated for life would be released. Importantly, it 
would be the Minister of Correctional Services (and not the Court 
anymore), on the recommendation of the Correctional Supervision and 
Parole Board, to release the offender incarcerated for life on parole1231; the 
duration to be served before an offender serving a life sentence is released 
will be determined by the National Council in line with the incarceration 
framework that it would develop1232; and the Amendment Act will be 
applicable to all prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment since 1 October 
                                                            
1227 Correctional Services Amendment Act, Act 25 of 2008. 
1228 See section 87 of the Correctional Services Amendment Act for the circumstances 
under which the Act will come into force. 
1229 Government Gazette, Volume 521, Cape Town, No. 31593, 11 November 2008. 
1230 See sections 73, 75, and 78. 
1231 Section 78. 
1232 Section 73A. 
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2004.1233 It is appropriate to outline below section 78 which details with the 
manner in which offenders serving life sentences will be released on the 
coming into force of the Amendment Act: 
 
78. (1) Having considered the record of proceedings of the Correctional 
Supervision and Parole Board and its recommendations in the case of a 
person sentenced to life incarceration, the National Council may... 
recommend to the Minister to grant parole or day parole and prescribe the 
conditions of community corrections in terms of section 52. (2) If the 
Minister refuses to grant parole or day parole in terms of subsection (1), 
the Minister may make recommendations in respect of treatment, care, 
development and support of the sentenced offender which may contribute 
to improving the likelihood of future placement on parole or day parole. 
(3) Where a Correctional Supervision and Parole Board ... recommends, in 
the case of a person sentenced to life incarceration, that parole or day 
parole be withdrawn or that the conditions of community corrections 
imposed on such a person be amended, the Minister, on advice of the 
National Council, must consider and make a decision upon the 
recommendation.(4) Where the Minister refuses or withdraws parole or 
day parole the matter must be reconsidered by the Minister, on advice of 
the National Council, within two years. 
 
Two important features, amongst others, should be noted here with regard 
to section 78. First, the Minister, when he/she refuses to release the 
offender on parole, has discretion (in section 78(2) the word ‘may’ instead 
of ‘shall’ is used) to make recommendations to ensure that that offender 
attends or participates in programmes that would improve his/her chances 
of being placed on parole in the near future. One could argue that if the 
Minister’s refusal to place an offender on parole is based on the reason that 
the offender has to participate in a particular rehabilitation programme, for 
example, an anger management course, it becomes obligatory on the 
Minister to introduce such a programme in the correctional centre where 
that offender is being incarcerated so that he/she can participate in it, or the 
                                                            
1233 Sections 85 and 136(4). 
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Minister must ensure that that offender is transferred to a correctional 
centre where such a programme is offered. Another important aspect that 
the Amendment Act introduces is that should the Minister decline to put the 
offender on parole, he/she is under a duty, on the advice of the National 
Council, to reconsider that offender’s case for parole after two years. It is 
argued that even then the Minister is at liberty to refuse to release the 
offender on parole. The question that remains to be answered is this: If the 
Minister refused to place the offender on parole after the two years’ period, 
what remedy does the inmate have? The Act is silent on that issue, but one 
could assume that the Minister would be in a position to advise the offender 
as to when he/she would be considered for placement on parole again, and 
would have to give reasons why parole has been denied this time again. 
Otherwise some prisoners would petition the courts for intervention. 
 
6.2 Mauritius 
 
As mentioned in Chapter IV,1234 offenders sentenced to penal servitude for 
life could be pardoned by the President under section 75(1) of the 
Constitution. In practice, since 2006 and even after the Privy Council ruling 
in July 2008 to the effect that offenders sentenced to life imprisonment 
should have the prospect of being released,1235 section 75 remains one of 
the only likely windows through which those prisoners could escape 
imprisonment for lengthy prison terms. For the President to pardon any 
prisoner, he/she must first of all be advised by the Commission on the 
                                                            
1234 Chapter IV, 4.2.2. 
1235 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
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Prerogative of Mercy, established under section 75(2) of the Constitution. 
This means that the Commission probably would have to study the relevant 
judgment, the recommendations made by the judge at sentencing, and the 
recommendations made by the prison authorities relating to that particular 
prisoner, in order to determine whether such prisoner should be 
recommended to the President for pardon or early release. The challenge 
with this approach is that prisoners do not know what is expected of them 
in order to be considered by the Commission as suitable for 
recommendation to the President for pardon or early release. Most 
importantly, the President is not obliged to release any prisoner just 
because the Commission has advised him/her to do so.1236 This means that 
prisoners will always remain in a state of uncertainty, not knowing whether 
they could ever qualify to be, at least, recommended for pardon or early 
release. The German Constitutional Court held that for the sentence of life 
imprisonment to pass the human dignity test, there should be a legislative 
enactment detailing the circumstances under which a prisoner may be 
released.1237 Some judges of the European Court of Human Rights have 
                                                            
1236 The Supreme Court held, in a case where the President commuted the offender’s death 
sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment without remission, and the prisoner sued the 
Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy and asked court to order the Commission to 
recommend to the President to grant him remission on the 20 years’ sentence, that under 
section 50(1) of the Reform Institutions Act ‘[a] prisoner is eligible to remission but has no 
right to remission as such’ and that section 75 of the Constitution ‘provides for a 
constitutional exercise of quasi-judicial function by the Executive. In the exercise of its 
function under section 119, this court has no power to direct the way in which the 
prerogative of mercy is to be exercised unless it amounts to a breach of the Constitution. 
Nor does the Judiciary propose to recuperate by the backdoor what has constitutionally 
been placed in the hand of the Executive.’ See P Poongavanam v The Commission of the 
Prerogative of Mercy 1999 MR 204, 206. 
1237 BVerfGE 45 187 246 as cited in Van Zyl Smit 2006: 409. 
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also held that prisoners should have ‘a real and tangible prospect of release’ 
otherwise life imprisonment will be a cruel and inhumane punishment.1238 
The impression one gets from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence discussed 
in Chapter IV,1239 although the Privy Council appears to have ignored it,1240 
is that the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy does not seem to be 
carrying out its work in a satisfactory manner. In cases where the Supreme 
Court wanted prisoners who were serving sentences of penal servitude for 
life to be released after 20 years, it avoided instructing the Commission to 
oversee their release. Instead, the Court decided that such prisoners should 
be released pursuant to its judgment. In the Court’s words: 
We could have made a recommendation to the Commission [on the 
Prerogative of Mercy] to ensure that all those who have been sentenced to 
penal servitude for life in respect of manslaughter both before and after 
the coming into operation of the [Abolition of the Death Penalty] Act 
should serve only a maximum term of 20 years’ penal servitude.  But we 
have declined to do so for two reasons.  First, Mr Ramdin who, it is 
recalled, withdrew his motion in Court and intended to seek redress from 
the Commission, is still in prison.  Boucherville, cited already, obviously 
made matters worse.  Second, the Commission might very well decide not 
to act upon our recommendation.  In such a case, Mr Ramdin and all the 
others who have been sentenced for manslaughter to penal servitude for 
life both before and after the coming into operation of the Act will be left 
with no redress.1241 
The above discussion shows that the law and mechanism in place do not 
favour the interpretation of both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council 
that offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life have, to use the 
European Court of Human Rights words, a ‘real and tangible prospect’ of 
                                                            
1238 Kafkaris v Cyprus 2008: para 6, joint dissenting judgment of Judges Tulkens, Cabral 
Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens. 
1239 Chapter IV, 4.2.2.4. 
1240 De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius 2008: para 23. 
1241 State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 153-154. (Emphasis in original).  
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being released.1242 Their release, should it materialise, would depend on 
several unclear administrative decisions that can never be subjected to 
judicial1243 or public scrutiny. This may result in some prisoners being 
pardoned because of their political affiliation, race, sex, and nationality, 
amongst other grounds, and others being imprisoned for lengthy periods 
because of the same grounds. The Supreme Court has also indicated that 
there was a case where an applicant applied ‘on several occasions to the 
Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy pursuant to section 75 of the 
Constitution to review his case albeit without success’1244 and cites only 
one case in 1992 where the offender’s death sentence was commuted to 20 
years’ imprisonment after several legal battles as an example to illustrate 
‘the effective operation of section 75 of the Constitution.’1245 Had the Court 
been aware of more than one case where offenders had had their sentences 
commuted in line with section 75, it would have relied them to justify the 
effective operation of section 75. The fact that in 2009 the Court relies on 
an incident that happened in 1992, almost two decades ago, shows how it is 
almost impossible for offenders to have their sentences commuted under 
section 75. It should also be recalled that in 1992 Mauritius was just about 
                                                            
1242 Although the Supreme Court, after realising that some offenders serving penal 
servitude for life had applied unsuccessfully to the Commission on the Prerogative of 
Mercy to be pardoned by the President, held that ‘[o]ur system has also the singular 
advantage that any convicted person may, on his own initiative, petition the Commission 
to exercise its prerogative of mercy. The petition may be presented at any time and there 
does not appear to be any limitation as to the number of times it can be presented.’ See De 
Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 9.    
1243 The Supreme Court has itself held that ‘the Supreme Court, in exercise of its functions 
under section 119 of the Constitution ha[s] no power to direct the way in which the 
prerogative of mercy [is] to be exercised unless to amounted to a breach of the 
Constitution.’ See De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 9. 
1244 De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 8. 
1245 De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 8. 
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to abolish the death penalty, which it did in 1995, and all death sentences, 
as we have seen earlier, were commuted to penal servitude for life, which 
meant 20 years at the time.  
 
There is also evidence that some prisoners who want to petition the 
President for their release under Section 75 of the Constitution are 
sidelining the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy and addressing 
their complaints/applications to the National Human Rights 
Commission.1246 This could be attributable to two factors: one, that such 
prisoners do not have confidence in the Commission on the Prerogative of 
Mercy and believe that the National Human Rights Commission is in a 
position to present their cases to the President more comprehensively and 
convincingly than the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy; and, 
secondly, they may not be aware of the existence of the Commission on the 
Prerogative of Mercy. Either way, the fact that prisoners are directing 
themselves to the National Human Rights Commission and not the 
                                                            
1246 See File No. 07/85, Mauritius National Human Rights Commission Annual Report for 
the Year 2007 (Annex X, Table E, Complaints against Prisons) in which a prisoner, who 
was sentenced to death and his sentenced commuted to penal servitude for life, petitioned 
the National Human Rights Commission to petition the President to pardon him; and the 
National Human Rights Commission referred his case to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. In File No. 07/195, the prisoner, who was serving a term of 8 years 
imprisonment and had been paralyzed while in prison, contacted the National Human 
Rights Commission to take his case for his release to the President. The National Human 
Rights Commission advised the prisoner to write to the Commission on the Prerogative of 
Mercy.  See also complaints on File Nos. 07/18 (the prisoner who was sentenced to seven 
years imprisonment for sexual offences asked the National Human Rights Commission to 
intervene and have his sentence reduced; and he was referred to the Commission on the 
Prerogative of Mercy); File No. 07/36 (the prisoner was serving five years in prison for 
drug dealing and argued that his counsel misled him when he advised him to plead guilty, 
and that therefore, the sentence should be set aside. The National Human Rights 
Commission advised him to address his complaint to the Commission on the Prerogative 
of Mercy); and File No. 07/86 (the prisoners argued that their sentence of penal servitude 
for life was wrong in law because they were erroneously convicted, and, therefore, asked 
the National Human Rights Commission to intervene and have the sentence set aside. The 
National Human Rights Commission advised them to refer their complaint to the 
Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy). See Annex X Table H, Complaints against the 
Judiciary.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
421
Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy could be indicative that the latter 
body has not made its role well-known among prisoners. In at least one 
incident, when the prisoner contacted the National Human Rights 
Commission for it to present his case to the President for pardon or early 
release under section 75 of the Constitution, the National Human Rights 
Commission, instead of referring the prisoner’s case to the Commission on 
the Prerogative of Mercy, referred it to the Director of Public 
Prosecution.1247 This could be interpreted to indicate that the National 
Human Rights Commission casts doubt on the ability of the Commission 
on the Prerogative of Mercy to give the prisoner’s case the attention it 
deserved to secure a Presidential pardon.  
 
The above discussion of the manner in which the Commission on the 
Prerogative of Mercy operates, and the lens through which it is viewed by 
the National Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court, is 
evidence that the window through which prisoners serving a sentence of 
penal servitude for life could secure their pardon or early release is not 
wide open. It is regrettable that the Privy Council did not pay attention to 
that fact and also that the lawyers representing the appellant did not draw 
the Privy Council’s attention to the above facts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1247 Mauritius National Human Rights Commission Annual Report for the Year 2007, File 
No. 07/85. 
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6.2.1 Introduction of a new release regime? 
 
Whereas the Supreme Court believes that penal servitude for life is not an 
irreducible sentence and that offenders could be released pursuant to 
section 75 of the Constitution, there is reason to believe that the Court has 
introduced a new regime that is likely to regulate the manner in which 
offenders serving penal servitude for life are to be released in the future.  In 
the 12 January 2009 decision of De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of 
Mauritius,1248 the appellant had been sentenced to death for murder in 
1986, and when the death penalty was abolished in 1995 his death sentence 
was commuted to penal servitude for life. As discussed earlier, the Privy 
Council held in July 2008 that applicant’s life sentence was 
unconstitutional1249 and that the ‘applicant was invited by the Judicial 
Committee to apply to the Supreme Court under section 5 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Amendment) Act 2007 to review the sentence.’1250 The 
following lengthy quotation from the Court’s judgment shows the factors 
that are likely to be considered before and offender sentenced to penal 
servitude for life is released: 
 
We have called on Counsel for both the applicant and for the respondent 
to bring before us all materials which they deem relevant for the exercise 
of our review.  We have considered the judgment of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal delivered on 8 July 1986 … which gives an insight of the facts and 
circumstances of the cold blooded murder committed by the applicant in 
January 1984.  A list of previous convictions – 20 prior to the 
pronouncement of his death sentence in 1986 – has also been placed 
before us.  These relate mainly to cases of larceny, some with aggravating 
                                                            
1248 De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009. 
1249 De Boucherville  v The State of Mauritius 2008. 
1250 De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 5 -6. 
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circumstances, 4 cases of aggravated wounds and blows, but also two drug 
offences.  Finally, the State has produced a list of 45 prison offences 
against the applicant spanning from 13 July 1987 to 30 June 2007 
involving the applicant during his detention.  These were mainly in 
relation to the use of disrespectful, offensive, abusive and insolent 
language towards prisons officers including the Prisons Medical Officer, 
disobeying lawful order, making false and malicious allegations against 
the Commissioner of Prisons.  But one of those questioned prisons [sic] 
offences stands out.  It relates to a number of unauthorized articles found 
in applicant’s cell on 9 January 2007…1251The updated profile of the 
applicant, including his conduct in prison, does not show someone who is 
contrite, remorseful and who understands the gravity of the crime he had 
committed.  In an affidavit affirmed on 14 August 2008, which forms part 
of the respondent’s brief, Assistant Commissioner of Prisons Rughoobeer 
has given his opinion that the applicant still represents a risk to society if 
released.  That is not in our consideration, an element which would “per 
se” disqualify the applicant of any humane approach and consideration by 
the Court, considering specially his advanced age as was indeed addressed 
by the Judicial Committee.  On the other hand, whilst being prepared to 
“take the risk”, as it were, of granting applicant an earlier release than 
would normally have been granted on the basis of fixing a posteriori a 
tariff and giving adequate discounts in line with the observations of the 
Judicial Committee, we must also bear in mind the impact and message 
which undue leniency even at this late stage could convey to the Mauritian 
population as a whole and to potential criminals in particular. After 
anxious consideration we believe that, in the light of all the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the applicant must serve a sentence of not less 
than 25 years penal servitude before his release.  This shall occur on 20 
February 2011.1252 
 
The above quotation raises several factors that are likely to determine 
whether an offender serving a serving a penal servitude for life should be 
released or not. First, the court will look at the nature and circumstances 
                                                            
1251 These items were: ‘a fair amount of money (some Rs 38,000; (ii) several items of 
offensive weapons, like one federal steamer, one barber type razor blade, one small knife, 
one tailor’s cutter and four pairs of scissors; (iii) communication equipment including 
battery charger, dry cells, mobile phone with four sim cards, about 50 ft of telephone wire, 
a portable radio; (iv) suspected dangerous drugs viz. 6 pieces of glazed paper containing 
whitish powder and several seeds suspected to be cannabis, several assorted pills and 
certain paraphernalia used in the consumption of dangerous drugs like cigarette papers and 
aluminium foil…There were also some items of clothings, some perfume and five bottles 
of containing 500ml each of alcohol described as “blue” alcohol which is a highly 
inflammable substance.’ De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 9 – 10. 
Footnotes omitted.  
1252 De Boucherville Roger FP v The State of Mauritius 2009: 10 – 11. 
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under which the offence for which the offender was sentenced to penal 
servitude for life was committed. This means that if the offence, for 
example, of murder was committed in a brutal manner, the offender is 
likely to stay in prison longer than another offender who is serving a penal 
servitude for life for murder but who committed the offence in less brutal 
circumstances. It is argued that the court should not be influenced unduly 
by the circumstances under which the offence was committed in 
determining whether or not the offender should be released early. This is 
because the sentencing court would have considered or taken into account 
those circumstances in imposing a sentence.1253 This could explain why, in 
the first place, the offender was sentenced to penal servitude for life as 
opposed to a lesser sentence. Therefore, the factors that influenced the court 
to impose a severe sentence should not be the same factors that should be 
relied upon to detain the prisoner for longer. Related to the above is the 
issue of the personal circumstances of the accused when the sentence 
he/she is serving was imposed. If he/she was a first offender, the court 
would order his early release more easily than would be the case if he was a 
recidivist.   
 
Secondly, the court will ask the state to adduce evidence regarding the 
offender’s conduct during the period of imprisonment. If the offender 
consistently disobeyed prison regulations and was a troublesome prisoner, 
for example, if he/she trafficked in contraband and was disrespectful of 
                                                            
1253 The Supreme Court held that ‘[i]n determining the sentence which the detainee has yet 
to serve, various factors might be taken into consideration, including pure retribution, 
expiation, expressions of moral outrage of society, maintenance of public confidence in the 
administration of justice, deterrence, the interest of the victims, rehabilitation and, last but 
not least, mercy.’ See State of Mauritius v Jeetun 2006: 154. 
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prison warders, the court may delay in ordering an early release. This 
would be the case especially where the prisoner breached prison regulations 
a few months or years preceding the application for early release. This 
could explain why the Court stated that ‘[t]he updated profile of the 
applicant, including his conduct in prison, does not show someone who is 
contrite, remorseful and who understands the gravity of the crime he had 
committed.’ Although the Court does not so say expressly, it is argued that 
a prisoner’s consistent disobedience of prison regulations could be an 
indicator that he/she has not been rehabilitated and that he/she has not 
learnt any hard lessons from his/her prison term. The release could be 
delayed either because a longer stay in prison would enable the prisoner to 
reform or to protect the society from him/her. The Court expressly 
recognises this fact and held that the ‘Assistant Commissioner of Prisons 
Rughoobeer has given his opinion that the applicant still represents a risk to 
society if released’ although the Court warns that the fact that the 
offender’s early release could still pose a danger does not constitute an 
‘element which would “per se” disqualify the applicant of any humane 
approach and consideration by the Court…’  
 
Thirdly, although closely related to the foregoing point, relates to the 
applicant’s age and whether he suffers from ill-health. It appears that the 
Court would not be very reluctant to order the early release of a prisoner of 
advanced age coupled with ill-health. This could be explained on the 
ground that such a prisoner is more unlikely to re-offend or at least to 
commit serious offences and therefore his release does not put the society 
at great risk. The early release of a prisoner serving a life sentence on the 
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ground of ill-health would not be exclusive to Mauritius. In South Africa, 
for example, a prisoner serving a life sentence could be released earlier on 
medical parole.1254 
 
The fourth factor that the Court is likely to consider in determining whether 
an offender serving a penal servitude for life should be released earlier is 
the manner in which the Mauritian population and the potential criminals 
would react to the applicant’s early release. The Court expressly stated that 
‘we must also bear in mind the impact and message which undue leniency 
even at this late stage could convey to the Mauritian population as a whole 
and to potential criminals in particular.’ The Court is thus more unlikely to 
order the early release of a high-profile prisoner than a low-profile prisoner 
because of the media attention that would accompany the release of the 
former, which would presumably make Mauritians believe that the court is 
treating criminals leniently. The Court is also with the view that the early 
release of prisoners would not deter potential criminals from offending. 
They would be led to believe that even when they commit serious offences, 
they would be detained for only a short period. However, the Court’s 
holding above is based on two highly questionable assumptions: one is that 
the Mauritian population follows criminal trials; and two, that potential 
                                                            
1254 Under section 79 of the Correctional Services Act, ‘[a]ny person serving any sentence 
in a prison and who, based on the written evidence of the medical practitioner treating that 
person, is diagnosed as being in the final phase of any terminal disease or condition may 
be considered for placement under correctional supervision or on parole, by the 
Commissioner, Correctional Supervision and Parole Board or the Court as the case may 
be, to die a consolatory and dignified death.’ For a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence 
and practice relating to medical parole in South Africa, see Mujuzi, ‘Reflecting on Medical 
Parole in South Africa’ Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative Newsletter No.23 
September 2007 at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Civil-Society-Prison-
Reform/newsletter/cspri-newsletter/archive-of-cspri-newsletter/cspri-newsletter-no-23.pdf 
(accessed 7 March 2009).   
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criminals would be deterred by knowing that if they committed an offence 
such as murder they would be punished severely. It is argued that unless in 
high-profile cases, where the media would widely publicise the release of a 
prisoner, very few people in Mauritius would know that a prisoner serving 
a penal servitude for life has been released early. These would be the 
prisoner’s relatives, neighbours and victims of his crime. Secondly, 
research has shown that what deters most potential offenders from 
committing crimes is not the severity of the punishment they could face, 
but the certainity of being detected, arrested, prosecuted and punished.1255 
Therefore, the Court’s assumption that the late or delayed release of 
offenders serving penal servitude for life would deter potential criminals 
remains highly disputable. 
 
One can argue that in Mauritius there are two ways through which an 
offender serving a penal servitude for life could be released. One, by 
applying to the Supreme Court for a reduction of sentence; and two, by 
applying to the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy to recommend to 
the President that the applicant’s sentence be commuted. If the prisoner 
does not take the initiative to utilise either of the above avenues, this could 
result being in prison for the rest of his/her natural life, unless the prison 
authorities apply on his/her behalf or the Commission on the Prerogative of 
Mercy visits the prison and deem it fit to recommend his release. However, 
it appears that more prisoners would rather go to court to order their release 
or commute their sentences than approach the Commission on the 
                                                            
1255 The South African Constitutional Court held that ‘[t]he greatest deterrent to crime is 
the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished.’ See S v 
Makwanyane, 1995: para 122. 
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Prerogative of Mercy. This is because, as we have seen above, the court has 
ordered the early release of many prisoners serving penal servitude for life 
whereas the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy has been successful 
only in one known case.    
      
6.3 Uganda 
 
Unlike in South Africa where prisoners serving life imprisonment have to 
be considered for parole after 25 years, in which case they may be released 
or not but when released remain on parole for the rest of their lives, and 
also unlike in Mauritius where the Reform Institutions Act does not provide 
for the release of offenders serving life sentences, in Uganda an offender 
sentenced to life imprisonment is supposed to be released after serving a 
maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment and could also be released on parole 
before serving 20 years’ imprisonment. The author will outline the relevant 
sections relating to the release of offenders serving life imprisonment in 
Uganda under the Prisons Act and thereafter discuss them. However, it 
should be noted at the outset that the Prisons Act only came into force in 
2006 and there is little practice emanating from it at the moment. Most of 
the discussion will endeavour to suggest practical suggestions how the Act 
could be interpreted to facilitate the release of prisoners serving life 
imprisonment. It will thus assess the relevant sections against each other for 
the purpose of indentifying how the Act can be implemented better with 
respect to the release of prisoners serving life imprisonment. 
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Section 84(1) of the Prisons Act provides that ‘a convicted prisoner 
sentenced to imprisonment whether by one sentence or consecutive 
sentences for a period exceeding one month, may by industry and good 
conduct earn a remission of one third of his or her sentence or sentences.’ 
Under section 84(2) ‘each prisoner on admission shall be credited with the 
full amount of remission to which he or she is entitled at the end of his or 
her sentence or sentences if he or she lost or forfeited no such remission.’  
Whereas section 84(1) appears to suggest that it is within the discretion of 
the prison authorities to decide whether a prisoner earned a remission of 
one third of his sentence, section 84(2) obliges the prison authorities to 
credit each prisoner serving a sentence of more than one month with a 
remission of one third of his sentence. The combined effect of the two 
subsections is that the prison authorities are under a duty to credit each 
prisoner serving a sentence of more than a month a one third remission of 
his/her sentence on the day he/she arrives in prison. The applicability of 
section 84 to offenders serving life imprisonment will be dealt with in due 
course. However, under section 85, ‘a prisoner may lose remission as a 
result of its forfeiture as a punishment for an offence against prison 
discipline and shall not earn any remission in respect of any period spent in 
hospital through his or her own fault or while malingering, or while 
undergoing confinement as a punishment in a separate cell.’ Section 86(1) 
is to the effect that the ‘Commissioner General may recommend to the 
Minister responsible for justice to advise the President ... to grant a further 
remission on special grounds.’  Section 86(3) provides that ‘for the purpose 
of calculating remission of sentence, imprisonment for life shall be deemed 
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to be twenty years’ imprisonment.’ The author shifts to the discussion of 
the above provisions and how they relate to offenders serving life 
sentences. 
 
The effect of the combined reading of sections 86(3) and 84(2) is that an 
offender sentenced to life imprisonment, which means 20 years, on the day 
he/she arrives in prison the sentence is no longer 20 years but two-thirds of 
the 20 years. In other words, the sentence is remitted by one-third and the 
prisoner could be released after serving the remainder of the sentence if 
he/she does not lose his/her remission in terms of section 85 of the Act. 
However, such an offender can also be granted remission in terms of 
section 86 by the President on ‘special grounds’ provided that the 
Commissioner General of Prisons makes the recommendation to the 
Minister responsible for justice and the minister also follows up the matter 
with the President. The challenge with the remission under section 86 is 
that three officials must all be of the opinion that the offender has to be 
remitted on ‘special grounds.’ That is, the Commissioner General, the 
Minister and the President. The Commissioner General is at liberty not to 
recommend to the minister the grant of remission to the prisoner, but even 
if the Commissioner General decided to make such a recommendation, the 
Minister is at liberty not to advise the President that the prisoner’s sentence 
should be remitted. Also, if the Minister advises the President to grant 
special remission to the prisoner, the President is at liberty whether or not 
to accept the Minister’s advice. Another dificulty with section 86 is that it 
does not define or enumerate the ‘special grounds’ upon which a prisoner 
may be granted further remission. It is argued that these could include 
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remission on health grounds, for example, where a prisoner is in the final 
stage of an incurable ailment. In countries such as Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, a prisoner could also be released on special grounds, and these 
include ‘the mental or physical condition of such a prisoner.’1256 Section 86 
should also be read with section 88 which provides as follows 
(1) The Commissioner General shall submit to the Minister responsible for 
justice a report on the general condition and conduct of every prisoner 
undergoing imprisonment for life... at the end of every four years of such 
imprisonment or of such lesser period as the Minister or the 
Commissioner General considers desirable. 
(2) A review referred to in subsection (1) shall include- 
(a) A statement by the officer in charge of the prison, where the prisoner 
concerned is detained on work and conduct of the prisoner; 
(b) A report from the medical officer on the mental and physical health of 
such a prisoner with particular reference to the effect of imprisonment 
on the health of the prisoner; 
(c) From the social worker about the community attitude and possible 
reintegration of the prisoner back into the community. 
 
It is argued that a combined reading of sections 86 and 88 could assist the 
prison authorities in identifying some of the ‘special grounds’ upon which a 
prisoner serving a life sentence could be granted further remission. For 
instance, if the medical officer is of the view that the continued 
imprisonment of the offender will have a negative impact on his health and 
could even result in his death or permanent disability, this could be 
communicated to the officer in charge of the prison who would then 
                                                            
1256 Under section 110 of the Zimbabwe Prisons Act which governs remission on special 
grounds as section 86 of the Prisons Act of Uganda, ‘[t]he Commissioner may recommend 
to the Minister, who, if he thinks fit, may recommend to the President that remission 
should be granted to a prisoner by reason of meritorious conduct or the mental or physical 
condition of such prisoner.’ Section 91(4)(a) of the Prisons Act of Botswana provides that 
‘any prisoner serving a determinate term of imprisonment of not less four years be granted 
special remission on the ground of – (i) of his meritorious conduct, (ii) that his mental of 
physical condition warrants such remission; (iii) that special circumstances exist which, in 
the opinion of the parole board, warrant such remission.’ Section 91(4)(b) provides that 
‘any prisoner serving a term of imprisonment for life … be released on any grounds 
specified in paragraph (a).’  
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communicate it to the Commissioner General to ask the Minister of Justice 
to advise the President to grant such a prisoner further remission. If the 
social worker is of the view that the community would not be outraged by 
the offender’s early release and that he/she will easily be reintegrated into 
the community, the Commissioner General could initiate the process to 
ensure that the prisoner gets further remission on the basis that his ability to 
integrate easily into society easily is a special ground. This would mean 
that the social worker should have visited the community to which the 
prisoner is expected to be released after the completion of his sentence and 
would have assessed that community’s attitude towards the possible release 
of the prisoner and also analysed the possible reintegration of the prisoner 
into the community. This ground raises two practical problems: one, 
offenders serving life imprisonment in Uganda are imprisoned in two 
prisons – Jinja Central Prison (about 50 kilometres from the capital city, 
Kampala) and Luzira Prison (in the capital city) – because they are the only 
maximum security prisons with the facilities to host prisoners for lengthy 
periods of imprisonment.1257 However, most of the offenders serving life 
imprisonment are from places hundreds of kilometres away from these 
prisons.1258 This would require a social worker attached to these two 
prisons to travel hundreds of   kilometres to the prisoners’ communities to 
                                                            
1257 When the author visited Luzira Maximum Security Prison in January 2008, Mr. 
Kivumbi Jacob, Assistant Superintendant of Prisons, told him that many prisoners serving 
life imprisonment had been transferred to Jinja prison. Mr. Kivumbi also said that many 
more prisoners were to be transferred from Luzira prison to Jinja. 
1258 Information which the author obtained from Uganda Prisons Services shows that many 
offenders serving life imprisonment are from the rural districts of Masindi, Kabarole, 
Mbarara, Mbale, Masaka, Kabale, Fort Portal, Kumi, and Lira. Although some come from 
within Kampala and others from the neigbouring districts of Jinja and Mukono. 
Information on file with author. 
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assess whether integration is possible in an event of early release. This is a 
very difficult task for the Uganda Prisons to execute.  
 
The second problem is that Uganda Prisons Service does not have enough 
social workers to effectively assess prisoners and make the necessary 
recommendations after every four years. In March 2009 there were 86 
social workers for the prison population of approximately 25, 000 prisoners 
in the whole country.1259 With the abolition of the mandatory death penalty, 
many offenders could be sentenced to life imprisonment and the workload 
of the social workers could increase which would make it even more 
difficult for them to effectively assess prisoners serving life sentences and 
make the appropriate recommendations.   
 
Section 89(1) relates to the release of prisoners on parole. It provides that ‘a 
prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for a period of three years or 
more may be allowed by the Commissioner General within six months of 
the date he or she is due for release on conditions and for reasons approved 
by the Commissioner General to be temporality absent from prison on 
parole for a stated length of time which shall not be greater than three 
months.’ The practical effect of section 89(1) in relation to the offender 
serving life imprisonment is that when such an offender has served two-
thirds of the sentence, assuming that he/she did not forfeit the one-third 
remission in terms of section 85, he could be released on parole six months 
before he completes his sentence. This means, the two thirds of the life 
                                                            
1259 Telephonic interview with Mr. Robert Omita Okoth, Commissioner 
Welfare/Rehabilitation, Uganda Prisons, 10 March 2009. 
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sentence could actually be reduced further by three months or more in 
terms of section 89. It is important to underscore here the fact that, unlike 
in South Africa where a prisoner serving a life sentence is supposed to be 
on parole for the rest of his life, in Uganda when an offender serving a life 
sentence has completed a prison term (depending on whether or not there 
was a remission of sentence) the prisoner has to be released because life 
imprisonment means a maximum of 20 years imprisonment.   
 
It is argued that there are cases in Uganda where offenders have been 
sentenced to serve prison terms and are likely to serve more time in prison 
than an offender sentenced to life imprisonment before they can be 
released. This is so when an offender has been sentenced by different courts 
for different offences. In Uganda v Baguma Moses, for example, the 
offender was sentenced to 10 years for rape and while still serving his rape 
sentence, he was sentenced to 15 years for defilement.1260 In sentencing 
him, the High Court observed that: 
I cannot lose sight of the fact that this is [a] serious offence and society, 
especially the girl children need protection from habitual rapists like the 
convict. Having considered all the above and the time spent on remand the 
convict is sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment. For the 
avoidance of doubt this sentence of imprisonment shall be executed after 
the expiration of the former sentence…1261 
This means that he was sentenced to a total of 25 years imprisonment. This 
was in effect a sentence longer than life imprisonment. If he served two 
thirds of the first sentence and two thirds of the second sentence, assuming 
that he did not forfeit his remission in terms of section 85 of the Prisons 
                                                            
1260 Uganda v Baguma Moses 2002. 
1261 Uganda v Baguma Moses 2002: 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
435
Act, he would serve more time, although a few more months, than a person 
serving a life sentence. To avoid situations where offenders could be 
sentenced to sentences longer than life imprisonment, it is important that 
the Prisons Act be amended to provide that any sentence longer than a life 
sentence is presumed to be a life sentence. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion has illustrated the laws and mechanisms that govern 
the release of offenders serving life imprisonment in South Africa, 
Mauritius and Uganda. As shown, in South Africa, an offender sentenced to 
life imprisonment and released on parole spends the rest of his life on 
parole. It is recommended that there is a need for the law to be amended to 
provide that when an offender released on parole does not re-offend in five 
years on the outside, he/she should be presumed to have served his sentence 
in full. This would serve at least two objectives: one, it would relieve the 
Department of Correctional Services of the task to monitor the offender’s 
compliance or otherwise of his parole conditions for the rest of his life 
hence allowing the Department to put both the human and financial 
resources where they are needed most; and two, will enable the offender to 
fully reintegrate into society and be able to seek employment in any part of 
the country because he/she will not be required to be confined in one area 
for parole purposes or to report to a parole officer often. In Mauritius, there 
is no law governing the release of offenders serving the sentence of penal 
servitude for life.  
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It is recommended that the Mauritian legislature need to enact a law which 
not only stipulates the maximum number of years an offender sentenced to 
penal servitude for life should serve before he/she could be considered for 
parole or early release, but also the procedure and mechanisms that should 
be followed by the offender serving a life sentence when the time for his 
release comes. The law should, for example, provide that an offender 
serving a life sentence will be eligible for parole after serving 15 years and 
that on completing the 15 years the parole board should consider release 
him on parole. If upon refusal to grant release on parole, the prisoner 
should have the right to request to review the decision of the parole board. 
As shown above, the Uganda Prisons Act does not define ‘special grounds’ 
upon which an offender could be granted additional remission. It is 
recommended that the Minister of Justice should use his/her powers under 
section 124(1) of the Prisons Act1262 to promulgate a regulation, setting 
what constitutes special grounds, in order that prisoners and prison 
authorities know them and are able to invoke them where prisoners would 
qualify for early release. We have seen that the frequent amendments to the 
laws relating to life imprisonment in South Africa have resulted in 
uncertainty on both the side of the prisoners and prison officials where 
some prisoners serving life sentence are due for release on parole. It is 
recommended that the Department of Correctional Services take the 
initiative to educate all prison warders about the relevant provisions of the 
Correctional Services Act, including all the subsequent amendments, so 
                                                            
1262 Section 124(1) provides that ‘[t]he Minister may in consultation with the Prisoner 
General, by statutory instrument, make regulations for the effective management and 
government of prisons and prisoners whether in or, about or beyond the limits of the 
prison, and generally for the better carrying out of the provisions and purposes of this Act.’ 
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that they know exactly when a prisoner who was sentenced under a 
different regime is eligible for parole. The Department of Correctional 
Services needs to simplify the provisions of the Correctional Services Act 
and to translate them into all nine official languages of the country. These 
would be published in pamphlet form and be distributed to all prisons so 
that prisoners may know when they are eligible for parole.  
Unlike in countries such as Germany where the prison officials are required 
‘to prepare the prisoner for early release’1263  South African, Mauritian and 
Ugandan prisoners have to prepare themselves for early release by 
participating in the rehabilitation programmes available in prisons. In these 
countries early release from prisonment is dependant on prisoners 
participating in rehabilitation programmes to the satisfaction of prison 
authorities. The problem here is that in some prisons in South Africa, for 
example, there are no rehabilitation programmes available for prisoners and 
some of the prisoners complete their sentences without having been given 
an opportunity at all to participate in rehabilitation programmes.1264 There 
have also been cases in South Africa where prisoners have not been 
released even where they have been fully rehabilitated, thus prompting 
them to go to court to order their release.1265 In Uganda, the government 
                                                            
1263 Dünkel and Rössner in van Zyl Smit and Dünkel (eds) 2001: 333. 
1264 The Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons established that ‘[i]n a survey conducted by the 
[Independent Prison Visitors], 60% of sentenced prisoners indicated that they are involved 
in rehabilitation programmes. However, these statistics were influenced by variables such 
as the sample selection and categories of prisoners interviewed. The actual number of 
sentenced prisoners involved in rehabilitation is probably lower. Without accurate 
information about the number of prisoners involved in formal rehabilitation programmes 
… the rate of rehabilitation cannot be calculated.’ Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Annual 
Report for the Period 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008, (April 2008):  40.  
1265 See generally, Sloth-Nielsen, ‘Parole Pandemonium’ Civil Society Prison Reform 
Initiative, Issue No.14 (2005) at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Civil-Society-
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does not allocate enough money to Uganda Prisons Services. This has 
resulted not only in prisoners almost starving and being naked,1266 but it has 
also led to rehabilitation programmes being provided by non-governmental 
organisations such as faith-based organisations.1267  
In Mauritius, the prison authorities provide different rehabilitation 
programmes in prisons. These include education, moral instruction, health 
service, vocational training and sports.1268 The Prison authorities ‘in close 
collaboration with the Trust Fund for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of 
Drug Addicts, the Probation Service, the Social Security Department and 
also the Employment Service have elaborated a part time Pre-Release 
Program for the benefit of the detainees’ which aims ‘to encourage 
detainees to retain links with their families and the community at large and 
preparing them for their gradual return to society in a variety of ways and 
this is, in a very significant manner, strengthening the role of this service in 
the community.’1269 Prisoners who participate in the scheme attend lectures 
which address different aspects of prison life.1270  As pointed out above, 
                                                                                                                                                     
Prison-Reform/newsletter/cspri-newsletter/archive-of-cspri-newsletter/newsletter-14.pdf 
(accessed 7 March 2009).  
1266 See Karugaba, ‘Police, Prisons Run Out of Food’ 4 December 2008, The New Vision, 
at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/662855 (accessed 10 March 2009).  
1267 Interview with Mr. Robert Omite, Commissioner Welfare and Rehabilitation 10 March 
2009 (who said that there are several faith-based organisations that provide rehabilitation 
programmes in prisons).  
1268 See ‘Activities’ at 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/prisons/menuitem.123d5e7025df95eef4a9e75b0bb521ca/?c
ontent_id=3f410e3e8ef68010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD (accessed 7 March 2009). 
1269 See ‘Projects: Pre-Release Scheme’ at 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/prisons/menuitem.c9a355ecf9be5d2ff4a9e75b0bb521ca/#5.
Pre-Release%20Scheme (accessed 7 March 2009). 
1270 These lectures are on: the rehabilitation of drug addicts; drug abuse; Aids; 
communicable and non-communicable diseases; human values; family life education; man 
and his environment; and employment and nutrition. See ‘Lectures’ at 
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rehabilitation is one of the conditions that the Supreme Court has 
highlighted as essential before the prisoner serving a penal servitude for life 
is released.1271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/prisons/menuitem.c9a355ecf9be5d2ff4a9e75b0bb521ca/#5.
Pre-Release%20Scheme (accessed 7 March 2009). 
1271 See generally 6.2.1 above. 
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CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier, each chapter has its own conclusion and 
recommendations and most of the recommendations made earlier will not 
be repeated here. However, the following general conclusions and 
observations merit attention.  
Chapter two of the study has dealt with the three major theories of 
punishment – retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. The author’s 
objective was not to point out which of the three objectives of punishment 
is more or should be more applicable to the sentence of life imprisonment. 
The author’s objective was rather to discuss in detail the strength(s) and 
weakness(es) of each of these theories of punishment and to demonstrate 
which of them has been emphasised by the international criminal tribunals 
and courts in the selected jurisdictions of Mauritius, Uganda and South 
Africa in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. It has been illustrated 
that both the international criminal tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR) and 
courts in Mauritius, Uganda and South Africa have emphasised deterrence 
and retribution in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. The difficult 
question that arises is how should a judicial balance be struck between the 
three main aims of punishment when considering the imposition of a life 
sentence?  Sentencing is inherently difficult as different factors come into 
play to influence the imposition of a lenient or heavy penalty. These factors 
could include the seriousness of the offence, the personal characteristics of 
the offender, and the manner in which the offence was committed. 
Naturally, the first point of reference should be the piece of legislation that 
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the judicial officer is interpreting or applying in imposing a life sentence. If 
the law requires the judicial officer to emphasise any of the above aims of 
punishment in imposing a life sentence, he has to option but to emphasise 
that objective of punishment. However, if the judicial officer has a wide 
discretion, whether deriving it from a piece of legislation or court practice, 
to determine which aim of punishment should be emphasised in imposing a 
life sentence, he should look at factors such as the seriousness of the 
offence or the manner in which it was committed in order to determine 
whether to impose a life sentence or not. However, caution should be 
exercised so that factors that were considered in convicting the offender of 
a particular crime are not the same factors that are relied on in imposing a 
severe sentence. This is a difficult balance to strike but an effort must be 
made to ensure that the offender is not prejudiced at sentencing.  
Chapter three has dealt with the sentence of life imprisonment before 
international criminal tribunals and has particularly illustrated the theories 
of punishment that these tribunals have emphasised in sentencing offenders 
to life imprisonment. The following conclusions have been drawn from the 
discussion of the jurisprudence or the relevant documents of the 
international tribunals with regard to life imprisonment: retribution and 
deterrence are emphasised more than any purpose of punishment; the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did not state the purpose the punishments 
they imposed were to serve; the Tribunals generally pay scant attention to 
the discussion of the objectives of punishment; the ICTR in some cases 
erroneously equates life imprisonment with imprisonment for the remainder 
of the offender’s life; and the ICC Statute approaches punishment in a 
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manner that is more  human rights friendly than the statutes of the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the SCSL. It is recommended that international tribunals 
should always engage in a robust discussion of the objectives/purposes of 
punishment at the sentencing stage so that the offenders and their counsel 
know whether the sentence imposed reflects the objectives that the Tribunal 
intends to achieve. 
The author has illustrated, inter alia, that the ICTR has drawn a distinction 
between the sentence of life imprisonment on the one hand and 
imprisonment for the remainder of the offenders’ life on the other. It has 
been argued that in the light of the human rights jurisprudence emanating 
from some African countries such as South Africa and Namibia, and from 
regional and international human rights bodies, such as, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights, and the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights 
Committee, emphasising the rights to human dignity and to freedom from 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the ICTR’s 
argument that an offender sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of 
his life will be imprisoned until his death is not persuasive. Offenders 
sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives should have a 
real and tangible prospect of being released otherwise they are likely to 
petition human rights bodies or courts in countries in which they are 
serving their sentences arguing that life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment.  
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In Chapter four the author has demonstrated that the sentence of life 
imprisonment has different meanings in different countries and that it has 
different meanings in Mauritius and South Africa. The author has also 
discussed the history and legal developments relating to life imprisonment 
in South Africa, Mauritius and Uganda. In South Africa, life imprisonment 
has been used since 1906 and has gone through different changes. Before 
the abolition of the death penalty in 1995, life imprisonment was a 
discretionary sentence in all circumstances and very few people were 
sentenced to life imprisonment. However, after the abolition of the death 
penalty, life imprisonment was made a minimum sentence for the most 
serious offences unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances 
for the court to justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. The number of 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment since it was introduced as 
minimum sentence has increased drastically. The author has illustrated, 
inter alia, that in Mauritius, as in South Africa, the number of offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment (penal servitude for life) increased after the 
abolition of the death penalty. 
It has been illustrated that the Constitutional Court of Uganda held that if 
the death penalty is to be abolished and replaced with life imprisonment, an 
offender sentenced to life imprisonment should be detained until death 
unless pardoned by the President. It is argued that abolishing the death 
penalty does not mean that life imprisonment as the ultimate sentence 
should mean imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life. In some 
African countries such as Rwanda, Namibia and South Africa where the 
death penalty was abolished, there are laws providing for the release of 
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offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. The following reasons have been 
given in support of the view that life imprisonment where the offender 
should be detained until his death as suggested by the Constitutional Court 
of Uganda is untenable. One, courts in South Africa, Namibia and German 
have held that life imprisonment where the offender does not have the 
possibility of being released is inhuman and degrading (with some judges 
of the European Court of Human Rights holding that an offender sentenced 
to life imprisonment should have a real and tangible prospect of being 
released and this prospect must be contained in legislation). Two, were the 
Ugandan law to be amended to provide that life imprisonment means 
‘whole-life’, it would mean that prisoners sentenced under the ‘whole-life’ 
idea would most probably not be rehabilitated because such prisoners 
would have no incentive in participating in rehabilitation programmes. 
Three, disciplining offenders serving ‘whole life’ would be a challenge to 
prison officials because any sentence of imprisonment imposed on such 
prisoners will run concurrently with the sentence they are already serving 
and in effect they would not have been punished for disobeying prison 
rules. Therefore, they would not be deterred from breaking prison rules 
because even other punishments like solitary confinement must be 
administered in accordance with the strict provisions of the Prisons Act. 
Four, ‘whole life’ life imprisonment has no support in international 
criminal law because, inter alia, the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
provide for mechanism for the release of offenders sentenced to 
imprisonment for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
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It should be emphasised here that the Constitutional Court of Uganda’s 
recommendation that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment should be 
detained until his death unless pardoned by the state president is a violation 
of Article 24 of Uganda’s Constitution which prohibits cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment. It is also a violation of Uganda’s 
regional and international obligations in the various human rights treaties it 
has ratified such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN 
Convention against Torture all of which specifically prohibit cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The same argument 
applies to other African countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana 
where life imprisonment means that the offender will be imprisoned for the 
rest of his life unless pardoned by the state president. A sentence, for 
example, of 50 years’ imprisonment which would in practice also result 
into the detention of the offender until death, like life imprisonment with 
only a possibility of executive pardon, also amounts to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment and should not be imposed and if 
imposed should be challenged either before national courts or before 
regional and international human rights bodies. 
Chapter five has discussed the offences that attract life imprisonment in 
Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda; the discretion of courts in imposing 
life sentences, and the theories of punishment which courts have 
emphasised in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. It has been 
illustrated that unlike in South Africa and Mauritius where life 
imprisonment is the minimum sentence in some circumstances, in Uganda a 
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judge is not obliged to sentence an offender to life imprisonment. It is 
recommended that in the event of the abolition of the death penalty, 
Uganda should not introduce life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence as 
this would be challenged in the Constitutional Court for violating the 
offenders’ right to a fair trial as they would not be able to plead in 
mitigation. A mandatory life imprisonment will also be challenged in the 
Constitutional Court for violating the constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers.  
The Ugandan Prisons Act, unlike the South African Correctional Services 
Act, does not provide for the maximum number of years that an offender 
sentenced to a specified number of years of imprisonment should serve 
before being released on parole. It is recommended that the Prisons Act 
needs to be amended to provide for the maximum number of years that a 
person serving any sentence, be it for 50 years, should serve, after which he 
should be considered for parole. Unlike the South Africa Correctional 
Services Act which specifically provides that two or more life sentences 
must run concurrently, the Ugandan Prisons Act is silent on the issue of 
whether two or more life sentences should run concurrently. It is 
recommended that, Parliament needs to amend the Prisons Act to provide 
specifically that more than one life sentence imposed on one person should 
run concurrently, and also that any sentence of imprisonment imposed on a 
prisoner serving a life sentence should run concurrently with the life 
sentence.  
In South Africa offences that attract life imprisonment can be categorised 
into two groups: One, where courts have wide discretion to decide whether 
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the offender should be sentenced to life imprisonment – cases where life is 
not the minimum sentence; and two, where life imprisonment is the 
minimum sentence unless there are substantial and compelling 
circumstances which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. Most of the 
offenders serving life imprisonment in South Africa were sentenced in 
terms of the minimum sentences legislation and many more are likely to be 
sentenced to life imprisonment since Regional Courts are now empowered 
to impose this sentence since December 2007. There is thus a need to 
investigate the likely effect of the extended jurisdiction of the Regional 
Courts to impose life sentences on the size of the South Africa prison 
population. It is more likely that the number of prisoners sentenced to life 
imprisonment will increase further when Regional Courts also impose life 
sentences. In this scenario the quality of legal representation of persons 
facing life imprisonment becomes critical. 
In Mauritius, there are cases under the Criminal Code, for example, killing 
others by explosives, where life imprisonment is mandatory and also cases 
where it is a minimum sentence. It is argued that the relevant provisions of 
the Criminal Code which oblige court to impose a life sentence on an 
offender convicted of the relevant offence or offences, violate the right to a 
fair trial and cannot pass the constitutionality test. It is recommended that 
there are two options to ensure that mandatory life imprisonment is 
removed from the Criminal Code: One, any person sentenced to life 
imprisonment under any of those provisions should challenge their 
constitutionality on the ground that they violate the rights to a fair trial and 
not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment. The second and 
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readily available option is for Parliament to amend the relevant provisions 
and make life imprisonment a discretionary sentence. In terms of the 2007 
amendments to the Criminal Code, an offender convicted of offences such 
as murder or homicide, has to be to be sentenced to penal servitude for life 
unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. Mauritian courts 
are encouraged to refer to South African jurisprudence as a persuasive 
interpretation tool in their attempt to define or enumerate what are 
substantial and compelling circumstances.  
The study has dealt with courts that have jurisdiction to impose life 
imprisonment in Uganda, Mauritius and South Africa. It has been 
demonstrated that life imprisonment in Uganda can only be imposed by the 
High Court, the Chief Magistrates’ Court, the Division Court Martial and 
the General Court Martial. In South Africa life imprisonment can be 
imposed by the High Court and the Regional Court. Although in both 
jurisdictions appellate courts can also increase any sentence to life 
imprisonment (the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Uganda and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa). In Mauritius it is only the 
Supreme Court that is empowered to impose a life sentence.   
The study has also dealt with the question of legal representation in 
Uganda, Mauritius and South Africa for accused faced with a life sentence 
on conviction. It has been illustrated that the difference between Uganda on 
the one hand and Mauritius and South Africa on the other hand, with 
respect to the right to legal representation for people accused of offences 
that carry life imprisonment, is that in Uganda that right is constitutionally 
protected irrespective of the accused’s ability to pay for his legal 
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representation whereas in Mauritius and South Africa it is dependant on 
amongst other factors, the accused’s inability to pay for his legal 
representation.  
Chapter five also examines the theories of punishment that courts in 
Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda have emphasised in sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment.  In all three jurisdictions, courts have 
emphasised deterrence over other theories or objectives of punishment. 
This is so notwithstanding the fact that these are three different legal 
systems in which the punishment of life imprisonment is approached from 
different angles. However, in South Africa, courts have gone to great length 
than in Uganda and Mauritius to explain why rehabilitation as an objective 
of punishment is not appropriate in cases of life imprisonment. The fact that 
courts in all the three jurisdictions are emphasising deterrence in sentencing 
offenders to life imprisonment is worrying in the light of the fact that the 
prisons authorities in these countries consider the rehabilitation of the 
offender as their major objectives. Another important feature to note about 
life imprisonment in these three countries is that in Uganda, most of the 
offenders serving life imprisonment were convicted of defilement whereas 
in South Africa the offenders were convicted for  rape and murder, and in 
Mauritius, drug trafficking. This shows that sentencing is not only 
influenced by the decision the judge makes but also by the statutory law 
itself. 
Chapter six discusses the law relating to the release of offenders sentenced 
to life imprisonment in Mauritius, Uganda and South Africa. In South 
Africa, the release of offenders serving life sentences is governed by three 
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different release procedures each depending on when the sentence was 
imposed. Those sentenced before and shortly after 1996 their release is 
governed by the Department of Correctional Services 1996 Release Policy 
which provides that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was to be 
considered for parole after serving at least 20 years of the sentence or, once 
he had reached the age of 65 years, after serving 15 years. Prisoners 
sentenced in 1997 and thereafter their release is governed by the 1997 
Parole and Correctional Supervision Amendment Act (PCSAA) which 
provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall not be released on 
parole before serving at least 25 years of the sentence. However, parole 
could be granted to a prisoner who reached the age of 65 years while 
serving his sentence on condition that such a prisoner had served at least 15 
years of his prison term. In practice, the first prisoner serving a life 
sentence whose parole is governed by the 1996 Release Policy will have to 
be considered for release in 2016 and the one whose parole is governed by 
the PCSAA will have to be considered for release in 2022. In 1998, the new 
Correctional Services Act was enacted but the provision relevant to the 
release only came into force in October 2004. Section 73(6)(b)(iv) provides 
that a prisoner serving a life sentence ‘may not be placed on parole until he 
or she has served at least 25 years of the sentence but a prisoner on 
reaching the age of 65 years may be placed on parole if he or she has 
served at least 15 years of such a sentence.’ 
 
In Uganda, in terms of the Prisons Act, an offender sentenced to life 
imprisonment is supposed to be released after serving a maximum of 20 
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years’ imprisonment and could also be released on parole without 
compeleting 20 years’ imprisonment.  Unlike in Uganda and South Africa 
where the prison laws specifically provide for the release of offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment, in Mauritius there is no such law. 
Offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life in Mauritius could be 
pardoned by the President using his prerogative of mercy under section 
75(1) of the Constitution on the recommendation of Commission on the 
Prerogative of Mercy, established under section 75(2) of the Constitution. 
The challenge with this approach is that prisoners do not know what is 
expected of them in order to be considered by the Commission as suitable 
for recommendation to the President for pardon or early release.  
 
The Supreme Court of Mauritius appears to have created a new window 
through which offenders sentenced to penal servitude for life will be 
released in the future. In the 12 January 2009 decision of De Boucherville 
Roger FP v The State of Mauritius the Supreme Court held that the 
following factors should be considered by the Court in determining whether 
or not an offender sentenced to penal servitude for life should be released: 
One, the Court will look at the nature and circumstances under which the 
offence for which the offender was sentenced to penal servitude for life was 
committed; two, the Court will ask the state to adduce evidence regarding 
the offender’s conduct during the period of imprisonment; three, the Court 
will evaluate evidence relating to the applicant’s age and whether he suffers 
from ill-health. Finally, before ordering the release of a prisoner, the Court 
will consider the manner in which the Mauritian population and the 
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potential criminals would react to the applicant’s early release. Therefore, 
in Mauritius, there are two ways through which an offender serving a penal 
servitude for life could be released. One, by applying to the Supreme Court 
for a reduction of sentence; and two, by applying to the Commission on the 
Prerogative of Mercy to recommend to the President that the applicant’s 
sentence be commuted. In Mauritius, although according to the Privy 
Council and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence offenders sentenced to life 
imprisonment have the possibility of being released, there is no piece of 
legislation expressly providing for the mechanism that has to be followed. 
It is recommended that there is a need for Mauritius to amend its prisons 
laws to specifically provide for the release of offenders serving life 
imprisonment. 
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Appendix 1 – Full list of reference to Chart 1 
 
In 1949, 60 offenders were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprisonment; in 1950, 
77 offenders were sentenced to death and 4 to life imprisonment; in 1951, 73 
offenders were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprisonment; in 1952, 77 
offenders were sentenced to death and 1 to life imprisonment; in 1953, 75 
offenders were sentenced to death and 1 to life imprisonment; in 1954, 115 
offenders were sentenced to death and 1 to life imprisonment; 1955-56, 94 
offenders were sentenced to death and 19 to life imprisonment; 1956-57, 123 
offenders were sentenced to death and 34 to life imprisonment; in 1957-58, 128 
offenders were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprisonment; 1958-59, 105 
offenders were sentenced to death and 16 to life imprisonment; in 1959 -60, 134 
offenders were sentenced to death and 23 to life imprisonment; 1960 -61, 108 
offenders were sentenced to death and 23 to life imprisonment; 1961-62, 177 
offenders were sentenced to death and 20 to life imprisonment; in 1962-63, 149 
offenders were sentenced to death and 21 to life imprisonment. See Special Report 
No. 272, Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1949-1962 (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1964) Table 10 – Convicted Prisoners Admitted According to Nature of 
Sentence, 1949-1963. In 1963-64, 157 offenders were sentenced to death and 48 to 
life imprisonment; in 1964-65, 124 offenders were sentenced to death and 21 to 
life imprisonment; 1965 -66, 138 offenders were sentenced to death and 5 to life 
imprisonment; 1966-67, 143 offenders were sentenced to death and 5 to life 
imprisonment; 1967-68, 115 offenders were sentenced to death and 34 to life 
imprisonment; in 1968 -69, 107 offenders were sentenced to death 13; in 1969-70, 
95 offenders were sentenced to death and 19 to life imprisonment. For the 
respective years, see Statistics of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1963-64, Report 
No. 08-01-01 (Table 10); 1965-66, Report No. 08-01-02 ( Table 15); 1965-66, 
Report No. 08-01-02 (Table 15); 1966-67, Report No. 08-01-03 (Table 16); 1967-
68, Report No. 08-01-04 (Table 14); 1968-69, Report No. 08-01-05 (Table 16); 
and 1969-70, Report No. 08-01-06 (Table 16). All the Reports were printed by the 
Government Printer, Pretoria. In the year 1977-78, 151 offenders were sentenced 
to death and 17 to life imprisonment; in 1978-79, 158 offenders were sentenced to 
death and 12 to life imprisonment; 1979-80, 151 offenders were sentenced to 
death and 2 to life imprisonment; 1980-81, 148 offenders were sentenced to death 
and 8 to life imprisonment; 1981-82, 124 offenders were sentenced to death and 7 
to life imprisonment; 1982-83, 171 offenders were sentenced to death and 4 to life 
imprisonment; 1985-85, 203 offenders were sentenced to death and 4 to life 
imprisonment; 1985-86, 126 offenders were sentenced to death and 4 to life 
imprisonment; 1986-87, 226 offenders were sentenced to death and 6 to life 
imprisonment. See Statistics of Offences 1968-1969 to 1978-1979, Report No. 08-
01-10 (Table 5.1); 1968-1969 to 1978-1979, Report No. 08-01-10 (Table 5.5); 
1979-1980, Report No. 08-01-11 (Table 5); 1980-81, Report No. 08-01-12 (Table 
5); 1981-1982, Report No. 08-01-13 (Table 5); 1982-1983, Report No. 08-01-14 
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(Table 5); 1984-1985, Report No. 08-01-16 (Table 5); 1985-1986, Report No. 08-
01-17 (Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1986/87) (Table 5) respectively. All the 
reports from 1977- 1986, were printed by the Government Printer, Pretoria. 
However, that of 1986/87 was printed by the Central Statistics Services. In 1987-
88, 204 offenders were sentenced to death and 12 to life imprisonment; 1988-89, 
154 offenders were sentenced to death and 6 to life imprisonment; 1989-90, 123 
offenders were sentenced to death and 9 to life imprisonment; 1990-91, 64 
offenders were sentenced to death and 28 to life imprisonment; 1991-92, 65 
offenders were sentenced to death and 28 to life imprisonment; 1992-93, 80 
offenders were sentenced to death and 18 to life imprisonment; 1993-94, 149 
offenders were sentenced to death and 15 to life imprisonment; 1994-95, 35 
offenders were sentenced to death and 49 to life imprisonment; and 1995-96 no 
offender was sentenced to death but 122 were sentenced to life imprisonment. See 
Crimes: Prosecutions and Convictions with Regard to Certain Offences, Report 
No. 00-11-01 (1987/88) (Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1988/89) (Table 5); 
Report No. 00-11-01 (1989/90) (Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1990/91) (Table 
No.5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1991/92) (Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1992/93) 
(Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 (1993/94) (Table 5); Report No. 00-11-01 
(1994/95) (Table 5); and Report No. 00-11-01 (1995/96) (Table 5) respectively). 
All the reports from 1987-1995 were printed by the Central Statistical Services.  
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Appendix 2: Offences under Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the MSL  
 
Murder 
 
When 
 
(a) it was planned or premeditated; 
(b) the victim was— (i) a law enforcement officer performing his 
or her functions as such whether on duty or not; or (ii) a person 
who has given or was likely to give material evidence with 
reference to any offence referred to in Schedule 1 to the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977)1272 at 
criminal proceedings in any court; 
(c)  the death of the victim was caused by the accused in 
committing or attempting to commit or after having committed 
or attempted to commit one of the following offences: 
(i) Rape: or 
(ii) Robbery with aggravating circumstances: or  
(d) The offence was committed by a person or group of persons or 
syndicate acting in the execution or furtherance of a common 
purpose or conspiracy. 
 
 
Rape  
 
(a) when committed— 
(i) in circumstances where the victim was raped more than 
once whether by the accused or by any co-perpetrator 
or accomplice;  
(ii) by more than one person where such persons acted in 
the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or 
conspiracy; 
(iii) by a person who has been convicted of two or more 
offences of rape, but has not yet been sentenced in 
respect of such convictions: or  
(iv) by a person. knowing that he has the acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome or the human immune deficiency 
virus: 
 
(b) where the victim— 
 
(i) is a girl under the age of 16 years;  
(ii) is a physically disabled woman who, due to her physical 
disability, is rendered particularly vulnerable: or 
(iii)  is a mentally ill woman as contemplated in section 1 of the 
Mental Health Act 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973): or  
(c) Involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm. 
                                                            
1272 There offences are: treason, sedition, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent 
assault, sodomy, bestiality, robbery, kidnapping, child stealing, assault when dangerous 
wounds inflicted, arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any property 
with intent to commit an offence, theft, receiving stolen property, fraud, forgery or uttering 
a forged document knowing it to have been forged, any offence punishable with the period 
of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of fine, offences relating to the 
coinage, escaping from lawful custody, any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit 
any of the offences mentioned above.     
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